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ABSTRACT 
"COVERING THE BODY": 
THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION 
AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOURNALISTIC AUTHORITY 
Barbie Zelizer 
Pro£essor Larry Gross (Chairperson) 
This study explores the narrative reconstruction by. 
journalists o£ the story o£ John F. Kennedy's 
assassination. It examines how American journalists have 
turned their retellings o£ assassination coverage into 
stories about themselves, promoting themselves as the 
event~s authorized spokespeople. At heart o£ their 
attempts to do so are issues o£ rhetorical legitimation, 
narrative adjustment and collective memory, all o£ which 
underscore how journalists establish themselves as an 
authoritative interpretive community. 
The study is based on systematic examination o£ the 
narratives by which journalists have told the 
assassination story over the 27 years since Kennedy died. 
Narratives were taken £roffi public published discourse 
which appeared between 1963 and 1990 in the printed press, 
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documentary films, television retrospectives, trade press 
and professional reviews. 
The study £ound that journalists' authority £or the 
event was rarely grounded in practice, for covering 
Kennedy's death was £raught with problems £or journalists 
seeking to legitimate themselves as pro£essionals. Rather, 
their authol'i ty was grounde"d in rhetoric, in the 
narratives by which journalists have recast their coverage 
as pro£essional triumph and given themselves a central 
role as the assassination Btory~e authorized retellers. 
Their narratives have allowed them to recast instinctual 
and improvisory dimensions o£ practice as the mark o£ a 
true pro£essional, while attending to larger agendas about 
journalistic professionalism, shi£ting boundaries o£ 
cultural authority and the legitimation o£ television 
All o£ this has made the Kennedy assassination a 
critical incident £or American journalists, through which 
they have negotiated the haws and whys o£ journalistic 
prac'tice, authority and community. 
This study thereby showed that journalists practice 
l'hetorical legitimation in a circular £ashion, circulating 
their narratives circulated in systematic and strategic 
ways across medium and news organization. Journalists use 
v 
discourse about events to address what they see aa issues 
central to their legitimation and consolidation as a 
pro£essional interpretive community. This suggests that 
the function of journalistic discourse is not only to 
relay news but to help journalists promote themselves as 
cultural authorities for events of the "real world." 
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INTRODUCTION 
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
NARRATIVE, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND JOURNALISTIC AUTHORITY 
Common sense is quite wrong in thinking that the 
past is fixed, immutable, invariable, as against 
the ever-changing flux of the present. On the 
contrary, at least within our own consciousness, 
the past is malleable and flexible, constantly 
changing as our recollection reinterprets and 
reexplains what has happened ; 
The ability of journalists to promote themselves as 
authoritative and credible spokespeople for events of the 
world" has long been an unspoken given in 
journalistic practice. From discussions about Watergate to 
recollections of the Hindenburg Affair, the world of 
journalism is cluttered with activities that should 
generate questions about journalists' right to position 
and perpetuate themselves as spokespeople for events. Yet 
audiences - and analysts - have insufficiently considered 
what makes journalists better equipped than others to 
offer a "preferred" version of events, particularly those 
events situated beyond the grasp of everyday life. Both 
have similarly avoided asking how journalists ascribe to 
themselves such a power of interpretation, or how it 
carries them from one news event to another. In short, the 
boundaries of journalists' cultural authority have 
remained largely unexplored simply because few people have 
bothered to ask questions about them. 
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This study of the cultural authority of journalists 
aims to address such an oversight. It examines how 
journalists have established themselves as authorized 
spokespeople of the events of the "real world." It does so 
by examining the establishment and perpetuation of 
journalists as authorized spokespeople for one event - the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy. Through the narratives 
by which journalists have recounted their coverage of the 
event over the past twenty-seven years, it explores how 
journalists have made the assassination story as much into 
a story about American journalists as about America's 34th 
President. In so doing, they have strategically shaped 
their position as cultural authorities for telling the 
events of the "real world." 
Positioning certain groups or individuals as cultural 
authorities has long been a problem of contemporary life, 
particularly in a m~diated age. Ongoing debates about 
acceptable notions of expertise, domination and power have 
occupied individuals in all aspects of everyday life. 
Which particular set of qualities invests one group, or 
one individual, with more authority than another has 
generated extensive discourse about the workings by which 
authority is seen as being most effectively realized. 
4 
For groups involved in public discourse, questions o£ 
authority are reduced to how speakers promote 
authoritative versions o£ real-li£e events through the 
stories they tell. Investing speakers with authority takes 
place through the e££ective circulation o£ codes o£ 
knowledge among members o£ the groups to which they 
belong. This recalls Durkheim's notion o£ collective 
representations, which suggests that groups structure 
through representation collective ways o£ understanding 
the world around them· It suggests that notions o£ 
authority, like other collective representations~ are 
arrived at by members o£ groups who give them meaning. 
Knowledge about cultural authority is assumed here to 
work in non-linear ways. Through circular interaction, 
knowledge is e££ectively circulated and recirculated. 
According to Anthony Giddens, 
the structural properties o£ social systems are 
both the medium and the outcome o£ the practices 
that constitute those systems 3. 
The suggestion that social actors react to others at the 
same time as they are being reacted to means that 
knowledge about authority is codi£ied, then £ed back to 
its codi£iers, who codi£y it yet again. 
Cultural authority is thus posited as a goal in need 
o£ strategic accomplishment. Members o£ all sorts o£ 
groups codi£y knowledge so as to generate solidarity - and 
5 
hence control- over other members. Codifying knowledge 
helps individuals act in collective, and hence, 
controllable, ways, making the perpetuation of collectives 
more feasible. At the same time, the successful 
codification of knowledge produces authorities who are 
better versed in its particulars. This has generated broad 
questions over who constitutes a cultural authority, or 
how one establishes and perpetuates oneself as an 
authority. 
The workings of cultural authority become 
particularly interesting when realized through the form of 
collective memory. Collective memory offers cultural 
arbiters a speci£ic dimension on which to exercise the 
full spread of their power across time and space. It is, 
in G.H. Mead's view, a way of using the past to give 
meaning to the present ~t· Using memory as an "instrument 
of reconfiguration" rather than retrieval has been most 
effectively discussed in the work of Maurice Halbwachs 5. 
In Halbwach's view, collective memory constitutes memories 
of a shared past by those who experience it. Collective 
memories are envisaged from the viewpoint of the group, 
whose conscious and strategic efforts have kept it alive 
~.:;. Remembering, and forgetting, helps groups and 
institutions --locate in memory an earlier version o£ 8e1£ 
with which to measure the current version" '7. Collective 
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mer.ory re£lects a group's codi£ied knowledge over time 
about what is important, pre£erred and appropriate. 
Relevant to this discussion is the notion o£ critical 
incidents, by which members o£ groups and institutions 
locate certain events in collective memory in a way that 
helps them reinterpret collective nations o£ practice. 
Critical incidents are what Claude Levi-Strauss once 
called "hot moments~"' those moments or events through 
which a society or culture assesses its significance 1<3 
They provide moments in discourse by which members o£ 
groups are able to negotiate their own boundaries o£ 
practice, through discussion and cultural argumentation 9 
These ideas bear particular relevance £or an 
examination o£ journalistic authority, the speci£ic case 
o£ cultural authority by which journalists determine their 
right to present authoritative versions o£ the world 
through stories o£ real-li£e events. Journalists have long 
had access to varied situations technological, 
through which they narrative, institutional and others-
have e££ectively perpetuated their memories o£ critical 
incidents. Their ability to shape memories in accordance 
with what they see as pre£erred and strategically 
important 
positions 
journalists' 
has directly 
o£ cultural 
a££ected their assumption o£ 
authority. In other words, 
memories o£ certain strategic events have 
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long been fashioned in accordance with collective aims of 
establishing themselves as an independent interpretive 
cornmunity~ although this is one aspect of journalistic 
practice that has rarely been examined. 
Notions of authority have long figured among 
journalists as a key to their efficient production and 
presentation of news. Much journalistic practice has been 
seen as a type of ··undercover work," where journalists 
have presented events through explanatory frames that 
construct reality but reveal neither the secrets, sources 
nor methods of such a process Journalism has 
traditionally displayed only partial pictures of real-life 
events to audiences, and journalists have rarely made 
explicit the authority they use to change "quasi" or 
partial accounts into complete chronicles of events. At 
the aame time, journalists' mode o£ event selection, 
formation and presentation ultimately hinges on how they 
justify their decisions to construct the news in one way 
and not another, bringing some notion of authority 
directly into the daily accomplishment of journalistic 
work. Acting appropriately lias journalists" thus depends 
on a reporter's ability to change codified knowledge in 
consensual ways. Collective memory, as the vessel of 
codified knowledge across time and space, reflects a 
8 
reshaping o:f the parameters o:f appropriate practice 
through which journalists construct themselves as cultural 
authorities. 
Journalistic authority helps explain journalistic 
practice in two ways: One has to do with the stature o:f 
journalism as a pro:fession; the other is the notion that 
authority is basically an act o£ transmission. 
,:J:g U R.M.~I"I§-'IJ9. ... ___ (;;OM M1!!'!TIY .;_._. FR0l1 
JNJ:§:BYB£:.TJYIL9Jd.!i!'!1I..!LI T '[ 
Journalists have been generally organized into 
communities with requisite bodies o:f codi:fied knowledge 
via the notion o£ '·professions l • ~~. Professions have been 
de£ined as an ideological orientation toward the 
production o£ work, realized via certain combinations of 
skill, autonomy, training and education, testing o:f 
competence,. organization, codes of conduct,. licensing and 
service orientation :lo:=: Taken together, these traits 
generate a shared notion o£ community £or the individuals 
who comprise such communities. 
Standardized codes o£ knowledge play a large part in 
maintaining and perpetuating traits o£ pro£essionalism, at 
the same time as they help pro£essionals to maintain 
themselves as communities 13 Everett Hughes' much-cited 
reformulation of Ilia this occupation a profession ll into 
"what are the circumstances in which people in an 
occupation attempt to turn it into a pro£ession and 
themselves into pro£essional people" signalled such a 
concern '4. Via standardized codes o£ knowledge, Hughes 
suggested, "profession" was turned into a symbolic label 
£or a desired shared status o£ actors .m. 
Examining journalism as a pro£ession, 
yielded 
de£ined" 
an unclear picture. 
professions o£ 
Unlike the 
medicine or 
however, has 
"classically-
law, where 
pro£essionals legitimate their actions via socially-
recognized paths o£ training, education or licensing, the 
trappings o£ pro£essionalism have not been required £or 
journalists to practice in the pro£ession: Journalists 
there£ore do not readily attend journalism schools and 
training programs or read journalism textbooks IS. Codes 
o£ journalistic behavior are not written down, with 
training considered instead a "combination o£ osmosis and 
fiat .. j. '7 Journalistic codes o£ ethics remain largely non-
existent,. and most journalists routinely reject licensing 
procedures 
pro£essional 
association 
Journalists are also unattracted to 
associations,. with the largest pro£essional 
- the Society o£ Pro£essional Journalists, 
Sigma Delta Chi - claiming only 17% membership o£ American 
journalists ''''. 
Journalists thereby act as members o£ a pro£essional 
collective in only a limited sense. Their rejection o£ 
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training and prescribed codes o£ conduct, licensing and 
professional organizations, or cades o£ ethics suggests 
that the IIpro£ession" o£ journalism has not sufficiently 
addressed the needs o£ its journalist members. As one 
researcher suggested, "the modern journalist 
profession but not .!.!l one ... the institutional 
is Q_i. a 
£orms of 
professionalism likely will always elude the journalist" 
Two features o£ journalism have been most affected 
through a near-exclusive understanding o£ journalists as 
"professional" communities. One has been the emergent view 
o£ journalists as "unsuccess:ful professionals": In this 
light, journalistic professionalism is faulted for 
promoting IItrained incapacity" News professionalism 
is Been as emerging from specific methoq~ o£ work 
(particularly, identifying and verifying facts) rather 
than answering to a combination of (supposedly laudatory) 
predetermined traits or condi tiona 8:1",~ This perhaps 
explains why contemporary journalists have continued to 
cling to the notion of a fully-describable "objective" 
world, despite the increasing popularity of philosophical 
and sociological views to the contrary 
Another feature affected by the emphasis on 
professionalism are those traits of journalism not found 
in other occupations and therefore not part of more 
11 
general perspectives on professionalism: Most obvious here 
are the generic and stylistic considerations of news 
narrative .. IIHow to tell a news-story," distinctions 
between fact and fiction. general stylistic determinants 
and speci£ic conventions o£ the news genre all have 
occupied journalists for decades yet are present in few 
discussions o£ journalistic professionalism 
This suggests that existing models of professions 
have offered a basically restrictive way of viewing 
journalistic practice, journalistic "'pro£essionalism," 
journalistic communities and collective lore, and, hence, 
journalistic authority. The organization of journalists 
into professional collectives has not provided a complete 
picture of how and why journalism works. This does not 
mean that the collectivity represented by professionalism 
does. not exist among journalists. It does suggest, 
however. that it may be generated by notions other than 
those offered by formalized codes of professionalism. 
Viewing 
interpretive 
journalists as 
community suggests 
an informally-coalesced 
an alternate way of 
examining their collectivity. Sociological studies of news 
organizations have long maintained that journalists' high 
degree of specialization and expertise has prompted the 
replacement 
management. 
of vertical management with horizontal 
thereby substituting collegial authority for 
12 
hierarchial authority Journalists absorb rules, 
boundaries and a sense of appropriateness about their 
actions without ever actually being informed of them by 
superiorsu This generally laissez-£aire environment, 
called by Tunstall a "non-routine bureaucracy," has 
generated a certain degree o£ "creative autonomy" £or and 
among journalists It is against the background of such 
creative autonomy that a sense of journalistic community 
emerges. Within these boundaries, cultural discussion 
takes place, with journalists accomplishing work by 
negotiating, discussing and challenging other journalists, 
This suggests the existence of a shared collective or 
institutional frame which both exists beyond specific news 
organizations and upon which journalists rely when 
engaging in cultural discussion and argumentation, 
All of this highlights the relevance of examining 
journalists as an interpretive community. An interpretive 
community is defined by Hymes as a group called a 
IIspeech community" that is united by its shared 
interpretations of reality ~7. Fish furthers the notion by 
claiming that interpretive communities are those who 
produce texts and "determine the shape of what is read" 
Scholarship in anthropology, folklore and 
studies holds that interpretive communities 
literary 
display 
13 
certain patterns of authority, communication and memory in 
their dealings with each other a point exemplified by 
journalis.ts' regular references to stories about Walter 
Cronkite or Watergate in their discussions of appropriate 
journalism. The idea that journalists constitute an 
interpretive community, a group that authenticates itself 
through interpretations furthered by its narratives and 
rhetoric, suggests that they circulate knowledge amongst 
themselves through channels other than the textbooks, 
training coun'!.e", and credentialling procedures stressed by 
formalized codes of professionalism, and that they have 
ways of collectively legitimating their actions that have 
little to do with the pro£ession's formalized 
accoutrements. This does not mean that other professional 
communities, such as doctors or lawyers, do not do the 
same .. Nor does it mean that the journalistic community is 
not concerned with professionalism, only that it activates 
its concern through its discourse about itself, 
collective memories on which it is based. 
and the 
Such an idea directs the analytical focus of 
journalists toward alternate attributes of community 
such as the individual, organization and institution, or 
structure of the profession - all of which may provide 
different motivations far establishing journalistic 
authority than those implied by discussions of different 
14 
journalistic tasks and routines .. It suggests that 
commonplace discourse about distinctions between reporters 
such as those differentiating beat reporters from 
generalists,. columnists £rom copy-writers, anchorpersons 
from health correspondents - may figure less centrally in 
journalistic discourse than motivations concerning the 
individual, organization and institution, and structure o£ 
the profession. In other words, professional literature 
may have done little to elucidate the role discourse plays 
in unifying journalists into an interpretive community. 
This study thus examines the journalistic community 
not only as a pro£ession, as suggested by sociology, but 
as an interpretive community, as suggested by literary 
studies, 
explores 
knowledge, 
discursive 
folklore and anthropology. Such a consideration 
the narrative relay of collective codes of 
as they exist in both tacit and explicit 
forms substituting commonly-regarded 
distinctions between journalists with dimensions assumed 
to figure into the workings of journalism as an 
interpretive community individual dimensions, 
organizational/institutional dimensions, and 
professional/structural dimensions, each of which will be 
shown to interact in journalists' promotion of themselves 
as an interpretive community. Through shared narrative 
lore, reporters espouse collective values and notions that 
15 
help them produce and present news. This suggests that 
journalists £unction together as much as apart, presumably 
guided by certain notions that are suggested in their 
nal."'rati vee .. 
questions 
This study 
about how 
thereby raises a number o£ 
journalists use narrative to 
legitimate their right as a community to preaent the news. 
How are such narratives perpetuated? What role, i£ any, 
does authority play in the construction and perpetuation 
o£ certain narratives over others? How do journalists 
arrive at seemingly "collective" ways of legitimating 
their actions and shared assumptions about their 
authority? How do narratives change over time and space? 
What role does memory play in generating a body o£ 
collective knowledge? Approaching the journalistic 
community as an interpretive community thus attends to the 
establishment o£ authority through narrative. 
A second reason that a consideration o£ journalistic 
authority enhances understanding of journalistic practice 
has to do with conceptions o£ authority already in the 
field. Media researchers have not provided a complete 
picture o£ the relevance o£ journalistic authority £or 
journalists. For roughly the past decade, they have relied 
Upon notions of linearity, e££ect and in£luence in 
conceptualizing relevant angles o£ "journalistic 
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authority." Authority has been conceptualized in three 
basic ways - as an e££ect on audiences~ an effect on 
organizational actors, or an e££ect on wide-ranging socio-
cultural systems. 
Studies 
journalistic 
of political 
authority as 
journalists 
effects have conceptualized 
a one-on-one correllation 
and IIwhat audiences between 
believe" ~'. This focus adopts a linear perspective as a 
frame for the entire communication process, with 
journalistic authority- or "credibility" - seen as a 
function of the believability it induces in audiences. 
Journalistic authority is evaluated in accordance with the 
proportional slice of audiences that appraise a news-story 
(and, by implication, a journalist or medium) as 
believable. Authority is thus ultimately reduced to the 
tangible effect it is seen as having on audiences. As 
Weaver and Rimmer maintain, they are interested in seeing 
"how credible (trustworthy, unbiased, complete, accurate) 
newspapers and television news were perceived (by 
audiences) to bel' 3~~ 
A second group of studies, tentatively labelled here 
"organizational studies," has regarded journalistic 
authority as a set of strategies by which actors jockey 
for power within the news organization Journalistic 
authority is seen here as the power by which journalists 
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co-exist as organizational actors. These studies have 
focused on organizational strategies which allow 
journalists to generate authority as organizational 
actors. Derived from Warren Breed's classic study of 
social control in the newsroom they hold that 
journalists are engaged in strategic behavior to gain 
influence over others. Strategies by which this occurs 
include time management~ imposing predictable frames for 
organizing resources, mitigating interpersonal conflict, 
routinization and purposive behavior 35. 
Yet a third body of studies has applied a linear 
£rame to larger socio-cultural configurations 
Journalistic authority is seen here as a social 
construction reflecting larger socio-cultural questions of 
power and domination .. IIAuthority" is taken as a marker £or 
some socio-economic or political power which determines 
how news is constructed. Gallagher, for example, contends 
that media performances are determined by media ownership 
':;')'7 Other studies have £ocused on how external issues o£ 
power and domination are co-opted within news discourse 
Each of these three conceptions thereby reflects a 
basically linear view o£ the communication processs By 
examining how authority is effected on others, they echo 
What has been called a IItransmission" view of 
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communication, tithe extension o£ messages across geography 
for the purpose of control, .~.and in£luence ll :::~9. While 
IInon-transmission ll dimensions undoubtedly figure within 
such conceptions, they nonetheless subordinate all 
considerations of authority to a consideration of its 
effect on others .. This has tailored explorations of 
journalistic authority to notions of influence, ignoring 
its possible internally-directed effects on those who make 
messages, the communicators. 
Yet an alternate view of authority is offered by 
folklore and anthropology, where authority is viewed 
primarily as an act of ritual that binds members of 
communities together in strategic ways. Victor Turner 
views rituals as moments in space and time where groups 
are solidified by questioning authority Roger Abrahams 
regards cultural performances of all sorts as a means o£ 
internal group authentication 41. James Carey maintains 
that the ritual view o£ cornmunication is lithe sacred 
ceremony which draws persons together in fellowship and 
commonality •.• through sharing, participation, association, 
fellowship and the possession of a common faith" 
Ritual sets up periods of marked intensification and gives 
members of a community a way to question and ratify basic 
notions about authority. In this view, authority is seen 
as a construct of community, functioning as the stuff that 
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keeps communities together. This allows observers to ask 
how authority creates a sense of community among the 
communicators who employ it. All of this has particular 
relevance for journalists, for it addresses previously-
unanswered questions about how journalists uae 
credibility, power or authority for themselves, regardless 
o£ its connection with audiences, organizational set-ups 
or larger socia-cultural questions of power. 
I have suggested two points that are basic to an 
alternate view of the establishment and perpetuation of 
journalistic authority. Briefly restated, they argue: 
1) Existing studies on" journalistic authority" have 
conceptualized it as .. transmission II among audiences rather 
than uritual" among communicators .. 
overlooked aspects of establishing 
They have 
authority 
thus 
which 
generate a collective journalistic lore in legitimating 
amongst journalists their right to present the news. 
2) A collective lore is created through codified 
knoldedge, yet codified knowledge among journalists has 
been assumed to emerge via channels connected with 
formalized codes of professionalism. How journalists 
codify institutional knowledge about authority through 
discourse may thus have been overlooked. One potentially 
fruitful way of re-examining journalists is through their 
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£unction as an interpretive community, a group that 
collectively authenticates itsel£ 
and collective memories. 
through its narratives 
This study examines journalistic authority along both 
o£ these newly-£ormulated lines: It assumes that messages 
about journalistic authority £unction to keep the 
journalistic community together, used by reporters as a 
ritual act o£ solidarity and commonality; it also assumes 
that journalists £unction as an interpretive community, 
keeping itsel£ together through its 
collective memories. This study thereby 
narratives and 
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Within this question are embedded three sets o£ 
secondary issues that are relevant both to understanding 
the establishment o£ journalistic authority and its 
potential role in consolidating a collective lor'e £or 
journalists: 
Tentatively 
de£ining journalistic authority 
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it asks whether journalistic authority is established 
through narrative; 
- H 0~ __ :l",_.j9.!!E!l?.li_'" t i_,,-~ u th 0Ltl;,Y_-.P.§:rP_§:f::._1,l_ .. :f::.",q? 
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whether shared notions of authority differ from individual 
notions. It also asks whether notions change with the 
passage of time, and, if so, how; whether journalistic 
authority helps journalists accomplish journalistic work; 
whether journalistic authority plays a part in 
consolidating a collective lore for journalists; and what 
role memory plays in establishing and perpetuating 
journalistic authority. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy provides one 
fruitful locus for considering all of the above-formulated 
questions. The Kennedy assassination brings together the 
threads on which this study is based: It constitutes a 
critical incident in the annals of American journalism p 
offering an effective stage on which to gauge the 
establishment and perpetuation of journalistic authority; 
it offers a way to examine journalists as an interpretive 
community engaged in ritual and/or cultural transactions 
with other journalists; and its persistence as a story 
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over time highlights the importance o£ narrative and 
memory .. 
IH)L_"'_~~A~§JJ\IA:LLQN_i!_~ __ 9J:!nI9A!"_J N~J:.pgN.I. 
The assassination provides a turning point in the 
evolution o£ American journalistic practice not only 
because it called for the rapid relay of information 
during a time of crisis p 
emergence o£ televised 
but because it consolidated the 
journalism as a mediator o£ 
national public experience ''''. The immediate demand £or 
journalistic 
characterized 
expertise and eyewitness testimony which 
this event in part called £or public 
reliance upon the credibility and centrality o£ 
journalists £or its clari£ication. Journalists not only 
used recognizable practices to cover the events o£ 
Kennedy's death, but improvised within the con£iguration 
o£ di££erent circumstances and new technologies to meet 
ongoing demands £or in£ormation. Journalists have since 
used the event to discuss collective visions about 
appropriate journalistic practice by re£erencing practices 
which they or other journalists adopted during those four 
November days 44. 
All o£ this suggests that the Kennedy assassination 
has £unctioned as a critical incident against which 
journalists negotiate their own pro£essional boundaries. 
They have used it to discuss, challenge and negotiate the 
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boundaries of appropriate practice. This wide-ranging 
cultural argumentation has been made possible by the 
journalistic treatment accorded it 4m. This has made the 
Kennedy assassination a particularly fruitful locus for 
narratives about journalistic practice and authority. The 
following pages thereby explore how journalists have 
reconstructed their coverage of the Kennedy assassination 
over time, with an eye to examining how it has emerged as 
critical to journalists forming collective notions of 
community, practice and authority through discourse. 
The assassination story has been perpetuated as an 
independent and finite tale within collective memory. 
Central to retellings of the events of Kennedy's death 
were pictorial repetitions of the images of that weekend. 
Images included the shootings of Kennedy and Oswald. 
Caroline Kennedy and her mother kneeling beside the 
coffin, John-John's respectful salute, the eternal flame 
and the riderless horse. These moments - captured by the 
media in various £orms have been replayed as markers of 
the nation's collective memory each time the story of 
Kennedy's death is recounted. 
Narrative has brought these images together in 
meaningful ways, lending them unity, and temporal and 
spatial sequencing. Narratives which persisted bear 
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collective authority Equally important, they lend 
stature to the people who inscribed them in collective 
consciousness. 
Collective remembering of the Kennedy assassination 
has thus been more actor-based than not, accomodating not 
only assassination memories, but the people who generated 
and in certain cases created them. As Ulric Neisser 
observed in his critique of theories about 'flashbulb 
memories": 
Memories become flashbulbs primarily through the 
significance that is attached to them 
afterwards: Later that day, the next day, and in 
subsequent months and years. What requires 
explanation is the long endurance (of the 
memory) ..e"O? 
Implicit within assassination memories has thus evolved a 
natural place for journalists as bearers o£ such 
recollections. To an extent this has fit in with a more 
general concern for the past, which has become "a 
persistent presence in the American mind"' 48 Yet more 
important, it has evolved into a strategic accomplishment 
on the part of American journalists as memory-bearers. 
It makes sense to again recall the afore-mentioned 
claim that communication activities always have ritual 
functions for groups engaging in them. The assassination 
of John F. Kennedy has traditionally been approached as 
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what might be considered a study in transmission. Scholars 
have considered how many people knew what, how long it 
took them to know it, and who they knew it £rom. This was 
thoroughly accomplished in a collection o£ research 
studies edited by Bradley Greenberg and Edwin Parker back 
in It has also been the perspective adopted by 
other scholarly treatments o£ the assassination coverage 
But this overlooks what Turner, Carey and others 
would call the "ritual" dimensions o£ the assassination 
story, examining what its relay has meant to the 
journalistic community itsel£. This study thus explores 
what the assassination has meant to the journalists who 
covered it, and how they have used narratives about their 
coverage to consolidate themselves into an authoritative 
interpretive community. In short, it explores how coverage 
o£ the events o£ Kennedy's death has helped make American 
journalists into cultural authorities. 
In so doing, this study stresses issues and practices 
o£ narrative, context and memory. It traces how 
journalists have treated the assassination story in 
narrative, and explores the ways they have turned it on 
angles critical to their own sel£-legitimation. Recalling 
Giddens, Durkheim and Halbwachs, it examines how 
journalists have used narrative practice as a means of 
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collectively representing shared codes of knowledge, which 
they in turn have fed back into the community to set 
themselves up as cultural authorities. 
§IB1LGTURE _ 0L§IllPj~ 
The analysis in this study was predicated on a 
systematic examination of journalists' published public 
discourse over the past 27 years. How journalists have 
recounted their role in covering the assassination was 
traced in the printed press, trade and professional 
reviews, documentary films, television retrospectives, 
books, and journal articles ~~. 
The study is divided into four sections: 
- §.Ellb TI N_~.A.!:!§A§§I!:!!lJ:.;r OILT AJ".5.!:!, 
This section provides the general background against 
which journalists have been able to tell the assassination 
story. It situates the events of the assassination against 
the more general cultural and historical context of the 
time, including the state of journalistic professionalism, 
the emergence o£ television news, shifting boundaries of 
cultural 
narratives. 
conjunction 
authority and the reflexivity o£ sixties' 
Each of these elements is discussed in 
with journalists' ability to promote 
themselves as authoritative spokespeople for the events of 
Kennedy's death. This section also explores the centrality 
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or strategies or rhetorical legitimation 
practice. 
in journalistic 
This section conveys the original narrative corpus or 
the assassination story, 
worked their retellings 
rrom which 
over time. 
journalists have 
It examines the 
accounts or actually covering Kennedy's death as they were 
rorwarded by journalists at the time and compares them 
with journalists' initial reconstructions of the same 
stories in the weeks immediately following the 
assassination. From this corpus of narratives, journalists 
have worked through narrative adjustment to reconsider and 
recast the story in systematic and creative ways over 27 
years. 
This section examines larger shifts in boundaries of 
cultural authority, which have had bearing on the ability 
of journalists to gain credence ror their versions of the 
assassination story. It details how official assassination 
memories were first de-authorized and the assassination 
record made accessible to alternate retaIlers seeking to 
reconsider its events, journalists among them. This 
section explores how journalists have authenticated 
themselves over other retellers attempting to accomplish 
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the same aim. Larger developments concerning documentary 
process and the role of memory are suggested to have 
upheld journalists' attempts to emerge as the 
assassination's preferred retellers. 
This section explores how journalists have 
perpetuated themselves as authorized spokepeople of the 
assassination story across time and space. It considers 
how journalists have kept their narratives alive, by 
embedding them within recognizable memory systems. Three 
separate memory systems are considered celebrity, 
professional lore, and history- which journalists have 
employed to effectively perpetuate their assassination 
narratives and their authoritative role as retellers. 
Situating, telling, accessing and perpetuating - each 
activity is suggested as a central part of establishing 
and perpetuating journalists as authorized spokespeople 
for the events of Kennedy's death. Through these 
mechanisms, this study traces out the canonization by 
journalists of one of contemporary American history's 
central moments. 
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ASSASSINATION TALES 
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CHAPTER T~JO 
BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION: 
CONTEXTUALIZING ASSASSINATION TALES 
The Kennedy assassination took place at the 
intersection of a number o:f culturally significant 
CirCllJftstancea, which impacted upon how its story would be 
constituted, remembered, interpreted, challenged and 
perpetuated by journalists. Images of these circumstances 
were themselves moulded by recollectors of the period. The 
fact that the decade's spokespersons often constituted not 
remote historians sifting through documents to describe 
its happenings, but participant-observers in the era whose 
views and actions were part of the story they were 
writing, inflected in no small way upon retellings of 
covering the Kennedy assassination. How participants' 
views o£ the era, its concerns, images and problems, made 
the assassination into a critical incident for American 
journalists is the topic of this chapter. 
Journalists' narratives about covering the Kennedy 
assassination were grounded in three main features of the 
time: A general mood of reflexivity that interacted with 
then-current forms o£ professionalism; pre-assassination 
ties linking Kennedy and the press corps, amidst 
accusations or news management and labels of lithe 
36 
television and pro£easional uncertainties 
about the legitimacy o£ television news at the time o£ the 
assassination. 
!?BgE~~s I O.NJ:\h.:J:..e.l:! .. , __ ...... <:::JLhI.UBA!,,_ . .!tuTl:JQEI TY.~NJ2 __ J:lJ1L_m;;nEgy.Ex.._QE 
?-IXn@_'._r.J_~BBAnS_~.?_ 
Much o£ what can be understood about American 
journalism, journalists and their pro£essional memories o£ 
covering the Kennedy assassination is wrapped up in the 
temporal era in which all were situated - the sixties. 
Recalling the sixties through narrative has produced an 
extended body o£ literature into which journalists' 
reconstructions o£ the Kennedy assassination would £it. 
Indeed, many chronicles were written a£ter the events o£ 
the assassination were over. Chroniclers _0£ the sixties 
were re£lexive and extensive, their narratives punctuated 
with questions about cultural authority and the relevance 
o£ history in everyday li£e. 
Chroniclers cast the sixties as a time of social, 
cultural and political trans£ormation 1 Morris Dickstein 
recalled how the era provided a "paint o£ departure £or 
every kind o£ social argument p ll encouraging everyone to 
b~come lIan interested party" Social and cultural 
enterprises o£ the time were lent a historical cast. As 
one observer, Todd Gitlin, claimed: 
It seemed especially true that 
capital H had come down to 
History with a 
earth, either 
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inter£ering with li£e or making it possible; and 
that within History, or threaded through it, 
people were living with a supercharged density; 
lives were bound up within one another, making 
claims on one another, drawing one another into 
the common project 3. 
Individuals reconstructed their everyday lives as having 
been infused with history and historical relevance. 
nurtured a daring premise," said one observer, "We were of 
historical moment, critical, unprecedented, containing 
wi thin ourselves the £ullness o£ time" <+. History was not 
only viewed as accessible, but it was woven into the 
missions by which both individuals and collective groups 
claimed they had sought to authenticate themselves. 
Chroniclers o£ the sixties looked back on the decade 
through events. Events helped them mark public time, 
demarcating IIbe£ore u and "a£terll periods and generating a 
collective sense o£ the decade that gave it its signature 
of upheaval, social invention and change. 
Yet which events were recast - and where - depended 
on larger social, cultural and political agendas. Many 
chroniclers maintained that the sixties began with the 
1950 Presidential elections. In his celebrated article 
about the 1950 conventions, "Superman Comes to the 
Supermarket," writer Norman Mailer hailed the arrival of a 
hero who could "capture the secret imagination o£ a 
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people" ~ Others held that the election was the beginning 
o£ a "historical £ree £all": 
assassinations, riots, Viet Nam, Watergate, oil 
embargoes, hostages in Iran, the economic rise 
o£ the Paci£ic Rim nations, on and on, glasnost, 
China - that has created an utterly New World 
and le£t America searching £or its place therein 
Chronicles cast the decade in the mould o£ an amusement 
park, replete with its barely-controlled chaos, 
recklessness and theaters o£ activity on every corner. The 
assassinations o£ John F, Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin 
Luther King and Robert Kennedy raised serious questions 
about the quality o£ American leadership, ushering in what 
the editor o£ one magazine called "two decades o£ 
'accidental' presidencies.' 7 The Vietnam War instilled 
doubts over the authority and justi£ication o£ American 
presence abroad, while the civil rights movement and 
£reedom marches generated large-scale activism on the home 
£ront. Publication o£ the Pentagon Papers and the 
beginnings o£ Watergate marked illegalities within the 
private spaces o£ government. And £inally, student 
activism and the culture o£ protest, marked by the Free 
Speech Movement,. university protests and Kent State 
shootings, displayed the disjunctions that were splitting 
America's college population. 
Many chroniclers cast the Kennedy assassination as a 
prototype £or the events that £ollowed. It was, said one 
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writer, "the day the world changed", constituting a rite 
of passage to what was called the end of innocence M. The 
assassination symbolized a "rupture in the collective 
experience o£ the American people" 'i-) Looking back, 
chroniclers held that Kennedy's death generated doubts 
about existing boundaries of cultural authority. "The 
whole country was trapped in a lie," recalled activist 
Casey Hayden. "We were told about equality but we 
discovered it didn't exist. We were the only truth-
tellers, as £ar as we could see·· :l.Q. Said another critic: 
"We came to doubt the legitimacy and authority of the 
doctor pounding our chest, and of the cop pounding the 
beat II :t:l.. 
Doubting authority, chroniclers began to cast 
themselves as cultural, social and political arbiters. 
IIWhere the critic of the :fifties would appeal 
to .•. tradition, the critic o:f the sixties was more likely 
to seal an argument with personal testimony," said 
Dickstein Ui,: As the values o£ immediacy, confrontation 
and personal witness were upgraded, chroniclers 
legitimated a subjective perspective on events. Recalling 
the sixties thereby generated a highly reflexive genre of 
narratives whose chroniclers addressed ongoing questions 
about cultural authority and history. 
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The sixties were reconstructed as a chipping-away o£ 
consensus .. Whether or not such a consensus ever existed 
became less important than the £act that its eradication 
was invoked in recollections o£ the era. In Fredric 
Jameson's eyes, members o£ the sixties saw themselves 
adopting a urei£ied, political language o£ power, 
dornination l' 
Questioning 
authority and anti-authoritarianism" :1. :::~ 
power, negotiating power, de£ying power, 
eliminating power, and ultimately creating new £orms by 
which power might be realized became characteristic 
concerns o£ narratives about everyday li£e. 
One particular group o£ chroniclers £or whom this had 
relevance were the up-and-coming pro£essionals o£ the 
time .. Pro£essionalism constituted a valued way o£ 
addressing ongoing questions about cultural authority. In 
Todd Gitlin's view, there was an "approved running track 
£or running £aster and stretching £arthertl :1. ... + Concerns 
about an increased access to history were particularly 
held responsible £or bringing pro£essionals directly into 
the heart o£ surrounding issues. Events were seen as 
rattling the £oundations o£ a variety a£ pro£essians in a 
way that made pra£essianals rethink the boundaries o£ 
appropriate practice, £orming the pro£essianal identities 
o£ writers, artiste, doctors through the events o£ the 
time. Questions about power and authority thus became 
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internalized by individuals and groups as direct 
challenges to the changing boundaries o£ their 
pro£essional identities. 
Journalism was not immune to these circumstances o£ 
change. As David Halberstam noted, 
(In the sixties) the old order was being 
challenged and changed in every sense, racially, 
morally, culturally, spiritually, and it was a 
rich time £or journalists. For a while there was 
a genuine struggle over who would de£ine news, 
the people in positions o£ power or the people 
in the streets .~. 
Larger questions about changing consensus and cultural 
authority thus readily permeated narratives that were 
generated by journalistic pro£essionals. 
In looking back, journalists construed the sixties as 
having been a time o£ pro£essional experimentation. A 
special issue o£ g_~£n!J_:r_§. magazine on '"The Sixties'· 
maintained that II no longer were there observers,. only 
participants. This was especially true o£ journalists. 
They were part o£ the problem, part o£ the solution, and 
always part o£ the story'" H'. Being part o£ the story took 
on many new £orms in writing, reporting and presenting 
news. O£ten, journalists embraced a subjective perspective 
on events, in large part due to surrounding circumstances 
that called £or their presence within them. 
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Claims that the boundaries o£ cultural authority were 
shi£ting 
practices 
in£used journalists with new challenges, new 
and new ways by which to legitimate themselves. 
swelling with the sense o£ who they could be, they saw 
themselves experimenting on the £ringe with £orms o£ 
writing and reportage called "new journalism," or with a 
broad spectrum o£ underground writing :1. ~? In the center, 
they recalled leaving the staid establishments o£ the 
"newspapers of record" and venturing into less secure 
territories of newer media establishments :I,s a 
This sugests that the questions about authority and 
power £ound in more general recollections o£ the sixties 
were also a £eatured part o£ journalists' attempts to look 
back at themselves. They readily translated such concerns 
into pro£essionally-grounded behavior, 
questions about cultural authority to 
applying 
localized 
larger 
issues 
about the appropriate boundaries o£ journalistic practice. 
For example, a larger mood o£ re£lexivity encouraged 
journalists to reconstruct the sixties as a time o£ 
pro£essional risk and experimentation. While this did not 
mean that changes did not take place at other times, it 
did suggest that in recalling the decade, the shi£ting 
boundaries o£ pro£essional behavior as one mode of 
cultural authority were supported by journalists~ 
narratives on a number of domains. 
43 
Journali.sts~ narratives were thereby contextualized 
by ongoing discourses about the proper boundaries of 
authority assumed by a variety of social and cultural 
grOUPS, mainly professionals, in society. These narratives 
not only emphasized the changing boundaries of cultural 
authority, a premise ultimately relevant to journalism 
professionals, but they also bore a distinct pseudo-
historical cast, and featured an interest in history"s 
infusion within everyday life. This suggested that 
journalists, like other chroniclers of the period, would 
be able to borrow from history to authenticate themselves. 
Such a point would have particular bearing on journalists' 
reconstructions of covering the Kennedy assassinationB 
was 
One arena of 
the Kennedy 
interest to chroniclers of the sixties 
administration. It was relevant to 
journalists' discussions about themselves, because it gave 
them an extensive institutional framework of interaction. 
In narrative" journalists consistently highlighted the 
supportive aspects of Kennedy's Presidency, which they saw 
as haVing forwarded many of their professional aims. 
Hints of an aura of favorable relations between the 
President and the press corps were found already in 
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Kennedy's campaign £or the Presidency. Press Secretary 
pierre Salinger maintained that Kennedy had directed his 
sta££ to make the 1960 Presidential campaign as easy as 
possible £or the press corps to cover He gave 
journalists transcripts o£ his remarks made on the 
campaign trail within minutes o£ having made them. 
"Instant transcripts," explained Salinger, eliminated the 
time-consuming chore of reporters having to clear remarks 
with his o££ice 
vJhat he did not say was that they also gave 
journalists the £eeling that the President was attending 
to their needs. This tension between catering to 
journalists and manipulating them - permeated accounts o£ 
the Kennedy administration. All but one o£ his news 
conferences were "on the record I) Hallmark decisions 
£or which he would be known and remembered as President -
decisions to debate Nixon, warnings to the Russians about 
missiles on their way to Cuba, or assumptions of 
responsibility £or the Bay o£ Pigs invasion were 
interpreted as having been taken, i£ not motivated, by 
some regard £or the media. 
Kennedy's £astidious media 
One representative account of 
behavior held that journalists 
were "there to help him arrange reality, to make style 
become substance, to de£ine power as the contriving o£ 
appearances" 
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During the administration's early years, Kennedy's 
attentiveness to the media was well-received by the press 
corps .. Journalists tended to be complimentary in their 
dispatches about him. In 1961 Arthur Krock wrote in Ih"~. 
press requests are being fielded to the 
president in greater numbers than 
previously ••• And Mr. Kennedy's evaluations of 
the merit of such questions is fair and generous 
Reporters perpetuated tales of culture, integrity, and 
generally '"good times"'. Kennedy, for them, appeared to 
symbolize all that went well with America. Such a mood 
encouraged a certain suspension of judgment on the part of 
journalistic chroniclers.. Later, reporter Tom Wicker 
maintained that if the press of the Kennedy era "did not 
cover up for him, or knowingly look the other way, it did 
not put him or the White Hause in his time under as close 
and searching scrutiny as it should have"l 24. 
Journalists recalled that other factors dissuaded 
them from being too critical of the new President. He was 
thought to be polished and eloquent, energetic and witty. 
He was Harvard-educated yet a war hero. His rhetorical 
style, youth and promises o£ a New Frontier were 
interpreted as appealing, different and refreshing. 
Wicker's view, this encouraged the press to 
give Kennedy more of a free ride than any of his 
successors have had. One was the man#s wit, 
In 
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charm, youth, good looks, and general style, as 
well as a feeling among reporters that he 
probably liked us more than he liked 
politicians, and that he may have been more 
nearly one o£ us than one o£ them .•. Hence, there 
was at the least an unconscious element o£ good 
wishes for Kennedy·· 
Reporters recalled willingly and consistently overstating 
these sides o£ Kennedy in their dispatches, to the same 
extent that they had understated other points his 
Addison's Disease or extramarital affairs as. 
Kennedy's familiarity with journalism was held 
responsible for endearing many reporters to him. They 
stressed the fact that in 1945 he had served as a special 
correspondent for the International News Service (and his 
wife had been an lIinquiring photographer" for the 
W~shingtoR~T~~~He£~~~), a point which made him familiar 
with the conditions under which journalists labored .7. He 
earned the coveted Pulitzer Prize in 1957 £or Profiles in 
--~-.. ",,"-."-.... " ... " ... -
In a lead article in November o£ 1960, the 
trade magazine gS!i,:I=.9:'::""_." .. ",,\!l.g" ... p'!'!.e"L:h.§I:'-~ lamented the loss o£ 
"a first-rate reporter," admitting that: 
and 
will 
A President who knows how to write a news-story 
a first lady who can snap good news-pictures 
be residing in the White House after 
January 20 ""~'. 
Kennedy was hailed for taking an interest in journalism, 
with Gloria Steinhem recalling years later that it was the 
only time a reporter felt that "something we wrote might 
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be read in the White House n .:~}c) All o£ this made the 
journalistic community 
a natural constituency £or him. He was 
interested in the same things they were, had 
gone to the same schools, read the same books 
and shared the same analytical £rame o£ mind. By 
and large he was more com£ortable with reporters 
than he was with working politicians "'. 
Whether or not this was true mattered less than the £act 
that journalists recalled it as having been so. 
In journalists' attempts to recollect the Kennedy 
administration, Kennedy was thereby held to be more a part 
o£ the journalistic community than separate £rom it. One 
reporter, Hugh Sidey o£ TJJ!LE;!., termed it this way: 
Has there ever been a more succulent time for a 
young reporter? I doubt it •.• It was a golden 
time £or scribes. He talked to us, listened to 
us, honored U5~ ridiculed us, got angry at uS p 
played with us, laughed with us, corrected us, 
and all the time li£ted our trade to new heights 
of respect and importance 32. 
""Had he outlived his time in the White House,"" added 
.senior columni.st Joseph Kra£t, "it is probable that in 
some way he would have turned to journalism"" Although 
this was in no way verifiable, it was nonetheless 
.signi£icant that journalists continued to make the claim. 
Interestingly, journalist,,' recollections o£ the 
President did not focus on one obvious arena his 
personal ties with many o£ them. The £act that Kennedy 
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maintained social relations with a number of high-ranking 
journalists including Charles Bartlett (who had 
introduced him to his wife Jacqueline), Joseph Alsop and 
Benjamin Bradlee- was unaddressed in most journalists' 
writings about the era. When suggestions by James Reston 
that the President stop seeing reporters socially were 
rejected outright, there was little ado among the press 
corps 34. Even correspondent Benjamin Bradlee's book of 
reminiscences, 
stir. Published ten years after Kennedy's death, the book 
detailed how Bradlee and the President had regularly 
swapped gossip and information about the administration 
and the press corp'" "'"". The book was favorably reviewed by 
a number of magazines, with little mention of the 
problematics suggested by the revelations One 
exception was writer Taylor Branch, who lambasted the 
relationship in !:L,!'''p'er.§'::.. magazine in an article subtitled 
"The Journalist as Flatterer." Branch called the book "one 
of the most pathetic memoirs yet written by an American 
journalist about his President" 37: 
The Bradlee who covered Kennedy was hardly the 
prototypical reporter - cynical and hard, with a 
knife out for pretense and an eye out for dirt. 
He was hardlY the editor he became under Nixon 
:u, 
The uneven range of responses directly reflected the 
shifting parameters of cultural authority assumed by 
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journalists at the time o£ Kennedy's assassination, and in 
the years that £ollowed. 
But the aura o£ a££inity between Kennedy and the 
press corps also wore thin at times, especially when the 
President's attempts at image management con£licted with 
his voiced concerns £or an independent press. Decades 
later, columnist David Broder recalled how the President 
had success£ully converted a portion o£ the press corps 
into his own cheering section 3_. Acts o£ image management 
permeated accounts o£ Kennedyls administration: These 
included cancelling 22 White House subscriptions to the 
coverage o£ his administration .... -1'0 .. , bawling out Time 
reporter Hugh Sidey in £ront o£ his editor because the 
estimate he had given £or a Kennedy crowd was too low ":~:I .• , 
cooling long-standing relations with then-con£idante 
Benjamin Bradlee because o£ a remark the reporter had made 
about the Kennedys in one o£ his dispatches or denying 
journalists access to sta££ers because he had taken 
o££ense at certain aspects o£ their stories Charles 
Roberts, who covered Kennedy £or later 
maintained that the administration was "intolerant o£ any 
criticism ... 'You are either £or us or against us,' is the 
way Kenny O'Donnell, the President's appointments 
secretary ~ put it to mell ":~":I' 
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Predictably, this somewhat chipped away at the 
suspended judgment with which most journalists had 
appraised the administration. Labels of news management 
began to circulate among reporters covering the White 
House. Following the Cuban missile crisis, Arthur Krock 
wrote in a particularly virulent attack on the President 
that a policy of 
I.F. 
news management not only exists, but in the form 
of direct and deliberate action has been 
enforced more cynically and boldly than by any 
previous administration in a period when the 
U • s. was not at warll .... +~. 
Stone accused Kennedy of deception and deterioration 
of standards of leadership in his newsletter on April 26, 
1961: "The President's animus seems to be directed not at 
the follies exposed in the Cuban fiasco but at the free 
press :for exposing them" .... +6. !f.~.2?_.'§t~~~_'§Lli was charged wi th 
regularly adjusting its coverage of events in order to 
enhance Kennedy's image at the same time as the !:t§'<:L .. L?.F..1s. 
Ltm§'§. was lambasted for suppressing its knowledge of the 
invasion of the Bay of Pigs 47. Years later, Henry Fairlie 
complained that both Kennedy's policy of news management 
and his social flattery of journalists had made it 
difficult for journalists to be objective about him 
All of this set up a certain framework in which 
journalists could be reflexive about the Kennedy 
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administration. Images of Kennedy as President set the 
stage for memories of Kennedy after his death. This 
pattern was aptly illustrated with the community of 
television journalists, who recalled that Kennedy had had 
a special regard for their medium, a regard which earned 
him the name of "the television president": He and the 
television "camera were born £or each other, he was its 
£irst great political superstar" ~~g.. 
To an. extent, Kennedy's affinity with television was 
thought to have been orchestrated by his family, which had 
been instrumental in promoting his nomination. 
Halberstam related the following story: 
In 1959, Sander Vanocur, then a young NBC 
correspondent, found himself stationed by the 
network in Chicago and found himself taken up by 
Sarge Shriver. One evening there was a party at 
the Shrivers' and a ruddy-faced older man walked 
over to Vanocur and said, "You're Sander 
Vanocur, aren"t you?" Vanocur allowed as how he 
was. III' m Joe Kennedy, JI the man said. III saw you 
at Little Rock and you did a good job down 
there. I keep telling Jack to spend more time 
and pay more attention to guys like you and less 
to the print people. I think he's coming around" 
David 
As Kennedy grew into his administration and his concept of 
the Presidency, his interest in journalism reportedly 
sparked his curiosity about television. But perhaps mare 
than other circumstances, his television debates with 
Nixon convinced him of the value of televised journalism. 
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Part of the folklore about Kennedy held that he won 
the election of 1960 because of his understanding of the 
new medium o£ television .. His per£ormance in the "great 
debates·' was held to have been superior to those who 
watched him on television: Those who listened to the 
debates on radio perceived Nixon to be the winner; those 
who saw the debates on television perceived that Kennedy 
had won :5:1. The debates were seen as helping Kennedy turn 
around a sagging second place in the polls ••. Observers 
decided that he won the election "largely because o£ the 
way he looked and sounded on the TV screens in our living 
rooms" !:,!!;,3 .. 
Such a point was emphasized by journalistic 
chroniclers, who told of how Kennedy employed his 
knowledge of the medium to full advantage: He rested 
before his televised appearance, used cosmetics to hide 
facial blemishes and allowed himsel£ to be extensively 
coached beforehand m4. Don Hewitt, who directed the debate 
that helped him win, later maintained that "television had 
a love affair with Jack Kennedy" mm. The significance of 
his performance extended well beyond the actual political 
campaign: Television was held to have become IIthat. much 
more legitimized as the main instrument o£ political 
discourse": It was a "triumph not just for Kennedy but for 
the new medium; within hours no one could recall anything 
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that was said, only what they loaked like, what they £elt 
like" "''';.. A£ter the debates, recalled reporter Edward 
Guthman, the age o£ television journalism was purported to 
have begun "'7. 
Another act that supported positive links between 
Kennedy and television journalists was his decision to 
implement regular live televised news con£erences. It was 
a decision then regarded by press journalists as "an 
administrative disaster second only to the Bay o£ Pigs" 
~56:l , but television journalists were overjoyed. They lauded 
the detail with which he organized his £irst con£erence: 
Observing that ""Hollywood could not have done better in 
preparing one reporter recalled haw 
Kennedy brought down a TV consultant £rom New York to 
arrange staging, set up white cardboard so as to dispel 
£acial shadows, and had the drapes hanging behind the 
lecturn re-sewn at the last minute ~~;'i;;) Kennedy's 
preparation £or each con£erence was heralded as ··intensive 
and elaborate" i'.:.C'. A stringent brie£ing process preceded 
it,. during which Salinger predicted questions and 
collected responses £rom Kennedy sta££ers. The President 
then convened a "press con£erence break£ast ll where he 
practiced answering predictable questions .'. 
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The live news con£erences provided the right stage 
£or Kennedy. Tom Wicker maintained that they gave the 
President a 
per£ect £orum £or his looks, his wits, his quick 
brain, his sel£-con£idence. Kennedy gave 
Americans their £irst look at a President in 
action ••. and he may have been better at this art 
£orm than at anything else in his Presidency G~. 
A £requent participant on behal£ o£ :rh§L __ lc!."'!.~_"X'?.F."!~" . ..1A!fI_es., 
James Reston recalled how he "overwhelmed you with decimal 
points or disarmed you with a smile and a wisecrack" ",co>. 
It was there£ore characteristic o£ his administration that 
on October 22, 1962, Kennedy chose to go on air at 7.00 
p.m. to demand that Russian missiles be removed £rom Cuba. 
His message's e££ect on the nation had much to do with its 
televised delivery: 
By delivering the ultimatum on TV instead o£ 
relying on normal diplomatic channels, Kennedy 
magni£ied the impact o£ his actions many times 
over, signaling to the world that there would be 
no retreat ~~..:~ .. 
While these acts £amiliarized the American public with 
governmental process and the e££ect o£ televised 
journalism on the political process, they also, in David 
Halberstam's wordS, "helped to make television journalists 
more power£ul as conduits £or politicians than print ones" 
Kennedy's attentiveness to the medium o£ television 
continued through his administration. In December o£ 1962, 
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he became the £irst President to conduct an in£ormal 
television interview ~lith three network newsmen 66 
Benjamin Bradlee, upset over the deviation from routine 
practice, wrote the £ollowing: 
December 17, 1962. The President went on 
television live tonight, answering questions 
£rom each network's White House 
correspondent ... I watched it at home and £elt 
pro£essionally threatened as a man who ,.as 
trying to make a living by the written word. The 
program was exceptionally good, well-paced, 
color£ul, humorous, serious, and I £elt that a 
written account would have paled by comparison 
e. M7 
When Bradlee con£ronted the President with the disturbing 
e££ect the television interviews would have on print 
journalists, Kennedy retorted, "I always said that when we 
don't have to go through you bastards (the printed press), 
we can really get our story over to the American people" 
Continuing to place television in the £ore£ront o£ 
political activity, Kennedy allowed cameras to £ilm his 
e££orts to integrate the University o£ Alabama his 
trips to Paris, Vienna and Berlin, his warnings to the 
Russians to keep away £rom Cuban shores. On other domains, 
Jacqueline took the American people on a televised tour o£ 
the White House. Kennedy's recognition o£ television's 
unique qualities thereby legitimated his £ormalized and 
viable interest in television journalists. 
All o£ this cast him in the role o£ promoter £or the 
journalistic community, and television journalists among 
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them. It was thus no surprise that a memorial section o£ 
published the week a£ter Kennedy's 
assassination, hailed his e££ect on journalism and 
televfsion,. saying 
no President had ever been so accessible to the 
press; no President ever so anxious £or history 
to be recorded in the maJ<ing; he even let TV 
cameras peek over his shoulder in moments Ox 
national crisis 70. 
Thus, at a time when the boundaries o£ cultural 
authority were changing, the ties between Kennedy and the 
press. corps de£ined the boundaries o£ journalistic 
community that were 50 important to journalists seeking to 
authorize themselves. Kennedy's interest in journalism 
highlighted the authority o£ members o£ the pro£ession~ 
Communal concerns about professional practice were given 
consistent and de£initive stages, with Kennedy playing an 
active part not only in upholding journalism as a 
pro£ession but in granting legitimacy to those employed by 
television. In much the same way that larger questions 
about cultural authority, history and professionalism 
in£ormed journalistic practice o£ the sixties, the Kennedy 
administration provided a £ocused stage on which to shape 
many of the aame concerns. 
Largely due to these two £actors the shi£ting 
boundaries o£ cultural authority and Kennedy's consistent 
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interests in journalism the early sixties were 
reconstructed as having been "great years :for journalism" 
The Kennedys were applauded by journalists for 
providing good c:opy, and the growth of the more 
established news organizations 
was seen as a precursor to more general 
professional expansion. Observers felt that the stature of 
journalism as a profession was enhanc:ed. By 1962 
journalists 
saw their career increasingly as a profession ... 
Whic:h meant that there were obligations and 
rights and responsibilities that went with it. 
They were better paid, more responsible and more 
serious. They were not so easily bent, not so 
easi 1 y used '7~~: 
Journalists saw themselves entering a period of growth and 
maturation, whereby it was fair to assume that new stages 
for c:ultural and soc:ial legitimation would present 
themselves. To a large extent, this image of growth fit in 
with narratives about shifting consensus and the changing 
boundaries of cultural authority and reflexivity that 
emanated from the dec:ade. 
Growth, however, was not shared across media .. During 
Kennedy's asc:ent to the Presidenc:y, the authoritative 
boundaries of television news were still being debated. On 
the one hand, television news was considered a bastard 
c:hild within the journalistic community, dismissed as "a 
journalistic: frivolity, a c:umbersome beast unequipped to 
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meet the demands o:f breaking news on a day-to-day basis" 
Every press journalist still believed that "his was 
the more serious, more legitimate medium for news" The 
superiority o:f print over television was 
a view widely shared by TV newspeople themselves 
in the sixties. The :feeling was not entirely 
unjusti:fied. Examples o:f original reporting on 
TV were rare then, and the medium was still 
essentially derivative 7m. 
Television reporters with original angles on a story o:ften 
fed them to wire-service reporters, so as to capture the 
attention o:f their New York editors 76 It was thus no 
surprise that a :few months be:fore the Kennedy 
assassination, the International Press Institute rejected 
a move to admit radio and television newspeople, stating 
that they did not constitute bona :fide journalists 77 • 
Yet already by the early 1960s, interest in the 
legitimacy o:f television news had begun to blossom. The 
average American household used television :for :four to 
:five hours daily by the summer o:f 1960, and 88% o:f all 
homes owned television sets 78 Certain technological 
advances, particularly the use o:f videotape and the 
employment o:f communications satellites, helped improve 
the broadcast quality o£ television news 79. Networks were 
able to alter existing :formats o:f news presentation, 
moving :from the '"talking head" set-up towards more 
59 
sophisticated ways of including actual news footage within 
broadcasts. 
Institutional changes also worked to the advantage of 
television news. Officials within the Federal 
Communications Commission suggested an independent news 
association devoted only to broadcasting 80. Newton Minow, 
the newly-appointed chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, called for an increase in the time devoted to 
television news to offset what he labelled the "vast 
wasteland" of television programming. In the fall of 1963, 
television news' is-minute time slot was expanded to a 
full half-hour 6" .• To mark the occasion, Kennedy gave 
interviews to all three networks, and was applauded for 
agreeing to hold an interview a second time when ABC 
di "covered afterwards that its camera had broken ~,;~, 
Television networks opened new bureaus to accomodate a 
growing demand for information .3. 
The legitimacy of television news was also linked to 
the the medium's technological attributes, with advocates 
beginning to suggest that television might be a better 
medium than print for transmitting certain kinds of news 
stories. As David Halberstam later commented: 
Gradually in the last year of Kennedy's life, 
< IX!'l_E>. journalist Hugh) Sidey noticed a change, 
not so much in Kennedy's feeling about the 
magazine~s rairness as in his estimation o£ its 
importance. The equation had changed with the 
coming of television. In Washington the power of 
print 
access, 
Chroniclers 
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waB Blipping. Television gave 
so television got greater access 
pointed to a range o£ stories at which 
television excelled, with the civil rights movement later 
construed as having gained most o£ its acclaim £rom 
television, its "leaders ••• master£ul at manipulating 
television, conscious o£ the way certain images could be 
used to move the electorate" Television's technology 
allowed cameramen and reporters to "cover candidly things 
that might have been barred to them in the past" ,,<E.. These 
televisual £eatures prompted the print media to recognize 
what one critic called their status as "mere 'extras' at 
JFK#a press con£erences 
- shows so obviously staged £01' 
television·' &:l? .. 
In general, journalists thereby hailed television's 
technological "improvements" the immediacy, visual 
element, drama - as responsible £or making TV news a bona 
£ide journalistic £orm. Implicit in what they saw as its 
burgeoning legitimacy was thus an increasing acceptance o£ 
the technological advances associated with television. 
Television was seen as promoting a "better' £orm o£ 
journalism than that o££ered by print. As one observer 
said, "As he (Kennedy) made television bigger, it made him 
Thus journalists' attempts to consolidate 
themselves were directly linked with Kennedy. 
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It thus made sense that in chronicles of the decade, 
the fates of both Kennedy and television journalism were 
construed as coming together with Kennedy#s assassination. 
Television, said one critic, "was at the center o£ the 
shock. ~Jith its indelible images, information, immediacy, 
repetition and close-ups, it served to define the tragedy 
for the public" "''''. By the end of 1963, a Roper survey 
maintained that Americans relied for news as much on 
television as on the printed press By the late 
sixties, after "Lee Harvey Oswald was shot on television, 
presidents dissembled (and) protestors protested in front 
o£ the c:amerss u By then, it was safe to assume that 
television had come of age ss the preferred medium for 
news. 
This posited the Kennedy assassination squarely in 
the middle of a process by which television was recognized 
as a legitimate medium of news transmission. Journalists 
upheld this notion in their chronicles. Television 
journalism was said to have grown "up in Dallas, £or never 
before had it faced such a story with so much of the 
responsibility for telling it .. The fact that 
journalists construed the fates of Kennedy and television 
as being parallel to each other in itself underscored 
gropings for legitimation in both arenaBG It was 
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significant that £igures in the television industry, 
particularly television journalists, regarded Kennedy as a 
midwi£e to their own birth. A special edition o£ 
m.agazine. published the week a£ter the 
ass.assination, included a section entitled "The Dimension 
JFK Added To Television". It went as £ollows: 
From ·the Great Debates where America £irst saw 
this young man to the TV close-up o£ a U.S. 
President telling the American people we were 
about to blockade Cuba and might even go 
£urther, he took radio and television o££ the 
second team and made them peers o£ the older 
print media. Electronic journalism and its 
newsmen grew in stature by leaps and 
bounds ... The medium needed no £urther assurance 
o£ its place in society than the President's 
exclusive interviews with CBS's Walter Cronkite 
and NBC's Chet Huntley and David Brinkley .3. 
Members o£ the journalistic community saw Kennedy's 
interest in the media as engendering the industry's growth 
and enhancing journalists' pro£essional legitimacy. This 
was upheld in eulogies about the President, printed in 
trade publications under titles like "Kennedy Retained 
Newsman's Outlook" ... ",)~~ Thus p in a small turn o£ irony, 
Kennedy's e££orts at enhancing his image and legitimating 
his administration made him a central £igure in the 
authentication of journalism and television news 9~. 
All o£ this suggests that chroniclers were concerned 
with the boundaries o£ journalistic community at the time 
o£ the assassination. Their accounts stressed that the 
profession o£ journalism was undergoing change and that 
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one stratum o£ journalism television news was 
beginning to be held in regard above the others. This cast 
the assassination coverage against a larger backdrop o£ 
legitimating American journalists. Holding television news 
responsible £or communicating the tragedy thus directly 
supported larger discourses about the authority o£ 
journaliats. Exposure to the assassination was made 
possible by television, and to a large degree its 
technology was hailed £or giving America its memories o£ 
the event. 
Thus the legitimation o£ television journalists was 
construed by chroniclers as having been gradual but 
certain. Like other enterprises o£ the decade, 
legitimation was seen as having been realized during the 
sixties through shi£ting boundaries o£ cultural authority 
and definitions o£ pro£essianalism, changing consensus 
about what was important and the increased relevance o£ 
history £or the concerns o£ everyday li£e. In looking 
back, chroniclers attributed this to a general mood o£ 
reflexivity that had allowed £01' changes an all £ronts. 
This suggests that in telling and retelling tales o£ the 
assassination, journalists leaned into a context already 
made explicit by their narratives. Tales of the 
assassination were thus explicitly and implicitly £ormed 
64 
by the in£lections o£ the time on larger contemporaneous 
narratives. 
Chroniclers o£ the decade, its events and £ocal 
points were thereby le£t to negotiate and renegotiate 
parameters o£ knowledge and action - about the sixties, 
about Kennedy's administration, and about the legitimation 
o£ television news - until they £it com£ortably together 
within one context. They enmeshed their narratives until 
the same notions £igured in all. Within such a context, it 
was possible £ar journalists to readily perpetuate 
memories o£ the Kennedy assassination, and they did so in 
a way that made sense o£ ongoing issues about the time, 
the pro£ession and the emerging technologies by which they 
told their stories. 
By July 1964, the summer £ollo'"ing Kennedy's 
assassination, television journalism had begun to emerge 
as a power£ul £arce in American li£e and politics. The 
scene where journalists contended that this took place was 
the Republication National Convention at San Francisco's 
Cow Palace. Seen as "players in the game itsel£" 
journalists were booed by convention delegates and carried 
o££ the £loor by security guards and policemen. 
Signi£icantly, press journalists did not play alone in 
such a game. One reporter recalled how 
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Those £ists raised in anger at the men in the 
glass-booths the 'commentators' and the 
'anchor men~, bore this message too: The 'press' 
had become inextricably linked with television 
in the public mind .7. 
Linking press and television journalists underscored 
attempts to uni£y them into one community. More important, 
their role as independent players in the construction o£ 
news had turned them into forces meriting careful 
consideration" Although Barry Goldwater relied upon 
delegates' promises o£ support £rom be£ore the start o£ 
the convention, his sta££ "had not recJ<oned I.i th 
television, or how necessary it was to restrain its 
appetite £or drama" "6'. As Goldwater said later, "I should 
have known in San Francisco, that I won the nomination 
, (there) but lost the"'J election" ';i~";I. Television journalists 
had become a £orce to be reckoned with. 
In looking back, chroniclers saw the Cow Palace as 
re£elcting signi£icant changes in the legitimacy granted 
television journalists. The £act that the previous year 
television journalists had been denied membership by an 
international press organization but were considered 
"'active players"' one year later re£lected a marked change 
in the legitimacy accorded practitioners in the medium: 
The uncertain pro£essional beginnings o£ 1963 were pushed 
into hints o£ legitimacy over the next 13 months. This 
signalled a clear change in the circumstances by which 
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television journalists and by implication, all 
journalists - could authenticate themselves. What remained 
unclear, however, was what prompted circumstances to 
change, and how they did 80. 
These pages have addressed the cultural and 
historical context which backgrounded the assassination. 
They have shown how chroniclers of the era set up the 
legitimation of Kennedy as President alongside the 
legitimation of television journalism .. Paralleling 
accounts of the Kennedy Presidency with accounts of the 
1J 
evolution and authentication of television news had direct 
bearing on hQl,., television journalists have taken their 
places as cultural authorities. Already in chronicles o£ 
both Kennedy's administration and the evolution of 
television news, an affinity was set up that connected the 
two arenas. This affinity would figure in journalists' 
attempts at collective legitimation and would infiltrate 
their stories of covering Kennedy's death. 
Legitimating Kennedy and legitimating television news 
were thereby held up as characteristic enterprises of the 
sixties, rein£orced by embedding tales of their 
authentication in a context shaped by issues of cultural 
authority, history and reflexivity. Reconstructions of the 
sixties decade underscored the function of history and 
historical events for professional legitimation. 
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Chroniclers of the era stressed the importance of history 
within the formations of professional identities. The 
increased access to history was thus construed as infusing 
a historical perspective into discussions about 
pro£essionalism. This is not to say that the above-
mentioned circumstances ~made historians out of all 
pra:fesBionals p only that history's seemingly increased 
access inflected how professionals determined their 
boundaries of appropriate practice. Circumstances made it 
eaeier :for a range o£ pro£essionale, such as journalists p 
to borrow :from history in their attempts at self-
legitimation. Journalists saw themselves taking on 
expanded roles of cultural authority, and acting in net.] 
and different ways as social, political and ultimately 
historical arbiters, a point which generated consensus 
about appropriate and authoritative practices of the time 
and later. In particular, this informed journalists' 
subsequent tales o£ covering Kennedy's assassination, 
which upheld journalists attempts to consolidate 
themselves as an authoritative interpretive community. 
It makes sense, then, to assume that journalists have 
reconstructed their part in covering the Kennedy 
assass.ination in conjunction with ongoing discourses which 
they, and others, have perpetuated about the sixties 
decade. A decade construed as a period of reflexivity -
68 
where existing parameters o£ J~thority were questioned, 
negotiated and altered by persons involved in lending 
meaning to events has made way for discussion of a 
number o£ then-burgeoning enterprises, one o£ them the 
uncertain but growing legitimacy o£ television news. Such 
a discourse was supported by the overattentive interest o£ 
the Kennedy administration in things pertaining to the 
media .. All of this has directly a££ected the parameters o£ 
the memory systems through which coverage o£ the Kennedy 
assassination has been reconstructed by journalists. The 
context underlying most sixties' reconstructions has 
suggested an a££inity between narratives about television 
journalism and the Kennedy administration, an a££inity 
that was torn asunder with the President's assassination. 
In an ironic twist, Kennedy's death £uelled the concerns 
and energies o£ 
members a stage 
chroniclers of the era, o££ering its 
on which to debate timely issues of 
authority, power~ connectedness and historical relevance. 
His death was used by journalists to legitimate 
television, making the medium which served him best in 
li£e continue to serve him in death. 
The Kennedy assassination has thereby become one 
stage on which journalists have choreographed their 
legitimation as pro£essionals. It has backgrounded the 
movement of television journalists £rom the ranks o£ 
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outsiders to "central players in the game .. 11 In such a way, 
it has served 8S a critical incident £or journalism 
pro£essionals, a stage on which they have evaluated, 
challenged and renegotiated consensual notions about what 
it means to be a journalist • 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RHETORICAL LEGITIMATION AND JOURNALISTIC AUTHORITY 
Journalists~ ability to forward themselves over time 
as the authorized spokespeople for the events of Kennedy's 
death was predicated on their use of narratives about 
Kennedy~s assassination in deliberate and strategic ways. 
To a degree, narrative's relevance in accomplishing such 
an aim has been built into existing models of journalistic 
practice. 
skilled 
For while journalists have long been viewed as 
tellers of events who reconstruct activities 
behind the news through stories p their claims to 
legitimacy are also rhetorically based. The suggestion 
that journalists legitimate themselves through the 
rhetoric they use thus has particular bearing on their 
emergence 
story. 
as authorized tellers of the assassination 
In the pages that follow, I discuss the particular 
role played by journalists' narrative and rhetoric in 
setting them up as the authorized spokespeople of the 
story o£ Kennedy's assassination~ This chapter first 
explores the theoretical relevance of narrative as a tool 
of rhetorical legitimation. It then discusses three major 
strategies of narrative reconstruction by which 
journalists have attempted to retell the assassination 
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story. Finally, it considers the aigni£icance o£ narrative 
and the way in which it has offered 
fertile ground on which to authorize 
adjustment, 
journalists 
themselves 
story. 
as preferred tellers of the assassination 
Legitimating speakers through rhetoric has 
traditionally concerned analysts of public discourse. Its 
salience was particularly foregrounded when the ascent of 
the mass media generated what were construed as changes in 
the structure of discourse. Media technologies were seen 
as creatively expanding 
to public 
by which 
the range and type of stages 
speakers, thereby altering the 
they could effectively authorize 
available 
potential 
themselves But the ability of speakers to legitimate 
themselves through their tales has long been of concern to 
small-group communication researchers, rhetoricians, 
folklorists, anthropologists and sociologists alike. As 
modern forms of public discourse have offered an 
increasingly complex mix of different kinds of content 
attending to different communicative aims, media 
researchers have also begun to focus on the problems 
implied by rhetorical 
d i securee ~H:. 
legitimation in mediated public 
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One shared assumption about the legitimation of 
speakers through rhetoric is the view that it is both a 
rational and strategic practice. Aristotle was perhaps 
first to define rhetoric as invoking the effect of 
persuasion, or the wielding of power: 
The primary goal of rhetorical discourse is what 
the persuasionachieves •.• Rhetorical narratives 
exist beyond (their) own textuality 3. 
A regard for narrative as an act of strategic dimension 
was also suggested by sociologist Max Weber, who forwarded 
the notion that people act rationally in order to 
legitimate themselves But the potential for 
legitimating oneself through rhetoric has been most 
directly addressed by Jurgen Habermas. Habermas maintains 
that speakers employ language to effect various kinds of 
consensus about their activity: 
Under the functional aspect of reaching 
understanding~ communicative action serves the 
transmission and renewal of cultural knowledge; 
under the aspect of coordinating action, it 
serves social integration and the establishment 
of group solidarity; under the aspect of 
socialization, it serves the £ormation of 
personal identities 5. 
Speakers use language, discourse and by implication 
narrative to achieve aims often related to freedom and 
dependence, with objectives like social cohesion, group 
solidarity or legitimation directly upheld or disavowed by 
What a speaker says & 
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Notions about narrative as strategic practice suggest 
its implication in the accomplishment o:f community and 
authorit.y. 
e:f:fective 
Imowledge. 
meta-code 
In particular, narrative is seen as an 
tool in maintaining collective codes o:f 
In this light, narrative :functions much like a 
for speaJters, a point proposed nearly two 
decades ago by Roland Barthes. It o:f:fers speakers an 
implement more general underlying logic by which to 
communicative conventions and allows :for the e:f:fective 
sharing and transmission o:f stories within culturally and 
socially explicit codes o£ meaning '. This idea - which 
upholds the ritual dimensions of communication activities 
has been suggested by theorists as wide-ranging as 
Hayden White, Lucaites and Condit, the narrative paradigm 
o£ Walter Fisher, and in a more general :fashion by social 
constructivists like Berger and Luckmann Within the 
meta-code o£ narrative, reality becomes accountable in 
view o:f the stories told about it. But it becomes 
accountable only to those who share the codes o:f knowledge 
which it invokes. 
These three points about narrative - its ability to 
invoke community, its employment as a strategic act o:f 
legitimation and its :function in constructing reality 
suggest that journalists, as speakers in discourse, have 
employed a broad range o:f stylistic and narrative devices 
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to uphold parameters o£ their own authority. As Hayden 
White argues: 
once we note the presence o£ the theme o£ 
authority in the text, we also perceive the 
extent to which the truth claims o£ the 
narrative and indeed the very right to narrate 
hinges upon a certain relationship to authority 
per 5e 'if) ... 
This suggests that with public speakers in a variety o£ 
modes of discourse, questions o£ narrative are at least 
partially entwined with questions o£ authority and 
legitimation. 
The role o£ narrative reconstruction in achieving 
legitimation becomes particularly relevant when 
considering the evolution o£ particular stories over time. 
Many literary theorists have allowed £or the possibility 
o£ £alse authority in the communication of historical 
narratives. Work in £olklore has also made suggestions 
about the dissemination of narratives across time and 
space The cumulative addition o£ new speakers - hence, 
new information- as time and space un£olds is thereby 
seen as positioning and repositioning speakers vis a vis 
original events, recon£iguring their authority. In such a 
way, di££erent aims having little to do with narrative 
activity are seen as becoming di££erentially embedded as 
narratives are replayed across time and space. This 
£ocuses attention on tellers o£ the tale, £or as Hayden 
White notes, 
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a specifically historical inquiry is born less 
of the necessity to establish that certain 
events occurred than of the desire to determine 
what certain events might ~~~Q for a given 
group, society, or culture's conception o£ its 
present tasks and future prospects ". 
Which speakers emerge as authorized voices of a given 
story thus reveals much about the practices by .. hich they 
are rhetorically legitimated and the authority through 
which they are culturally constituted. It suggests that 
telling a tale has much to do with the attributes and 
authority of its teller. Ultimately, this £ocuses 
attention on the inevitability of narrative adjustment in 
retelling a given tale, and the possibility that the 
reconstructive work it implies can be taken in accordance 
with aims associated with the speaker's legitimation. 
Such premises about narrative and rhetorical 
legitimation are o£ direct relevance to journalism 
pro£essionals, whose work has long been characterized as 
an entanglement o£ narrative, authority and rhetorical 
legitimation :l .• ?. While nearly all professional groups have 
evolved in association formalized bodies of 
knowledge, much of the professional authority of 
journalists has corne to rest not in what they know but in 
how they use it in narrative practice. This means that 
their rhetoric offers them an effective way of realizing 
their legitimation as public speakers. Such an analysis 
not only emphasizes the ritual dimensions of 
81 
communication, but it again suggests the regard £or 
journalists as an interpretive community, held together by 
its tales, narratives and rhetoric. 
In such a light, the £oundations o£ creating 
journalistic authority £or the assassination are embedded 
within the narrative £ramework by which journalists have 
told its story. This is £acilitated by the £act that 
rhetorical legitimation constitutes a characteristic trait 
o£ journalistic practice. Journalists have used their 
narratives to legitimate their actions as pro£essionals. 
The immediate and ready linkage between journalists and 
their narratives has thus invited a wide-ranging and 
identi£iable corpus by which journalists have addressed 
not only their coverage o£ Kennedy's death but also 
ongoing discourses about cultural authority, journalistic 
pro£essionalism 
journalism .. 
Journalists 
and the legitimation o£ television 
have employed a number o£ narrative 
strategies by which they re£erence their own legitimation 
through the assassination story. While each o£ these 
strategies will be discussed in detail in subsequent 
chapters, they are mentioned here in order to generate an 
understanding o£ how rhetorical legitimation works and how 
narrative £unctions to promote a shared lore among 
journalists. 
82 
;!TBAI.EG_g~_9LJ3gI£~~lJiG_JJ:lg __ AS;;iI"?J3.J..R~n9l!. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy constitutes one 
incident 
rhetorical 
incident 
which has invited narratives addressing the 
legitimation of journalists. Seen as a critical 
among journalism professionals :L .;:,,; , that 
journalists have used to evaluate and reconsider notions 
of professional practice and journalistic authority, the 
assassination story has offered journalists a particularly 
fruitful corpus through which to construct and reconstruct 
the story of their assassination coverage. Through it,. 
they have also set up foundations by which they can claim 
to be the story's authorized spokespeople. 
Retelling the assassination of John F. Kennedy has 
provided a viable cornerstone against which the 
reconstructive work of journalists has flourished. 
Retellings of the assassination have produced a huge body 
of literature, including nearly 200 books within 36 months 
of his death, hundreds of periodical pieces, television 
retrospectives and at least 12 newsletters In all 
medial names of reporters have been thrust forward, often 
in front of the names of organizations employing them. 
Stories of the assassination coverage have traded and 
paraded the names of individual reporters as emblems of 
authority for the events of those four November days. 
Retelling the Kennedy assassination has given journalists 
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a 
stage on which to spread tales and gain status for their 
telling. 
Journalists were not the only ones vying to retell 
what had happened, especially when the possibilities of 
conspiracy became more pallatable during the late 1960s. 
By that point, ""newsmen, police, intelligence agencies 
examined the evidence" 1~, as did historians, novelists 
and screenplay writers. One early suggestion that 
journalists would not play an understated role in 
retelling the events of that November weekend was found in 
correspondent Charles Roberts' critique of 
assassination buff Mark Lane. Roberts complained that 
Lane, ",ho provided "the only complete published list of 
wi tnesses·' to the assassination, failed to include "some 
50 Washington correspondents who were on press buses" SG. 
This suggested as early as 1967 that journalists would 
promote themselves as central players in establishing the 
official record of Kennedy's assassination. 
Over time, journalists have chosen many formats in 
which to incorporate themselves and their memories into 
the assassination story. Appraisals of Kennedy's 
administration have been marked with references to his 
assassination .. Nostalgic "'period"" pieces have reserved a 
place for journalists' personal memories. Articles, books 
and documentaries have provided investigatory glimpses of 
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the assassination, including £resh perspectives on then-
reigning conspiracy theories. Regardless of format, most 
attempts to address the assassination have re£erenced some 
aspect o£ the reportorial role in covering it. As one 1988 
television retrospective remarked on showing Kennedy being 
hit by bullets: 
President and Mrs. Kennedy in the final seconds 
be£ore that aw£ul moment (pause, while shot £rom 
Zapruder £ilm shown). A moment etched forever in 
our hearts. An hour later NBC correspondent Chet 
Huntley and Frank McGee relayed the news we had 
all £eared most 07. 
The relay of memories about the assassination ensured that 
the journalist-as-teller became embedded in the event's 
telling. This has created a place £or narrative within the 
retellings o£ the assassination. Over time, it has also 
created a situation by which actual news coverage has been 
held up by journalists as the "preferred evidence'· o£ 
their assassination recollections. 
Implicit in retelling the assassination - regardless 
o£ the medium which journalists have used to do so 
- is 
narration, or how journalists have narratively retold 
events. Retelling the events o£ November, 1963 constitutes 
an imprecise history by which journalists have narratively 
reconstructed the story in ways which address and 
reinforce 
- their own legitimation and authorization as 
speakers. By de£inition, narrative accomodates the 
inclusion of narrators within the assassination story. 
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Telling the story (of recollections of the assassination) 
of the story 
story (of the 
(of the assassination coverage) through the 
journalists who covered it) has introduced 
rounds of narration that mediate the resulting narration 
record. 
This was exemplified in a 1988 NBC television 
retrospective on the assassination .. The documentary 
positioned Edwin Newman 
Huntley, David Brinkley 
as 
and 
extern",l narrator; Chet 
Frank McGee as internal 
narrators; and various reporters- like Bill Ryan or Tom 
Pettit - as on-the-site chroniclers of events The 
story progressed as if there were no visible difference in 
the temporal frames occupied by each chronicler: Yet Edwin 
Newman spoke 25 years after events, Frank McGee spoke the 
night of the assassination, and Tom Pettit spoke a few 
moments after Oswald was shot. The fact that they were all 
brought together as if they were relating one 
chronological story neutralized the differences involved 
in occupying alternate temporal frames. It made the role 
o£ external narrators central in 
(false) proximity to the events 
a way that suggested a 
in Dallas, enhancing the 
authority of those spokespeople who were both temporally 
and spatially furthest from the original events of 
Kennedy's death. 
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Narrative has thereby accomodated the inclusion o£ 
narrators regardless o£ the part they originally played in 
the assassination coverage. It has also given journalists 
a way to legitimate their connection to the story years 
a£ter the assassination took place, and miles away £rom 
its original events. It is thus no surprise that very £ew 
articles 
remained 
editorials 
or news-items. about the assassination hsve 
anonymous .. Those that did are generally 
that bear the collective mark o£ the 
institutions that produced them. Instead, most e££orts at 
journalistic recollection have not only been authored but 
identi£ied by individual author's name. One CBS 
retrospective, £or instance, documented the £our days o£ 
Dallas coverage through the persona o£ anchorperson Dan 
Rather. By repeatedly coming back to £ilm clips o£ Rather, 
the documentary gave the impression that he was 
responsible £or all o£ the network's original coverage 
£rom Dallas i'a This supports his central presence in the 
documentary as narrator. 
This is not to suggest that narration has been 
realized in a haphazard or sporadic £ashion. As Lucaites 
and Condit have suggested, narrative £unctions as a 
pragmatic and critical choice on the part o£ speakers. 
Rhetorical narrative, in particular, has evolved as 
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distinct from other kinds of narratives due to 
dependence on larger discourses: 
Rhetorical narration constitutes only one part 
of the discourse in which it appears •.. The claim 
supported by a rhetorical narrative must be 
calculated outside of the narration .0. 
its 
The fact that the original recording Ox events - such as 
the television footage or step-by-step prose accounts of 
Kennedy's shooting - has often stayed the same while the 
narration about it has changed with each retrospective or 
publication has allowed journalists to differentially 
contextualize stories o£ their coverage. The strategic 
adjustments of memory which narration implies has tended 
to correspond to larger discourses through which 
journalists have recalled the assassination. They have 
done so in ways which uphold ongoing discourses both about 
the legitimacy of television news and the consolidation of 
journalism professionals. 
Recognizing the need for narrators in assassination 
retellings in itself references a collective code by which 
journalists have agreed to accomodate their presence in 
their tales. The place created for narrative within 
assassination retellings thus upholds more general notions 
about the role of narrative in consolidating them into a 
community. It also references the role of narrative in 
constructing reality. In particular, the narrative 
adjustments by which journalists have retold their part in 
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the assassination suggests the employment of narrative to 
realize aims o:f legitimation. The fact that narrative has 
persisted 
reposition 
ways. 
over time and space allows speakers to 
themselves around such an aim in a variety of 
Journalists have relied upon three main narrative 
strategies to recollect the assassination. These 
strategies have been invoked both alone and in tandem~ 
exemplifying the complex nature of journalists~ 
reconstructive work in retelling their coverage of the 
events of Dallas: They include synecdoche, personalization 
and rearrangement. 
Synecdoche, or the narrative strategy by which the 
part is called to '"stand in"" for the whole is 
frequently used by journalists in recollecting their 
accounts of Kennedy's death. Within the assassination 
narrative, this strategy allows journalists to borrow the 
authority accrued from having covered certain events, and 
apply it to events they did not experience. 
For example, a rifle being withdrawn from a window in 
the Texas Schoolbook Depository olas used to stand in for 
witnessing Oswald's shooting ••• References to a bullet 
being pumped into Oswald's stomach signified his shooting 
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e3. A foot sticking into the air from the back of the 
president's limousine signified Kennedy's death 
The most illustrative example of synecdoche can be 
found by examining the actual facts behind journalists./' 
coverage o£ the assassination story. Scholarship on the 
assassination has established that journalists effectively 
covered the events of the longer 'Jeekend In 
particular" they covered the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald 
by capturing his shooting on live camera" 
labelled a "£irst in television history" 
hailed as exemplary reporting. Similarly, 
a feat then 
;:;:e. and since 
t.heir coverage 
o£ Kennedy's funeral made them into masters of ceremonies" 
who were lauded for having played an active part in 
healing the nation Against these two aspects of the 
longer assassination weekend" journalistic coverage or 
Kennedy's assassination has been touted as one of the 
journalistic triumphs of contemporary history. 
Yet closer examination reveals that this was a 
constructed notion that set in after the assassination 
weekend had passed. Moments of triumph were unevenly 
scattered across the assassination weekendw Journalistic 
coverage began, in reporter Tom Wicker's wordsii' "when it 
was allover" "";. Although journalists provided prompt and 
comprehensive coverage, it was fraught with problems: Most 
journalists did not see Kennedy shot, did not hear Kennedy 
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shot, 
rumor" 
chronicled reports on the basis of hearsay and 
lacked access to recognizable and authoritative 
sourcesI' and processed faulty information S'~'r:) Proven 
journalistic methods- such as reliance on eyewitness 
status, accessi~g high-ranking sources, or fact 
verification - were all unhelpful. The speed with which 
information could be transmitted outpaced the reporters~ 
ability to gather it. They simply could not keep up. And 
this took place 
in media history. 
in front of one of the largest audiences 
Moreover, the extensive involvement of amateurs and 
laypersons challenged the professionalism of journalists. 
Eyewitness testimony was provided not by the fifty-some 
journalists in the motorcade but by ordinary bystanders 
who had not been paid to ··cover the body" of the 
President, but who did so anyway. Pho"tographic 
documentation, including the famous Zapruder film, was 
provided not by the 50-some journalists riding in the 
Presidential motorcade but by local merchants, housewives, 
businesspeople and other laypersons 30. Abraham Zapruder p 
the dressmaker who provided what has come to be called one 
of the most studied films in history, actually forgot his 
motion-picture camera and had to go home to retrieve it 
before the motorcade~s arrival 3~ 
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While these points will be addressed in more detail 
in later chapters, the sketchy overview offered here 
suggests that journalists' coverage of the death of John 
Kennedy was problematic. On the provision of 
information, the original journalistic task of covering 
his shooting, journalists simply did not make the grade. 
From this perspective, their coverage reflected a 
situation of journalistic failure, casting the ability of 
journalists to serve as spokespeople for the event as 
false. Authority needed to be constructed not through 
their actions but through their narratives about those 
actions .. In other words, journalists needed to 
rhetorically legitimate themselves in order to offset what 
was in effect a basically problematic performance. 
The ability of journalists over time to forward not 
the problem-ridden version of the assassination coverage 
but the version that hailed their activities as a 
professional triumph has been made possible in part 
through the narrative strategy of synecdoche. Through 
synecdoche, journalists have made the assassination 
narrative into one long story that extended from Friday 
until the following Monday. It tells the tale of Kennedy's 
death, Oswald's murder and the funeral of the President in 
a way that lends closure to the upheaval suggested by the 
events of those four days. By adopting one long narrative, 
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journalists have success£uly overstated their successes of 
coverage and underplayed their failures. By invoking what 
was seen as "successful u coverage - the funeral or the 
shooting of Oswald - as representative of all journalistic 
performances o£ the assassination weekend p they have 
turned aside potential criticism of their performance. 
Rhetorical legitimation has thus been facilitated by 
the natural tenor of events during that long weekend. For 
e::>cample, many of the problematic aspects of coverage on 
the day Kennedy was shot were resolved by the day he was 
buried: 
shooting 
funeral 
Journalists' lack of eyewitness status in the 
was resolved by their presence both at the 
and at Oswald's murder. Issues of fact 
verification appeared less salient once the more general 
facts of Kennedy's death and Oswald's presumed role in it 
were confirmed. The accessibility of sources played less 
of a role as the unravelling of what had happened took 
shape through the eywitness accounts of non-official 
sources, usually bystanders. Disjunctions between the 
rapid pace of information relay - made possible by wire 
and the slower pace of services, radio and television-
journalists' information gathering became less central as 
the events of the weekend edged into the funeral, where 
little information-gathering was necessary. Within all of 
these circumstances, the fact that journalists missed the 
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shooting was recast as an incidental part of a larger 
journalistic triumph rather than maintained as an 
independent mishap that cast serious doubts on their 
professionalism. 
It is important to note that technology has been 
portrayed as central to the accomplishment of journalistic 
work .. Photographs, affadavits, films all have given 
journalists a way of going back and retelling their role 
in the assassination in a way that let them take 
responsibility for both the work of other journalists and 
news organizations. It facilitated synecdochal 
representations of the event, by which journalists could 
emerge as authoritative spokespeople for the assassination 
story, regardless of what they personally had done. seen 
or heard. This situation was particularly fruitful for the 
legitimation 
others. 
of certain journalists as speakers over 
Thus synecdoche has given journalists a credible role 
in the larger assassination narrative, constructed by them 
as extending from Kennedy's shooting to his funeral four 
days later. Portraying events within one long narrative 
has made them responsible for the story in its entirety. 
Synecdoche blurred the problems that characterized many of 
their activities. It blurred what was and was not 
··professional"' about their coverage. It also helped 
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journalists assume responsibility for events which went 
beyond their personal experience, by hinging discussions 
less directly on what journalists had actually done and 
more on the images o:f journalistic coverage that both 
journalists and news organizations were interested and 
invested in perpetuating. 
A second strategy o:f retelling the assassination is 
through personalization a Recollecting events has been 
accomplished through the persona o£ reporters, with 
assassination coverage documented through their personal 
experiences. Journalists have tended to set up their 
:familiarity with the events of Dallas, so as to later play 
off the authority which it gave them. 
Personalized narrative has been most effectively 
grounded in journalists' physical presence in Dallas 
during the assassination weekend. Journalists who were 
there wrote and spoke of their eyewitness experiences 
under titles which underscored their authority for events. 
Ttm.§'. correspondent Hugh Sidey authorized his account o£ 
the Kennedy Presidency by noting that "r was with him in 
Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963. Few correspondents who 
were there will ever forget that day" 
correspondent Tom Wicker credential led one of his books 
with the note that "his two years as White House 
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correspondent included coverage of President Kennedy's 
assassination U ~3. Pictures £rom the assassination weekend 
were reproduced with markers encircling reporters' heads 
or torsos. An article by !'L~.~_"!~_~.§,-Is. reporter Charles Roberts 
reproduced a photograph of Roberts at the LBJ swearing-in 
aboard Air Force One. In the picture, thick white arrows 
pointed at Roberts' head, situated behind that of the 
Vice-President ~4. A book by the same author reproduced a 
picture of the press credentials that Roberts had used in 
Dallas on its back flap ""'. 
Television '~ retrospectives began by setting out the 
November 1963 presence of their narrators, detailing 
exactly where in Dallas they had been. Reporter Steve 
Bell, 
but then a national correspondent, recollected the 25th 
anniversary of Kennedy's death on the evening news in the 
following way: 
In Omaha, Nebraska, this young reporter and his 
wife had just been told by the doctor that our 
first child would be born any day now. Then the 
President was dead, and I was sent to Dallas to 
cover the aftermath 3_, 
The program then proceeded to document not only what had 
happened when Kennedy was shot but what else Bell had done 
in Dallas. For example, it included repeat on-air footage 
of Bell's original televised coverage twenty-five years 
earlier. 
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Setting up the journalist's presence in Dallas was 
central to legitimating the journalist as an authorized 
speaker for the assassination story. Recalling the 
assassination story was ~lso grounded in t.he monitoring 
positions which certain reporters like Harrison 
Salisbury or Walter Cronkite held at network or 
newspaper headquarters. In an article entitled '"The 
Editor's View in New York," Salisbury recalled how his 
position at the 
assassination coverage ~7a His reconstruction of events 
reinforced the importance o£ his role in covering the 
assassination. Indeed, the relevance attached to 
monitoring the assassination story was somewhat 
underscored in assassination tales from their outset. Said 
Marya ~Iannes in Ihe. ... J:Lee.E.9E_t.§~_ o£ December 19, 1963: 
I listened to the familiar voices o£ those men 
who we are highly privileged as a people to have 
as interpreters o£ events: Edward Morgan and 
Howard K. Smith, Walter Cronkite and Eric 
Sevareid and Charles Collingwood, Chet Huntley 
and David Brinkley. Marvin Kalb and Robert 
Pierpoint ':i>,s. 
Few o£ the reporters Mannes mentioned were in Dallas. Most 
were anchorpersons or correspondents who monitored and 
commented upon the assassination story from afar ~ •. 
Journalists also used their tales to document their 
intentions o£ having been present at the event in Dallas: 
Twenty-£ive years after the assassination p television 
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reporter Edwin Newman was called upon to narrate NBC's 
opus six and one-half hour reconstruction of events. He 
began his narration by saying that "r myself, having been 
told that I would be going to Dallas went instead to 
Washington 
Chancellor 
on a plane NBC had chartered" 40. Reporter John 
introduced another television retrospective by 
talking about his experiences in Berlin at the time that 
Kennedy was shot What was not made clear in either 
them to case was why these experiences credential led 
authoritatively speak about the events of Kennedy's death. 
Personalizations> made explicit by the personal 
experiences and narratives of journalists, has thus helped 
to anchor and authenticate institutional recollections of 
the assassination. It allows media institutions to invoke 
the experiences of certain journalists as legitimate 
reconstructions o£ the assassination story_ In both the 
press and broadcast media, journalists are able to 
position themselves in authoritative positions vis a vis 
the assassination weekend through their personal 
experiences .. Doing so, however, blurs the fact that many 
personal narratives based on such experiences bear 
questionable authority for the events in Dallas. Working 
on the assassination story from afar thus constitutes a 
potentially faulty frame through which to recollect the 
assassination ,.eekend. The fact that personalized 
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narrative has been held up by news organizations as a 
legitimate way to anchor institutional recollections of 
the assassination story~ hO\lJever ~ reinforces its 
importance. Wittingly or not, it has also set up a 
credible frame"Jork by which to legitimate certain 
journalists as speakers for the assassination story, 
regardless of the role they actually played 
it. 
in covering 
Yet a third way of retelling the assassination is 
through rearrangement. Rearranged narrative has generated 
many holes of memory in the assassination story, as 
journalists have reconstructed their assassination 
coverage by rearranging time, people and places connected 
with original assassination tales. The role of radio. for 
example, was literally erased from institutional 
recollections of events. Although mos·t -television 
retrospectives employed radio broadcasts as background 
when discussing television's part in covering the 
assassination, few have problematized radio's coverage or 
identified it - either by medium. network or individual 
reporter. Books and articles employ fragments of radio 
broadcasts, usually vaguely referencing them as "radio 
broadcasters". 
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Other holes o£ memory perpetuated by rearranged 
narrative include the controversy surrounding television's 
£acilitation o£ the death o£ Lee Harvey Oswald. The 
disappearance o£ this speci£ic discourse over time has 
played directly into ongoing notions o£ what it means to 
be a journalism pro£essional. The intruding presence o£ 
journalists in the corridor where Oswald was shot - the 
cables, equipment, sheer numbers - was enough o£ a problem 
a£ter the assassination to generate many o££icial and 
pro£essional censures of" journalistic behavior The 
Warren Report even had a special section called liThe 
Activity ox Newsmen,,11 where it examined the problematic 
aspects o£ journalistic per£ormances in Dallas Yet 
contemporary mention of that dimension o£ 
behavior in Dallas is di££icult to £ind. 
journalistic 
Contemporary 
renditions o£ the Oswald story have instead cast it as the 
pro£essional triumph that was implicit in the scoop o£ 
having caught the murder on live camera. Other holes o£ 
memory have included the role o£ amateur photographers and 
£ilmmakers in capturing Kennedy's shooting, and the 
assistance engendered by local media in covering the 
assassination. Although immediately hailed £or the help 
lent national media during the events in Dallas 4., today 
local reporters receive nary a mention in assassination 
recollections. 
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The most interesting rearrangements Or assassination 
coverage are found in the people who have disappeared from 
institutional recollections of the story. CBS reporter 
Eddie Barker~ for example p who was news director o£ CBS"s 
affiliate in Dallas, played a major role in the 
assassination coverage, providing the first unconfirmed 
reports that Kennedy was dead. 
conveyed shortly afterwards: 
KRLD-TV newsman Eddie Barker, after having 
talked to a doctor at the hospital, made the 
initial report that the President was dead. 
Walter Cronkite in New York continually referred 
to this report but emphasized it was not 
official. Thus, CBS had a beat of several 
minutes that Mr. Kennedy had died of his wounds 
Also at the scene of the assassination, Dan Rather 
followed Barker's dispatch with twa uno££icial 
confirmations before Kennedy's death was officially 
established. 
Yet how has this story held up over time? In 
contemporary chronicles, Barkerl's role in the story is 
mentioned in only the most extensive and detailed 
accounts. Generally, they follow the line taken by this 
1989 recounting: 
"The eyes of Walter Cronkite swelled ~Iith tears 
when he heard, from a young Dan Rather, that 
President Kennedy was dead" '.''''. 
Another version, penned in 1983, claimed that "thanks to 
Rather, CBS achieved another '£irst" the news that 
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Kennedy was dead" Yet another, written in 1978, 
mentioned that first Rather, then Barker had received word 
that Kennedy was dead ••. A number of facts have been 
invalidated by these accounts: That Cronkite heard the 
news initially from Barker and only afterward from Rather; 
that Cronkite's eyes swelled with tears when he received 
official confirmation of the death, not when he heard it 
from Rather; and that the "first·· of conf irmi ng Kennedy's 
death was accomplished by Barker, not Rather. Most 
accounts of CBS' coverage o£ events have rarely conveyed 
correct versions of the incident, instead highlighting Dan 
Rather within the story at the expense of the lesser-known 
(and non CBS-employed) Eddie Barker. In other words, the 
role of t.he local reporter has been consistently 
understated alongside the more extensive accounts accorded 
his or her national counterpart. 
The purpose of rearranged narrative is thus to help 
certain journalists and news organizations rhetorically 
legitimate their presence within the assassination story. 
There are many examples of what is gained here: 
Understating the role of radio overstates the role of 
television; shifting attention away from the role of 
amateurs focuses attention on the function ox journalism 
professionals; 
recollections 
deleting mention of local media 
of the performances of national 
enhances 
media. 
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Rearranged narrative has thus reflected ongoing discourses 
about the rightful boundaries of journalistic practice and 
authority. Journalistic recollections o£ the assassination 
coverage have been strategically rearranged to produce a 
uniform narrative that plays up the role of professional 
journalists~ particularly those employed by the national 
broadcast media, in covering the assassination 
Rearrangement is thus directly linked with 
of discourses about shifting boundaries 
story. 
larger 
cultural 
authority, changing definitions of journalistic 
pro£essionalism 
television news. 
and the emerging legitimation of 
The narrative strategies by which journalists have 
retold the assassination story have thereby set up an 
extensive which journalists are able -to 
rhetorically reconstruct the part they originally played 
in the assassination story. Personalization centers 
recollections on journalists' personal experiences and 
narratives, highlighting the importance of the reporter 
within the larger contex't of Kennedy's death. 
Rearrangement promotes the presence of certain 
journalists, practices and news organizations within those 
recollections. And synecdoche contextualizes the 
personalized rearrangements of journalists within larger 
narratives about the legitimation of television journalism 
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and journalistic professionalism. While the precise ways 
in which journalists have used these strategies will be 
addressed in coming chapters, it is fitting to note here 
that journalists~ strategies of retelling the 
assassination have foregrounded a self-referential 
discourse that in many cases conceals a false authority 
for the events of that weekend. Regardless of the 
integrity of such a discourse, it has played a critical 
part in journalists' self-legitimation as their 
assassination tales have been disseminated across time and 
space. 
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By setting up the foundations by which journalists 
would emerge as authorized spokespeople for the 
assassination through their retellings of its story over 
time and space, narrative has thereby fostered the 
rhetorical legitimation of journalists. While it did not 
signal the complete process by which journalists would 
emerge as the story's authorized spokespople, it has 
nonetheless provided the groundwork on which their 
authorized presence could and did flourish. The fact that 
journalists' retellings of the story of Kennedy's death 
have accomodated the presence of narrators, in a variety 
of forms" has made retellings of the story largely 
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dependent on journalists~ presence as storytellers. 
Narrative has thereby set in motion a somewhat circular 
process of legitimating journalists as authorized public 
speakers: Over time,. the assassination story has most 
effectively been told by journalists authorized to speak 
for its events. But by the same token, journalists have 
become increasingly authorized and legitimated as 
spokespersons for the story through their presence in the 
narratives which have relayed its events. 
Much of this has been realized through the acceptance 
and recognition of narrative adjustment as a legitimate 
implicit way of retelling the assassination. The 
acceptance of constructed versions of' reality, making 
reality accountable through the stories told about it, has 
allowed journalists to strategize their assassination 
retellings by adjusting them to meet collective aims. The 
fact that narrative adjustment- in all its forms - has 
evolved into an acceptable practice for telling the 
assassination story has erased barriers that in other 
circumstances might have obst.ructed journalists' 
rhetorical legitimation. The peculiar reality-based claims 
of assassination narratives,. coupled by the large spatial 
and temporal spans through which they have been 
disseminated .. suggests that they have involved a mode of 
adjustment that fertilizes journalists' attempts to 
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legitimate themselves. This in turn has increased the 
possibility of adjusting narratives in accordance with 
even larger agendas - about journalistic professionalism, 
cultural authority, and television journalism 
engendering 
legitimation. 
the cyclical nature 
Wit.hin such parameters, 
of rhetorical 
the consolidating 
moves of journalists around the centrality of narrative 
have upheld their functioning as an interpretive community 
and solidified the ritual aspects of their retellings. 
It is important to note that the acceptance of 
narrative adjustment as a mode of retelling the 
assassination was derived in no small part from the chaos 
that surrounded the events of Kennedy's death. Audiences 
existed - for however transient a period of time in 
cirucmstances or confusion, void and uncertainty. The 
ability of journalists to step into those circumstances 
and emerge as authoritative spokespeople was thus in part 
circumstantial, with legitimacy derived from the 
audience's suspension of judgment. Yet the overwhelming 
need for cohesion and community not only on the 
journalists' part but on the public's too - has allowed 
journalistic authority to flourish through the narratives 
that journalists have told. 
Against these circumstances, these pages have 
suggested how, in the case of the Kennedy assassination, 
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narrative set the groundwork by which journalists have 
transformed themselves into more authoritative 
spokespeople than warranted by their actual connection to 
the assassination story. Journalists have used narrative 
strategies of adjustment to offset what was often false 
authority for the actual assassination story. The rhetoric 
of self-legitimation on which this was predicated has been 
embedded by journalists within the assassination tales 
themselves. This exemplifies Habermas' contention that 
speakers in public discourse use "street t",isdom" as 
effective rationale to exercise a basically false 
authority. 
Narrative has played a central role in setting up a 
certain image of journalists in conjunction with their 
coverage of the events in Dallas. In order for 
journalists' versions o£ the assassination story to emerge 
as authorized perspectives, there was need for routinized 
and repeatable narratives by which the part played by 
journalists would be told. Reporters' assassination tales 
has thus become instrumental in setting up and maintaining 
the parameters of the events of Kennedy's death not only 
'. 
for those concerned with the tale of the President's death 
but with the tellers who told it. While the rhetoric of 
journalistic legitimation has been subsequently cemented 
by other features - such as journalists'" assumptions o£ 
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different roles through their assassination narratives-
the process of legitimating journalists as spokespeople 
for the assassination story is grounded in its 
legitimation as a strategy in public discourse. Through 
narrative, the ability of journalists to promote 
themselves as cultural authorities for the story of 
Kennedy's assassination was made possible~ 
i This argument has been most forcefully advanced by 
technological determinists who contend that the form of 
establishing authority in public discourse is directly 
determined by the attributes of the medium at hand [See 
Harold A. Inois, g:.ffi.pA!:"' .... ~!1.9.J:: .... 9J.ll.m .. E}1ic .. "!tig!l.§. (Toronto: 
1 972) ; Mar sha 11 M c L uh a 0 , ll ..'-' ... 9"'§"J;'..§ ... t,.?!!1sl..in.SLl1.."' .. <::I .... i a ( Land 0 n : 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"COVERING THE BODY" BY TELLING THE ASSASSINATION 
"This numbed grief must be made articulate" 
- Editorial, Th .. "' .... B_~£:.:t.."'.:r. .. (12/5/63), p.19. 
November 21, 1963 was a routine day for the fifty-odd 
journalists who travelled with President John F. Kennedy 
on a campaign trip to Dallas. They had been assigned to 
"cover the body." This assignment held them responsible 
for the activities of the President of the United States, 
particularly if the unpredictable were to arise. "Covering 
the body" gave news organizations one way o£ routinizing 
the unexpected ". 
On November 22, however, "covering the body·' took on 
a more literal connotation: The assassination of John F. 
Kennedy threw the boundaries of appropriate journalistic 
practice into question. What journalists could and could 
not do - or did and did not do in covering the 
assassination rattled their shared notions of journalistic 
pro£essionalism, and the boundaries by ~lhich their 
practices could be labelled professional. In this chapte" 
I identify what happened to those boundaries by tracing 
the narratives through which journalists recounted their 
part in the assassination story. Through journalists' 
narratives that were published and circulated at the time 
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of Kennedy's death, the following pages describe how 
journalists relayed their activities of that weekend 
through narrative. Through their coverage of the events in 
Dallas, they displayed what they considered to be 
boundaries 
authority. 
of appropriate journalistic practice and 
During the quarter-century since John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated, journalists have transformed their accounts 
about his death into one long narrative memorializing the 
slain President. Journalists# memories e}:tend over what 
appeared to be four continuous days of grief and mourning. 
They begin with the arrival of the Kennedys in Dallas, 
extend through the President's motorcade and death, and 
conclude with his state funeral. Stories of this four-day 
stretch of events have come to constitute the master 
narrative by which the particulars of Kennedy's death have 
been told. Through it, journalists have assumed 
responsibility for many of the smaller events comprising 
the assassination story, regardless of what they 
themselves saw, did or heard. 
Yet at the time journalists faced tasks that were far 
more discrete. Covering the assassination called' £or 
behavior that was somewhat "out o:f bounds" of Iormalized 
journalistic standards. It constituted what Gaye Tuchman 
has called the "what a story" category, the story which 
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sidesteps routinized expectations p has no steadfast rules 
o£ coverage and calls for strategies o£ improvisation and 
rede:finition Herbert Gans has similarly discussed the 
"gee whiz"' story" the classification that embodies the 
residue of other more commonplace types of news stories 3. 
The assassination story thus called £or trained instinct 
on the part of journalism professionals. In their attempt 
to effectively routinize and control its unpredictability, 
they approached aspects of the assassination as 
independent moments o£ coverage. News organizations 
assigned individual journalists to seemingly finite i'mini-
events" within the more generalized assassination story .. 
This presented a quandary, of sorts. For while 
journalists did not possess the kind of standardized 
guidance they needed to cover the story, what journalists 
did, or said 
themselves 
activities, 
activities,. 
they did, had much to do with how they viewed 
as professionals. Embedded within their 
and narrative reconstructions about those 
were explicit notions about professionalism p 
journalistic practice and the media technologies that 
assisted and hindered them in formulating authorized 
stories about the assassination. The fact that they did so 
in circumstances that offered few guidelines for covering 
news other than an emphasis on instinct and improvisation 
has made an examination o£ 
critical. 
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their authority all the more 
In this chapter, I consider journalists~ accounts of 
covering the assassination at the time of Kennedy's death. 
I trace the master narrative of the assassination~ by 
£ocusing on journalists' original accounts of covering 
Kennedy's shooting~ Johnson's swearing-in, the £ollow-up 
to the shooting and the mourning of the President. Through 
notions of professionalism, authority and journalistic 
practice that were embedded in these accounts, r consider 
covering the assassination story was an act of 
journalistic failure. Yet its transformation into a story 
of professional triumph and its invocation as a 
cornerstone by which the craft of journalistic authority 
would be realized 
legitimation. 
- displays the workings of rhetorical 
By most existing models of journalistic practice, the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy constitutes one event 
that has rattled formalized notions about what it means to 
be a profeSSional journalist. The assassination story 
moved from the shooting of the President to the shooting 
of his presumed assassin, £rom the improvisory swearing-in 
of a new President to the ceremonial burial o£ an old one, 
with a rapidity that stunned most journalists seeking to 
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inscribe its chronology .. 
the beat that assigned 
Reporters "covering the body~" 
journalists to the President's 
activities should the unpredictable arise, faced difficult 
and unanticipated circumstances~ 
Although they provided prompt and comprehensive 
coverage~ journalists did not see the event, sometimes did 
not hear the event, incorporated hearsay, rumor and faulty 
information into their chronicles, and failed to access 
recognizable and authoritative sources~ Journalistic 
methods upon which most reporters had come to rely - such 
as eyewitness status, access to sources or fact 
verification - proved unhelpful and rendered an incomplete 
version of the story. The speed of information 
transmission outpaced their ability to gather it, and 
their inability to keep up was apparent to the largest 
viewing audience in media history~ 
When Kennedy was assassinated, neWB editors quickly 
labelled the event "the biggest story of their lifetime" 
.,. Within 24 hours more than 300 media representatives 
arrived in Dallas ,~; Because of the story's numerous 
unpredictable and potentially unmanageable angles, 
assignments did not always match anticipated event.. It 
remained a "breaking story" throughout: The .. transfer" of 
Lee Harvey Oswald became coverage o£ his murder~ Covering 
the succession story became an eyewitnessing of LBJ's 
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inauguration amidst the cramped conditions aboard Air 
Force One. Those assigned to write the follow-up on 
Kennedy's shooting wrote instead of the killing of Officer 
Tippit or confused medical briefings about the President's 
Although the state funeral provided one £orum in body. 
which the story's different threads were temporarily 
brought together, journalists approached the larger 
assassination story through stages manageable to them. 
This meant that they concentrated on independent and often 
isolated moments o£ coverage that were later brought 
together in larger narrativess Those moments offered 
journalists individual but separate loci on which to 
reconsider p recall and rethink the haws and whys of 
journalistic practice. 
IIJhl1e intended here as an analytical tool, reducing 
the assassination story into discrete moments of coverage 
in effect reflected the task-orientation of journalists 
covering the story. Journalists recounted concentrating on 
the immediate tasks to which they had been assigned. Their 
accounts focused on four moments o£ coverage: the shooting 
of Kennedy; the hospital; the swearing-in 
John:son; the follow-up to Kennedy'. shooting, 
of Lyndon 
including 
the murder of' Lee Harvey Oswald; and Kennedy's funeral .. 
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The following pages summarize how journalists recounted 
those moments at the time of the assassination story. 
Despite the presence o:f :fi:fty-odd tvashington 
correspondents in the President's entourage, at the moment 
o£ Kennedy's assassination most were corralled inside two 
press buses taking them to downtown Dallas. As a result, 
covering the assassination began in one reporter's view 
"'4hen the central fact of it was over'· S By the time the 
£ew reporters riding in press photo cars had broken loose 
"7 , the President's car had already sped o:f:f to Parkland 
Haspi tal. Consequently, reporting on the assassination was 
reconstructive and derivative £rom the beginning. Most 
reporters simply missed the initial event. 
Typical reports o:f the shooting, taken respectively 
f'rom radio, television and the print media, went as 
It appears as though something has happened in 
the motorcade route. Something, I repeat, has 
happened in the motorcade route. Parkland 
Hospital - there has been a shooting. Parkland 
Hospital has been advised to stand by :for a 
severe gunshot wound. The o:f:ficial party, as I 
can see itp turning around, going to the 
emergency room at Parkland Hospital -. 
At about 12:32, the motorcade turns a corner 
into a parkway_ The crowds are thinner ... three 
shots are heard, like toy explosions. (NBC 
cameraman Dave) Weigman jumps from his car, 
running toward the President with his camera 
running. People scream, lie down grabbing their 
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children. I leave the motorcade and run after 
police, who appear to be chasing somebody. The 
motorcade moves on fast 9 
As our press bus eased at motorcade speed down 
an incline toward an underpass~ there was a 
little confusion in the sparse crowds that at 
that point had been standing at the curb to see 
the President of the United States pass. As we 
came out of the underpass~ I saw a motorcycle 
policeman drive over the curb, across an open 
area, a £ew £eet up a railroad bank, dismount, 
and start scrambling up the bank 10 
The perspective was partial; no account confirmed that the 
President had been hit. Accounts began through the 
uncertain perspective of the bystander and reflected 
innuendo, rumour and half-truth. It took time before 
journalists definitively knew 'nhat had happened. 
Afterwards some reporters maintained that they "were not 
8v.n=tre that anything serious had occurred until they 
reached the Nerchandise Nart two or three minutes later" 
:1. :1. 
For journalists invested in upholding their status as 
pre£erred observers o£ the event, this posed problems~ The 
assignment o:f "covering the body" gave them what were 
essentially generous boundaries - of proximity and access 
in which to play out their authoritative presence in the 
story. The £act that they m.issed the event in e££ect 
constituted a blow to their professionalism. Because news 
organizations hungered £or a cont.inual stream o£ 
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in£ormation~ the disjunctions £elt by reporters sent to 
"cover the body" \-·}ere magnified. 
When Kennedy was shot, _the Associated Press~ Jack 
Bell was in the pool car in the Presidential motorcade. 
pre£acing it with the observation that he had "witnessed 
the shooting £rom the £ourth the procession :1. l",~ 
The £easibility o£ that £eat was doubt£ul. a point borne 
out when Bell himsel£ authorized the event through what he 
had h.§'..5!L9... not what be had § .. ~§,_11: 
There was a loud bang as though a giant 
£irecracker had exploded in the caverns between 
the tall buildings we were just leaving behind 
us. In quick succession there were two other 
loud reports. The ominous sounds o£ these 
dismissed £rom the minds o£ us riding in the 
reporters' pool car the £leeting idea that some 
Texan was adding a bit o£ noise to the cheering 
welcome ... The man in front of me screamed, "My 
God, they're shooting at the President" ,.~,' 
As Bell looked back at the building where he thought the 
shots had come, he said he "saw no signi£icant signs o£ 
activity" 14* His actions suggested that he also did not 
believe what he did see: When the pool car pulled up at 
Parkland Hospital, he jumped out and looked in the back 
seat of the Presidential limousine: 
For 
back 
£ull 
natty 
there 
asked 
said, 
an instant I stopped and stared into the 
seat. There? £ace down, stretched out at 
length, lay the President, motionless. His 
business suit seemed hardly rumpled. But 
was blood on the £loor. "Is he dead?" I 
a Secret Serv ice man. II I don ~ t l~not-J , II he 
"but I don~t -think so" :I.~.'.'j 
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Even faced with first-hand evidence of activity that other 
reporters contended had blown hal£ o£ the President's head 
away, Bell needed confirmation. 
Ironically, the AP's eyewitness account for the 
assassination came from a staff photographer. 
Photographing the motorcade, James Altgens telephoned his 
Dallas editor with the news that Kennedy had been shot. "I 
saw it,." he said. IIThere was blood on his face~ Mrs. 
Kennedy jumped up and grabbed him and cried 'oh no!' The 
motorcade raced onto the :freeway" ',<ii, The AP ran that 
account in £ull. Altgens' photograph o£ a Secret Service 
agent climbing over the back of Kennedy's 1 imousin8 'VJas 
transmitted 25 minutes after the shooting :I. '7 TvJO ~4eeks 
later, 
entitled "Lone 'Pro' on Scene When JFK \')as Shot". Tracing 
his career as a professional photographer, the article 
hailed the fact that Altgen's photographs remained 
exclusives "for 24 hours - until some amateur film turned 
up" ~. f~ 
During the shooting, UPI's Merriman Smith was seated 
in the saffle pool car as Bell. Like Bell, he did not see 
the event but heard the shots. Over the pool car's 
radiophone, he reported that "three shots were fired at 
President Kennedyls motorcade in downtown Dallas" :1. 'i:'~ 
Seeing but not knowing, hearing but not seeing p neither 
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seeing nor hearing: Such were the Ioundations from which 
journalists generated authorized accounts o£ the event. As 
William Manchester later said of Smith: 
Smith was not as astute a reporter as he seemed. 
Despite extensive experience with weapons, he 
had thought the sounds in the plaza were three 
shots from an automatic weapon, and in a 
subsequent message he identified them as bursts. 
But his speed was remarkable eo. 
Initial reports of the assassination, '''hile rapidly 
transmitted, thus displayed the authority of partial 
J,no,.,ledge. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that the machinery 
of government information was virtually paralyzed. Unlike 
the death of Roosevelt, \rJhich was "announced by a 
simultaneous phone call to three wire services from the 
White House" ;t-i: :I. , official channels of information relay 
were blacked, confused or simply nowhere to be found. 
Journalists had three choices: to exclude problematic 
in£armation, to include it or to qualify its inclusion by 
admitting that it had not been verified. As Wilbur Schramm 
later said,. reporters on ·the Dallas story were "up against 
one of the classical problems of journalism: What 
constitutes evidence? tJhen does a report have enough 
support to justify passing it along?" Reporters lacked 
the time,. source£!.. or circumstances in to 
satis£actorily resolve such issues~ 
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Information about the shooting was strung together in 
bits and pieces. Reporters needed to £irst establish the 
presence of shots, then the fact that the shots had 
wounded the President, the possibility that the wound was 
fatal, the rumors of his death, and finally the fact that 
had died. ~!i th each step in that sequence p the 
certainty among journalists about what had happened grew. 
But each step also generated new questions, uncertainties 
and inaccuracies~ Accomplishing professional goals of 
coverage in an accurate, £act-based and veri£iable fashion 
was virtually impossible. 
The main thrust of coverage was to inform the public 
quickly. Approximately 61 minutes elapsed 
journalists worked their way down the initial story's 
sequence. First reports reached the wires a meager £our 
minutes after the shots were fired 23. Six minutes later, 
at 12.40 p.m •• \')alter Cronkite broke into CBS' "As the 
~~orld Turns"' to announce- in UPI" S I.<Jords that Olin 
Dallas Texas, three shots were fired at President 
Kennedy's motorcade. The first reports say that the 
was seriously vJounded" Radio brought 
intermittent and fragmented updates~ mostly reworded wire-
service accounts: 
We interrupt this program to bring you a 
special bulletin from ABC Radio. Three shots 
were fired at President Kennedy's motorcade 
today in downtown Dallas, Texas ... State and 
local 
Port, 
to get 
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police have sealed 
where the Kennedys 
near that area a~. 
o££ the area at Hyannis 
live. No one permitted 
Before Kennedy was officially pronounced dead~ over ha1:£ 
of the nation had heard news of the assassination attempt 
This does not suggest that many journalists knew more 
than their dispatches revealed. As William ItIanchester 
later recounted, during that first hour 
the ratio between the public and its true 
informants was roughly 38,000,000:1. The 
Cronkites and Huntleys were as out of touch as 
their demoralized listeners; the best they could 
do was pasa along details 2? 
Filmed footage sho¥led journalists huddling in groups 
outside Parkland Hospital, clutching notepads and pencils. 
Many listened to radio, whose reporters, relatively 
unencumbered by equipment, transmitted the paraphrased 
accounts OI wire services. Television followed suit. 
the story moved on, local ne¥ls staffers helped national 
organizations flesh out 
reporter Tom Wicker maintained that "nobody thought about 
an exclusive; it didn~t seem important'" 2':''''. Cooperation, 
as a standard o£ action, ¥las "greater than it ever had 
been in the industry's history" Although tales of 
rivalry and competition did exist in a fashion typical of 
everyday journalistic practice, it was telling how much 
journalists' retelling Or the story of their cO .... lerage 
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emphasized the notion of cooperation. This in itself 
suggested the ritual aspects of telling the assassination 
and hCH.) it \l,.Jas invoked by journalists to establish 
community and authority. 
An impromptu press conference at Parkland Hospital 
gave journalists their first marker of institutionalized 
journalism, less than an hour a£ter the President was shot 
3~ Later cited as one of the major sources of confusion 
over the exact nature. or Kennedy's head wound, the 
conference, held by acting press secretary Malcolm 
Kilduff, confirmed that the President was dead. The 
medical briefing that followed was later called "the most 
tempestuous hour in the history of American journalism": 
The scene was bedlam. Several correspondents 
were hysterical. A question would be asked, and 
the doctor would be halfway through his answer 
when another reporter broke in with an entirely 
different questiong Misquotations were 
inevitable •. ~Medical briefings were supposed to 
quash misunderstandings. The one at Parkland did 
exactly the opposite 32. 
When reporters asked Dr. Malcolm Perry i£ it was 
possible that one bullet could have struck the President 
from the front, the doctor replied affirmatively. 
reporter Hugh Sidey, realizing the implicat.iol1S, cr.i..ed, 
IIDoctor p do you realize what you're doing? You're 
con£using us." But reporters quickly transmitted hie. 
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confusing answer to the public, and the next morning 
Americans across the country were already ··convinced that 
a ri£leman had £ired £rom the top of" the underpass" 
This in turn generated one o£ the major misreadings of the 
nature of Kennedy's head wound. 
Soon a£ter, transport o£ the Presidential co££in on 
its way £rom the hospital to Air Force One gave som.e 
journalists what would be their closest and most 
authori ts·ti ve sightings o£ the President. In the l'L<e'.Io! .... Y9..E.l>. 
Tom Wicker's account of the procession around the 
bronze coffin was laced with the intricate detail 
eyev.Ji tnessing: 
Mrs. Kennedy walked beside (the co££in). Her 
£ace was sorrow£ul. She looked steadily at the 
£loor. She still wore the raspberry-colored suit 
in which she had greeted welcoming crowds in 
Fort Worth and Dallas. But she had taken o££ the 
matching pillbox hat she wore earlier in the 
day, and her dark hair was windblown and tangled 
o£ 
His account £ocused solely on the grie£ o£ the widow. Ten 
days later, his account of the same event was more 
distanced and appeared to be less stunned: 
They brought the body out in a bronze co££in. A 
number of White House sta££ people - stunned, 
silent, stumbling along as i£ dazed walked 
with it. Mrs. Kennedy walked by the cof£in. her 
hand on it, her head down. her hat gone, her 
dress and .tockings spattered. She got into the 
hearse with the co££in. The sta£f men crowded 
into cars and £ollowed 3B 
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In the second account p Wicker contextualized Jacqueline 
Kennedy#s actions alongside those of the White House staff 
people}, suggesting a metaphoric step backward to include 
them in the picture. Ten days later, the reporter was 
sufficiently distanced from her grief to contextualize her 
activities around the casket within a larger 
about the continuity o£ governm.ent and 
machinery. 
The removal of Kennedy's casket 
extensively by the media. Reporters recounted 
discourse 
governm.ent 
replayed 
lool<s of 
dazed shoc1-\ on the faces of staffers and family. 
Photographic images of Jacqueline Kennedyp her dress 
spattered with blood, holding onto the side of the coffin, 
were one o£ the first filmed shots provided by nevJB 
in Tom photographers. The casket's removal \o.las alsop 
Wicker's words, ··just about the only incident that I got 
wi th my O\;l)n eyes that en'tire afternoon" 
The events at Parkland Hospital slightly offset the 
jarring conxusion of the first hour that 
Kennedy's shooting~ There was a temporary overstatement of 
formalized journalistic practices p with the medical 
briefing reinstating semblances of the channels through 
which reporters usually obtained their in:formatiol1.D 
Transport o£ the President's coffin upheld the eyewitness 
status of those journalists who witnessed it. Journalists~ 
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pree,ence at Parkland Hospital provided detai Ie, I;Jhich 
helped journalists authorize themselves as spokepeople for 
the story: For that reason details from the hospital 
stories of journalists milling about outside, the medical 
briefing, the transport of the body - filled audio, prose, 
photographic and filmed assassination accounts a This was 
not because the hospital constituted a central part of the 
larger assassination narrative. because it. 
signalled a return to order until more authorized filmed 
and photographic records of the shooting would become 
available. Coverage OI journalists" hospital presence 
o:f:fered journalists. a viable way to uphold their 
professionalism, and therefore authorize their coverage o:f 
the story_ Emphasizing this particular moment of coverage 
helped them lend credence to their presence within the 
larger assassination narrative. 
Following the shooting, coverage of the assassination 
branched in three separate directions 37 a In one arena o£ 
coverage? journalists were assigned to what William 
~lanchester later suggested was the Uother story II - Lyndon 
J':;)hnson~ s succession as President 38. As the co£:fin was 
brought out, a group of reporters "made (their) way to the 
hearse.a.and the driver said his instructions were to take 
the body to the airport u .:Y:;'). Conf"used communiques between 
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Kennedy~s staff, Attorney-General Robert Kennedy in 
v-)ash i ngton, and the President-elect generated a hasty 
decision to inaugurate Johnson at the airport before Air 
Force One was airborne. To facilitate an unproblematic 
succession}' Johnson agreed far reporters to be present as 
eye,,,,i tnesses 
This made the swearing-in one of the £ew times during 
the assassination story that journalist.s took on 
officially-recognized role.e, of eyew i t.nesses .. Three 
journalists agreed to serve as the press pool~ Said UPI's 
Merriman Smith: 
Jiggs Fauver of the White House transportation 
o££ice grabbed me and said Kildu££ wanted a pool 
of three men immediately to fly back to 
Washington on Airfares One, the Presidential 
Aircraft... Downstairs I ran and into the 
driveway, only to discover that Kilduff had just 
pulled out in our telephone car. Charles Roberts 
(of ~Li§:.~!'§'~.:d~~!i), Sid Davis (0£ tl)estinghouse 
Broadcasting) and I implored a police office to 
take us to the airport in his squad car 41 
Davis went aboard the plane to cover the swearing-in but 
did not return to Washington 42. He instead supplied pool 
coverage o£ the event to a busload o£ reporters that 
arrived as the plane took off. Said ane reporter: 
I shall not soon forget the picture in my mind, 
that man (Davis) standing on the trunk of a 
white car. his figure etched against the blue? 
blue Texas sky, all of us massed around him at 
his knees as he told us of what had happened in 
that crowded compartment in Air Force One 43 
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Thus was chronicled JohnBon~s s\-Jearing-in ~ Special 
importance was accorded the role o£ photographers, I:Jho 
produced the o££icial photograph o£ the event. 
"one of our 
historic photographs" ..tj • ..t:j •• 
But. the uncertainty and hasty arrangements 
surrounding 30hnson 1 s swearing-in produced coverage that 
was spotty and uneven. The !{§."'_ .. 'l-'?J;:JS .... .IJJJ1_E'..:"'.. c.omplained that 
'-no accurate listing of those present could be obtained" 
The 34 words which made Johnson President were 
recounted verbatim, with little attempts at enclosing them 
within larger narratives. Accounts, scripted lil<e 
descriptions o£ photographic details, sti£fly recorded who 
stood next to whom and what color clothes each person 
wore~ The coverage, while authenticated as eyewitness 
reporting, was seen as sti££ and uninspired prose. 
The £act that reporters eye"i tnessed the s~,earing- in 
was nonetheless important £or their notions o£ 
pro£essional credibility. It gave them a pro£es.ional 
presence within the larger assassination story 9 and that 
presence was highly regarded by other members of the press 
corps~ Charles Roberts was interviewed on the Hunt.ley-
Brinkley Report the night of the assassination about his 
experiences in eyewitneasing the swearing-in 46. Roberts 
also used his attendance at the swearing-in and the plane-
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ride home to justify his writing of a 1967 book called I!1§. 
fA much larger group of journalists set to work 
unravelling the assassination's threads. Their £ollOvJ-Up 
work began Friday night, when Dallas police attempted to 
hold a midnight photo opportunity with Kennedy's accused 
killer, Lee Harvey Ost,vsld ~ At the tim.e, over 100 persons 
filled the halls of the police station, whose conditions 
I;)ere "not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush 
hourI! 
_8 Dallas was ill-equipped to handle the growing 
in£lux of reporters, and the police's attempts that night 
to address mounting pressure :for information proved to be 
a :fiasco: 
Cameramen stood on the tables to take pictures 
and others pushed forward to get olose-
up •... After Oswald had been in the room only a 
few minutes, Chief Curry intervened and directed 
that Oswald be taken back to jail because, he 
testi£ied~ the 'newsmen tried to overrun him' 
The police planned to transfer Oswald from the city 
to the county jail the next morning. Armed with details of 
the trans£er, the press corps arrived in groups. ABC" 13 
camera person wae one o£ the £ew told to relocate at the 
country jail so as to await Oswald's arrival there ~O~ By 
10:00 a.m~, an estimated 50 journalists were in attendance 
in the basement o£ the city jail, including still 
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pho·tographers~ television camera-people and reporters from 
all media ~''::j:1. Conditions £01." coverage were among the best 
available to journalists during the larger assassination 
story, which in itself suggested the degree to which 
journalistic authority was negotiated with other cultural 
and professional groups. 
One detective relayed the following account of the 
police attempt to transfer Oswald: 
The 
which 
Almost the whole line of people pushed forward 
when Oswald started to leave the jail o££ice, 
the door, the hall - all the newsmen were poking 
their sound mikes across to him and asking 
questions, and they were everyone sticking their 
£lashbulbs up and around and over him and in his 
:f ace :'!.~iE:. 
"near-blinding television and motion pictLlre lights 
were allowed to shine upon the escort party 
increased the difficulty of observing unusual movements in 
the basement"" 53 This I,A}ould later generate discussions 
about whether or not journalists had facilitated Oswald's 
death. As NBC's Tom Pettit recalled ane year hence: 
In that throng it was di££icult £or any reporter 
to Bort out who was who. But £or the television 
reporters the problem was compounded by the need 
£or simultaneous transmission. What was recorded 
by microphones and cameras (either film or live) 
would go on the air without much editing. What 
transpired in the hallway was broadcast without 
much opportunity for evaluation. And the 
television reporter could not move about freely, 
since his own movement was limited by the length 
o£ his microphone cable 54 
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What happened after that became. in the eyes of certain 
observers, in television Jack Ruby 
stepped out £rom the group of reporters, dre~N a gun and 
pulled the trigger. Oswald slumped to the floor. 
Journalists recorded the event in sound; in prose, in 
still photographs, and transmitted it live on television. 
Written accounts detailed the incredibility of Oswald 
having been shot in view of the television camerae 
Still photographs of the homicide pushed editors at the 
p_"tt.~.9-"' __ .. H9.Kn.ing __ l:l_~Y'.§. into a second edition: The photograph 
on its front page displayed Ruby clearly pointing a gun at 
Oswald. 
later win a Pulitzer Prize for picture of Os,,,ald 
crumpling under the bullet1e impact ~7. One trade article, 
entitled II Pictures of Assassination Fall t.o Amateurs on 
Street II" \..;ent as :follows: 
The 
the actual shooting down of the President was 
caught mainly through out-of-focus pictures 
taken by non-pro£essional photographers~ But the 
actual shooting of his accused assailant was 
recorded in £ull view o£ press photographers 
with their cameras trained right on him and this 
produced pictures which may ranlt with the 
greatest news shots o£ all time ~e 
article offset the largely amateur photographic 
recording of Kennedy's shooting- its emphasis on 
pictures that were "out o:f focus" and photographer,s "'ho 
unon-pro£essianal"" t.he pro£essional 
photographic recording o£ Oswald's murder. Photographic 
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coverage of the second event upheld the professionalism of 
news photographers which, other than Altgens' photograph 
o:f the President slumping in the car or the o:f:ficial 
photograph o£ LBJ's inaugurationr had until that point 
been a questionable dimension of recording the atory~ The 
:fact that most trade publications juxtaposed coverage o£ 
one event !",ith the other suggested the problematics 
presented by their earlier per£ormanceA 
P.Jd.pJjd~:.9,§:~~ noted in a moment of professional vindi.cation, 
.. i:f President Kennedy's death 'las left for the amateur 
photographers to record, the situation reversed itsel£ on 
Sunday ~ November 24" ~'.'.';.::~. 
Radio reporters called out the news o:f Oswald"s 
with Radio Press International broadcasting 
sound of the shot to its subscribers around the world so. 
Ike Pappas was then a reporter for WNEW Radio in New Yorl~: 
My job on that day was to get an interview with 
this guy, when nobody else was going to get an 
interview~ And I was determined to do that ... I 
went £orward with my microphone and I said p this 
is the last time you can talk to Lee Harvey 
Oswald. ask that question again, and I said "'00 
you have any·thing to say in your de£ense?" .]us·t 
as I said "de£ense", I noted aut of' the carner 
of my eye p this black streak went right across 
my £ront and leaned in and, pop, there was an 
explosion. And I :felt the impact o:f the air :from 
the explosion o£ the gun on my body ... And then 
I said to mysel£~ i£ you never say anything ever 
again into a microphone, you must say it now~ 
This is history. And I heard people shouting in 
back of me "he" s been shot," ~ So I e.aid the only 
thing which I could say, which was the story: 
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"Osv,~ald has been shot. A shot rang out~ Os",~ald 
bas been shot.. (i,:,:t ~ 
Despite Pappas' on-the-spot presence, he did not himself 
put together the information that Oswald had been shot~ 
His relay of the incident was thus in some sense derived 
from the accounts of reporters around him. 
But the story a£ OswBld~s murder belonged mainly to 
television: 
For the first time in the history o£ television, 
a real-life homicide was carried nationally on 
live television when millions of NBC-TV viewers 
saw the November 24 fatal shooting in Dallas of 
the man accused 
ear 1 i er (,=;',:l,: .. 
of assassinating JFK two days 
The story played live on NBC. CBS recorded the event on a 
local camera. Although the network's New York headquarters 
were not £eaturing that camera on live feed] they were 
able to replay immediate coverage from a videotape monitor 
ABC~ whose camaraperson had moved to the county jail. 
had to compensate with non-£ilm accounts of the story 
More than perhaps other moments o£ coverage within 
the assassination storYr the presence o£ journalists was 
made an integral part of Oswald's murder. A caption under 
the photograph of O",",ald sinking to the floor read "Dallas 
detectives struggle with Ruby as newsmen and others watch" 
Reporters recounted the cries of NBC correspondent Tom 
Pettit and ather reporters on the scene. Replays of Pettit 
shouting "He'" s been shot r he'" s been shot, Lee OS!:Jald .has, 
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been ahot!1I constituted one way to legi timate t,he 
journalist as eyevJi tness. It also referenced the 
iDst.i tutional presence o£ the news organization to which 
he belonged .. 
issued 
one week after the assassination, carried the following 
description of Oswald's murder: 
Oswald, flanked by detectives r stepped onto a 
garage ramp in the basement of the Dallas city 
jail and was taken toward an armored truck that 
was to take him to the county jail. Suddenly~ 
out of the lower right hand corner of the TV 
screen, came the back of a man. A shot rang out p 
and Oswald gasped as he started to fall. 
clutching his side SS~ 
A telling £eature about this narrative rested in its 
second sentence, which was repeated verbatim in numerous 
prose accounts by jouurnalist.s: ··Suddenly 1 out o:f the 
lower right hand corner of the TV screen, came the back of 
a man .... The juxtaposition of reality and televised image~ 
by which Oswald's l~iller was seen coming out of the 
t.elevision screen,. rather than a corner of the basement, 
paid the ultimate compliment to television*s coverage of 
the event. In the case of Oswald~s death, television was 
featured as of£ering a reality that seemed momentarily 
preferable to the real-life situation on which it I"as 
based. 
Coverage of Oswald's murder thus somewhat resolved 
the uncertain eyewitness status of reporters that had 
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characterized their coverage of Kennedy#s shooting. The 
adjunct technologies used by journalists authenticated 
them as eyewitnesses through various replays o£ the 
incident~ The event, now camera-witnessed, emphasized 
journaJ.ists~ presence,. part.icularly that of 
photographers and television journalists, and brought it 
into assassination chronicles. Reporters would replay the 
across media with the assistance o£ tapes, 
recordings and photographs, their reactions becoming 
embedded through technology in the story's retellinge 
Still another arena of coverage took 
Washington. From Saturday onwards, the media 
attend to the grot,.}ing processions of" mourners ~ 
shape 
began 
in 
to 
that Kennedy·s body would lie in state in the Capitol 
Rotunda before the funeral o£fered journ-31ists a 
continuous stage of activities connected 'Hi th t.he 
assassination storY4 Decisions to display those activities 
reflected far-reaching normative and organizational 
responses to the assassination story. 
Newspapers cancelled columns of advertisements in 
order to mak'2 room for e}ttra copy (,.",7'" P.:3.E.§' .. 9..~. magazine held 
up distribution of" an issue that £eatured an article about 
Jackie Kennedy in the White House Ga~ Networks cancelled 
commercials, and substituted scheduled programming with 
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special coverage Haking the Kennedy assassination 
their only story through Monday evening, television 
cameras focused non-stop on groups o£ citizens viewing the 
President.iel coffin. NBC broadcast continuously for 42 
hours "70.. The long and continuous coverage provided a 
glimpse of "Jhat many observers called the best of 
televi~,ionp it .. trans.ported the viewer to the 
scenes a£ news" 7:1. Coverage culminated in Kennedy's 
funeral on Honday, which by Nielson estimates constituted 
the heaviest day of television viewing within the 
assassination at.ory 
Central to all moments of coverage within the 
assassination story was the jOl.lrnalie.t" .e. role of 
consolation and reassurance. Covering the assassination 
turned journalists e££ectors o£ uni£ication and 
reassura.nce~ The "'individual cat.harE,is~ t.he laying o:f 
doubts to rest and the reinforcement of American norms" 
were more the rule than the exception 73~ Communication 
channels "'reassured people that the :functions of 
government were being carried on smoothlyp that there was 
no conspiracy and that there was no further threat"· 7~ 
Said TV broadcaster Edwin Newman~ the night of the 
assassination: 
~<}e shall hear much in the next £eW' days about_ 
the need ·to bind up the Illounds o:f the natlol1 y 
and about the need :for all Arn.er i cans to stand 
together .. (Me may treat t.hoe,e v·,'ords as empty 
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slogans or as real needs to be genuinely met. 
Whatever we do, that can be no guarantee that 
what happened today will not happen again. But 
what is within our power, we should do. And it 
is within our power to be more serious about our 
public life on, 
James Reston~s Washington column the day after the 
assassination was perhaps first to set aut the parameters 
of journalistic consolation in print~~ Entitled 
America tveepsHp ·t.he column began as £01100:,.]s: 
America wept tonight, not alone for its dead 
young President, but £or itsel£. The grief was 
general, for somehow the worst in the nation had 
prevailed over the best .•. There 1 0 however 
consolation in the fact that while he was not 
given time to finish anything or even to realize 
his own potentialities, he has not left the 
nation in a state of crisis or danger 76. 
Celebrated by other journalists as IImagnificent~~oits 
content better than Reston.P s column \.v8S 
eventually regarded as a landmark piece o£ assassination 
coverage 7"7. ,Other nel,,;e, organizat.ions post tioned t.he IfJords 
of journalists in prominent places. One Colorado newspaper 
relocate.d the column of Walter Lippmann to the lead spot. 
on the £ront page and ran his reaction alongside details 
of the assassination 79. 
The consoling role of journalists reached new heights 
with their coverage of the mourning and the funeral~ Media 
presentations were saturated with messages of stability, 
unity and continuity_ Mourning Kennedy was treated liJ<e 
the grieving o£ a personal friend. Political questions, 
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such as the possibility of disruption or threat implicit 
in the fact of the assassination. were thrust aside, even 
mOJii.entari 1 Y ~ The mood was one of continuity rather than 
disruption. 
The sounds of mourning resounded long after the event 
concluded at Arlington National Cemetery. The day 
the tattoo of muffled drum., the hoof beat. of 
the horseB, the measured cadence o£ the honor 
guards, a tolling of a distant bell, and the 
sound of bands as they played marches and hymns 
after 
Sounds were broadcast with an immediacy that brought 
listeners into close contact with the event The 
silence of journalists who catered to them reinforced 
their supportive role. 
But the poignancy o£ the weekend belonged overall to 
television .. It \¥8.S ironic that television's triumph 
emerged £rom the £act that "t.he voices of the 
I,)ere silent"" .:'i:\j. 
the day's history is written, the record of television as 
a medium t.>Jill constitute a chapter ox honor" 
magazine labelled televj.sion~s continuous 
coverage mature, digni£ied, e~pert and pro£essional 
"Touches of pure television", in addition to the murder of 
OSI"Jald 1 included Jackie Kennedy kneeling in the rot,unda 
\'J i t.h Caroline to kiss the £189 on the co££in, John . ..Try 
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saluting the caisson outside St~ Mathews cathedral~ t.he 
tovlering de Gaulle beside the tiny £raJTtE; 0:£ 
Haile Selassie, and the riderless horse 84. In If1any of 
those moments, the "good t.aste of television asserted 
i t,$J?l£ as the cameras veered a~,}ay t.o ensure pr i.vacy··; in 
ot.hers, the cameras vi.sually an·ticip.sted 'vJhat the 
audiences wanted to see 85 
Thus the ability of journalists to tell the story of 
the assassination of John F. Kennedy was realized through 
a number of discrete moments a£ coverage. Some o:f t.heSi2 
moment.s - such as the £uneral or the capture of Lee Harvey 
OSl.vaJd constituted pro£essional tr i mnphs. Others 
notably the shooting o£ President Kennedy - were £raught 
with conduct that shadowed professional standards9 In the 
latt.er case, formalized notions of journalistic practice 
were rattled in £avor of journalists l ability to respond 
inst,:'lntl y to une){pected circumstances: The lac]t of access 
to sources produced an overemphasis on activities at the 
hospi t.31 fr even though journalists' decorum at the hospital 
press conference helped generate one of the most contested 
reading!:::, o£ Kennedy1e. head Coverage of the 
swearing-in was spotty, uneven and stilted, and was hailed 
for its p:hotogr~:phic record a£ the event by 
photojournalists rather than in prose~ The 
capt.ure o£ Oswald posed serious questions about the 
intrusive nature o£ journalistic practice. 
This suggests that journalists' ability to present 
cO"<lera9 8 of the assassination as a story o£ pro£essional 
·triumph support,ed by journalists~ activities on 
the 2,cene ~ It waB, however, embedded in the narratives by 
t.hey reconst~ructed their act~.i.vi ties .. In 
ret.elling their coverage p journalists thereby eml?:rged as 
pro.fessionals~ Rhetorical legitimation was invoked as an 
antidote to what was basically a situation of journalistic 
£ailure. 
Already by the end of the assassination i;.Jeekend I' 
journalists had begun to refine the story in the direction 
of a larger narrative~ CBS~ Charles Collingwood gave the 
brushed-up scenario of the Kennedy shor.:J·ting 
Monday evening. By then. II) i ·th a 
phot.ograph of" t.he incident.: 
This was the scene in the big open Lincoln a 
split second a£ter that shot. The President is 
slumping to his le£t. Mrs. Kennedy, half rising, 
seems to stretch out an encircling 
Connally, in the seat ahead of the 
half-turned toward the President. 
been hit himself or is about to 
moment., noone knew how seriously 
had been wounded. But from this 
arm. N GO .... lernor 
PrI2.sident,.f is 
He' E. ei ..!cher 
be~ this 
the Pro!:=.i.dent 
in Dallas moved with dizzying speed BG. 
still. 
Collingwood's account differed considerably from the wire 
St--:.<rviC'2 television correspondents had 
delivered verb·stirn jUf:.t four days earlier. In the 1.3.ter 
143 
version, the photograph of the shooting provided the focal 
point of Collingwood's story. His familiarity its 
details hid the fact that he had not eyewitnessed the 
e~lent'5 The phot.ograph le9Jtimated him . ~ as an eyewl~ness -
i£ not o£ the event, then o£ its record~ In this way, the 
reconstructive work bolstered his partial authority £c~r 
the event. It also embedded the media's role in telling 
the story within the event's retelling. 
said on the evening of November 25, II in thig day o£ 
t,e1evision and r,adio" the clOrd spread quicl-::ly. in 
offices and homes came to a standstill, a.s:, people sat 
transfixed by television and radio £',e.ts " 1;,~--7 
point that not many accounts of the assassination left 
out. ~ 
It. is therefore no surprise that what journalist,s 
[,.aid ·they did in covering the assassination story o£ten 
did not match their original activities. The £act that 
many problems of coverage out through 
long \;,Jeekend- with? £or example, a leck o£ eyewitness 
status resolved at both the £uneral and at 
murd,2.:t-· ; a need to access high-ran]~ing sources resolved by 
the eyewitness accounts of bystanders about Kennedy's 
de-at.h; the pressure to verify facts resolved as the more 
cent.ral facts of Kennedy's death or LBJ's swearing-in were 
con:f i. rmed; and disjunctions about the pace and unevenness 
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of in£ormation relay neutralized as events gave way to 
tbe £c.Dcral, ,<.)here 1 i t.tle information-gathering 
neC2'SBary - all suggest that within the larger context o£ 
the assassination weekend, the individua.l 
cr'''3racterized m.o:ments (:if coverage h~ere recast at:!.. 
incidental parts of a larger drama~ 
This suggests that already by Monday many journalists 
had begun to retell the event through the perspective o£ 
authorized chrarliclers, their accounts substituting the 
UDcext.ain words o£ bystanders with more certain authorized 
ob.s(?1"vat.ions ~ bystanders~ eyewitness accounts, 
amateur photographs, preliminary r,?port~, o£fe1."ed by t lv;; 
police and medical establ i.~,hnl,ents p and 1.3t-er :fi lmed 
chroniclesi' journalists began to counter 
their problematic authority for the event through their 
Because t,heir retelJ.ings conte.~~:t:-ua 1 iZ i2d 
diE,crete moment.s of coveragr;:~ on8 COherl;:3nt 
narr-.sti "'-Ie:l they blurred v-lhat~ IrJas and not. 
IIpro£es~,ional u about coverage,. !,vhat con.c:;t.i tute.d 
"prof'2s.sional U would emerge not £rom singular events li)~e 
the Kennedy shooting but from the larger narr,7{,':.i'l8 i.nto 
INhic.h they 1,>}'2re eventually recast. This made journalists 
into authoritative spokespeople for the story in its 
not just for the discrete moments o£ coverage 
they personally saw and heard p or in the worst a£ cases, 
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did not see and did not hear. More important? their 
retellings began to reveal characteristics of the larger 
discourses into which stories o£ the assassination would 
eventually be co-opted. 
The fact that original assassination accounts were 
constructed £rom discrete moments of coverage~ each 
di££erent journalistic goals, thereby had less bearing 
impact due to journalists' reconstructive work. Once 
recontextualized as one overall assassination narrative, 
the different problems concerning journalistic practice 
and authority that emerged during the weekend had little 
bearing on the general tone of the assassination coverage. 
Journalists reconstructed their role in covering the 
assassination by assuming responsibility for the narrative 
in its entirety. This allowed them to assume 
responsibility both £or the work o£ other journalists and 
£01' coverage in which they played no role. It gave them a 
credible role in the larger narrative, regardless o£ "hat 
they personally did, saw or heard. Technology 
photographs, eyewitness accounts and, later, :films 
assisted them by giving them a technological base on "hich 
to conceal or o££set the parameters o£ their (o£ten £alse) 
authority £or the event. This was essential £or their 
emergence as an interpretive communitYR 
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£91'§'Q1.!L'LLO.N_ys.B?Jl:~LL~IOB!1.in±QN_ 
These pages have suggested that in recounting their 
part in covering Kennedy~s assassination, reporters 
created boundaries of the event that went beyond the 
actual moments during which the President was killed. 
Adopting synecdochal representations of the story, they 
reconstructed the event as one long narrative, that began 
Friday morning, when Kennedy and his wife were met with 
bouquets of red rases at Love Airfield in Dallas,. and 
ended Monday afternoon, when the slain President was laid 
to rest in Arlington National Cemetery. The fact that this 
stretch of four days has entered the collective 
consciousness and has been perpetuated by reporters as one 
story within its repertoire o£ collective memory certainly 
lent closure to the events of Kennedy's death. But it also 
imposed closure on the meanings behind journalistic 
presence within such a story. It made their presence 
meaningful 
provided 
gripping 
not only because of the information they 
but because of their ability to narrate a 
public drama. Their talents of in£ormation-
provision were thus recast as a rhetorical e~ercisel' much 
like the validation of their authority had in essence 
always been. 
This set up a situation by which journalists could 
justifiably legitimate themselves as an authoritative, 
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interpretive community. The ability of journalists to act 
as masters or ceremonies and play an active part in 
healing the nation is certainly a capacity they played 
well, exemplified by the dignified mode of conduct 
exhibited by many reporters covering Kennedy's funeral or 
the temporary abandonment of investigatory procedure for 
reverence But this analysis has shown that even 
consolation was only part of the picture. On a number of 
counts, journalists provided neither in£ormation nor 
consolation. Within many of the moments of coverage that 
comprised the assassination story, journalists failed to 
align themselves with either the formalized professional 
standards that guided them during regular news coverage, 
or· standards of improvisation and instinct, the "'what a 
story" category implicitly reserved for special event 
coverage. 
Yet tales of their coverage have endured. In part 
their lasting significance rested with technology. It is 
not coincidental that the parameters of journalists' 
memories of the assassination parallel the coverage lent 
the event by television. Professional memories begin and 
end in direct correspondence with the coverage provided by 
television journalists, adopting the four-day time span 
that lent the event continuity. It is in these terms that 
journalists became, in the terminology of Elihu Katz and 
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Daniel Dayan p per£ormers of a media event, putting the 
American people collectively through its paces of shock, 
grie£ and reconciliation 
The fact, however, that the technological parameters 
of television were adopted by journalists in 
reconstructing the event raises serious questions about 
the degree to which their authority for telling it was 
originally 
conditions 
demands 
justified. The unroutinized and unpredictable 
for coverage, coupled with institutional 
for information and the shadows laid over 
normative forms of journalistic practice access to 
sources, eyewitness status, or fact verification 
embedded problems of journalistic authority in much of the 
assassination coverage. The settings by which journalists 
could experiment with improvisory and instinctual forms of 
pro£essional behavior also 
to new media technologies. 
increased their receptiveness 
That over time they would 
perpetuate the narratives offered by one technology over 
others belied the extent to which their professionalism 
depended on the medium of television. Technology, in a 
sense, stabilized the improvisory nature of their 
profeSSional practice. 
It is worth noting that journalists' dependence on 
teleVision was also illustrated by the relatively 
unproblematized role of radio: In journalistic accounts of 
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the assassination, radio was rarely mentioned or 
aclmow 1 edged, even when both television and print 
It was journalists borrowed the words of its reporters. 
also rarely identified, either by medium, network or 
individual reporter. Journalists recast radio as having 
played a minor role in covering the assassination story, 
literally erasing it from institutional recollections 
because of the implicit importance they ascribed to 
television. 
The master narrative of Kennedy's death has thus told 
of "covering the body," in bath its literal and figurative 
forms .. Its implicit message is one o£ solace and 
consolation, lending closure to events which might have 
otherwise remained difficult and incomprehensible. But the 
sub-text behind this narrative, presented alongside such 
messages of comfort and consolation, has tried to forward 
a story of journalistic professionalism. Much retelling of 
Kennedy's assassination has thus been invested from the 
beginning with legitimating journalists, and particularly 
television journalists, as professionals. Journalists' 
memories of the assassination are narratives that have 
celebrated their own professionalism. This chapter has 
shown that the actual coverage of Kennedy's assassination 
Was fraught with conduct that made formalized professional 
standards problematic. Authority for the assassination 
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story, then, which journalists might have assumed for 
their coverage of events, was rarely, if ever, grounded in 
practice. Instead, it was grounded in rhetoric, in the 
narratives by which journalists have given themselves a 
central role as the assassination story~s authorized 
retellers. 
In this chapter, I have examined the basic narrative 
corpus by .,hich journalists recounted their part in the 
assassination at the time that it happened. These 
narratives have revealed that the assassination coverage 
was in many cases a situation of problematic journalistic 
professionalism. Journalists turned their failures into 
triumphs already by the end of the assassination weekend. 
This means that the reconstructive work of journalists was 
part of the assassination story from its inception and was 
basic to their emergence as authorized spokespeople for 
the assassination story. 
The accounts presented here constitute only one level 
of an intricate network of recollections, reminiscences 
and reconstructions by which the assassination story has 
been told and perpetuated. Over time, the central and 
authoritative presence o£ journalists has been firmly 
embedded in the tales by which they 
assassination 
strategically 
story. 
use the 
Journalists have 
assassination to 
retold 
come 
the 
to 
legitimate 
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themselves as professionals, trans£orming it as much into 
a story about American journalists as about America's 34th 
President. This chapter has traced the narrative corpus 
against which such a process began. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"COVERING THE BODY" 
THROUGH PROFESSIONAL ASSESSMENT 
Journalists' reconstructive work in turning the 
assassination story into a marker o£ pro£essional 
accomplishment began in the weeks immediately £ollowing 
Kennedy's death. Particularly in pro£essional and trade 
circles" marking assassination coverage as professional 
triumph had bearing on the collective sentiments that 
prevailed among journalists. Journalists' reconstructive 
work signalled the parameters of appropriate journalistic 
practice through stories of triumph, £ailure, irony, 
mishap and tragedy, all replayed as integral parts of 
assassination retellings. 
In the following pages, I explore how journalists, 
£aced with problems o£ professionalism in covering 
Kennedy's death, endeavored to cast their practices as 
pro£essional. I consider how journalists pro£essionally 
assessed their coverage at the time by emphasizing the 
improvisory and instinctual behavior that helped them 
emerge triumphant and downplaying angles problematic to 
formalized notions of pro£essionalism. This chapter first 
considers the narratives that appeared shortly a£ter the 
assassination in mediated discourse, and then the 
narratives that appeared in trade publications and 
156 
pro£essional £orums, both o£ which showed how journalists 
stretched boundaries o£ pro£essional behavior and 
journalistic practice in order to legitimate themselves as 
authorized spokespeople £or the assassination story. 
In the media, journalists assessed their coverage o£ 
the assassination story in two main ways: One way 
problematized the limits o£ journalism and journalistic 
practice through stories o£ mishap; the other way paid 
tribute to those same limitations through stories o£ 
triumph. 
The £act that the assassination story placed "perhaps 
the heaviest burden in modern times on the news-gathering 
capabilities o£ the American press'" £igured directly in 
journalistic stories o£ mishap~ For its circumstances 
the disorder, £requency and salience o£ independent 
moments o£ coverage, lack o£ access to sources, inability 
to veri£y £acts called for coping strategies among 
journalists. 
instinctual 
journalistic 
They needed to depend more on improvisory and 
behavior than 
practice, and 
reflected this dependence. 
on formalized 
their stories 
notions of 
of mishap 
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To an extent coping strategies were necessitated by 
the event~s uniqueness, and the fact that it generated 
unending demands for information. New_Xor~ T"m~§_ reporter 
Tom Wicker heard a car radio blare news o£ the President's 
death while he was milling about outside Parkland Memorial 
Hospital. "No authority," he said later of the broadcast. 
"No supporting evidence, but I believed it immediately 
because in that situation it sounded right and it sounded 
true" -. Elsewhere he said that he knew of 
no reporter who was there who has a clear and 
orderly picture of that surrealistic afternoon; 
it is still a matter of bits and pieoes thrown 
hastily into something like a whole -. 
The ohief editor of Ih.!L_.J~.§'.I?0".:..t.§<£ displayed a similar 
attempt to cope when he justified his "numbed grief" 
expressed in a column written "on November 22, a few hours 
a£ter the President died" 4. Practices and behavior which 
figured in assessments signalled journalists' ability to 
respond instantly to unexpected circumstances, bend 
established rules and procedures on a hunch and be correct 
in doing so. This helped journalists deal with mishaps by 
raising questions about certain givens of practice and 
rearranging the significance attached to them. 
One given was the journalistic "scoop". The fact that 
Coverage of Kennedy's shoC!ting was accomplished by 
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amateurs, not professionals, denied journalists the major 
scoop of the assassination story: Prose accounts readily 
incorporated the words of eyewitnesses as journalists 
tried to piece together what had happened; amateurs, 
notably dressmaker Abraham Zapruder, Mary Muchmore and 
Orville Nix, similarly recorded the shooting on film, 
outpacing the "TV cameras recording the motorcade (which) 
didn't get usable pictures" t'5 • , and still photographic 
evidence of the Kennedy shooting was provided by amateur 
photographers Mary Moorman and David Miller, who captured 
the moment with simple Polaroid cameras, in what one trade 
publication said was distanced, unprofessional and 
unfocused footage 5. Other than the Associated Press' shot 
of the Secret Service agent sprinting onto the back of the 
Kennedy automobile, professional photographers admitted 
that they "never had a chance to take a picture" '7 
These facts challenged the professionalism of 
journalists covering the story. In order to cast coverage 
of Kennedy's death as a story of professional triumph, it 
thus became necessary to bypass the importance of .. the 
scoop" by redefining what it meant. Goals thereby moved 
from generating first-hand information to collecting it 
second-hand: UPI, for example, "claimed it provided the 
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fir·st film for TV of President Kennedy's assassination 
when it sold sequences shot by Dallas amateur photographer 
11ary Muchmore to WNEW-TV New York" <;. k.i.:f.~. Vias hailed for 
running Zapruder's sequence as a four-page photographic 
spread in its November 29 issue. In both cases, the poor 
alternative this offered to providing the footage 
themselves was not visibly problematized: For example, in 
the text accompanying the pictures Zapruder's 
name was not mentioned, and the sequence Vias labelled a 
IIrem.arJ.{sble and exclusive series o£ pictures" which 
displayed the details of Kennedy's death "for the first 
time" 9. 
Professional photographer Richard Stolley recounted 
how kJ . .i§. sent him to engineer purchase of the Zapruder 
film. He observed that 
(Zapruder) was gentle with us, almost apologetic 
that it was a middle-aged dressmaker and nat one 
of the world-famous photographers with the 
Presidential press party who had provided the 
only filmed account of the President's murder 
:1. CI 
Bidding over the heads of UPI, the Associated Press and 
other news magazines, !,.if..§. paid $150,000 for all rights to 
the film. The purchase was obviously engineered in order 
to boost magazine sales, but it also corrected a basically 
flawed journalistic per£ormance, redressing with money 
what ki.i.§.:_.'2. staff had missed in practice. Interestingly, 
it also highlighted the importance of technology, for kA~~. 
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bought the technologically-produced of the 
assassination, not the coverage itself. 
Similar attempts to offset missing the scoop 
surrounded still photography_ James Featherston, a 
reporter for the Dall~§LJA~~§-H~_~ld, told of obtaining a 
Polaroid photograph of the shooting from a woman 
bystander, although some reports held that he "stole" or 
took it by force '.' .• Photographs were sometimes published 
without mentioning the amateur photographers who took 
them, a violation of commonly-followed rules of 
acknowledgement. And certain narratives by which 
photography's role in events was retold recast the missed 
scoop of news photographers as a professional triumph: For 
exam.ple, a 1968 Q],!j,J.J.. article about "Professional ism in 
News Photography" featured a picture of bystanders 
stretched atop the grassy knoll near the assassination 
scene, under the following caption: 
Seconds after the John F. Kennedy assassination 
bullets hit their mark, news photographers kept 
on working as bystanders "hit the dust" for 
protection. Photographers, including the one who 
took this picture, reacted instantly as 
professionals should •• 
Original accounts of the shooting showed that this was not 
the case, for with one exception photographers missed the 
Kennedy shooting. It was telling that recasting this 
mishap as a professional triumph was engineered by a trade 
publication, where the need for professional legitimation 
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may have been more salient than in other types of 
publications. 
Discomfort over missing the major scoop of the 
assassination weekend was reflected in interviews 
conducted with journalists one year later. They held that 
most news organizations lauded for their good taste in 
not having shown explicit photographs or footage of 
Kennedy's assassination - would have displayed the footage 
had it been available, a judgment borne out by their 
coverage of Oswald's murder: 
the American public beyond Dallas did not 
witness the assassination of the President 
simply because the television cameras had not 
been set up in the fateful block and because 
film of the event was not available until some 
time later, when its news value had changed to 
historical value 13 
Missing the footage thus punctured a hole in journalists' 
professional personae that Friday. 
Yet the importance of missing the scoop was redefined 
with the assistance of technology. Technology made it 
possible for journalists to turn first-order collections 
of information into second-order collections of the 
information gathered by others. Journalists adjusted 
"missing the scoop" into a second-order practice, by which 
they bought. stole or borrowed the records generated by 
other journalists of their own scoops. Technology - which 
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made such an adjustment possible - helped journalists hold 
onto their professional identities. 
Tales of mishap also centered on a feature that has 
since become a mainstay o£ on-the-spot journalism, the 
eyewitness report. Questions of eyewitness testimony - and 
who was sufficiently competent and authorized to provide 
it 
had 
- were complicated by 
informally gathered 
the large numbers of people who 
to watch the Presidential 
motorcade. Journalists mingled with the crowds, and their 
observations were countered or supported by lay testimony. 
This fact put the eyewitness report, as a specific form of 
journalistic record-keeping, in a problematic light. 
Journalists provided eyewitness testimony in their roles 
as bystanders or spectators to the assassination, rather 
than as professional journalists. Eyewitness testimony 
provided the details of the crime before 
upon to realize professional aims. 
it was called 
The effect that this had on journalistic notions of 
observation, seen by journalists as a pro£essional 
was tangible. In ~~§~~ek correspondent Charles activity, 
ROberts' eyes, journalists were supposed to be "'trained 
professional observers" :I . .(.j •• 
saw the President being 
circumstances which could 
Yet few 
killed. 
journalists actually 
Few had access to 
improve their perspective. As 
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William Manchester later said, reporters '·weren't learning 
much where they were .•• They were dependent on the 
cooperation of colleagues and tolerant passers-by who 
hopefully would be reliable··· m While the inability to 
provide eyewitness testimony about the Kennedy shooting 
was partly mitigated by the provision of eyewitness 
testimony by others, its absence nonetheless left a mark 
of amateurism on overall journalistic accomplishments of 
the weekend. This made the authority of journalistic 
accounts problematic. 
This was admitted readily by some journalists. "If I 
learned anything in Dallas that day, besides what it's 
like to be numbed by shock and grief, it was that 
eyewitness testimony is the worst kind," said Charles 
Roberts ' •• In his 1967 book on the assassination, Roberts 
tore apart the authority of the eyewitness report as a 
genre. The "more that is written about Dallas on the basis 
of eyewitness recollection, the more my suspicion is 
confirmed," he said :1.7 Tracing his own faulty recall of 
details associated with the President's car, the grassy 
knoll, the inauguration, he called eyewitnessing the 
"worst kind" of record-keeping available to journalists: 
To be a witness to the events that followed the 
final shot was like witnessing the proverbial 
explosion in a shingle factory and not knowing, 
at each split second, where to look. I would 
hesitate to testify under oath to some events I 
saw peripherally. With hindsight, I now realize 
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that many of the words I frantically took down 
from the mouths of witnesses during the next few 
hours were the product of imagination, shock, 
con£usion, or from something much worse - the 
macabre desire of some bystanders to be 
identified with a great tragedy. or to pretend 
greater first-hand knowledge of the event than 
they actually possess •• 
Roberts complained that eyewitness testimony provided 
incomplete, faulty, subjective data that could be easily 
overturned. 
Yet Roberts carefully documented his own eyewitness 
stature. His book was billed as an "eyewitness reporter's 
documented point-by-point study" Its back flap 
displayed a picture of his press credentials under the 
title the "official White House badge which (he) \-Jore 
during the assassination." The flap also told readers that 
(Roberts) was in the first press bus of the 
Kennedy motorcade when the shots rang out. He 
was one of only two reporters who witnessed the 
swearing-in of Lyndon Johnson aboard Air Force 
One at Dallas and then accompanied the new 
President, his wife and Mrs. Kennedy to 
Washington aboard the plane bearing the the body 
of the slain president. 
Roberts' book bore a picture of the Johnson swearing-in 
under the caption ""standing behind the President is 
Charles Roberts, author of this book" E"". The same picture 
was re.produced in ~~~~~~k with a thick white arrow 
superimposed in the direction of Roberts' head, under the 
caption, "The long voyage home: Charles Roberts (arrow) 
Covers LBJ's Bwearing-in" of this suggests that 
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while Roberts was ambivalent about his eyewitness status, 
he was also careful to document it. 
Roberts was not the only reporter to admit such an 
ambivalence. 
day after the assassination, pointed out that 
most reporters in the press buses were too £ar 
back to see the shooting .•. It was noted that the 
President's car had picked up speed and raced 
away, but reporters were not aware that anything 
serious had occurred 22 
Wicker went on to lament the faulty vision which most 
reporters in the motorcade shared. Yet Wicker's own 
eyewitness account was systematically circulated as one of 
the better eyewitness reports of the assassination 
coverage. 
Eyewitnessing was thus invoked both as a basis for 
journalistic authority and as a faulty method of 
journalistic record-keeping. This ambivalence suggests 
that journalists were unclear about the part to be played 
by this practice, and hints at why the reordering of 
certain professional practices was necessitated by 
Kennedy's death. 
Some journalists tried to overcome the eyewitness 
report's unreliable status by constructing their authority 
for the a~sas.sination story in ather ways. One 
alternative, mentioned earlier, was providing synecdochal 
representations of what had happened, making the part 
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"stand in" for the whole. Another was concentrating on 
those aspects of the assassination story which either 
engaged journalists' observation in a professional fashion 
as in Oswald's murder or made eyewitnessing 
irrelevant - as in the funeral. This made problems with 
the eyewitness report less central to the overall 
assassination record8 
It is also important to note that journalists 
the unreliability of eyewitnessing through bolstered 
technology. Technological output, notably photographs and 
films, produced a record of journalistic presence that 
authenticated their eyewitness status to events of the 
assassination weekend. Due to the preservation 
capabilities they offered, reporters' eyewitness status 
was generally upheld within the larger assassination 
narrative,. including footage that "witnessed" Oswald's 
shooting, for example. By concentrating on events which 
visibly featured journalists as eyewitnesses, being a 
second-hand witness became less of a mishap in the 
assassination's overall narrative than it might have been. 
Again, this stressed how technology helped journalists 
uphold their professional identities by redefining givens 
about journalistic practice. 
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The possibility that journalists had inter£ered with 
events o£ the assassination weekend was also aired by 
journalists. In particular, stories o£ this kind o£ mishap 
typi£ied tales o£ covering Oswald's murder. Journalists 
were £aulted on three points £or circulating hal£-
truths, prematurely establishing Oswald's guilt, and 
possibly £acilitating his murder. magazine 
attested to the invalidity o£ Oswald's statement that he 
had not killed anyone with the statement, "This was a lie" 
headline which read "President's Assassin Shot to Death" 
one observer lamented the £act that the press had 
taken to calling Oswald "the assassin" rather than "the 
alleged assassin". The £acts were insu££icient to prove 
his guilt, contended Richard Tobin in the §al;;.urd~.Y_J!!,,_,,-ie~: 
Lee Harvey Oswald had not yet legally been 
indicted, much less convicted, o£ President 
Kennedy's assassination. The !:!.ew __ 'LQ!'l< __ :LLllL~§. had 
no right whatever under American law Or the 
standards o£ journalistic £air play to call the 
man the "President's assassinu ... What did the 
T:i,.mE!§.' own banner line do i£ not prejudge 
wi thout trial, jury or legal verdict? "'''' 
The headline promp·ted I;i, .. !]LeS_ editor Turner Catledge to 
admit his paper had erred ••• 
Journalistic inter£erence in the events surrounding 
Oswald was problematic £or reporters who publicly 
questioned the viability o£ journalistic presence. Their 
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discussions largely centered on technology and the so-
called Uintrusive equipment"· of television journalists. 
Marya Mannes penned her complaints in Th§ Repor~er a few 
weeks after the assassination: 
The clutter of newsmen and their microphones in 
the basement corridor. The milling and talking, 
and then those big fat men bringing the thin 
pasty prisoner, and then the back of a man with 
a hat, and then Oswald doubled, and then 
pandemonium, scuffles, shouts and young Tom 
Truitt and his microphone in and out of the 
picture trying to find out what happened. 
Questions seethed through my mind: How in God's 
name could the police expose a President's 
assassin to this jumble of people at close 
range? 
Ultimately, however, journalists" interference in the 
events around Oswald was addressed by quarters outside of 
the journalistic community, when the Warren Commission 
took issue with it. 
Interfering with events posed particular problems for 
journalists on the assassination story due to the fact 
that television was still an uncertain medium for news. 
Other reporters ;"ere unused to the cables and camera 
equipment which television journalists brought with them. 
As ASNE (American Society of Newspaper Editors) 
Herbert Brucker maintained, the murder was 
related to police capitulation in the glare of 
pUblicity ••. to suit the convenience of the news 
media •.. (the problem grew) principally out of 
something new in journalism ••. the intrusion of 
the reporter himsel£ in the news ~s 
head 
169 
These particular points monopolized public appraisals of 
the assassination coverage for months following the event. 
But they were absented from subsequent journalistic 
accounts o£ the assassination~ a point showing what 
journalists were willing to perpetuate about their 
assassination coverage. Over time, interfering with the 
events around Oswald did not fit collective perceptions 
about themselves. 
Stories of lesser mishaps ranged from minute detail 
that was wrongfully conveyed to entire stories that never 
made it to print or broadcast. These included 
misquotations and inaccuracies, contradictory reports 
about the make of the gun, the number of shots, the number 
of assassins, and the location from which the assassin had 
fired ••. Even whether or not Jackie Kennedy's skirt had 
been spattered with blood was disputed 30. 
Many mishaps had to do with technology, and the fact 
that journalists could not always master it as needed. 
Dallas TV reporter Ron Reiland, "the only reporter" to 
accompany police to the Texas theater where Oswald had 
hidden, "reversed the process £or indoor filming, 
suffering one of the hardest scoop losses of the period" 
':::) :l NBC's Bill Ryan read verbatim from AP bulletins held 
by technicians at his feet and held up AP photographs of 
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the motorcade because there was uno videotape and no 
£ilm" .. A phone patch to NBC correspondent Robert MacNeil 
at Parkland Hospital failed because of overloaded circuits 
It took CBS nearly 20 minutes to join Walter 
Cronkite's face with his voice, a feat which encouraged 
network officials to later install a special "flash 
facilitating simultaneous visual and audio 
transmission 33. 
One reporter's story of technological mishap was 
often another's triumph. Within a general air of 
cooperation, tales of rivalry and competition nonetheless 
found their way into retellings. After the shots were 
fired at Kennedy, UPI's Merriman Smith and Jack Bell of 
the Associated Press rushed for a telephone to report the 
story. Seated in the front seat of the pool car, Smith 
accomplished the task first by radiophone. William 
Manchester provided the following reconstructed account of 
that incident: 
(Smith decided that) the longer he could keep 
Bell out of touch with an AP operator, the 
longer that lead would be. So he continued to 
talk. He dictated one take, two takes, three, 
four. Indignant, Bell rose from the center of 
the rear seat and demanded the phone. Smith 
stalled. He insisted that the Dallas operator 
read back the dictation. The wires overhead, he 
argued, might have interfered with his 
transmission. No one was deceived by that. 
Everyone in the car could hear the cackling of 
the UPI operator's voice. The relay was perfect. 
Bell, red-faced and screaming, tried to wrest 
the radiophone from him. Smith thrust it between 
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his knees and crouched under the dash ••• (then) 
surrendered the phone to Bell, and at that 
moment, it went dead 34. 
There was also a £lip side to the triumphs o£ 
technology £or the reporters ",ho experienced them. As NBC 
reporter Tom Pettit said o£ the minutes a£ter his live 
televised broadcast o£ Oswald's murder, I. when other 
reporters were £ree to go inside police headquarters to 
get Hlore in£ormation, I still was tied to the live 
microphone" ~$~.'!l . Pettit saw himsel£ limited by the very 
instruments o£ technology which had earned him, in the 
words o£ Broad~~_~ting. magazine, a in television 
history" '::~£,r,'. 
Stories o£ journalistic mishap during the 
assassination were thus largely thematized through 
technology: On one hand, normative upsets missing 
scoops, becoming second-hand witnesses or inter£ering with 
events were construed as having been redressed by 
technology, which o£ten £acilitated additional standards 
o£ action that allowed journalists to hold onto their 
pro£essional identities. On the other hand, journalists 
admitted succumbing to technology. All o£ this gave 
journalists an extensive £oundation on which to consider 
standards o£ journalistic practice and authority. Through 
their stories o£ mishap, they raised questions about the 
boundaries o£ journalistic coverage appropriate to the 
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event. The unpredictability, salience and frequency with 
",hich large and crucial issues crossed their paths 
generated questions about the degree of authority they 
could comfortably and legitimately claim for interpreting 
the assassination story. Stories of mishap allo' .... ed them to 
air concerns about the insufficiency of formalized notions 
of practice. This helped journalists bring issues of 
their authority for events into the forefront of 
discussions about covering the assassination. 
Journalists did not only see the assassination story 
as being problematic, however. Many of its angles were 
upheld as triumphs of coverage. Stories of triumph were 
cast against the larger background in which coverage took 
place, ",>1th its emphasis on unprecedented ness and 
disorder. Whereas tales of mishap allowed journalists to 
air concerns about £ormalized notions o£ pro£essionalism, 
in tales of triumph they valorized on-the-spot judgment 
calls and hunches as signs of the "'true"' professional. 
These stories generally assumed one of three forms 
"'being the first"', "'being the best·· and "'being the only"'. 
The Kennedy assassination offered parameters or 
action which were on the one hand unpredictable and 
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unroutinized, and on the other, the focus of extended and 
exclusive media attention. Such circumstances gave 
journalists the opportunity to implement a series of 
"£irstsll in covering the story. Authority was derived from 
cases where such practices prevailed. 
Conceptions o£ "being the £irstlil referenced the 
presentational style that remained after the Kennedy story 
had been told. "Being the first .. in the event of Kennedy's 
death differed from media presentations of other events. 
For example, while radio's role in the death of President 
Harding challenged existing notions of journalistic 
practice, it did not produce the kind of sustained stage 
that Kennedy's assassination did. Many journalists had 
never before covered the death of a President. Television 
journalists had not yet had the opportunity to play a 
central part in presenting such an event, and certainly 
not in the long, protracted manner of the assassination 
weekend 3'" 
This set up alternate parameters by which journalists 
could cover the assassination story: On one hand, most 
journalists lacked the professional precedents to help 
them rehearse the event. They also lacked identifiable 
markers by which to cue their moves "'_. On the other, the 
sustained nature of media coverage during the 
assassination offered them the possibility of acting 
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dixxerently xor extended periods ox time. The quality ox 
"firstness" which the Kennedy assassination oxxered was 
therexore unique not only because it set up circumstances 
that were dix£erent xrom normal coverage but because it 
sustained them. 
Dixxerences in journalistic practice generated by 
these sustained settings added new dimensions to notions 
about appropriate proxessional practice. For example, 
interrupting scheduled programmming and sustaining the 
interruption, xor example, was a dixxerent kind ox 
"first·· that directly enhanced the stature ox the 
broadcasting networks capable ox accomplishing it. Similar 
xeats took place in other media - replating magazine copy 
or issuing second newspaper editions. 
The event's newness was best articulated by then-NBC 
reporter Robert MacNeil on the eve ox the assassination: 
This is one ox those days that a reporter £inds 
himselx musing about when he"s halx asleep. 
Sometimes in a plane. Your mind drixts as your 
prepare xor the big story. What is likely to 
happen at this moment is that sometimes your 
mind drixts to the most extreme thing that could 
happen but you hastily dismiss it, because the 
most extreme thing never does happen. You pull 
your mind back to the ordinary things that 
always do happen :·S9 . 
When the most extreme thing did happen, journalists were 
xaced with xinding new ways to crank out authoritative 
interpretations ox why it did. This was because "old ways" 
were rendered unhelpxul, with sources unavailable, 
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veri£ication unworkable. At the same time, institutional 
pressures on journalists to produce in£ormation persisted. 
Providing in£ormation thus became as much an institutional 
necessity as a pro£essional goal, a circumstance embedded 
in the demands created by new technologies. 
Journalists told o£ 
accomplishing work tasks by improvising, redoing completed 
tasks and reorganizing around last-minute changes. When 
local WBAP-TV reporter Robert Welsh was re£used entry to 
Parkland Hospital by the police, 
hailed the way he drove over the curb through the 
barricade and up to the hospital entrance 40 Meg 
Green£ield recalled how stories were "hysterically remade 
on deadline" ""'. NBC correspondent Bill Ryan was preparing 
the 2.00 p.m. radio newscast when 
an unnerved sta££er burst into his o££ice, 
shouting, "Get back to TV right away! The 
President has been shott" It was 1.45 p.m., and 
NBC was o££ the air £01' its daily noon 
break ... Technicians had to hastily rig a 
patchwork o£ telephone lines be£ore NBC could 
tell America that President JFK had been shot in 
Dallas. Even then, NBC couldn't tell an anxious 
nation whether Kennedy was alive or dead. It 
didn't know. In 1963, there were no satellite 
links, no microwave relays, no you-heard-it-
here-£irst reports £rom on-the-scene 
correspondents. Seated in a closet-size studio, 
Ryan and Chet Huntley scrambled not only to 
report the news but also to learn it •• 
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These stories constituted awkward but success£ul attempts 
at improvisation .. Journalists conveyed how well they 
adapted to last-minute changes, redoing even those tasks 
which had already been £inalized. Ultimately their ability 
to do so re£lected well 
worked. 
on the organizations where they 
Perhaps the most startling attempt at improvisation 
was re£lected in the broadcasting industry's decision to 
£ocus its cameras on the procession of mourners viewing 
Kennedy's casket. This decision, culminating in NBC's 42-
hour marathon broadcast o£ lines o£ mourners to hushed 
background music, constituted Iia £irst" in broadcasting 
that was called '"television's finest hour"' .t:~.:;;,) .. Journalists 
were lauded £or their good taste and sensitivity, £or the 
"unobtrusive coverage o£ the £inal rites (that) 
underscored broadcasting's dignity and maturity in 
covering the news" ..(~..:~ Embedded in these comments was a 
regard £or the improvisory skills o£ television 
journalists, by which they adapted to the events o£ 
mourning in a way that contradicted the investigatory and 
intrusive practices £avored by other members o£ their 
trade. 
The written press did not go unpraised. Sta££ers at 
the three major newsmagazines were lauded £or "getting 
everything into their issues in spite o£ incredible 
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deadline problems": Editorial sta££s tore out huge holes 
at the £ront o£ their magazines, with N~~~<&l:s., Lime and 
]L,,$.-,-__ N§,~§., ... 3'!.n9.._ .. J!)J?s.lc.L,K<;!.Q,or:l;,. add i n g tens 0 £ pag e s o£ £ r esh 
type at the last minute. Both 1';"!"e and !!!~_"L.~!!,,<&.~!:<:. were 
hailed £or having replated twice - once a£ter Oswald's 
murder and once a£ter the Dallas Morning_R~~ published a 
photograph o£ Oswald's murder ".'.'. Journalists hailed the 
cancellation o£ columns o£ scheduled advertising ••. On 
Friday alone, newspapers issued as many as eight "extras" 
The press set new sales records, with the N,§'~"XQ£.!:<:, 
1".ffi,§.§, sell ing 1,089,000 papers on November 26, nearly 
400,000 above its normal sales Magazines were lauded 
£or working around Friday a£ternoon deadlines. As the 
""these magazines made 
over whole sections - in some cases interrupting press 
runs to add late developments - and still reached most o£ 
their readers on time" 4·9 Replating, resetting, redoing 
prose accounts were all seen as improvisory practices that 
were substantial sacri£ices to the usual order o£ printing 
a newspaper or magazine. 
Other stories o£ "being the 
first .. £ocused on the journalistic "hunch", or the 
instinct which guided journalists in their work. A lack o£ 
Obvious rules for covering the assassination and its 
unpredictable circumstances meant that journalists did not 
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always know what to do. Tom Wicker relied on instinct when 
heard from another reporter that Kennedy had been shot: he 
One thing I learned that day. I suppose I 
already knew it, but that day made it plain. A 
reporter must trust his instinct. When 
<Marrianne) Means said those eight words I 
never learned who told her - I knew absolutely 
that they were true. Everyone did •.. That day a 
reporter had none of the ordinary means or time 
to check or double-check matters given as fact. 
He had to go on what he knew of people he talked 
to, what he knew of human reaction, what two 
isolated "facts" added to in sum - above all 
what he felt in his bones ao 
Harry Reasoner's "instincts told him it would be better 
not to broadcast" an item that Oswald had been shot by a 
made the trip to Dallas because he thought there might be 
trouble ma. Two Dallas newspapers ran editorials calling 
for restraint of public sentiments against the President 
Reporters confessed journalistic hunches that Dallas 
would turn into a "big story": CBS news executives 
discussed the possibility of a hostile demonstration in 
Dallas at their regular news briefing before the 
assassination ~4. 
While it is difficult to retrospectively ascertain 
how the journalistic hunch crept into journalists' tales, 
the "I told you so" position it implied helped them regain 
control of an event whose unpredictability had made it 
UnWieldy. In other words, the journalistic hunch or 
instinct helped journalists reinstate certainty in their 
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about the event. In using tales of instinct to 
the uncertainty surrounding situations of "being 
the first··, journalists offset their partial knowledge and 
authority 
generated 
for the event. The fact that few hunches 
substantive discussions about the assassination 
in the days following Kennedy's shooting suggests the 
degree to which political questions were temporarily 
suspended by journalists covering the story. But relying 
on instinct also had its rewards, as when CBS reporter Dan 
Rather urged his network to assign extra reporters to 
cover Kennedy's Dallas trip. In at least one account, that 
premonition earned him rapid promotion through the ranks 
at CBS ~;~;. 
As with tales of mishap, embedded within journalists' 
stories of triumph was a larger discourse about 
professionalism. 
lias professional a job ... as one could care to see" !;!;f;;". An 
editorial in grq~d~~~t!EJl magazine noted that the last-
minute reorganization of reporters and the energetic and 
creative ways in which they revamped existing set-ups to 
meet the pace of the event .. ",as not a job that amateurs 
could have done .•. It was a job for professionals" ""7. The 
ability to improvise, reorganize and redo, on one hand, 
and to anticipate events through instinct, on the other, 
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were cast by journalists as activity that legitimated them 
as pro£essionals a 
Thus, stories o:f "being the :first" to a large extent 
displayed how journalists valorized improvisory and 
instinctual behavior as the true mark o:f the pro:fessional. 
Being able to quickly respond to unpredic·ted 
circumstances, bend established rules and procedures on a 
hunch, and do so correctly were touted as signs o:f 
pro£essionalism. Through their stories o:f improvisation, 
rede:finition and instinct which held that they had 
effectively covered the assassination story, journalists 
thus made claims of professionalism for behavior not 
necessarily valorized by formalized cues o:f professional 
practice. 
dimensions 
In highlighting instinctual over formalized 
of practice, journalists constructed an 
authoritative role for themselves in retelling the 
assassination story. 
- BE:.I~.~I.!:I E BE.2.I. 
Where tales of "being the first·· highlighted the 
improvisory and instinctual dimensions o£ journalistic 
practice, in tales Or "being the best" journalists 
expounded on the range or activities by which they could 
do so. Because much o£ the assassination coverage was 
structured through discrete units, "being the best" orten 
meant excelling in the proressional tasks at stake within 
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each discrete moment o£ coverage. "Being the best" in 
covering Kennedy's shooting meant quick relay~ for 
example, while covering his funeral called for reverent, 
slOwly-paced and hushed reportage. liThe best .. was 
differently reflected in James Reston's condolence column 
the day after the assassination than in Frank McGee's 
choked-up relay of the news that Kennedy was dead. 
For television journalists, in particular, Kennedy~s 
funeral became a fruitful institutional stage to spread 
tales of "being the best". How television journalists 
adapted to the decision to broadcast processions of 
mourners generated numerous tales of practice that was 
different yet acceptable. For instance, the broadcasting 
industry was hailed for having cancelled advertisements, 
costing by one estimate some S3m. in direct spending and 
ten times that 
coverage 
was one o£ 
most hours, 
emotion that 
in advertising revenue 
superlatives - the most people, the 
the biggest losses and the most raw 
broadcasting had ever known m. 
Its 
Television was complimented for having efficiently "played 
to the largest audience in its history" These 
appraisals were o£ten set against a background of 
professional expertise. As J;l!,o<;Lg_9..~!~:!;:"ln.9. magazine stated: 
Were 
have 
their 
it not for the experience that broadcasters 
acquired in the day-to-day practice of 
form of journalism, their coverage of the 
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wholly unexpected events of Nov. 
have been impossible 61. 
22-25 would 
One irony behind tales of "being the best" was that 
they legitimated what elsewhere might have been considered 
lapses in professional behavior. In the 1964 United 
Artists a local 
reporter was shown rushing into a Dallas television 
station, with "you'll excuse me if I'm out of breath 
but ... II • The rejoinder, breathlessly delivered,. 
constituted his introduction to news of Kennedy's 
assassination. In addition to successfully conveying the 
import of the news, the delivery suggested how out-of-
place was the collected demeanor of the profeSSional 
television commentator. Similarly,. tales of "being the 
best" implied that other, possibly unusual, qualities were 
required to professionally cover the assassination. In a 
special column entitled "If You Can Keep Your Head When 
All About You ... "', 
performance of journalists by highlighting their "special 
talent ll and "training". Editor Richard Tobin maintained 
that "it took coolness under the fire of highly-charged 
events" to carry out one's reportorial tasks Ed:;;: 
But "being the best" did not mean the same thing to 
all journalists, and no one set of rules characterized all 
assassination coverage. This was displayed in the range of 
journalists' stories of "being the best," which provided 
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reporters with alternate backgrounds against which to 
spread their tales of superlative practice: 
For many, "being the 
best" meant "being the most dedicated", or the degree of 
personal deprivation accrued in accomplishing one's work 
tasks. This ranged from sleep and food deprivation to 
affecting a semblance of no emotions. Meg Greenfield, 
walking around with other journalists in a ··disembodied, 
high-octane state", told of how she did not go home until 
Saturday .3. ABC News Division's president said late-night 
planning conferences prevented staffers from getting more 
than three to four hours of sleep •• , and reporter Bill 
Seamans "was forced (after 36 hours) to take a break when 
his eyes became so irritated from lack of sleep that he 
couldn't force them open all the NBC 
correspondent Bill Ryan held back his emotions until he 
got of£ the air, where he "cried like hell·· ''''. Wa Iter 
Cronkite did not realize until he was relieved from his 
anchoring duties that "r was still in my shirtsleeves, 
although my secretary hours before had draped my jacket 
Over the back of my chair" 6!--7 A sense of dedication, in 
each case, was derived from the reporter's ability to 
place the public's right to know above basic personal 
reqUirements. Dedication thus referenced an absolution of 
self in £aee of the news organization!'s needs. 
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!:l.E I N_(;_'LJ:!E:_" MOJE_lI.YllAN " • For others "being the best" 
constituted "being the most human," or the ability to 
momentarily abandon one's professional demeanor. NBC's 
Frank McGee, ::r.b.'? __ ... tJ..~XL_.Y.£L~._T_im§!.§: Tom Wicker and CBS's 
Walter Cronkite both became choked up while relaying news 
of Kennedy's death. As Cronkite relayed the news to the 
audience, "his voice broke with emotion and he wiped a 
tear from his eye" ''''s. He removed his eyeglasses, then put 
them back on in a distracted fashion. In another incident, 
Cronkite delighted telling how, on his first break from 
anchoring the Kennedy shooting, he answered a studio phone 
whose caller admonished CBS for allowing Cronkite to 
anchor the broaadcast. 'This is Walter Cronkite,' he said 
angrily, 'and you're a goddamned idiot'. Then he flung the 
receiver down &~. Journalists used these tales to work out 
the personal and professional incongruities imposed by the 
assassination coverage, an important dimension of 
consolidating themselves as an interpretive community. 
dwelled on technology in many of their stories, with 
"being the best" constituting the most 
technologically adept" • These 
"being 
stories conveyed 
journalists' triumphs over the technologies where they 
worked. Often this meant utilizing technologies other 
than one's own in generating stories~ Watching television 
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coverage from the Dallas-Ft. Worth airport, Tom Wicker 
incorporated an eyewitness interview it showed into his 
prose account of Kennedy's shooting 70. NBC's Frank McGee 
cradled a telephone in his hand while on-air and repeated 
verbatim the words of a correspondent on the other end 
Press reporters huddled around radios while waiting for 
information outside of Parkland Hospital 
Mention of technology reflected how journalists were 
able to carry out their tasks despite technological 
limitations. Tom Wicker made reference to the fact that he 
was without a notebook that day in Dallas NBC 
Correspondent Bill Ryan made the same point when he 
remembered the precise conditions of the flash studio, and 
its "'lack of technical sophistication"'; 
We didn't even have a regular news studio. We 
had to go to what they called the flash studio 
in New York, a little room where they had one 
black-and-white camera set up 74. 
References to instruments of technology - the notepads, 
pencils, cameras or studios - were invoked by journalists 
as reminders that professionalism did exist. They suggest 
that journalists tried to be professional about their 
assassination coverage. The ways reporters worked to 
offset the primitive state of the media thus formed one 
cornerstone to discussions of professionalism. Journalists 
saw themselves legitimated as professionals because they 
had mastered the limitations of technology, using their 
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acumen to make technology work for them. Such claims were 
not incidental to establishing their authority in 
retelling the assassination. 
Tales of ""being the best"" thereby legitimated a range 
of practices by which journalists made claims to 
journalistic professionalism. In tales of "being the 
best, II journalists expanded the range or improvisory and 
instinctual activities by which they continued to be 
labelled professional. 
Tales of ""being the only"" constituted the stage by 
which journalists backgrounded themselves as individual 
reporters. They conveyed how journalists integrated 
themselves into situations which valorized instinctual 
behavior over formalized professional cues. "Being the 
only" told the tale of individual moves of adaptation to 
improvisory cues of professionalism. To a large extent, 
these tales marked the personalities that would emerge as 
celebrities in conjunction with the assassination story. 
Stories of "being the only" allowed journalists to 
valorize the tales and practices o£ certain repor"cers and 
news organizations over others~ In daily news I'being the 
only" tends to be a temporary category, where a 
journalist's interest in a story is validated by other 
journalists doing simi~ar stories. Thus by the Friday 
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afternoon o£ the assassination,. there would be many 
con£irmations of Kennedy's death. Nevertheless, the 
reporters who confirmed it first would be accorded special 
stature. For a time,. because of the aforementioned 
telephone dispute, UPI's Merriman Smith was the only 
reporter to have relayed news of the President's shooting. 
Said William Manchester: 
(The) bulletin was on the UPI printer at 12.34, 
two minutes before the President's car reached 
Parkland. Before eyewitnesses could collect 
themselves, it was being beamed around the 
world. To those who tend to believe everything 
they hear and read, the figure of three (shots) 
seemed to have the sanction of authority and 
many who had been in the plaza and had thought 
they heard only two reports later corrected 
their memories 75. 
That this was altered once the pool car reached public 
telephones did not affect the stature derived from the 
fact that Smith had for a time been .. the only reporter" to 
convey the news of Kennedy's shooting. He would later win 
the Pulitzer prize for his coverage, and the UPI 
reproduced his account in its in-house organ !!£LJ3_~B.orj:.e£.. 
It called it "an historical memento ••• for what it shows 
about how a top craftsman dealt with the fastest-breaking 
news story o£ his generation" 
Another well-known tale of "being the only" was found 
in the activities of KRLD-News (and CBS affiliate) 
director Eddie Barker, who initially reported that Kennedy 
was dead. He was at the Trade Mart when Kennedy was shot: 
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A doctor I know who is on the staff at Parkland 
Hospital came to me, and he was crying •.. He had 
learned that President Kennedy was dead. When I 
announced this over the air, the network 
panicked. No official announcement had yet been 
made, and the validity of my source was 
questioned. However I knew that this man was 
trustworthy, so I kept repeating that the 
President was dead 77 
Barker l s decision to announce the President's death 
without official confirmation was, in one observer's eyes, 
possibly .. the most important journalistic event of the 
period ••• one of the greatest snap evaluations of a source 
in the history of broadcast journalism" 7_. 
Another risky practice which generated a similar tale 
of "being the only" was employed by CBS reporter Dan 
Rather, then stationed in Dallas along the motorcade 
route .. Rather was one of the first reporters to confirm 
Kennedy's death. His account of how he did so went as 
follows: 
Keep in mind that I had heard no shots. I didn't 
know what was wrong. I only knew that something 
appeared to be very wrong ... and so I began 
running, flat out running, sprinting as hard as 
I could the four blocks to our st.ation .•. I got 
through to Parkland Hospital. And the 
switchboard operator was not panicked but not 
calm. And very quickly she told me it was her 
understanding that that the President had been 
shot, and was perhaps dead. And I'll never 
forget her saying that. And I followed up with 
that, and tried to talk to one of the doctors 
and a priest at the hospital, bath of whom said 
that the President was dead. But nobody had said 
this officially 7. 
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The account prompted CBS to relay unofficial reports that 
Kennedy had been confirmed dead, thereby earning for 
Rather the title of "being the only" reporter to do so 
Other stories o£ "being the only" remained exclusives 
long after the events which generated them. Walter 
Cronkite's removal of his eyeglasses in order to shed a 
tear set up the outer parameters by which it was possible 
to anchor the news, yet few journalists looked upon it as 
behavior to be emulated. Thomas Thompson's exclusive 
interview of Oswald's wife and mother, held before the 
police had found them, put him "high on the list of 1_t!.'!l, 
interviews" E-l :I. , while circumstances prevented other 
reporters from generating similar stories. Theodore 
White's post-funeral discussion with Jackie Kennedy, 
naming the Kennedy reign "Camelot'", was hailed for years 
afterward by the journalistic community In that 
interview, Jackie Kennedy revealed that her husband liked 
to play the record of "Camelot" before going to bed. 
Sometimes '"being the only" offered journalists a way 
to turn mishaps into triumphs. Harry Reasoner was working 
at the CBS anchor desk the morning that Oswald was 
murdered: 
At the moment Oswald was shot, CBS was 
broadcasting a live report from 
Washington ••• Reasoner, who was watching the 
Oswald story on a closed-circuit monitor, saw it 
happen - or saw, at least, that something had 
happened. Although seldom given to emotional 
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outbursts, Reasoner began jumping up and down in 
his chair, screaming for the cant~ol room to 
switch to Dallas. A few seconds later, the 
switch was made •.. Thanks to videotape, CBS soon 
was able to broadcast an 'instant replay' of the 
shooting F.. .... ::~. 
Interestingly, the fact that CBS IImissed'" original 
coverage of the event became intriguing from an 
institutional point of view, because the scene was 
recorded by the CBS camera-person but was not replayed on 
national television until after the fact. The "presence" 
of journalists thus oddly existed but was not 
institutionally legitimated or supported. 
Journalists also told more literal tales of "being 
the only": Richard Stolley was "the only reporter" among 
Secret Serv ice agents to v iew the Zapruder film 1M.; Henry 
Brandon the only foreign correspondent in Dallas on 
November 22 James Altgens the only professional 
cameraperson to catch spot pictures of Kennedy's shooting 
Entwined within these tales was the notion of having 
left one's personal signature on history: That Tom Pettit 
"made TV history at the scene of the shooting of Oswald" 
was possible because he had been "the only television 
reporter" on live television &7 This suggests that 
assassination memories were £ormed by instinctual and 
improvisory behavior which was not followed by other 
reporters. 
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Thus journalistic tales about covering the 
about existing parameters of assassination reveal much 
journalistic practice at the time. While covering the 
assassination was not necessarily outlined by formalized 
professional codes, in their tales of mishap journalists 
aired concerns about the insufficiency of such codes. In 
their stories of triumph, they valorized on-the-spot 
judgment calls as the mark of the true professional. They 
replayed the event in three categories of tales: One 
stories o£ '·being the first" - opened up formalized codes 
of professional behavior and offered journalists 
instinctual and improvisory ways to do their work; a 
second - stories of "being the best" - expounded upon the 
range of activities by which it was possible to do so; a 
third - stories o£ "being the only" - brought individual 
journalists in contact with improvisory codes and cues of 
professionalism. In all of these tales were entrenched 
different notions about technology, professionalism and 
the appropriate boundaries of journalistic practice and 
authority. Interestingly enough, the ability to rearrange 
existing 
networks 
standards was made possible by the informal 
connecting reporters. This helped strengthen 
their status as an independent interpretive community, 
that relied on the circulation of narratives through the 
media for collective authentication of its members. 
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AS?F_$.?'JN.G_ ... g.Q'ygP&GjL._TJ:I.B.Q\LGJL.PJ~pFgSS.I Ql'l\b.£QR U liB. 
These pages have suggested that journalists assessed 
their coverage of the assassination story in two main 
ways: They o£ten invoked the same attributes o£ coverage 
to generate totally opposite appraisals o£ per£ormance. 
For example, the technology o£ television was hailed £or 
producing live coverage of Oswald's murder, yet its 
instruments - the cables, microphones and cameras - were 
held responsible £or £acilitating his death. 
This was especially borne out in trade publications 
and professional forums, where the ambivalence over 
journalists' coverage was linked to the story's complex 
nature. Trade publications particularly concentrated on 
the demand £or in£ormation that did not let up through the 
weekend. This was complicated by the £act that television 
journalism was coming into its own as a legitimate medium 
£or news. One critic lamented that "broadcasting resembles 
the little girl in the nursery rhyme. When it is bad, it 
is horrid. But when it is good it is very very good" 
For a community trying to legitimate itsel£ as an 
authorized interpretive group, these circumstances made 
pro£essional asse.ssments a critical part o£ retellings. 
For the £irst year a£ter Kennedy's death, the 
assassination story occupied nearly every pro£essional 
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journalistic forum. During their 1963/64 meetings, the 
ASNE (American Society for Newspaper Editors) , NAB 
<National Association of Broadcasters), and the Radio and 
Television News Directors Association each independently 
considered what would have constituted appropriate 
coverage of the Kennedy assassination. Trade and semi-
devoted special sections to the 
assassination .. The 1964 meetings of the Association for 
Education in Journalism dedicated a plenary session to 
journalism and the trial of Jack Ruby 
On one hand l these forums lauded the assassination 
co v er age. The g.Ql_\.!.1!l12J.s.L_Lq.'d.:r.!!~J,.;L.§!.'!_ ... R",_yJ§';1. sa i d t hat 
Like no other events before, the occurrences o£ 
November 22 to 25, 1963, belonged to journalism, 
and specifically to the national organs of 
journal ism ',t)O 
In its annual report, the Associated Press called the 
assassination the "major national news event of 1963" and 
boasted that the AP had "thrown more resources into 
covering the assassination than any single news-event in 
its history" '2) :l An editorial in 
called the story .. the most amazing pe£ormance by 
newspapers, radio and television that the world has ever 
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witnessed" Sel£-congratulatory advertisements. £illed 
the pages o£ 
magazines .. 
The broadcast media received special attention. 
!}. .. oaQ£~§j;:j._D.g. magazine claimed that "in those £our terrible 
days, television came o£ age and radio reasserted its 
capacity to move to history where it happens" ''''0. Radio 
was hailed £or broadcasting over 80 hours o£ coverage 
The radio-television industry received a special Peabody 
Award Televised coverage o£ the £uneral was voted the 
best £oreign program o£ the year by the British Guild o£ 
Television Producers and Directors 9&. The NAB sent its 
subscribers a £ull-page newspaper advertisement that 
echoed praise accorded the broadcasting indust.ry '1>"7. 
Embedded within these appraisals was journalists~ 
recognition of a new form of news coverage. 
£ull emergence o£ a televised documentary £orm 
(in which) the conditions which de£ine the role 
and £unction o£ the artist and reporter in 
television journalism have begun to take shape 
'ii~e 
Indeed, how journalists covered the assassination story 
would determine the parameters o£ similar stories in later 
years : Covering Kennedyls assassination, £or instance, 
taught journalists how to approach assassination attempts 
on Gerald Ford or Ronald Reagan Coverage o£ Kennedy's 
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funeral showed journalists how to cover the funeral of 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
Yet in many professional quarters grumblings had 
begun to circulate about the problems caused by 
journalists' assassination coverage. For every attribute~ 
there was a violation: 
the central question is whether the best 
tradition of the press is good enough ... The 
lesson of Dallas is actually an old one in 
responsible journalism: Reporting is not 
democratic to the point that everything posing 
as fact has equal status 101 
Coverage of the Oswald case drew the greatest criticism. 
Journalists faulted themselves for not having been easily 
identifiable to local police~ possessing intrusive 
equipment and arriving in numbers too large for the police 
to handle. While not the first event to do so, Oswald's 
homicide and its coverage shed light on the problematic 
boundaries surrounding journalistic obligations, rights 
and privileges in covering criminal cases. 
The Warren Commission Report played an active part in 
crystallizing these problems for members o:f the 
journalistic community. In a special section called "The 
Activity of Newsmen," it traced the events leading up to 
Oswald's murder: 
In the lobby of the third floor, television 
cameramen set up two large cameras and 
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£loodlight in strategic positions that gave them 
a sweep Ox the corrridor in either direction. 
Technicians stretched their television cables 
into and out o£ o££ices, running some o£ them 
out o£ the windows o£ a deputy chie£'s o££ice 
and down the side o£ the building. Men with 
newsreel cameras, still cameras and microphones, 
more mobile than the television cameramen, moved 
back and £orth seeking in£ormation and 
opportunities for interviews. Newsmen wandered 
into the o££ices o£ other bureaus located on the 
third £loor, sat on desks and used police 
telephones; indeed, one reporter admits hiding a 
telephone behind a desk so that he would have 
exclusive access to it i£ something 
developed ... The corridor became so jammed that 
policemen and newsmen had to push and shove i£ 
they wanted to get through, stepping over 
cables, wires and tripods'· :1.0;::::. 
A detective was quoted as saying that the journalists were 
"asked to stand back and stay back but it wouldn't do much 
good, and they would push £orward and you had to hold them 
o££ physically The press and television people just 
took over'" :t C>~~ When Oswald was brought into view o£ the 
journalists, "his escorts ••. had to push their way through 
the newsmen who sought to surround them ••. when (he) 
appeared, the newsmen turned their camera on him. thrust 
microphones at his £ace and shouted questions at him" 
The Report concluded that partial responsibility £or 
Oswald's death "must be borne by the news media II :l(.")e~ and 
it called on journalists to implement a new code o£ 
ethics. 
Such an idea was already circulating among 
journalists. In January o£ 1954, ASNE association head 
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Herbert Brucker had plaintively called £or media curbs. 
the Press Shapes the News", he stated that 
"pressure £rom the press ... had set the stage £or (Oswald's 
killing, with) ... little doubt that television and the 
press must bear a share o£ the blame" 
Independently considering where - and i£ - they had 
gone wrong in covering Oswald's murder, trade publications 
"judgment by television" '07. A £orum conducted in 1964 by 
g_l,!r:[§ILt. magazine, entitled "The Li£e and Death o£ John F. 
Kennedy," concluded with a £inal section called "Trial By 
Mass Media", which asked: 
in their competitive 
aspect o£ the story, 
trample the rights 
assassin? :!.Og. 
eagerness to report every 
did the media ignore and 
of Kennedy~s accused 
CBS President Frank Stanton o££ered monies to the 
Brookings Institute to establish a voluntary inter-media 
code o£ £air practices In October o£ 1964, the ASNE 
convened a meeting o£ 17 top news organizations 
including the American Newspaper Publishers o£ America 
(ANPA), Associated Press Managing Editors Association, 
Sigma Delta Chi, NAB, UPI, National Press Photographers 
Association and the Radio and Television News Directors 
ASSOCiation - to discuss complaints about journalistic 
practice Ten days later, the group issued a statement 
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that warily conceded the news media's in£luence over 
events. It echoed earlier reservations about journalistic 
practice voiced by the ASNE: 
1£ developing smaller TV cameras is beyond our 
control, we can certainly try by our own example 
to teach the electronic newsmen larger manners 
and a deeper understanding o£ the basic truth 
that £reedom o£ in£ormation is not an unlimited 
license to trample on individual rights •••• 
While allowing £or pooled coverage under certain 
circumstances, the statement stopped short o£ permitting 
codes or other external bars on media performance :I. :I. '$~ 
The idea that external £orces tNould regulate 
journalism seemed anathema to the notion o£ a free press. 
A !r!_'Ls;..hi .. !l9_toiL_E..Q§_t editor urged journalistic sel£-restraint 
over 'magic codes' to curb excesses typical of Dallas 11$. 
Ne~. ____ '('?Sk __ I.J,l'!!?s editors Turner Catledge and Cli£ton Daniel 
separately called on members o£ the press corps to use 
their own judgment in covering similar events The 
president o£ the Associated Press Managing Editors 
Association complained that the Warren Commission should 
have lauded the press instead o£ scoring it :1. :l ~'5 And 
teleVision reporter Gabe Pressman, in 
9J,!.§!£:\;_""rl,.,y. article about ethics, journalism and the Kennedy 
assassination, complained that his medium was being used 
as a scapegoat: 
Because we have the capacity o£ telling a story 
e££iciently. dramatically and with a maximum 
amount o£ impact - because we have the ability 
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to satisfy the need of the American public for 
instantaneous journalism in this modern age 
does it follow that we have to be paralyzed 
because people react badly? 11& 
published under the title "The Responsible Reporter", the 
article considered whether journalists could carry out 
their job without intruding on others~ despite their 
"cumbersome equipment". It suggested directing the focus 
of journalism to 
the 
well 
open 
their 
matter of reportorial taste and jUdgment, as 
as the respect for the individual in an 
society. Since Dallas, many have voiced 
concerns about these issues :I. :1.7. 
One interesting interchange in the article mentioned that 
television~s newness magnified the irritation caused by 
television cameras: In derense, Pressman said that 
camera is used as a newspaperman uses his pad and pencil. 
And yet, the camera is the most faithful reporter we have. 
The video-tapes don't lie and the film doesn"'t lie ll :1. :1, .... 3 
Unquestioned here were two basic suppositions about this 
newly evolving medium for news: One was the notion that 
the camera equipment to which Pressman and others referred 
made for a better journalism; the other was the suggestion 
that television provided a more truthful and hence 
authoritative form of reportage. Whether Ruby shot Oswald, 
for instance" was not debatable, for the camera had 
reCorded it. Yet these assumptions were largely 
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unproblematized in most broadcasters· accounts o£ their 
_assassination coverage. 
It is worth noting that legal quarters picked up the 
controversy about journalistic performance and condemned 
the press' insistence on the right to know. They claimed 
that it had seriously interfered with Oswald's right to a 
free and private trial and hampered police efforts to 
transfer the accused. The director of the American Civil 
Liberties Union held that Oswald was '"tried and convicted 
many times over in the newspapers, on the radio and over 
television" When Jack Ruby's trial necessitated quick 
decisions about acceptable parameters of press coverage, 
District Judge Joe Brown consulted only with press 
representatives before ruling to prohibit television, 
radio and still photographers from the courtroom. 
Brown: 
The microphone and the television camera in open 
court are intrusions that no judge or defendant 
should have to put up with. There is enough ham 
acting by prosecutors, defense lawyers and even 
judges without this further invitation. 
Reporters bearing pads and pencils, 
photographers carrying candid cameras are 
enough. They give the public the news the public 
is entitled to 120. 
Said 
Television journalists grumbled about the judge's 
decision, but generally did little else to contest it. 
Their reluctance to act possibly stemmed from the salience 
Of more general criticism about their coverage o£ Oswald's 
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murder. Indeed, the fact that Oswald's murder generated 
two opposite appraisals o£ journalistic practice among 
journalists is interesting: Some observers used attributes 
of coverage to condemn journalism; others used the sarlle 
attributes to hail it. The instruments o£ technology 
cameras, cables, micrQphones both facilitated live 
coverage and Itlere held responsible for creating 
circumstances which led to Oswald's death. This seems to 
suggest that 
professional, 
hindrance. 
journalists used 
but unthought£ully-used 
instruments to be 
instruments were a 
At stake within professional assessment was a larger 
discourse about the relationship between professionalism 
and technology: Questions over I>Jhether journalists 
constituted better professionals by succumbing to 
technology or mastering it inflected debates not only 
about coverage o£ the Oswald homicide but also more 
general discussions about the tenor of coverage of 
Kennedy"s assassination. In a sense, then, discussions 
about Oswald's homicide provided a microcosm of larger 
debates evolving across media about journalism and the 
assassination story. 
How the Oswald imbroglio figured in journalists" 
tales o£ triumph and mishap about the assassination 
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reveals much about the embedded discourses of technology. 
professionalism, and journalistic authority through which 
journalists sought to position themselves as authorized 
spokespeople for the events in Dallas. Because the 
specific events of Kennedy's death embedded problems of 
journalistic authority 
coverage, retelling the 
in much of the assassination 
journalists' part in covering the 
story called for reconstructions of their performances as 
effective professional triumphs or understandable - but 
salvageable professional mishaps on the part of 
journalistic performers. This took place both in the mass 
media and trade publications in the months 
following Kennedy's death. 
immediately 
Through their tales of triumph and mishap, 
journalists thus set the stage for self-authorization via 
discourse about professionalism. Journalists' retellings 
gave reporters a way to cast their hunches and improvisory 
behavior as the mark of a "true" professional. On one 
hand, the fact that this discourse was set up through 
tales of "being the first", lithe best" and Itthe only" 
underscored how little journalistic pro£essionalism had 
moved from baser notions of competition. The discourse by 
Which journalists legitimated themselves had individual 
dimensions, 
reporters' 
in that it served as a springboard for certain 
careersp Yet in a larger sense, it had 
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collective dimensions too, for it helped to legitimate 
journalists as prof"esssionals and to uphold the 
pro£essionalism of television journalists. In such a 
light, it made sense for journalists to cast their actions 
as the mark of professionals. Their tales functioned as an 
antidote to basically insu££icient cues of formal 
practice. 
ability to do so depended largely on Their 
technology. Technology was seen as facilitating and 
hindering - the emergence of collective and individual 
professional identities. It allowed journalists to hold 
onto professional identities at the same time as it 
hindered them from doing so. This embedded the possibility 
of forwarding alternate professional practices within a 
larger discourse about technology, with technology seen by 
journalists as allowing them to cast improvisory behavior 
as professional. 
It is within such a discourse about technology that 
two distinct assessments of assassination coverage 
simUltaneously prevailed. These assessments displayed the 
extent to which the acceptable parameters of journalistic 
professionalism were still being debated at the time of 
the assassination. personified by the Warren 
Commission and court decisions barring television cameras 
from courtrooms, emphasized the foibles of television. It 
advanced 
beyond 
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the view that journalistic coverage had extended 
its appropriate limits in covering the 
assassination, acting irresponsibly and intrusively in 
covering the Oswald homicide, in particular. Such a point 
which underscored television's invasion of the rights of 
the accused- overturned the technological base which 
television journalists had used to legitimate themselves. 
For journalists to agree with it would have been 
tantamount to invalidating those qualities distinguishing 
television journalism from print. In other words, the 
imbroglio about Oswald threatened to upset the shaky 
legitimacy of television practitioners. 
Thus most journalists preferred the second argument, 
which emphasized the attributes o£ television. They 
regarded the assassination coverage as a positive 
enhancement of the professionalism of journalists, laying 
testimony to different standards of professional behavior. 
Its proponents saw appropriate journalistic performance as 
journalists' successful adaptation to the new technology 
of television. This story about the Oswald murder 
prevailed, showing how technology was constructed as 
working ultimately to journalists' advantage. 
In other words, over time the appraisal which 
Criticized television journalists for their coverage of 
the Oswald story has more or less disappeared £rom 
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journalistic accounts. This is because it threatened the 
legitimacy of televisionS' equating questions about 
journalistic practice with 
technology and television 
an assault on 
journalism. This 
·television 
means that 
concerns about legitimating television have thereby larger 
promoted 
imbroglio. 
the collective forgetting of the Oswald 
Memories of the Oswald story have been instead 
recast as narratives legitimating the scoop of having 
caught the murder on live television. They uphold the 
professionalism of journalists, as redefined by television 
technology. 
This chapter has examined how the professional 
assessments of assassination coverage entwined the role of 
television technology within journalists" attempts to 
promote themselves as professionals. Television technology 
offered journalists alternate ways of repairing to 
professionaliBm~ by helping them to classify activities 
realized by loosely-defined improvisory standards as 
professional. This discourse thus helped to consolidate 
the journalistic community around certain issues central 
to its professionalism. Such pro£essional assessments 
upheld journalists as an interpretive community, setting 
out certain collective notions about the improvisory and 
instinctive nature of their practices, their emphasis on 
informal networks and the innovative ways in which they 
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mastered technology. Professional assessment - in both the 
-mass media and trade publications - has thereby signalled 
what it mesns for journalists to speak authoritatively 
about the assassination. It embedded notions of authority 
in professionalism and technology, and in the tales by 
which their importance was narratively constructed, 
setting up an effective base for assassination memories to 
spring forth over time and space. 
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ACCESSING 
ASSASSINATION TALES 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DE-AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL MEMORY 
Continued public interest about Kennedy's death meant 
that journalists would not alone attempt to emerge as 
spokespeople Ior its story. The recognition OI journalists 
as the story's preIerred spokespeople evolved in 
association, negotiation and contest with other groups 
vying to tell their versions OI the same tale. Journalists 
did not simply contrive to assume the role OI speaker, but 
more general circumstances associated with cultural 
authority had bearing on their assumption OI that role. 
What took place beyond journalism directly aI£ected 
journalists' attempts to legitimate themselves as 
authorized retellers o£ the assassination story. In the 
£ollowing pages, I discuss three such circumstances: One 
was the diIIerent readings o£ Kennedy's death that linked 
the assassination with images o£ JFK as President; a 
second was the establishment OI conditions o£ documentary 
failureS" by which oIIicial bodies and recognized 
institutional Iorums Ior documentation £ailed to bring 
closure to the assassination; and a third was the 
recognition OI alternate retellers OI the assassination 
story, including journalists, assassination bUIIs and 
historians. These three circumstances made the 
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assassination record an attractive locus £or journalists 
seeking to consolidate their own authoritative position as 
speakers in public discourse. This became even more the 
case as their assassination memories became part o£ the 
repertoire by which they authenticated themselves as an 
interpretive community. 
l2.I;;b..IIL.<:::B£:.A.:L:J:ll.G ..... !e.IE.J;; .. :_Ill.!L.A.?eA?eJN.A.TtQN. .. ANP..J!:lAGJ.;.eQf..l.EK 
John F. Kennedy was once called the "'most fascinating 
might-have-been in American history":L It is thus no 
surprise that individuals and groups have remembered him 
through his assassination, with the Kennedy image often 
seen as created by the Kennedy death. Gore Vidal suggested 
as much in 1967 when he said that "Kennedy dead has 
infinitely more force than Kennedy living" -. Twenty years 
later Todd Gitlin advanced a similar theme, maintaining 
that "'Kennedy could be appreciated better in his absence"' 
The fact that Kennedy's death remained as vital an 
issue as his administration - and that understanding the 
assassination took place at the same time as observers 
began to appraise his Presidency brought the 
assassination directly into the heart of the growing 
national repertoire of Kennedy stories. Through the 
assassination, the Kennedy story was recast as one of 
tragedy. It thus had direct bearing on images of Kennedy, 
his Presidency and his administration. 
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In the years after Kennedy died, chroniclers 
attributed much of America's enthusiasm for him to the 
fact of his death and its violent circumstances 4 Said 
Daniel Boorstin: 
His untimely death reminds us of how history 
assesses public figures who die too soon. In the 
making of historical reputations, there are 
advantages and opportunities to brevity 5. 
cuting his rapidly-engendered status as a legendary hero, 
one journalist lamented that 
The Kennedy myth came into being only after he 
was dead, and then only as a means of coping 
with his death ••• Anyone with a clear memory or a 
willingness to read through editorials in the 
liberal journals of those years knows that very 
substantial segments of the American public, 
particularly its liberal elite, were well able 
to contain their enthusiasm for John Kennedy 
while he was alive •.. All those splendid great 
expectations that we are now convinced we had 
back in the early 60s were discovered for the 
first time after the assassination a. 
The assassination was seen as having provided Kennedy with 
"a reprieve, forever enshrining him in history as the 
glamorous, heroic leader he wanted to be, rather than as 
the politician buffeted by events he could not control" 7' 
Much of the enthusiasm for the President thus set in after 
his death, by people with vested interests in its 
persistence. 
Journalists played a key role in implanting and 
perpetuating images about Kennedy within collective 
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memory. Already in 1964 a major news-magazine applauded 
the fact that Kennedy's face was plastered "all across the 
nation - in newspapers and magazines, on TV screens" e 
NeWs organizations hurriedly produced books and films on 
Kennedy's Presidency and administration-
and Pierre Salinger and Sander Vanocur's book of tributes 
to the President Documentary films like 
NQ.Y..§J.~~~Q.§lJ?'.. premiered in 1964 :I.e::>. As the years wore on~ 
extensive patterns of image management through media 
eulogy, commemoration and simple repetition - persisted. 
Twenty years later, Americans were being treated to what 
one journalist called "a media bath of reassessment .. :t :L 
More important, many of their efforts directly linked 
Kennedy's death with his life. 
appended with a 48-page booklet 
:tl:!.§."_ .. "..!;Jr:~IH1§:.9Y __ ,_ .. Y.§.~.;r.§. was 
on the assassination 1a 
UPI and A.m."ll;" ... ;LQ .. <:!!:L .. _!i!?,.l;" . .!.t.S' .. 9.!?'. magazine published a book, E.2.!,lE. 
P.!".¥.§_ .... ___ i.!:l .... !'!.9.Y§'!flbE.'X .. , that descr ibed the assassination and the 
three days that followed <~ Books began to appear on 
anniversaries of Kennedy's death 14 
Media involvement promoted varied interpretations of 
the events of Kennedy's death. While a lack of consensus 
over their precise circumstances increased over time, with 
greater recall generating less agreement, the failure to 
generate a complete or agreed-upon version o£ the 
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assassination story challenged the media's authority as 
storyteller. Media organizations continued to invest large 
amounts o£ time, money and resources in the assassination 
story. But the more attention that they paid and the more 
fervently that they played the story, the more holes in 
collective memory about the assassination they generated. 
In many senses this created a professional dilemma for 
journalists seeking to provide an authoritative account of 
the assassination: It denied them the ability of assuming 
the role of authoritative spokespeople yet encouraged them 
to continue trying. It also played into the attempts of 
different groups seeking to add to and enhance the 
assassination record, by creating a situation ripe for the 
of different groups vying to tell the emergence 
authorized, and hopefully final, story of Kennedy's 
assassination. 
It is important to remember that such was not always 
the case. Immediately after Kennedy's death, chroniclers 
provided instant interpretations. They assumed that 
knowledge about the circumstances of his assassination 
would bring closure by generating a final reading of its 
events. This prompted journalists to initially impose 
hermeneutic readings on Kennedy's death, as in James 
Reston's much-acclaimed column "Why America Weeps", where 
he claimed that the assassination represented the 
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intrusion of irrationality into the national character 1m. 
Yet the route by «hich many .~mericans came to abandon 
either-or interpretations of Kennedy's death and to 
entertain more complicated notions about the assassination 
was a certain one. It «as also directly dependent on the 
active role that journalists played in giving voice to 
views £rom many sides. 
There «ere two main readings of Kennedy's death, what 
journalist Jefferson Morley has called "shorthand -for 
making sense of public life" •• : Nostalgic visions of the 
promise that was cut short in Dallas, visions of Camelot 
and King Arthur's court versus notions of conspiracy and 
an emphasis on the undertow of Kennedy's public existence. 
In Morley's terms, Camelot and the yearning for morally 
heroic leadership were set against conspiracy and the fear 
of undemocratic plots. It was because the assassination 
brought together these "two elemental themes of American 
history"' that its '"anniversary endures as a national rite" 
Depending on which image of Kennedy was adopted, the 
circumstances of his death became at least partly 
comprehensible in conjunction with it. 
The first popular sentiment held Kennedy in lofty, 
almost mythic regard, 
circumstances by which 
a peculiar point due to the 
it «as generated. In 1978, writer 
Theodore White recalled how Jackie Kennedy summoned him to 
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Hyannis Port one week after the assassination. She told 
him how Kennedy used to play the record "Camelot" before 
retiring at night: 
She wanted Camelot to top the story. Camelot, 
heroes, fairy tales, legends were what history 
was all about ... So the epitaph on the Kennedy 
administration became Camelot - a magic moment 
in American history. Which of course is a 
misreading of history. The magic Camelot of JFK 
never existed ~a. 
While the "selling of 'Camelot' was too insistent, too 
fevered, accompanied by too much sentimentality and too 
little rigorous thought" :l.'~l, it was a "purchase" that 
appealed to his friends and sympathetic authors like 
Theodore Sorensen, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , or Pierre 
Salinger. Capitalizing on the insider's status they had 
held at Kennedy's White House, they depicted him as 
the ideal personification of the values of 
cultural modernism and rationality •.. The Kennedy 
assassination (thus) had almost totemic 
significance: It was the sacrificial offering by 
the prince of Camelot to the forces of bigotry, 
irrationality and fanaticism .0. 
More substantive appraisals lauded Kennedy's support of 
the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress and, in certain 
circles, legislation on civil rights. 
At the same time, a second popular sentiment was 
generated by the cold warriors' somber visions. Kennedy 
was faulted from both left and right, alternately seen as 
a Communist agent who was IIkilled because he failed to 
fUlfill Moscow's decisions quickly enough II or 
21.9 
criticized for failing to effect,ively lead 
faulty administration and the Bay of Pigs invasion 
Distinctions between Camelot and the cold warriors' 
v ie'ltr' of Kennedy reflected distinctions between discourse 
and act,ion p rhat.oric and record~ The oral and wri t.t,en 
rhet~orical practices and strategies by which 
President, had talked about, his aims were frequently set 
against the actions by which he realized them. Admissions 
that his time as President had been too brief to produce 
adequate substance meant. t~() many observers t,hat "¥}e cann()t_ 
measure Kennedy's standards purely by :fie act.s of 
statecraft because his ti me was t.DO short .. This 
brought Kennedy's assassination directly into evaluations 
of his Presidency and administration, with observers using 
his death to justify many of his activities as President. 
Yet both perspectives endured, a point that was reflected 
in the entire spect~rum of opinJons represent.ad on t~he N.§.~. 
Y'?xk .......... ,~,"':,,::,' best-seller list during one week in 1964: It 
included Kennedy"'s mythically-inclined 
Victor Lasky's critique of the former President, 
a UPI book about 
the assassination 84 This brought memories o£ his death 
to t.he forefront o£ Kennedy stories? upholding the status 
of retaIlers who had much to offer on that part..icular 
domain of action, namel.y journalists. 
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UI~TJ.t1A. T" 
In E~uch a. vJay t,he Kennedy's death and 
life was embedded within the repertoire of commemorative 
pract.ices. It. is import.ant. t.o not.e t.hat. Kennedy's family 
t.ried to sev€"::o-r images of his death from appraisals of his 
1i£e" reconstructing the particulars of his death from the 
beginning. Family members actively shaped the President's 
st..at.el y funeral" engaged in their own commemorative 
practices .~ and bnycot.t.ed public services not. t.o t.he i r 
li.king By t.he seventies. t.he family had begun t.o avoid 
dedicati()n services in Dallas and called for national 
commemorations not on November 22" t.he dat.e of Kennedy's 
death, but. on his birt.hday By t.he 
anni.versary o:f his ass8!:;;,sination l' .i t. e~ucceeded in 
prohibiting official ceremonies near the place he was shot 
in Dallas. Attempts to dilute assassination memories were 
most evident during the mid-1960s p when the family set in 
what.. one news-magazine called "t,he biggest_ brouhaha 
over a book that. t,be nation has ever known" ;~;~"7 ~ "Trying to 
copyright. t.he assassination" m~e" the fern! 1 y agreed" t~hen 
reneged" t.o let writer William Manchester publish an 
history of Kennedy'" s death ~ The book, said T,tJ,fi.,~ 
magazine, "v1'a8 to be a ,,"., ... ::: .. 'c ... , .... c.,,: a h i t.hat. would be 
independent, but would still carry the authorization of the 
Kennedys and require their approval before pu[).licati.on·· 
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between Manchester and Jacqueline 
Kennedy, in particular!" over inclusion 0:£ a variety of 
details brought publication to a sLandstill in 19G6 and 
engendered a lawsuit over a number of charges on which 
Manchester eventually yielded 
While the Kennedys appeared to emerge the victors, in 
a larger sense they £ailed~ For at the same time that "the 
Battle o:f the Book" was waging between Nanchester and the 
Kennedy family persons in less recognized quar"ters 
were busily documenting their versions of the events of 
Kennedyl's death. Such effortsjl' not dependent on the 
Kennedy family's agreement to retell the assassiration 
story, produced a number of alternate perspectives on it, 
such as Edward J. Epstein's .I"g,!"'.§.1:. or Nark Lane's fI.'!.§!:! ... :!;..£!. 
:l.:YS!.gI~.§:n~t,,, The Kennedys'" f" ocus€ld €lEf orts on the .so~ca lIed 
authorized history of Kennedy's death thus rendered them 
unable to manage all assassination memories. t1oreover, 
their attempts to censure the media earned negative prese. 
In an insigh'tful overview of Mancheaterls quibbles with 
the Kennedy family, Logan pinpointed how "during 
Kenr:sedyf s term of office, his sta££ was accused o£ trying 
to manage the news. Now, o£ course, the charge on several 
:fronts is that of managing history" like 
news, ""has always been subject to some manageIftent~" But. 
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the di££erence, maintained Logan, 
directions should be out o£ earshot" 
All o£ this was important to 
journalists 
eschewed the 
as spokespeople, in 
Kennedy £amily's 
was that lithe stage 
the legitimation o£ 
that they generally 
attempts at image 
management. Few journalists agreed to commemorate Kennedy 
on his birthday, and at one point the 
marked the ""sixth month anniversary·' o£ Kennedy's death, 
which ironically £ell six days short o£ his birthdate 34, 
Interpretations o£ Kennedy's assassination thus held that 
much o£ his li£e was seen through his death, many o£ them 
£orwarded by journalists intent on promoting their own 
interpretations o£ events. As one observer commented, 
"what JFK was unable to do £or his country in li£e, he has 
been able to do £or his country in memory" Or, as a 
journal ist £or I!:!.!'!_. __ I"E.9..9E.§'.""-!';.tY_'" lamented, "in the midst o£ 
Death, we are in Life" 35. The assassination was thus 
directly £oregrounded as a cornerstone o£ memory about 
Kennedy. Links between his 1i£e and death were £orwarded 
in large part by the 
chroniclers, particularly 
hermeneutic perspectives 
journalists, trying 
o£ 
to 
understand his death at the same time as they were 
appraising his Presidency. Particularly £or journalists, 
Who pro£ited by routinized occasions £or their media 
presentations, yearly commemorations o£ the President on 
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date of his death gave them a predictable stage on 
~hich to spread their assassination tales. In a sense~ 
this Suggested that already from the beginning journalists 
recognized that their media access would help promote 
their assassination tales above those of other speakers. 
I.HEJ:_~I@.!e_:J: .. ~J:!.~LE..!:!.LQLJ2..9.99..!'1.g11J.!tRL[.p'!.;I:J"Q.BJ;_ 
But the story's successful circulation also depended 
on the recognized forums for documentation. At the same 
time as Kennedy's image was being linked with 
circumstances of his death, developments beyond the actual 
Kennedy legacy had begun to create circumstances that made 
the assassination's retelling more accessible to alternate 
groups of retellers. 
Access to the assassination story depended in large 
part on surrounding issues that were brought into focus by 
documentary agencies attempting to resolve the ambiguities 
of Kennedy's death. These recognizable documentary forums 
the police, FBI, CIA, and various investigatory 
commissions and committees set up over the years to 
examine the assassination kept the assassination a 
salient and topical issue, providing markers by which it 
was Possible to collectively remember Kennedy's death. Yet 
they also failed to lend closure to the assassination 
record, producing circumstances which I call "documentary 
:failure". It was the failure of official forums of 
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documentation to lend closure to the record o£ the 
assassination that in e££ect helped promote journalists as 
authoritative spokespeople o£ its story. 
By the year £ollowing the assassination, extensive 
official paperwork was being directed at the events o£ 
Kennedy's death. The Warren Commission, originally hailed 
as the body capable o£ providing de£initive answers to the 
mysteries o£ Kennedy's death 37 , set to work examining 
over hundreds o£ reports and documents and interviewing 
over 550 witnesses 38. By the time 
deliberations, the sheer volume o£ 
it had concluded its 
its documentation 
over 17,000 pages housed in 26 volumes o£ prose ';:·l'9 
initially laid to rest most substantive questions. 
Published in late 1964, the Commission's report held 
that Kennedy was killed by a 
Oswald. The documentation was 
lone gunman, Lee 
so wide-ranging as 
Harvey 
to be 
later labelled "the most completely documented story o£ a 
crime ever put together" In one observer~s semi-
fictionalized view, it was .Ithe novel in which nothing is 
left out" .f.1.:I. 
the Warren While 
initially circulated by 
documentation was also 
Commission's conclusions were 
the media,. much o£ its 
made readily available to the 
general public. For $76.00, people were able to purchase 
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copies of the document, allowing them to peruse it at 
their own pace and interest Abridged editions, less 
cumbersome than the report's 26 volumes~ were also made 
available .3, suggesting that a preliminary groundwork was 
set up already by 1964 where both lay-people and non-
official groups of professionals could authoritatively 
comment upon the official assassination record. 
Journalists' participation in the official 
assassination investigation was evident from the onset. 
Reporters were called as key witnesses, and they testified 
to hearing the firing of shots or photographing the 
windows of the Texas School Book Deposi tory .t)-..:~ .. The N.§.~ 
its own version of the report, with 
journalist Harrison Salisbury writing a special preface 
The Associated Press also issued its own edition, 
appending it with what it called "An liP Photo Story of the 
Tragedy," a series o£ 14 pictures of Kennedy's final 
moments ,(.~t'i..; In a footnote, the editors addressed possible 
problems connected with their having incorporated the liP's 
account within the abridged yet official record: 
As indicated, the supplement of pictures 
inserted in the front section of the book is not 
a part of the Commission's report. It was added 
in order to recall more vividly the tragic four 
days which made the report necessary 47 
Journalists thereby appeared initially to join in the 
efforts of recognized institutions to generate extensive 
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documentation about the assassination, all in conjunction 
with conclusions forwarded by the Warren Commission~ The 
record resulting from these efforts, bolstered by the non-
official enthusiasm and support of a number of public and 
professional quarters, produced what appeared to be a 
whole and complete official account of the events 
circumscribing Kennedy's death. 
The two streams by which Kennedy was commemorated 
immediately following his death persisted into the decade 
after the Warren Commission Report was published: More 
realistic Camelot-like sentiments lingered, at the same 
time as did revisionist readingsp consensual notions that 
the former President had himself been a conventional cold 
warrior .. 
Journalists played an active part in shaping memories 
on both fronts. A writer for the 1II.§.~ ... 'yg.l':.!5 ..... IJ.!'l.""'_"'. contended 
in 1971 that Kennedy was on his way to becoming great when 
he was killed .8. The 10th anniversary of Kennedy's death 
fell in the midst of the Watergate scandal, allowing JFK's 
admirers to contrast their hero with Nixon's stealth 49 
A+- . h 
- L e same time, Kennedy was dubbed 
an unimaginative and perhaps even conservative 
politician who bore systematic responsibility 
for the woes of the Johnson-Nixon years: an 
escalating arms race~ widening military 
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entanglements aboard, racial 
o£ presidential power ~O. 
turmoil and abuses 
Asked by A.J)1.§.L~g."'.!:L_ ... .J:!.'?EJJ;,.",.g.§. magazine to name the most 
overrated public figure in history, author Thomas Fleming 
chose JFK 
with a lump in my throat. But the record shows 
his public relations approach to the Presidency 
was almost a total disaster for the nation ~, 
Stone discounted Kennedy in 1973 as "simply an 
optical illusion"' t',';'i;E: By the tenth anniversary of his 
death, the Kennedy shrine, in one news-magazine's words, 
was beginning to show its IIcracks and termites" ~.':i~). 
Such a ""coarsening of the collective memory"' ~4 about 
Kennedy's life and death had direct bearing on the 
salience of the assassination story. A growing trend 
toward critical thinking whether in the Camelot or 
revisionist mode- promoted a more critical vie," of the 
assassination record itsel£. This was particularly the 
caSe with journalists, whose alternate readings throughout 
the seventies began to suggest a more complex and critical 
view of the assassination than that suggested by the 
Warren Commission's lone-assassin theory. Critical 
thinking made the possibility of intricacies, mysteries 
and of conspiracy in Kennedy's death more feasible. 
This produced a number of questions about the 
validity of the Warren Report during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, which largely centered on conspiracy. In some 
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quarters re-appraisals began to take shape immediately 
after the Coro.mi.ssion~s deliberations were published, with 
g§.9...1:t.:!:..~_§. publishing a "Primer of Assassination Theories" in 
1966 that suggested 30 versions of Kennedy's murder at 
odds with official documentary record ~~ Books by 
assassination buffs Mark Lane, Edward Epstein and Josiah 
Thompson went into circulation by the middle of the decade 
New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison accused 
prominent businessman Clay Shaw of involvement in 
Kennedy's death, in what carne to be called the Clay Shaw-
Jim Garrison affair ~7 Kennedy aide Richard Goodwin 
called for an independent group to weigh charges of 
inadequacy against the Warren Commission Groups of 
citizens began gathering signatures for petitions that 
urged the investigation's reopening 59. A television panel 
pitted Commission critics against its defenders for an on-
air debate and received widespread media coverage 
As the earlier role of journalists in upholding 
documentary record about the assassination had been 
central, so were the efforts of journalists in questioning 
it. Movement from acceptance of the Commission's 
dOcumentation, in however partial a form, to questioning 
its basic parameters, was exercised with their assistance. 
For example,. in September 1966 reporter Torn Wicker 
criticized the Commission for failing to quiet public 
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concerns that Oswald had been the assassin S' The 
following year the N§'.~! .... Y.Q.:r.!,; .... IJ.!'!.e.§. decided t.o reinvestigate 
the assassination, with editor Harrison Salisbury 
justifying the decision due to "the torrent o£ conspiracy 
yarns, challenges to the Warren Commission Report and 
general hysteria about the assassination
lO 
":':I.'a! CBS 
conducted its own 7-month probe o£ questions arising £rom 
the Warren Commission Report, aired in a £our-part special 
in 1957 The program was billed as "very well the most 
valuable £our hours you ever spent with television" "A. A 
press release by CBS News President Richard Salant 
praised it as "'professional"' and Jlgenius" 
held that "it ranks as a major journalistic 
achievement ~ ... a master£ul compilation o£ facts, 
interviews, experiments and opinions - a job of journalism 
that will be di££icult to surpass" e_g,. This suggests that 
already at that point, a technical discourse about 
documentary process was being hailed as the best o£ 
investigative journalism 67. 
Moreover, 
organizations 
media reports outlined calls by other news 
- including !,.j,J:.e. magazine and the !?2§.t2!:!. 
~~~R~ - to reopen the investigation Reporter Jack 
Anderson detailed stories o£ Kennedy-approved plots 
against Castro in his column o£ March 3, 1957 •• In 1975, 
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~?-,-__ ._!,!§y,?!?_ ... _,;tP.q._.!!l_g.!:_!.~:L.R§EQ.E.:t s tate d th a t cons p ira cy th eory 
taken on speed when had 
several news reporters disclosed recently that 
the late President Lyndon Johnson had told them 
confidentially that he believed Cuba's Communist 
Premier Fidel Castro might have been involved in 
the Kennedy slaying 70. 
It added that a score of books, three motion pictures and 
many magazine articles on the assassination had helped 
arouse public interest 7~~ 
This does not suggest that only journalists activated 
the call for reopening the investigation. At the same time 
as journalists began to question the validity of existing 
docuemntary record, the degree of public access to the 
Warren Commission's documents, begun years before with the 
transcript's public purchase, was steadily increasing. In 
1974, the Assassination Information Bureau drew 3,000 
people to Boston University, for the first public showing 
of Abraham Zapruder's film of the shooting 7. Optics 
technician Robert Groden screened on national television 
his own presentation of certain frames of the Zapruder 
film, by which he concluded that Kennedy was the victim of 
crossfire 73. In March 1975, the entire Zapruder film was 
shown on network television for the first time, displaying 
for millions of American viewers the graphic footage that 
had originally documented Kennedy's fatal head wound 7"':~. 
In 
one historian" s vief.oJ, IIthis episode convinced many that 
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the \~arren Commission had erred" That same year 
Representative Henry Gonzalez proposed a resolution 
calling for a congressional investigation into Kennedy's 
murder, that rapidly generated support in Congress 76. 
Such efforts were accompanied, if not precipitated, 
by the increasingly prevalent. intervention of one specific 
group of interested observers - the assassination bu££s. 
That largely amateur group of citizens that took it upon 
itself to investigate the assassination record shook many 
givens behind interpretations of Kennedy's death. Buff 
Mark Lane organized a Citizens Commission of Inquiry, 
whose purpose was to pressure Congress to reopen the 
assassination investigation 77 The buffs discussed 
conspiracies ranging from the Dallas police, FBI and 
Secret Service to Texas right-wingers and right-wing oil-
men 7a In their zeal, they "propounded the questions that 
more 'responsible' authorities nervously dismissed"' 7'. 
Public acceptance of the buffs was gradual. Even 
their name implied "a harmless fixation like collecting 
old cars" 80, In 1967, journalist Charles Roberts levelled 
a particularly scathing attack on what he considered 
threat to the integrity of the Warren Commission: 
the men who have created doubt about a Who are 
document that in September 1964 seemed to have 
reasonable answers ••. Are they bona fide 
scholars, as the reviewers took them to be, or 
are they, as Connally has suggested, 
'journalistic scavengers'? ... unlike Emile Z01a 
a 
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and Lincoln Steffans, who rocked national and 
local governments by naming the guilty, the 
Warren Report critics never tell us ~",'ho~ s in 
charge of the scheme that has victimized us all. 
Nor are they able to define its purposes, 
although they offer half a dozen conflicting 
theories €:\:L .. 
The fact that Roberts chose to frame his criticism of the 
buffs on professional grounds, comparing them with the 
most renowned writers and journalists of the muckraking 
tradition ... on the one hand, and with academics, on the 
other, was telling. This was because by and large the 
assassination buffs were neither scholars nor journalists. 
Rather, they comprised a group of lay-persons who 
independent of their professional calling voluntarily 
decided to investigate the assassination. Roberts' attempt 
to classify them as one group recognized for its 
documentary exploration only reinforced how extraordinary 
was their intervention. The assassination buffs' attempt 
to retell the assassination thus considerably challenged 
the lead position that other groups, generally 
professional by nature, assumed in retelling the 
aSsassination. 
The buffs' involvement made conspiracy into a more 
aCceptable reading of Kennedy's death. They made accessing 
the documentary record less problematic, turning the 
notion of access into a professional challenge for groups 
whose professional identity was wrapped up in documentary 
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e><ploration. The buffs made it possible to differentially 
interpret existing documentary record p showing that 
professional expertise and training did not necessarily 
produce the most authoritative perspectives on Kennedy's 
death. This not only suggested the possibility of 
conspiracy, but it intensified the need to reexamine 
e><isting official documentary record about 
assassination. 
I!:!ILEQR.I1AII.mL9.LI!:Ls .. J1Q'y'?Ji: .. ?'Ji:!"J;:_GI.GQJ~1!1JII.sIiA:U!R. 
RQQI.!:Is.liIA.RY .. X.A.Ik.lLR.Ji:. 
the 
In looking back, one news-magazine examined the 
ascent of the assassination buffs against a larger 
background by which Americans began to question recognized 
forms of authority and documentation: 
The 
In the 1960s, the tendency of many Americans was 
to regard attacks on the Warren findings as the 
ideas of 'kooks' or 'cranks' or of 'profiteers' 
seeking to exploit the great public interest in 
the Kennedy case ... Now, however, cynicism 
generated by the Watergate affair, the Vietnam 
War, and revelations about CIA operations have 
made both officials and the American public more 
inclined to accept a 'conspiracy' theory as 
possible 103;;;;:. 
increased access to official documentation" as 
represented by the buffs, constituted a cultural 
Phenomenon that called into question a number of givens 
about the role of the individual in decision-making. This 
directly challenged the authority of those expected to 
tell the story of Kennedy's assassination. 
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To an extent, questioning authority was borne out in 
developments that stretched beyond the assassination 
story. Undoing its official record took place during "a 
period when entrenched authority was to be challenged and 
confronted f>", part of what one observer called .. the 
tearing-loose - the active beginning of the end of life 
within the old institutions" By the mid-1970s, 
skepticism of things official had extended to a "popular 
mistrust of official historypll and that mistrust was 
shared by journalists Skepticism was directly 
facil i tated by \~atergate and other scandals of the 
seventies that rocked existing trust in public 
institutions. Growing mistrust in government was 
accompanied by what was seen as an increasing governmental 
dependence on secrecy and concealment. 
held that 
We have learned (or should have) much about 
ourselves in the past decade. We slaughtered 
women and children in Vietnam and then covered 
it up; there was bombing in Cambodia and then a 
coverup; there was massive espionage at 
Watergate and then a coverup. Given the 
atmosphere in Dallas in 1963, and the admitted 
inadequacies of the Warren Commission Report, is 
it not equally possible that the assassination 
of President Kennedy was followed by a 
coverup?.It is clear that a reopening of the 
assassination investigation is now in order a6~ 
QUestioning the record of the assassination thus had its 
roots in larger cultural and political enterprises that 
promoted a general questioning of government institutions 
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and recognized forms of documentation Within t.hi.~, 
larger setting, it is thus no surprise that other agencies 
began to conduct official and semi-official investigations 
into the events of Kennedy's death. To a large extent, 
this had to do with revelations about faulty process 
by certain official investigatory agencies, such 
as the CIA or FBI The shadowed integrity they 
suggested made a reopening of the case more pallatable, if 
not necessary~ 
All of this generated period of documen.t.ary 
questioning. off ici,,,l investigatory effort, 
comprised of medical practitioners, was called the Clark 
Panel. Appointed by Attorney-General Ramsey Clark in 1968, 
the team reviewed the autopsy photographs and 
reveal ··serious discrepancies between its rev i e\4' of t..he 
autopsy materials and it.self'· I;;>''''~ One such 
discrepancy was the disappearance of phot.ographs of 
Kennedy's body. Another e£fort~ \,;>as mount.ed by the 
Rockefeller Commission in 1975~ Formed to investigat.e 
number of assassination plot schemes - such as pos.si.ble 
CIA involvement in Kennedy's death the Committee found 
no conclusive link with Kennedy through any of the plots 
It. investigat.ed ';':~'~. ~ Yet another official 
'J<la the Church Comm i t"t,ee ~ Billed as 
"'" 
Congressional Committee to Study Governmental Operat,ions 
23& 
wi.th t.o Tr'!t..el1igencE~ Acl"Jv:lt . .i.es~ of 
con:ftrmed in 1976 the £ailllre o£ the federal int.elligence 
agencies to examine a number of conspiracy leads in 
Kennedy's death, as well as illicit. sexual connections 
betwE,:o;en Kennedy and Judith Campbell Exner 'ia:1. But 
produced no conclusive results about what had been it .. s 
stated intention - pinpointing Kennedy's exact role in 
plots to kill Castro - and thereby failed to lend closure 
to the one point it set out to resolve 92. 
By the mid-seventies these independent investigatory 
act_ivit..ies engendered a number of doubts about the 
valid:i.t.y o£ the Warren Commission Report, regardless of 
what one felt about Kennedy's image,. administration or 
death. A"" 
In the eleven years since its publication, the 
Warren Report never convinced the majority of 
Americans that the killing waB the work of one 
man acting alone ... The return of the 
assassination of President Kennedy to the 
headlines twelve years after the events of 
November 1963 brings with it a new national 
resolve to have a final satisfactory accounting 
of this American tragedy 93. 
Ambiguities p falsit.ies,. misb,andling of' informat.i.on and 
witnesse.s all made the CommissionPs conclusions into an 
issue of credibility. 
This upheld the accessihlity of alternate retellers, 
such as journalists)" who I/Jere invested in act.ively 
doubting t.he o££icial assassination recordPs validity. In 
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particular, the fact that the media lent firm and 
continued stages to these doubts helped enhance their own 
credibility. For it was not only a stage for the reports 
of others that the media provided. While reopening the 
assassination record, journalists were accused of 
deliberately undermining the assassination inquiry .-
Efforts by Jack Anderson, Harrison Salisbury and a number 
of other reporters to reopen the record made them central 
figures in a larger atmosphere of documentary questioning. 
The Rockefeller Commission, in particular, owed its 
emergence largely to journalist Jack Anderson and his 
reports that the CIA had plotted Castro's assassination 
with Kennedy's backing .~. TV anchorperson Walter Cronkite 
went on-air in 1975 to contend that former President 
Lyndon Johnson had indicated years earlier that he felt 
international connections might have been involved in 
Kennedy's assassination 9G Cronkite showed parts of an 
interview with Johnson that had been deleted from the 
original broadcast at the President's request. 
Documentary 
integrity of the 
questioning directly affected the 
original official documentary body - the 
Warren Commission 0 Its abuses were seen as wide-ranging: 
It had failed to procure relevant information from the FBI 
97 
, Over one-third of the assassination-related documents 
in the National Archives were still being withheld in 1969 
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~a, army intelligence files on Lee Harvey Oswald were 
destroyed as late as 1973 ••• Such representative vagaries 
tainted the integrity of official documentary process, 
with recognized forums for documentation seen as having 
failed to resolve the circumstances of Kennedy's death. 
Instead, the inadequacy of the Warren Commission's address 
to Kennedy's death had generated questions with no 
answers. 
Documentary questioning similarly blew holes in the 
images by which Kennedy's life was appraised. It de-
romanticized most Camelot-like perspectives: 
the notion of Camelot, always overblown and 
romanticized, has barely survived, if it has at 
all, allegations and disclosures about 
assassination plots and Mafia women, wiretaps 
and g.QItY§!:x.§.~.tAqn.§. ....... ~~ttt..h .. ~J~.§.nn.~.9 .. y'. ~. 00 .. 
By the end of the seventies, "Camelot <had come to be) 
portrayed as a hoax, conspiracy as realism" 1. 1:;>:1. It was 
a.s if the epistemology of the ~LE§...~ __ ... .x.Q.;F-.!5._ ..... T...~ .. m.~.§. and 
the W!"!.§.h.~.D9t.Q.!L£.Q.§.1. had been replaced by that of 
the !'!.;;!.tl.Q.D.;;!.l .. _ .... £:.D!;g'!A:r::.§'r and l2§gpl§. magazine. 
Camelot, it seemed, could never again appear to 
be the pristine place its celebrants had claimed 
there were simply too many Mafia dons and 
party girls dwelling within its precincts .0. 
Documentary questioning was also upheld by cultural 
productions 
or :Ih§ ...... l2.!?-_r.;;!.J.J.!"!.~ ........ Sl§l;'. , 
possibility of conspiracy 
in the assassination story. 
all of which underscored the 
- through odd configurations -
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By the late 1970s, these circumstances - the efforts 
of the assassination buffs, the atmosphere of documentary 
questioning and the smaller semi-official investigations 
into troublesome aspects of Kennedy's death - produced a 
decision in 1976 to reopen the official federal 
investigation of the assassination, known as the House 
Select Committee on Assassinations. Bringing together the 
killings of Kennedy and Martin Luther King in one cultural 
repertoire~ the Committee's 170-member study group sought 
to uncover what had been left ambiguous by the Warren 
Commission 12 years earlier and the rapid sentencing of 
James Earl Ray in King's murder. In the case of Kennedy's 
assassination, most of its subpoenas were directed at CIA 
and FBI-held files '03. 
The House Committee took two years to reach its 
deliberations, at an expenditure of S5.8 million 
According to historian Michael Kurtz, its mandate was 
fourfold. It was to uncover: 
1) Who assassinated President Kennedy? 2) Did 
the assassin(s) receive any assistance? 3) Did 
United States government agencies adequately 
collect and share information prior to the 
assassination, protect President Kennedy 
properly, and conduct a thorough investigation 
into the assassination? 4) Should new 
legislation on these matters be enacted by 
Congress? ~o~ 
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investigation lasted from January to July 1978, 
followed by two months of public hearings. The report was 
issued on December 30, 1978. 
The committee ruled that there had probably been a 
second gunman in the killing of Kennedy, but it could not. 
determine who. Noting that Kennedy was "probably 
assassinated as a result of a conspiracy,."' it conceded 
that it could not identify the identity or extent of such 
a conspiracy Rather, it produced extensive 
documentation about who might have been interested in 
pulling a second trigger, including the Cuban government, 
the Kremlin, right-wing Cuban exiles, the Mafia, the CIA, 
the FBI and the Secret Service. The 686 pages housed in 27 
volumes produced conclusions that were by all counts 
inconclusive, a point that dismayed most assassination 
observers .. Its final report, issued the following July, 
mentioned that elements of organized crime were "probably" 
involved, but said little more :to? 
In one observer's view, the Committee's efforts ""were 
an exercise in bathos" :toe.: 
The investigation uncovered some new evidence, 
particularly the acoustical analysis, but on the 
whole it proved as limited as that of the Warren 
Commission ... The committee's refusal to operate 
publicly, its lack of expert cross-examination 
of witnesses, its failure to attach the proper 
Significance to numerous pieces of evidence 
resulted in an investigation of the 
assassination that raised more questions than it 
originally sought to answer :l09 
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Because the Committee found insufficient evidence to 
implicate possible agents in Kennedy~s assassination, its 
deliberations were as much a disappointment as the Warren 
Commission's had been twelve years earlier. It overturned 
the Warren Commission's basic supposition and upheld then-
existing bias that there had been a conspiracy, but lent 
that notion little substantial support 110 Its failure to 
resolve the uncertain aspects of Kennedy's murder thus 
exacerbated the documentary questioning set 
the Warren Commission twelve years earlier. 
in motion by 
The Committee's failure to provide documentation that 
could resolve the gunman's identity - despite a plethora 
of evidence, documents and expertise - was crucial because 
it reproduced failings exhibited earlier by the Warrren 
Commission. In both cases, the plethora of documentation 
was insufficient and ineffective in lending closure to the 
assassination record. Bolstered by a number of semi-
official 
questions 
investigations which similarly produced more 
than answers, institutional £orums of 
documentation were lodged in a situation of what I call 
documentary failure. Recognized forums £or documentation 
were unable to generate conclusive answers about Kennedy's 
assassination, suggesting a failure of documentary process 
in regard to the assassination record. 
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Rather than generate closure, documentary failure 
diminished closure where it existed, and generated 
questions where there had previously been answers. As 
assassination buff Josiah Thompson said, normal 
investigatory procedure of homicides tend to produce a 
convergence o-f the evidence. But in Kennedy's homicide, 
"things haven't gotten any simpler; they haven't come 
together. " More in-formation only generated more questions 
:I.:I.:t " Despite their status as legitimate and recognized 
holders of memories about the assassination, o-f-ficial 
forums for documentation were unable to provide an 
authorized and complete account of the events o-f Kennedy's 
death: They produced a situation by which 
We are not agreed on the number o-f gunmen, the 
number o-f shots, the origin of the shots, the 
time spane between shots, the paths the bullets 
took, the number o-f wounds on the president's 
body, the size and shape of the wounds, the 
amount o-f damage to the brain, the presence o-f 
metallic -fragments in the chest, the number o-f 
caskets, the number o-f ambulances, the number o-f 
occipital bones 112. 
Ultimately documentary -failure exposed the basically 
constructed nature of documentary process, and showed how 
relative Were the "truths" such -forums sought to uphold. 
This generated conditions by which other figures 
eagerly sought to re-examine the assassination record. The 
assassination story was opened up for renegotiation, its 
O-fficial memories de-authorized. Implicitly or explicitly, 
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thiS invited other groups - such as journalists - to lend 
closure through their versions of events. In other .,ords, 
the failure of documentary process made it possible for 
other groups vying to tell the assassination story to 
emerge as its authorized spokespersons. Documentary 
failure made possible the legitimation of alternate forms 
of documentation in conjunction with the story of 
Kennedy's death. 
For other retellers striving to tell their versions 
of Kennedy's death, this generated immediate opportunity. 
The vacuum of recognized authority suggested a need for 
other kinds of evidence providing other angles to the 
crime. As Don Delillo remarked: 
Powerful events breed their own network of 
inconsistencies ... The physicial evidence 
contradicts itself, the eyewitness accounts do 
not begin to coincide. There are failures of 
memory~ there are con£licting memories ~~3. 
For speakers trying to forward their authoritative 
presence within the assassination tale, this suggested 
that by offering a different interpretation of the events 
of Kennedy's death, they could solidify their position as 
its authorized spokespeople. As David Lifton suggested in 
his book about the assassination, "What you believe 
happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963 depends on what 
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evidence you believe" ~~4. What he did not say was that as 
important as what one believed was who one believed had 
the right to assist 
assassination. 
in determining beliefs about the 
Given the re-search necessitated by documentary 
fail'Ure,. individuals and groups began to document the 
documents of others. 
access the original 
Because they were no longer able to 
assassination story, documents which 
had previously been sealed were opened; testimony was re-
given within di££erent parameters and circumstances; and 
access to secondary sources of information became equally 
important as access to the original crime. Journalists in 
particular often found themselves commenting upon their 
own documentation. For example, in discussing one of the 
more recent booKs on the assassination, author James 
Reston Jr. was told that he had no new evidence. Reston 
replied that his argument~ came from rereading the 
documents themselves :I. :t. :'.~i His comment upheld the 
legitimacy of secondary access, and recognition that the 
layperson's re-reading of old texts was a viable practice 
of interpretation, or documentary exploration. Attempting 
to advance its legitimacy in effect justified the access 
of laypersons to the documents of the assassination 
record, and suggested the central role they could play in 
deconstructing its contents. It also upheld the views of 
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~non-official persons as legitimate and recognized 
interpretations of Kennedy's death. The fact that many new 
theories" new evidence and expertise all relied on re-
readings of the same documents and statements thereby made 
the memories of alternate groups of people a potentially 
salient and valued source of documentation. 
Another example was found in a 1988 edition of Nova, 
which traced the kinds of evidentiary practice that had 
figured over the years in readings of Kennedy's death ~1&. 
Using Walter Cronkite as narrator, it explored 25 years of 
investigatory efforts through the categories of evidence 
and expertise that had been invoked to interpret its 
circumstances" suggesting that which assassination reading 
people adopted depended in large part on the categories of 
evidence" testimony and expertise in which they believed. 
This suggests that following documentary failure, the 
assassination was reinvested with cultural importance, but 
from a different perspective - that of alternate groups of 
speakers with their own memories and stories to tell. 
Officialdom's failure to document the assassination story 
inadvertently focused attention on the authority of 
alternate speakers in places where official forums had 
failed. This foregrounded the involvement of journalists 
and other retellers, and paved the way for alternate 
readings of the events of Kennedy's death. By allowing 
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them to position themselves through different interpretive 
practices around the gap of authority created by 
documentary failure, it put alternate documenters of the 
record - like journalists - into viable positions by which 
they could jockey for more authority through references to 
their own documentation about the assassinationG 
In particular, journalists' ability to do so was made 
easier because secondary access was a practice with which 
they were comfortable. Many journalists had used secondary 
access to the documents of others in order to initially 
generate their own authority for covering the story of 
Kennedy's death. For example, broadcaster Eric Sevareid, 
brought in to comment on a CBS Report on the Warren 
Commission, was criticized because ··as a witness, his 
credentials ... seemed to consist entirely of his agreement 
to watch the CBS documentary" ~. :1.-..... Yet for lack of a 
viable alternative, secondary access, or access to the 
documentary efforts of others, evolved into the optimum 
form of investigation. This put journalists and their 
professional practices in a positive light. 
Because journalists played such a large part 
fashioning 
documents 
"the record of the record," ordering 
implicitly upheld their placement 
in 
its 
as 
professionals .. At heart, then, of the reopening of the 
assassination record was a definitive movement from the 
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authority of the recognized official body to that of the 
non-of'£icial, the layperson and amateur. Because so much 
of the record was documented by journalists, they played a 
central and strategic part in shaping that movement. 
Retellers with access to technologies of dissemination 
promised not only a new way of reconsructing the events of 
Kennedy's death but of replaying them in convincing and 
plausible narratives. From such a perspective, journalists 
occupied a particularly advantageous position. Their ready 
access to technology and familiarity with practices of 
second-order access cast them as central players in 
retelling the assassination. 
FORMS OF MEMORY 
........... _ .... _ .................. _-_._--_._ ............ -"'--'--
As the assassination story edged into the eighties, 
journalistic memories o£ the assassination took on many 
forms. There continued to be an emphasis on personal 
memories of' eyewitnesses, newspapers filled with articles 
like UMany Remember the Scene As It Was" :t. :ll::S. Emphasis was 
on presence, both actual and symbolic. As journalist Mary 
McGrory said in an article entitled "You Had To Be There 
to Know the Pain": "Those who did not kno", him or did not 
live through his death may find it difficult to understand 
the continuing bereavement of those who did" 119. 
There were also recollections of a more theoretical 
nature, both by journalists and other retellers of the 
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assassination story~ Assassination retellings oscillated 
bet\..Jeen the two themes by which it had been most 
successfully codified, adopting slightly novel 
configurations of Camelot and conspiracy. On one hand, 
thirty-four percent of Americans were quoted as saying in 
1988 that Kennedy had been the country's most effective 
President 1~O. Camelot-like sentiments produced books like 
a long tribute to the President that mentioned 
neither plots to assassinate foreign leaders nor stories 
of Kennedy's sexual alliances, and romanticized television 
series like !s..~X!.n.§.9..y. with Mart.in Sheen :I.e:! .. Some observers 
maintained that there was a ··Camelot backlash··: 
The 20th anniversary of the assassination 
received even more media exposure than had the 
anniversaries of 1973 or 1978 much of it 
devoted to nostalgia about the Kennedy family 
and the Kennedy charm. The underside of Camelot 
was also acknowledged, dismissed as unimportant 
Articles were written about "Camelot Revisited" or 
"Camelot On Tape," detailing how Kennedy had taped his 
ongoing White House conversations regularly ""'''. Camelot 
was maintained intact, despite its acknowledged failings. 
At the same time revisionists demoted Kennedy from a 
""great" President to a merely "'successful" one: ··A dry-
eyed view of his thousand days suggests that his words 
were bolder than his deeds" :u::~'" Herbert Parmet's book on 
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the Presidency succeeded in thoroughly documenting the 
underside of Kennedy's Presidency but stopped short of 
castigating him for his failings 1e~. News-magazines were 
filled with more realistic re-readings of Kennedy's 
Presidency In 1985, Hofstra University conducted a 
The conference director maintained 
that the theme was chosen to provide a fair evaluation of 
the former President :I.Z-?7 
Conspiracy readings also flourished a 
vengeance" as in Don Delill.o's 1988 novel b'! .. Q.;r .. ~.. or 
the NBC min i - ser i es E~Y.Q.!: .. ~J::,~ ... ;;g'l. 1e9 New books on the 
assassination suggested different angles to old 
information: One posited Texas Governor John Connally as 
the assassin's target rather than Kennedy :I. ~?o • , others gave 
new reasons for the Mafia wanting to kill Kennedy 
Dav id Horowitz' 15 I.h.~ ....... ~.§!.!:!.!1.~<::!y.§. furthered suggestions of 
Kennedy's sexual activity and dubious connections 13Z 
The eighties thus brought with them few revelations 
into the assassination record. As one journalist remarked, 
t·there are no new facts about the Kennedys, only new 
att.itudes" Indeed, not everybody remembered, or cared 
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about, the events of Kennedy's death. As Pete Hamill 
observed, by 1988 
an entire generation had come to maturity with 
no memory at all of the Kennedy years; for them, 
Kennedy is the name of an airport or a boulevard 
or a high school ~34. 
A 1987 photograph showed two visitors at Kennedy's grave 
on the 24th anniversary of his death >am, a far cry from 
the hordes of people that had gathered earlier at his 
graveside. There appeared to be a certain national amnesia 
about the tawdry revelations of the seventies ." ... A 1983 
poll showed that relatively few Americans 
associated John F. Kennedy with either sexual misconduct 
or plots to murder foreign leaders 1:37. Reporter Jefferson 
Morley found an impatience with the ambiguities of the 
assassination, and held that "Camelot and conspiracy in 
Dallas were domesticated for prime time: 'Who shot JFK?' 
became 'Who shot J .R .. '?'" :1,3.8. Media forums ranging from 
the truth would never be known '.3g. 
Yet retellings persisted. This suggests that 
attention turned from uncovering new content about the 
aSsassination to the processes by which the assassination 
record had been documented. This played into the authority 
of journalists and other retellers, who became experts at 
seCondary access. As Don Delillo maintained: 
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The operative myth of the Kennedy years was the 
romantic dream of Camelot. But there is a 
recurring theme or countermyth that might prove 
to be more endearing. It is the public's belief 
in the secret manipulation of history. Documents 
lost~ missing~ altered, destroyed, classified. 
Deaths by suicide, murder, accident, unspecified 
natural causes. The simplest facts elude 
authentication 140. 
Understanding the manipulation of the record thus became 
as important as understanding the circumstances that 
caused Kennedy's death. Less concerned with finding whole 
theories or complete versions of what happened in Dallas, 
Americans b,egan to look to other quarters for 
authoritative versions of smaller incidents of documentary 
abuse. Christopher Lasch generated an aptly titled article 
called "The Life of Kennedy's Death," which detailed the 
story's lingering effect on ongoing definitions not about 
Kennedy or the assassination but. about those who produced 
such definitions ~4~~ In his view, the assassination has 
remained a national obsession because it validates 
conflicting historical myths about insiders and outsiders, 
professionals and laypersons. In such a light, ABC News 
produced its first two-hour length retrospective on the 
PreSident in 1983 Dallas finally opened what the N.§.!1. 
"its most infamous public space," the 
Texas School Book Depository amid wide-ranging 
Controversy over the collective and individual meanings 
generated by such a move. 
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This growing interest in the processes by which the 
assassination was documented - the meta-discourse about 
the record of the record - helped to focus attention on 
alternate forms of documentation, including professional 
memories, directly highlighting the role of journalists. 
The memories of those persons who were present in some 
professional capacity at the events of Kennedy's death 
offered a different perspective on tales which had been 
told many times over. As one reporter said, "what began 
with the assassination was not the present but the past" 
The past, however, was not necessarily the past of 
America's 34th President but of persons attempting to work 
out their own histories, both personal and professional. 
Memories were thus set up in competition with the official 
accounts that had until then been held sacred. Given the 
failure of such official accounts to lend closure to the 
record, the alternate form of documentation suggested by 
professional memories became an attractive alternative. 
This does not suggest that the alternate form of 
documentation which professional memories offer provided a 
more "accurate" or IItruthful" version o£ events. One 
chronicler maintained that in addition to the failure of 
official investigations into the assassination, there were 
failures of "non-official" investigatory efforts: 
We~ve seen documentaries and docudramas. We've 
watched the Zapruder film over and over again. 
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We've heard sound experts tell us that the 
evidence proves that there was a fourth shot and 
therefore two gunmen. We've read cheap fiction 
and superb fiction. In the end, nothing has been 
resel ved :t.4t:!~ g 
But reconstructions are in some ways not expected to make 
sense of everything. Stories of the 1980s became more 
realistic and personalized than those offered earlier .. 
They were also less grandiose, less encumbered by large-
scale visions. They constituted the folklore of the 
assassination record, based on the personal experiences 
and memories of those who had been present during the 
events in Dallas. Journalists took their place at the head 
of the list of those waiting to share their tales. 
All of these circumstances made the retelling of 
Kennedy's death a particularly attractive locus through 
which to establish and perpetuate one's authority as a 
speaker in public discourse through memory. The fact that 
the assassination record was promoted at a point in time 
When, in Christopher Lasch's words, truth has given way to 
credibility, "facts to statements that sound authorit.ative 
without conveying any authoritative informat.ion," ~ . .o(1.6 in 
effect enhanced the appeal of alternate records based on 
memory. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEGOTIATING MEMORY: SITUATING PROFESSIONAL RETELLERS 
The establishment of Kennedy's assassination as a 
viable locus for retellers trying to professionally 
authenticate themselves through memory encouraged a wide 
range of speakers to situate themselves in and around its 
story. The emergence of certain retellers as preferred 
over others took place through the attempts of many groups 
vying to tell their versions of the same tale. Tensions 
were created by the different strategies of self-
authorization they used. 
In this chapter, I explore the process by which 
journalists have emerged as the preferred retellers of the 
assassination story. I first examine the practices of 
credentialling that took place across groups of different 
retellers - notably, assassination buffs and historians. I 
then explore how journalists borrowed from the 
professional codes of other speakers to establish 
themselves as the story's preferred retellers. Finally, I 
Consider how journalists solidified their credentials for 
the story by strategically situating themselves inside it. 
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COMPETING F.Gli'MEMORY 
The assassination story 10ClJS around 
which different groups of retaIlers were constantly 
shifting in an effort to authorize their versions of what 
had happened. Implicit in ret.eIling its story 'Was the 
question of who was authorized to speak for the events of 
Kennedy's death. In retelling, authority was negotiated 
through continuing tensions by which retellere appraised 
t.he rightful positioning not only of themselves but of 
others. 
Uncertainty over how to best position oneself was 
reflected in how speakers borrowed from the professional 
codes of groups: His·torians were labelled 
report.era palr]ned themselves off as 
h istor lans ,: assas~:;i, nation buffs .sought. tel be called 
muck:rakers~ These shared references :for professional 
authenticat.ion not only Buggested how shaky 
terrain on which all retellers stood, but how valued a 
terra i 1'1 it v.J8.S n 
Speakers seeking to retell the tale came £rom all 
v.Jalks of lifel' and they used the assassination to unravel 
their own interpretive sidebars to the events of Kennedy~s 
death. The group which most. directly 
contest for the position of 
the assassination buffs. 
authorized spokesperson was 
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TBE.RETELLINGS OF '.J"",coaIN AT ION BUFFS 
Although init .. ially derided as ··crankg H or 
"prof i t.ears" by the end of t.he si.xties the 
assassinat,ion buffs had E~merged as a primary group by 
which the assassination st.ory ¥Jould be reliably told. 
After public cynicism about documentary process set in and 
later solidified by Watergs lee. the Vietnam War, 
revelations about CIA operations, ··o:£ficials and 
and 
the 
American public (were) more i.nclined 
conspi.racy theory as possible u ,iii: This by implication 
:focused attention on the buffs, who had been directly 
responsible for forwarding notions of conspiracy. 
TBE:.EVOL,UTION OF THE BUFFS. The buffs posed a 
direct challenge to t.he ability of other professional 
groups seeking to pClsi t . .:Lon theme'.el ves a.s authorized 
spokespeople of the story. Despite their amateurism, they 
turned an interest in t.he events of KennedyP s death into 
an avocation? with sleuth ranks including sales-personnel, 
graduat.e students and housevl i ves ~ Their function was to 
"get around·' the exist.ing officel account. As journalist 
Richard Rovere ,eo,aid in his introduction 
book. t_he record 
and disentangling the evidenCE) :from the. conclusions" ~:'" 
Attempts by the buffs to retell the assassination 
from their point of view were complicated by the fact that 
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they did not constitute a cohesive Bocial group~ They 
lacked both a communi.t,y and collective 
behavioural standards by which to practice their trade. As 
magazine reported: 
an aura of unanimous acceptance had grown up 
around the official version of what had happened 
in Dallas, and most Americans did not even want 
to listen to any theories that contradicted it. 
Most of the assassination buffs, even those with 
a large circle of friends? suffered for at least 
a while from the special kind of loneliness that 
comes from being obsessed by something that 
nobody else seems to care about 4. 
Their efforts were comprised of independent but often 
parallel investigations? which ranged from that of Sylvia 
Meagher" who on "finding the cOIDnlission'" s index next teo 
useless prepared and publi.shed her own" r:.~/I to t.hat. of 
David Lifton, who left a Master"'s in Engineering to 
pursue his own investigation~ 
The lonely and i,dioyncratic nature of being a buff 
presupposed a need for codes of validation. Eventually a 
sense of community was forged when many buffs discovered 
others with similar sentiments, and there sprouted an 
informal network for sharing information. But the buffs 
also needed to validate themselves externally, within 
behavioral paramet.ers that were £ami.liar to the general 
public. They thereby sought to authenticate themselves 
through the professional codes of other groups of 
rete 11 ers.~ figuring ·that. understanding the buffs within 
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the con£ines o£ journalistic or historical activity was 
easier than contemplating them as an independent entity, 
seemingly sprung £rom nowhere. 
While the bu££s' investigation o£ the assassination 
did not immediately gain momentum because "they did not 
have the resources to get answers £or many o£ the 
questions they proposed," 
the very £act that they asked them was vitally-
important, £or they broke ground the Warren 
Commission was disposed to ignore 6. 
A R! .. mp.~x.t_",. investigation o£ the bu££s' e££orts claimed 
"they were doing the job the Dallas police, the FBI and 
the \~arren Commission should have done in the £irst place" 
As time wore on, and other quarters £ailed to address 
the questions that the bu££s raised, their presence within 
the assassination story began to generate serious 
questions over whether o££icial experts were needed to 
adequately deconstruct the assassination record. At heart 
o£ discussions o£ their role in retelling the 
assassination story were thus considerations about the 
role o£ the amateur in a world generally run by experts, 
and a mound o£ poorly evaluated evidence in a context 
where tidy o££icial piles o£ documentation were assumed to 
have worked best. As one bu££ said, 
It's possible that (what I've £ound) is 
completely unscienti£ic. But my answer to people 
saying 'you're no expert' is 'where are the 
experts?' a 
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From the 
on.set~ 
were 
the buffs saw themselves driven by concerns that 
shared by both journalists and historians. 
"Constantly aware of the place in history reserved to 
whoever solves the puzzle" o:f Kennedy' 5 death ~~ ~ history 
motivated them to pursue their investigations. Generally 
nonplussed by the crevices they added to the record, they 
sought to advance their often idiosyncratic versions o£ 
events with the general population. "Only in textbooks was 
history tidy," said one editorial in their support ~O, in 
effect suggesting both that history was the ultimate locus 
of the assassination record but that historians needed 
assistance in its construction. 
Other retallers tended at first to dismiss the quirky 
theories they propounded. Kennedy's in-house historians, 
for example, originally ignored the raucus being generated 
by the more vocal Commission critics. Yet there seemed to 
be a growing, if uneasy, recognition of the fact that the 
assassination buffs addressed points about 
assassination that historians had failed to see. 
the 
This 
became particularly problematic as the volume of 
retellings by assassination buffs increased over time, 
taking the place generally assumed by historical record. 
A number 
themselves as a 
of journalists, accustomed 
:fourth estate o£ government, 
to acting 
found that 
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bu££S~ practices encroached on their territory and 
labelled them a "media o££spring" ii. Journalist Charles 
Roberts exempli£ied a characteristic trend o£ 
dismissiveness when he maintained that "clearly the 
pattern with Warren Commission critics is: 1£ the experts 
agree with you, use them. 1£ they don't, ignore them·' ""'. 
Interestingly, the £act that the same had been o£ten said 
about the journalistic community did not promote the same 
kind o£ evaluations about journalism. Criticism £ocused on 
the bu££s' lack o£ expertise and the £act that they based 
their authority an a groundwork laid by the press corps. 
Journalists in particular £aulted them £or building their 
assassination libraries from newspaper clippings, thereby 
constructing an assassination record on documents provided 
largely by journalists In an environment where 
journalists themselves sought ·to emerge as the 
assassination's authorized spokespeople, the bu££s' 
dependence an journalistic record was problematic. For 
they needed to set themselves apart £rom journalists, 
establishing their authority as an independent 
interpretive community, and that objective was obscured by 
their usage o£ journalistic documents to do so. 
PISTANCING MECHANJSMS AND_JHE BUF~~. In attempting 
to authorize themselves, the bu££s particularly tried to 
distance themselves £rom the journalistic community. They 
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were critical that journalists had not adequately realized 
their own professional calling. I'Reporters were everywhere 
in Dallas that day," said one buff, but the record they 
provided flstill remains inexplicable ll :/ • .(+ Another held 
that after the assassination, 
we all thought, 'it's almost going to break. 
This is just too blatant and obvious. There are 
bright newsmen working on this thing.' Well, of 
course it didn't break ~~ 
Buffs accused journalists of knowingly or unknowingly 
failing to "break the story," their inability to exercise 
professional authority seen as contributing to the defects 
of the assassination record. 
Other buffs complained that the media refused to play 
out their stories: David Lifton faulted the national media 
both television and print :for its reluctance to 
address the issues raised in :1. ~;. Similar 
complaints were levelled by Mark Lane, perhaps the most 
vocal assassination buff. Journalistic failure at times 
prompted the buffs to take up the task of documentary 
exploration themselves. 
It is worth examining Lane's contentions in detail, 
because they underscored how the buffs in many cases 
regarded themselves as journalists. Lane's book, A. 
began as a call to journalistic 
conscience, where he contended that European reporters 
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were puzzled by the obvious endorsement of the 
(Warren Commission) document by the American 
press ... they asked how the independent American 
newspaperman had been silenced or cajoled into 
supporting the Report 17. 
Bothered by the failure of a call to arms by Americ811 
journalists, he asked ""how do the American media act when 
a matter of historic dimensions occurs and when the 
Government takes the very firm position that that which is 
demonstrably false is true?" ~.a Providing his O~Jn answer, 
he called American journalists a IIbiddable press" and 
contended that the American people lacked confidence ··in 
the media for their many efforts to endorse the Report" 
19 
Lane also vigorously contested the selective - and in 
his eyes wrongful exercise of memory displayed by 
certain reporters. Directly in his line of fire was UPI 
reporter Merriman Smith: 
(He) had been awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his 
eyewitness reporting of the assassination. If 
ever one wishes to develop an argument against 
such awards, one need merely reread the Smith 
dispatches from Dallas in the light of the facts 
now known, making allowance for the fact that 
standards which an historian might be expected 
to adhere to cannot be applied tD a reporter eo 
Although Lane's comments at times assumed the tone of a 
they nonetheless exemplified how the buffs tried 
to authorize themselves thrDugh the standards followed by 
other groups of speakers. In this case, Lane bypassed the 
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reportorial standard in favor of the historical one, all 
in an attempt to legitimate the buffs' endeavors. 
Yet in general, Lane attempted to recast the buffs' 
tellings as effective journalism. In concluding his book, 
Lane called for a reopening of the official investigation, 
saying that 
the heroes of journalism are not those who 
crusade for the popular, who attack the weak and 
who are awarded the much-sought prizes. They are 
those v.Jho calmly assess the evidence .. those who 
do not permit a sense of self to interfere with 
their professional obligations. They are too 
few; they are a disappearing breed 21 
The reference again to "heroes of journalism," and the 
attempt to legitimate the work of the buffs as the best of 
journalism, was telling. 
Lane's claims were important for two reasons: They 
not only undermined the authority of journalists vis a vis 
the assassination, as appeared to be his intention, but 
they contextualized the work of the buffs as investigative 
reporting. In other words, the assassination buffs were 
seen - amongst themselves, i£ not others - as assuming the 
role of the press corps. Lane's framing of the buffs' 
efforts within a larger discourse about journalists and 
journalism suggested how related were the two spheres of 
practice. It also suggested the implicit centrality of 
journalists to retelling the assassination story. 
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Lane's comments also suggested an understanding of 
hoW pro£essionalism is conveyed in discourse? with the 
buffs promoted by chipping away at the exclusivity with 
which certain behavior was traditionally associated with 
other groups of retellers. By framing his discussion as 
journalism, Lane thereby blurred both the amateurism of 
the buffs and the professionalism of the journalists. This 
exercise elevated the professionalism of the buffs at the 
same time as it detracted from the professionalism of 
reporters~ casting the buffs as respondents to the 
professional 
community. 
challenges raised by the journalistic 
History \~as an integral part o£ assassination 
retellings. Observers made much of the fact that Kennedy 
had had an affinity for history. In an article called 
"History on His Shoulder," I:i,.ffi.§.. correspondent Hugh Sidey 
held that Kennedy "knew he was on history's stage" 
Jackie Kennedy was quoted as saying that "history made 
Jack what he was'l Nancy Dickerson explained that 
Kennedy videotaped his activities "because he thought that 
they could provide a new kind of record, a record so that 
people in the future could look back and see history more 
directly £or themselves" i;:;:"'~~ Kennedy's intere.e.t in history 
was thus set up as a context which anticipated the 
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reciprocal interest shown him by historians after his 
death. 
historians did not directly address the assassination, 
they did mention the loss it embodied. They not only 
engraved it within the nation's collective consciousness, 
but planted it firmly within the kinds of contexts that 
made it meaningful. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s A--IP9~§nd 
Qays and Theodore Sorensen's Ke.nnedy provided generally 
sympathetic views on the Presidency from persons who had 
served on the Whi te House staff "'"". The reprinting of many 
of these publications in popular magazines assured their 
availability to a wider public ~~. 
Yet their attempts to do so were met with antagonism 
by other retellers. It was as if what one reporter called 
"a historian's detachment'" was not well-positioned 
within the story's retelling. This sentiment was 
particularly evident among journalists, perhaps because 
differences between the two groups, traditionally 
considered ones of perspective or temporal distance, did 
not bear out in the assassination's retelling. While 
historical references implied an authority to be applied 
·'after h the fact," precisely what constituted "after t e 
factll in the case o£ Kennedy's assassination remained 
Unclear. The story's many loose ends did not yet call for 
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a 
perspective of detachment. Thus the persistence of the 
story's retellers failed to provide cues as to whose 
it was to report it. The legitimate parameters of 
the charter of I·reporting history·' remained unclear to 
all potential retellers. 
This generated doubts as to the viability of one 
definitive history about the assassination~ Doubts were 
expressed over whether one history was possible, 
attainable or desirable, as were questions over the role 
of historians in retelling the events of Kennedy's death. 
Part of this rested with the larger regard for the 
constructed ness of the assassination record, which by 
definition assumed that there were many versions of the 
events of Kennedy's death, not just one. 
Public critiques were levelled on historians" 
performances, particularly by journalists. 
critiqued for "missing the boat": "Historians Lost in the 
Mists of Camelot .. was how one article in the !e.9.§ ...... Ang.§!J .. §' .. §. 
I.tl]l.§'.§. proclaimed readings of Kennedy's administration and 
assassination ~8. Journalists spoke of certain historians 
as stuffy, distanced observers whose analyses of all 
things pertaining to Kennedy suffered from their formality 
Even one historian admitted that: 
For the most 
neglected the 
occurred 5 This 
vacuum filled 
part, professional 
assassination, as 
lack of attention 
by journalists, 
scholars have 
if it never 
has created a 
free-lance 
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writers and others, most o£ whom have examined 
the assassination more for its sensational value 
than for its objective value 30. 
The narrative, professional and perspectival standards 
regularly employed by historians were all seen as working 
against renewed considerations of the assassination story. 
They also failed to underscore the importance of memories 
as a viable way of documenting it. 
One direct challenge to the legitimate presence of 
historians within the assassination story came from writer 
Theodore White. White had enjoyed an e>:tensive 
relationship ,d th Kennedy o,hile wri ting T.h.§' ...... !~L'l}5 .. i..!'..9. .... .9f ..... 'l .. 
and his relatively easy access to 
Kennedy's 1000 days in office made him a familiar face at 
the ~Jhi te House. On such a basis Jackie Kennedy summoned 
him the week after Kennedy died, having decided she wanted 
him to write about the slain President: 
She had asked me to Hyannis Port, she said, 
because she wanted me to make certain that JFK 
was not forgotten in history. She thought it was 
up to me to make American history remember .•• She 
wanted me to rescue Jack from all the 'bitter 
people' who were going to write about him in 
history. She did not want Jack left to the 
historians :.>;:1 ... 
From their meeting came the title of "Camelot." This 
memorable construction of Kennedy's administration made a 
journalist~, not a historian, responsible for popularizing 
Kennedy's memory~ transforming him into an instant 
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evaluator of history. Such a fact was energetically 
stressed by journalists in their chronicles across media. 
In search ror history's precise role Or history 
within the assassination story, interest was also stirred 
in other potentially authoritative voices, as that 
exemplified by fiction. History and journalism were 
posit'ed alongside fiction and drama .. Edward Epstein 
lambasted William Manchester's reputedly "authorized" 
novel frivolously begun as R,""_~.t_h._ .. 2.:LJ=.!'!l2S:.""£. O'~". Underlying 
all these discussions was the fact that retellers of the 
assassination competed with a number of perspectives and 
agendas in retelling the assassination story. There was 
thus a growing awareness that the assassination story 
could be seen by many different perspectives, dependent on 
one's larger aims in telling it. 
RJeGQt:1f_PRI ____ {,LITH __ :nu::RQI,.J:;:. Qfl:ll:_eTORIA.NS. One 
consequence of this was an extensive back-biting, 
particularly by journalists, about historians' efforts at 
record construction. Articles debated whether Arthur 
SchleSinger's work constituted more IIgossip" than 
His memoirs were discussed under the title 
"Peephole Journalism,·' with the somewhat caustic comment 
that "he has made the most o£ a £ew occasions when he was 
permitted to see more than t.he average reporter"' 
>-
L 
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Reporter Meg Greenfield castigated the work of memoirists 
about the Kennedy administration, through a discussion o£ 
commonly-accepted journalistic practices: 
Any reporter can tell you how hard it is to 
recall even a brief quotation word for word 
after an interview, and the fact that certain 
memoirists repaired to their diaries in the 
evening is not even mildly reassuring in view of 
the extensive verbatim exchanges they have 
produced '::;';4 .. 
These tensions in part emerged from whether it was 
the journalist's or historian's mission to report history. 
Chronological and linear demarcations between the two 
professions "'Jere somewhat blurred by the story's 
persistence. That fact in itself created spaces where 
different groups of public spokespeople could contest the 
right to tell the story's authorized version. But it was 
exacerbated by the varied involvement by which different 
groups sought to professionally authenticate themselves 
via the tale's telling. Professional needs thereby 
intensified the circumstances for competition among 
different groups of speakers. As DeLillo admonished, 
"establish your right to the mystery, document it, protect 
itll It ",as a challenge directly taken up by all 
ret.ellers of the assassination, but it was a challenge to 
which journalists appeared particularly well-suited. 
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SITUATING THE JOURNALIST 
Si t.uat. in9 j()urnal iE3t.£C. and around the 
ase,assination t~hu~;. f:",haped. in conjunct.ion with 
t .. hc:. r(~t,e 1.1 i ngs of t.wo other qroups ox 1on,31 
- assassination buffs and historians. Journalists 
reworked basic standards of action common to both groups 
in order to fashion their own authority for retelling the 
events of Kennedy's death. 
It is t.elling that. the hierarchy sug by 
retellers of the assassination story 
according 
labelled 
to which assassination buffs st.rove to be 
.io'Urnalists, or better yet historians; 
iournalists were intrigued by their historical role i:n 
retelling the assassination: and hi.E,t: .. orians 
uphold t,he!r own position as tellers-from-a-
distance to be unravelled over time~ All 
ional tales :focused lore o£ ional 
memories~ But co:mpeti t,ion among reteller~, to a 
rC12,e and fell t.he availabi.1.i of 
t,hrough which to promot,e one $$ version of 
assassi n£:1tion record. Members of alternate forums for 
document.ing KennedyR s assassination competitively st~rove 
to tell their versions of the tale of his death according 
t,o the availability of such stages. 
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This was crucial to the emergence of journalists as 
x'st,elIers". for it gave t,hem the upper hand over 
otJ-ler ,::p::-oups of 
jout"n,glists 
speakers. In contrast to other groups _~ 
easy and continued access to the 
rn.edia~ The c:ent.r-;:1J they played in bringing the tales 
e,f all includinq historians and as,sassinat. ion 
buf£s~ to the public at times made them into mediators of 
a record in-the-making. In a sense, they became moderators 
of all versions of the assassination tale. Their ability 
mediate tales that were and 
ted by other therefore worked to their 
advantage~ 
Journalist!?;·,~ regular appearances 
thrust them into the forefront of the assassination story . 
For example .. a 1988 .5rtic~le in the . /lngl ee; Time,s, by 
Jack Valenti was entit.led '"Anni ver~:.ary of an 
ABsae:,g i os i:, i. () n : a and 
the of Valenti.l's memorie.s in 
documenting what had A 1983 special edition 
of America 
professional memories of a 
:featured t..he personal 
number of 
and 
and 
photographers who had been with in Dallas 
Each independently established where in t.,hc~ 
President,tal motorcade t_hey had been and 
remembered~ Sign if icant 1 y,~ the ent.ire pro9:ram was 
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com pr.i :::;:!;,ed of such recollections@ t.hat by 1983 
memories alone had bE:~gun to be considered z,:.uf£icient. 
documentation of the events in Dallas. 
The ional memories of journalists became even 
more entrenched by 1988, media ives 
included them in a wide array of forums. Journa 1 i st~s i' 
recol1ect.-i ons c:'ompr,ised cent.ral s{;ogment..t'? o£ PBS 
doc:umen called A T 
billed !:'''l.S a ··collect.ion of reminiscences about_ t~he £al1 of 
Camelot .. ~ •• Journalists ranging :from Nancy Dickerson and 
Charles Bartlett to Tom Wicker, Sarah McClendon and Dan 
inscribed what t.hey saw l' heard and remembered. By Rat.her 
1988, journalistic presence at the events of Kennedy" :3 
- symbolic or physical was being extensively 
referenced across media. Journalists' memories began to be 
legitimated over those of other grollps o£ 
Indeed, by the 1:.\;]en -fifth anniversary of the 
assassination" recollections of 
Dallas inclucled fH"?'ar 1 Y every facet ox recollection 
posedble" Te],evised recoll,ection appeared t,o be more t,he 
norm than ion~ t.aking on a wide range of .forms~ 
While early recollections gave blow-by-blow accounts of 
what had happened in Dallas 39 p later years produced a 
number of special programs that specifically addressed the 
a'<;;3E!.,ae.e. t nat ion Each anniversary of the 
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assassination received greater and more varied media 
attention than the ones preceding it 4'. 
By the twenty-fifth anniversary, televised 
recollection of the assassination was so pervasive that it 
not only generated special documentaries but also pervaded 
existing programs. Regular news was filled with small 
commemorative segments, from a ten-minute segment called 
"JFK Remembered," on Philadelphia's Ag.tJ.9.!:; ..... N.'e<.<,./.§ .. to a 
special hour-long edition of ABC's N.:lBh.t .. + ... :i, .. ml., to an eight-
part series about the assassination which was broadcast on 
the GJ:\.$ .. J;:.Y.~.!1.J.n.g ..... N.~.<"/.§. '."'. News-organizations produced their 
own institutionally-grounded retrospectives, ranging from 
one-hour recaps-
to long six and one-half hour reconstructions of events 
43 Tabloid television recounted the assassination on 
programs by Oprah Winfrey, Mort Downey, Jack Anderson and 
Geraldo Rivera 44 
Philadelphia's even bore their own 
assassination-related segments The reconstructed 
versions o£ events which media retrospectives 
encouraged one reporter to somewhat caustically 
offered 
mention 
that "if you don't come to Dealey Plaza this year, the 
assaSSination is very much as it was 25 years ago: reality 
framed by a television set" ••. The freedom with which the 
aSsaSSination story was rendered entertainment suggested 
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effective was the story as folklore. More important, 
efforts underscored the centrality of television in 
documenting the lore of journalistic memories. 
The ultimate difference between most historians and 
assassination bu££s~ on one hand, and many journalists, on 
the other, was what the lore of professional memories 
rested upon presence. In the final reading .~ the 
authority of retelling came down to the ability of 
retellers to establish the fact of "actually (having been) 
present to .i:""7. 
Assassination buff David Lifton said that after 
purchasing a negative of a photograph taken on the grassy 
knoll, "watching the images come up to full contraat~ I 
felt I was joining the ranks of the eyewitnesses - a year 
and a half after the event" 4B Journalist Meg Greenfield 
phrased it more bluntly in an article entitled "The Kiss 
and Tell Memoirs," ~}here she posed the follov.Jing dilemma: 
If the author stood somewhat outside the event, 
has he let us take this fact into account - or 
done so himself? Is there evidence that (as a 
historian) he has made some effort to fill in 
fairly those parts of the story he knew he had 
missed? Or has he taken advantage of the 
ingenuousness of a public that can hardly be 
expected to realize that he speaks with 
different degrees of authority on different 
subjects - a public that is already inclined to 
invest any insider with broad oracular powers on 
the vaguely understood ground that he was there? 
... +<;;~ 
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comments like these suggested that much of the authority 
for retelling the assassination was found in the presence 
of retellers at the events of Kennedy's death. It thus 
became an unvoiced goal among retellers to lend a sense o£ 
their o.m presence to the story. 
The systematic attempts to construct presence where 
there was none, and to imply presence through 
authoritative retellings, ultimately put journalists at an 
advantage over other groups of speakers. Novelist Don 
Delillo noted that "when experience is powerless? all 
things (however constructed they may be) are the same" '~"'. 
The fact that many journalists had been present when other 
professional speakers had not- as well as the fact that 
journalists had systematic means by which to invoke and 
perpetuate a sense of that presence- served them well, 
making them well-equipped to engender 
words would 
the kind of 
ensuring their be heard and 
remembered. 
This is not to say that journalists simply created 
their role in the story because of their access to 
technological 
professional 
storytelling 
predicated 
aSsassination 
and institutional support. Their 
memories, narratives, particular mode of 
and technologies they used were all 
on presence. Unlike many historians or 
buffs, certain journalists involved in 
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retelling the assassination story had been present at some 
of its events. When they were not, their technologies and 
narrative strategies allowed them to construct their tales 
a8 if they were. These foundations of journalistic 
authority not only encouraged presence but were predicated 
upon it. The record by which journalists constructed their 
tales of the assassination was thereby devoted to 
constructing a sense o£ proximity to the events o£ 
Kennedy's deat.h. 
To a large extent p this was made possible by 
television. Television allowed journalists to reference 
their presence as if it were a given in the assassination 
story. Journalists' professional memories and their 
implication of presence at Kennedy's death were solidified 
by television technology. Mere attentiveness to the role 
of television developed into an extensive self-referential 
discourse, by which reporters, particularly television 
journalists, sought to document extended aspects of the 
role the medium played. 
The fact that journalists' recollections of their 
be amassed into their o'VJn record COverage began to 
immediately after the assassination encouraged reporters 
to generate extended self-referential 
assassination stories that 
Kennedy's death. Television 
recounted the 
journalists 
accounts of 
events o£ 
"'Jere deemed 
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particularly 
-assassination 
active players in punctuating the 
record .. Inscribing their punctuations in 
memory over the years was reinforced by the appraisals 
lent television over the two and a half decades that 
followed Kennedy's death. As the status of television - as 
a legitimate medium for telling nelt-JS grev.J p so did 
journal istic appraisals of television's role in covering 
Kennedy's death. 
It was therefore no surprise that by 1988, 
recollections of Kennedy ... Jere intimately linked with the 
media, in general p and with television, in particular. To 
an extent this was built into circumstanceI' for,. as one 
writer commented, "Kennedy INas. cut o££ at the promiseI' not 
after the performance, and so it was left to television 
and his widow to frame the man as legend" But in 
addition to circumstance, the II anniversary spate of books 
and TV specials" ~.o;;':=:,. in one nellJsmagazine's words, produced 
much information that was media-linked. As 
magazine maintained, television helped create a flashbulb 
memory,. the indelible freeze-framing of the event at its 
most trivial incidental detail: 
The Kennedy in that freeze-frame is the Kennedy 
of Camelot, not the man who miscarried the Bay 
of Pigs invasion or shared a Vegas playgirl with 
a Mafia don; it is as if the shadows had been 
washed 8,"ay by the flashbulbs or the tears "'",: 
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The role of television in in9 jOllrnalist8~ 
Id in narratives across media. A special 
commemorative editiofl o£ Morn prc)c 1 a i. med 
that the assassination made television into "irreversibly 
the most, import"ant. fflJ;?dlum £CJ~r comrflunicAt.J.on'": The deatJ) of 
our first television President markerl the beginning of the 
age of t,elevision as the dominant, m.edium in our lives" [',,;L, 
Ne'0}spaper recountings of the assassination in 1988 
procl.aimed television~s triumph, under head.1 i nes 1 i l{e "TV 
Retells the Story of Slaying," ··CBS Replays November 22," 
"JFK and a Tribute t.o TV" or "TV: The Ghost of a Presidemt. 
Past,'· e.~!!.';; S-3.id one such art.,iels: 
Television has marked the 25th anniversary of 
the assassination of President Kennedy in a 
wave of programming that is as much a reminder 
of how large a role television pI in 
rEmo"t.inrg the tragedy and it,s aftE~rmath as i't is 
a retelling of the event 3~. 
EVAn on8 historian n his account of the assaesinat_ion 
\,.;'1 t,h an introduc:tory remi..~rk about t.eIevision, whIch 
und(~rscored t,he m(2d i um" 53 c,~entr'~11 i ty and vita.lity in 
usting the assassination 
TeleviE.;ion 
aftermat.h 
electron_ic 
unfolding 
transm.it.ted 
l)rO'U9ht t.he and it.s 
vividly into the national 
In their finest hours, the 
news medj,a the events 
in Dallas and Washington and 
them instantaneously to the American 
people. Far more ieally and realistically 
than the printed page, 
Z.ome of the mo:::~.t~ un 
the video screen depicted 
Ie scenes in recent 
290 
Efforts like these finalized the stage by which JFK, his 
administration, assa.ssination and television became 
inextricably linked. At heart of these 1 inJ{s were 
journalists, who lent the story its narrative form. 
Thus persistent emphasis on television technology as 
the medium t.hat most effectively memorialized Kennedy 
enhanced the position of journalists, and particularly 
television journalists, as competitive articulators o£ the 
assassination's memory. Television technology perpetuated 
the presence o£ journalists within the assassination 
story. The positioning of journalists, initially squeezed 
in with other groups working out their own memories, was 
further enhanced by easily-accessed stages where they 
performed their versions of Kennedy's death. A~S one 
reporter observed in 1988, ··the amount of coverage (given 
the assassination story) suggests how strongly television 
executives believe the event still grips the American 
population" ~?!;a 
What all of this suggests is that as the 
assassination narrative was splashed across time and 
space, negotiation for the position of its authorized 
Spokesperson worked to the advantage of journalists - from 
the perspective of narrative standards F prOfessional 
standards;, organizational priorities and institutionally-
bound discourse. Journalists' practices and values worked 
291 
to their favor, helping to establish, authenticate and 
perpetuate them as rightful retellers of the assassination 
story. 
All of the above-mentioned circumstances the 
background of documentary failure, contest over the place 
of authorized spokespersons £or the assassination story, 
viability of television technology- helped journalists 
credential themselves as authorized spokespeople of the 
story. It is interesting that this took place despite the 
fact that they had often not covered the story when it 
happened. Yet the fact of associating themselves with the 
assassination story became a professional goal in itself, 
encouraging them to create and perpetuat.e new and 
different ways of connecting themselves with the events in 
Dallas. 
Yet what has happened since? Journalists have not 
left their negotiations for the position of authorized 
Spokespeople to external developments. Instead, 
journalists have over time adopted four main roles in 
their attempt.s to narratively situate themselves as 
retellers of Kennedy's death. Each role links journalists 
ongoing discourse about journalistic practice, 
prOfessionalism and the legitimation of television news, 
in that it highlights a different dimension of 
i our'!').:'?!} i C,J,t. ic 
invest,iqation 
journalist::.;;," 
Through 
.and 
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eyev;i tnessing f' 
int ion s11 
ional codes of behavior. 
journalistg 
re~presc~ntat"ion ! 
to 
have t::'.i t-uat.e.d 
them~,e.l ves within the assassination story in each of these 
roles!, as eyewitnesses, nODrE'S'0Tltst i ves!' invest.i..getoX'.s;, 
find i Each implicates slightly 
foundations by which jOllrnalists claim to be 
differE~nt 
Jegiti.'mate 
of the assassination story. The fact that roles 
have often been invoked in concert with others underscores 
Lhe complexity of the rhetoric by which journalists have 
aLLempLed La legiLimaLe Lhemselves. 
THE ,TOURN ALIST 
PLACE. of sit,u8_ting oneself' wi'thin Lhe 
89',sassinat lon is as an eyewitness. While an earlier 
the eyeVJit..nes.s:';~ roll,? in n;;~'1rrat,i.veg 
by .journalists at the time of KennedyP s death, 
journalists have also used it across time and space to 
cI,~edent~ial themselves within the story. Journalists use 
their eyewitness status to events to generate personalized 
Darret i ve!;:'. by they est,ablish 
or authorizc:d t the assasinat.ion 
Being an eyewitness carries with it the authority 
of baving Idb.at posi t i, on became 
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important in light of increasingly prevalent debates about 
conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. 
Reporters like Hugh Sidey or Tom Wicker recoll~cted 
Dallas through their experiences as eyewitnesses. 
recalled that 
perhaps we knew when the first sound reached the 
press bus behind President Kennedy's limousine. 
A distant crack, another. A pause, and another 
crack. Something was dangerously off-key 5~ 
Wicker recounted how he was 
sitting on the press bus, I think the second 
press bus, with a local reporter from Texas. He 
observed this, people running and so forth, and 
he dashed up the front of the bus and then came 
back to me and said, 'something's happened. The 
President's car just sped away, they just gunned 
away' e:..:,<:,. 
Sidey 
There were eyewitnesses to Ost;Jald' s shooting, as when uNBC 
News Correspondent Tom Pettit, at the scene, exclaimed in 
disbelief , He's been shot' II Eyewitness tales were 
frequently embedded v.Ji thin journalistic recollections o£ 
the assassination. While at times they referenced problems 
of eyewitnessing, they nonetheless invoked it as a common 
journalistic practice. 
The eyewitness role was generally invoked from Dallas 
but it was also applied to journalists' presence in 
Washington .' where they a\rJai ted arrival of the plane 
Carrying Kennedy's body. NBC correspondent Nancy Dickerson 
recalled that 
.~; .•. ' ••.. " ... "'" E£" 
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we were on the air, talking~ and Air Force One 
arrived and I saw them. They were all confused 
as far as I was concerned. They weren't doing it 
the right way. Instead of opening the front door 
of Air Force One, they were opening the back 
door. And they had a hydraulic lift there, and 
of course they were taking the body out the back 
door in a casket SQ. 
Eyewitnessing was recounted not only in direct conjunction 
with the events of the assassination. NBC Nel,.Js 
Correspondent Sander Vanocur recalled standing outside of 
the west wing of the White House when he saw Kennedy's 
rocking chair being brought out and LBJ's mounted saddle 
brought in. "Power changes very quickly and very brutally 
in \vashington," said Vanocur. 111'11 never forget the 
exchange of those two pieces of furniture within a 20 
minute period" 
By situating themselves as eyewitnesses, journalists 
have authenticated themselves for having been in the §.~l!1§. 
~J .. ~§:. and §.~.~.g .. ., .. " ..... p' .. +' .. §!.~.§:. as the events o£ the assassination 
weekend. The same time and place that characterizes these 
personalized narratives took journalists £roTft Dallas to 
WaShington, where t.he assassination culminated in 
Kennedy's funeral. Being an eyewitness has ensured the 
access o£ journalists with stories that bear space-time 
qualities equivalent to those of the assassination itsel£~ 
InVoking the role o£ eyewitness, journalist.s have 
legitimated themselves through an authority derived from 
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been in the same time and same place as the events 
of Kennedy's death. 
A second way of credentialling 
oneself is through the role of representative. Journalists 
have generated authority for their tales by assuming the 
role o£ representative a Such a role is predicated upon 
pro:fessional affiliation, with journalists positioned as 
representative players in the assassination story through 
their professional affiliation as reporters. The role of 
representative is invoked when eyewitnessing 'V,las not 
possible and reporters did not work on the assassination 
story in either its Dallas or Washington frames. One NBC 
retrospective used John Chancellor~s experiences during 
the assassination weekend as a focal point for its footage 
of events in Dallas: 
I was NBC's correspondent in Berlin then. 
Kennedy had been there a few months before his 
death, and he was idolized by Berliners ... The 
people there were devastated by (Kennedy's) 
death. In West Berlin, you would get in a taxi, 
give your destination p and the driver would say 
~America~? 1£ you said yes, the meter would be 
turned off and you rode free 64. 
The fact that Chancellor's experiences as a correspondent 
in Berlin bore little relevance to the events of the 
aSsassination \4eekend t,\~as not visibly problematized. 
Instead, his professional standing at the time of t.he 
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assassination credentialled him to speak about Dallas. 
Even i£ his personal memories o£ the events in Dallas 
tendered from the less-than-vantage perspect_i ve or 
Berlin, NBC incorporated it because it authorized him as 
a representative spokesperson £or the assassination 
weekend. 
The role o£ representative is thus authorized by the 
£act that narrators were reporters at the time o£ the 
assassination. Pro£essional standing is invoked to justi£y 
the £act that seemingly "unconnected ll reporters could 
nontheless authoritatively interpret events o£ the 
assassination weekend. As one reporter said, "When the 
shots were £ired, I was working for b!f~ as a reporter in 
the education department" "'''. ~Jhile she then £le .. to spend 
the day with Rose Kennedy in Hyannis Port, other reporters 
were never even assigned to the story. Journalist Chuck 
Stone, £eatured on Philadelphia's late evening news, 
"recalled being a Washington newsman covering Kennedy" 
The news-item showed a £ramed photograph o£ Kennedy at one 
Or his news conferences, presumably authenticated by 
Stone's presence, although that was not made clear. Peter 
Jennings introduced an item on the assassination as "a 
reporter .. ho covered this region in the mid-60s" 
Malcolm Pointdexter, in 1953 a reporter £or the 
in a television interview 
297 
"we sat there. We couldn't believe what had happened. 
asked members of the police department, ~could it 
happen here?" I. {.;1ti~. None of these reporters was situated 
anywhere near Dallas during the assassination; nor were 
they in any way connected with the story elsewhere. Yet 
the fact that they had been reporters at the time of the 
assassination thrust them into a position years later of 
authoritatively retelling its story. Using their words to 
index the assassination rein£orces journalists' ability to 
act as authorized spokespersons. 
Journalists were thus credential led as 
representatives for having been in the !"aJ!l~._ .. !,.ime but. a 
differe_nt .. _~£.~ as the events in Dallas. The relevance of 
professional affiliation at the time of the assassination 
implicitly supports the emerging status of journalists as 
the story"s authorized retellers. The fact that 
journalists did ~ot work on the assassination story is 
obscured by the frequency with which news organizations 
have used tales of the representative to authorize 
assassination recollections. These tales e><pand the 
foundation by which journalists legitimately provided an 
authorized version of events. Not only do they perpetuate 
associations with the assassination story that bear little 
connection to the part journalists originally played in 
ita coverage, but they equallize the access of reporters 
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whose stories displayed de£inite spatial disjunctions £rom 
the events in Dallas. 
a third role assumed by journalists 
in their narratives is that o£ investigator. The role o£ 
investigator allowed journalists to invoke authority 
through their activities as investigative reporters, a 
recollection supported by increasingly prevalent discourse 
about conspiracy in Kennedyls death~ In particular, the 
height.ened role of assassination bu££s in the years 
following the assassination gave tales of the investigator 
momentum and increased credence. As one reporter said, 
"the story ",oul d die dot-ln £or a while and then crop up 
again~ Something was always coming IIp"" &9. 
Situating reporters as investigators wae implicit in 
journalistic coverage o£ the assassination £rom its 
inception. It t,.]as implied in the way that journalists 
crowded Dallas police headquarters the night o£ the 
assassination, hoping to catch a glimpse of Kennedy's 
accused killer, Lee Harvey Oswald. One speci£ic dialogue 
Was widely recounted across the media: 
Reporter: Did you kill the President? 
Oswald: No. I have not been charged with that, 
in £act nobody has said that to me yet. The 
£irst thing I heard about it was when the 
newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that 
question. 
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Reporter: You have been charged. 
Oso;.'Jsld: Sir? 
Reporter: You have been charged 70. 
Later, Oswald was reported to have said that ··the first 
thing I heard about it was when the newspaper reporters in 
the hall asked me that question·· The role of 
journalists as investigators was thereby foregrounded 
almost from the first days of the assassination story. 
Tales of the investigator are couched in the fact 
One that Kennedy's death incomplete story" 
reporter remarked that Uhaving covered the story as a 
working journalist on the scene, I cannot accept as proven 
facts the incoherent conglomeration of circumstantial 
evidence against (Oswald)·' 73. The assassination story was 
full of '"loose strands, improbable cOincidences, puzzling 
gaps" 74, which made deciphering difficult. Attempts to 
resolve the story's unknowns have thus given journalists 
tasks through which to authenticate their professional 
identities? recasting them as tales o£ investigation. 
Dan Rather referred on-air to the years he spent 
investigating the story·"". N.~.'! .... yq".t ... .IJIIl~."'. edi tor Harrison 
Salisbury maintained that journalists at the T.i .. IIl.~ .. ". 
continued to actively investigate the assassination story 
"to the limits of the correspondents' ability" 
Ultimately, boasted SalisburYF "there was litt.le 
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likelihood" that other evidence would materially change 
the fundamentals which in it,s 
ini Ual reporting. Jack Anderson hosted his own special on 
the assassination that credential led him as a npulitzer 
Prize winning journalist-· and det.ai led his "twenty year 
investigation of the crime of the century" 77 \>}al ter 
Cronkite summed up a special edi tion of N.gy,'l, by saying 
that its investigation had "explained many but not all of 
the questions about twhe assassination'" 7_. Tales of the 
investigator thereby re£erence career trajectories by 
which reporters have conducted independent investigations 
into various unsettled aspects of Kennedy's assassination. 
Implici t in these discussions are references to practices 
of exploration, discovery and scrutiny_ Journalists are 
portrayed as having made "exhaustive" and "painstaking" 
efforts at unravelling the assassination story 79. 
This has applied to news organizations too. 
magazine was hailed by K"''!1.<;;.\~~.'''K in 1955 for having led the 
call for a ne\\J investigation while a myriad of 
newspapers 
§Jp~.~. - "'ere heralded for having supported the call .n. 
Difficulties in playing the investigator role were widely 
discussed , as when columnist Nora Ephron commented in the 
mid-seventies that "only a handful of reporters (are) 
Wor-king the assassination ,storyll: 
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This is a story 
investigators, 
t.hat begs for 
subpoena power, 
g:canls 
that requires. 
volumes of' the 
of' immunity: itls 
slogging through 
Warren Commission 
hundreds of 
f'orensics 
also a story 
twen'ty-seven 
Report and 
dozens of books on the assassination~~~The whole 
thing is a mess ~~ 
But the plethora of unr'avelled a.nd unresolved threads 
about the assassination have made it an attractive task 
for many journaliBts~ 
Situating themselves as investigators have thus given 
journalists authority for having returned to the place of 
the assassination to conduct their investigations. It is 
not coincidental that they do so many years after the 
event.s in Dallas. These tales of but 
have created a way £or journalists who 
did not take an active part in covering the assa •• ination 
weekend to authoritatively retell aspects of the 
assassination 8tory~ They legitimate journalists who 
associate the:rnsel ves with the assassination story by 
reopening its record years af"ter the event,s in Dallas. 
Journalistic access to the asaassination#s retelling is 
thereby ensured despite the temporal disjunction which 
these .tories embody. 
THE ~.:g:Jl,lRN!l. h .I.:::;.If\?~ 
T,LMEtPIJ:l':E=g!:'NIJ'hll.G!;.. Journal ists also situate them",el ves 
wi t.hin the assassination story as interpreters. The role 
of interpreter focuses attention on the i. n t.erpret i ve 
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activities of journalists in conjunction with the events 
of Dallas. Borrowing from the experiences of eyewitnesses, 
representatives and investigators in making interpretive 
claims about the assassination~ the role of interpreter 
implies that it was unneccessary to have been in either 
the same place or time as the events in Dallas in order to 
make authoritative claims about the assassination story. 
Certain journalists fulfilled the function of 
i n t~erpreters p despite the fact that they also acted as 
eyewi t.nesses, representatives or investigators in their 
narratives .. Charles Roberts' book on eyewitnessing, £or 
example, claimed to ""examine coolly and critically some o£ 
the odd theories and rumours that have burgeoned ... looking 
at the whole record'" .3. In a semi-philosophical moment, 
Tom Wicker commented that the assassination was "as if our 
country had been struck dO~.-Jn!,11 dealing a IIterrible bIoI,<) to 
one" s sense of' the possible" F.:\~~ a Walter Cronl{i te contended 
years later that the assassination had dealt a "serious 
blow to our national psyche" 85* Hugh Sidey maintained 
that "we t-Jere never the same!, nor \~Jas the I;Jorld" 
Situating the journalist in the role of interpreter 
'Nas indicated in the days immediately following the 
assassination~ Wrote reporter Marya Mannes of the press 
corps: 
for £our interminable days!, I listened to the 
familiar voices of~ .. so many who never failed us 
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or history during their great.est_ posEdble 
ordeal. Shaken as they visibly were, infinitely 
weary as they became, they maintained calm and 
reason and insight throughout the marathon of 
madness and mourning 97. 
But the references which have evolved over time and space 
in conjunction with journalists' interpretative role have 
blurred both the temporal and physical distance from which 
they can be expected to reliably pronounce judgment on the 
events of Kennedy's death~ 
This means that a number of reporters have assumed 
the interpretive role without any visible linkage to other 
roles. In such a case, situating them,gel ves as 
int.erpreters not only allows journalists to generate 
authority for events from distant positions, such as that 
of New York anchorpersons or nev·}s-edi tors, but it 
legitimates persons who have little association with the 
assassination at the time. ABC's Forrest Sawyer conducted 
a one-hour retrospective of the assassination on 
yet did not explicate how he was associated 
",ith the event!", in Dallas. Other than mentioning that "for 
those of us who are old enough, this has been a day of 
remembering, recalling t.he glamour of the Kennedy 
presidency and how it. felt then" Sawyer made no 
attempt to credential h i.e. interpretation of the 
assassination story. Similarly, writer Lawrence Wright 
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concluded his book on the sixties, which dealt in part 
with Kennedy's assassination, with the observation that 
it began as an essay for IS'."'-"'''' ...... tl9nth .. +Y about 
growing up in Dallas in the years preceding the 
assassination of President Kennedy. I did not 
intend to make myself a character so much as a 
guiding sensibility to the thoughts and passions 
of the moment~ (a's 
In both cases, the most obvious connection to the 
assassination story was a contemporary pro£essional 
affiliation with journalism. 
The role of interpreter is thus legitimated through 
contemporary professional ties to journalism: Whereas the 
role or representative is authenticated by a journalist's 
pro£essional association at the time or the assassination, 
the role of interpreter is credential led by his or her 
proressional association at the t.ime of the 
assassination's recollecting a The shi£t in recognizable 
boundaries is significant,. for it has helped to render 
retellers of the assassination with no obvious link to the 
st.ory int.o aut.horized spokespersons £or the events in 
Dallas. 
Journalists thereby situate themselves as 
interpreters despite the fact that many journalists acting 
as interpret.era told their tales £rom a t.iJ.f.t.§L_ .. ~.nd .... " .. P .. t~ .. S.~. 
Dallas story. Invoking the role o£ 
interpreter has allowed journalists to become 
authoritative spokespeople despite - or, perhaps,. because 
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of - the spatial and temporal disjunctions which their 
tales embodied~ In one assassination bu££~s view, this has 
generated a breed of journalists years aft.er the 
assassination who have no first-hand knowledge of 
making them better able to approach the story without bias 
90 Spatial and temporal distance has thus legitimated the 
ability of journalists to act as 
interpreters of the assassination story, 
authoritative 
likening their 
role as spokespeople to that of historians. Like other 
role.s by "'hich journalists have credential led their 
recollections of the assassination, situating themselves 
as interpreters constitutes a way for journalists to 
associate themselves with the assassination story without 
having had any prior pro£essional connection with itg 
The four roles through ",hich journalists have 
narratively positioned themselves vis a vis the 
assassination have thus created a range of situations by 
they can rhetorically legitimate themselves as 
spokespersons o£ the assassination storY8 Access to the 
assassination story, as offered by these roles, has 
expanded the £oundations by I/Jhich reporters can 
legitimately claim to be its spokespersons~ 
l\ccess is ensured through a span o£ time-space 
disjunctions: The role of eyelr1i tness legitimates 
journalists £or having been in the same place and same 
305 
time as the events in Dallas; the role of representative 
authorizes them to speak about the time period of the 
assassination but from places ather than Dallas; the role 
o£ investigator allows them to perpetuate stories that 
were generated from the same place but from a different 
time period; and finally the role of interpreter makes it 
possible for journalists to recollect the assassination 
despite the fact that they had been in neither the same 
place nor time period as the Dallas events. Each role 
allows journalists to legitimate themselves as 
spokespeople for the assassination story not through the 
role they originally played in covering the assassination 
but through a wide range of activities that took place in 
times and places beyond it. The wider range o£ activities 
their tales reference aptly suits journalistic codes o£ 
pro£esE:;,ional behavior .. In all of these ways, journalists 
have used the expanded access these roles gave them to 
turn stories of the assassination into stories about 
themselves. They have effectively used the assassination 
of Kennedy as a stage through ttJhich to exercise t.heir own 
legitimation, both collective and individual. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL: 
RECOLLECTING THROUGH CELEBRITY 
To be talked about is to be part o£ a story, and 
to be part o£ a story is to be at the mercy o£ 
storytellers - the media and their audience. The 
£amous person is thus not so much a person as a 
story about a person 1. 
Once journalists promoted themselves as an authorized 
presence within the assassination story, they set about 
locating ways o£ perpetuating their presence over space 
and time. Journalists £it their assassination tales within 
larger memory systems, retelling their tales according to 
pre-determined patterns o£ collective memory. By linking 
in with existent memory systems, they were better assured 
o£ their tales' success£ul perpetuation. 
In the pages that £ollow, I discuss the workings o£ 
one memory system by which the stature o£ individual 
journalists was promoted above the stories they told 
celebrity. How celebrity has helped journalists not only 
perpetuate their presence in the assassination story but 
gain independent leverage £rom it constitutes a basic 
cornerstone o£ their authority as spokespeople. This has 
had particular bearing on journalists' constitution as an 
interpretive community, where the emphasis on the 
individual was central. 
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The £ollowing chapter has three parts: It addresses 
general characteristics o£ journalistic celebrity. 
particularly its function as a memory system; discusses 
the Kennedy assassination as a ground £rom which 
journalistic celebrity sprouted, with emphasis on speci£ic 
cases o£ journalistic celebrity; and £inally explores how 
the celebrity status of certain reporters has been 
institutionally perpetuated. 
De£ined as "persons well-known £or their well-
knownedness" 2, celebrity functions as a set of rules for 
speakers and actors, giving them idealized notions about 
how they should be or act. It re£lects "shi£ting 
definitions of achievement in a social world" 3. Depending 
in large part on the mass media, it has evolved into its 
contemporary £orm through an interlinking o£ di££erent 
kinds of mass-mediated texts 4 The media legitimate 
celebrities through a network o£ institutional activities 
that generate extensive public discourse about them. 
Constructing and perpetuating celebrity is thus as much an 
concern as an individual onep with institutional 
institutional practices necessary to generate and maintain 
individual cases o£ celebrity. 
Such is the case with journalistic retellings o£ the 
assassination. While journalists have systematically 
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promoted themselves as retellers within their 
assassination tales, in certain cases their status as 
storytellers has effectively elevated their importance 
above that of the tales they told. Celebrity has both 
helped them strategically interpret the significance of 
their coverage as well as highlight the presence of 
certain figures within their narratives. It has thus 
promoted the actions of certain journalists as a frame of 
reference for journalistic behavior in contexts stretching 
beyond assassination retellings. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the ability to 
highlight individual personalities within and 
independent from assassination tales underscores an 
important dimension of assassination retellings the 
significance of the individual. Journalists' ability to 
constitute themselves as an independent interpretive 
community through their assassination retellings has 
depended on the role played by individuals in delineating 
boundaries o£ cOTflmuni ty and authority. The featured 
presence of the individual reporter within assassination 
narratives has thus keyed members of the community into 
boundary changes within the profession. 
Tales of celebrity were initially formed via 
references to larger discourses about technology and 
professionalism. The then-emerging state of television 
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news reinforced the fact that television had begun to 
develop its own form of journalistic storytelling, which 
wove the celebrity of reporters directly into TV news 
presentation Celebrity status was furthered by 
television's visual, dramatic and personalized dimensions, 
which generated an authority characterized by style, 
personality or flair The authority with which 
television would eventually come to promote the on-site 
recognition of journalists establishing forums, like 
televised interviews, that associated news with faces 
thereby figured already within the structure of 
assassination tales. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding 
news at the time generated a flurry of television 
attention around television journalists, whose invocation 
and utilization of the new medium thrust many into the 
critical public eye for the first time. 
A concern for professionalism also permeated 
attempts to promote themselves as journalists' 
celebrities. Legitimating the new medium of television 
allowed for the rearrangement of professional roles in 
existing media, giving celebrity alternate forms not only 
in the medium being introduced but in other media too. 
Notions of celebrity became differently informed by the 
nascent forms of authoritative storytelling and new 
prOfessional identities that adoption of each medium made 
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not only possible, but if institutional inter-media 
competition were to survive - necessary. 
Technology and professional roles thereby helped 
journalistic celebrities link their assassination 
retellings with larger discourses external to the 
journalistic community. In recollecting their coverage of 
the Kennedy assassination, journalists were able to 
promote themselves as celebrities parallel to both ongoing 
discourses about journalistic professionalism and the 
legitimation of television as a news rnediumD Celebrity 
offered journalists ready-made ways of making sense of 
assassination tales by offering them specific cues of 
memory .. Individual reporters were made the pivotal point 
o£ criss-crossing discourses about the assassination, on 
one hand, and technology and professionalism" on the 
other. Over time, this has offered assassination retellers 
an effective way of both perpetuating their own presence 
within their tales and gaining stature independent of 
them. It has also set out the appropriate boundaries of 
community. While offering a temporally and spatially 
bounded memory system of shared perceptions and 
recollections about Dallas, celebrity allows for the 
systematic substitution of different reporters as part of 
the assassination story, systematically thrusting certain 
reporters into the public eye over others. According to 
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such a sUbstitutional rule, di££erent journalists are 
e££ectively "plugged in'; as celebrities £or having covered 
the story. Di£ferentially associating the Tom Wickers, Dan 
Rathers, Walter Cronkites or Theodore Whites with the 
assassination story, dependent on the larger discourses 
about journalism that were at hand, is thus a critical 
dimension o£ the workings o£ celebrity. Individual 
journalists receive celebrity status because they have 
attended to larger discourses about journalism. 
Thus tales o£ journalistic celebrity have not only 
helped journalists £ocus on themselves, thereby 
rein£orcing their celebrity status and promoting them in a 
£ashion separate and independent o£ the assassination 
tales they tell, but they have also set up the collective 
boundaries o£ journalistic practice. Certain journalists 
have been legitimated in ways which set them up as 
independent £rames o£ re£erence £or the journalistic 
community. Celebrity has thereby helped mark memories of 
the assassination, at the same time as it has signalled 
both the status o£ memory-bearers and the boundaries of 
the community where they reside. It has made the 
assassination narrative into a locus by which journalists' 
celebrity status has given them a more generalized stature 
as cultural authorities. 
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The Kennedy assassination constituted one obvious 
cornerstone upon which tales of journalistic celebrities 
could groWa The Kennedy administration, like the 
assassination that brought it to an end, catered to 
journalists' celebrity status. In recalling his coverage 
of Kennedy's reign, ~_~§.h_;L.n£!tcm __ Y.o_§i_ reporter Dav id Broder 
maintained that the President's live television 
con£erences dret<J reporters who generally eschewed 
institutionalized set-ups: 
Some of those (reporters) Kennedy recognized 
regularly became TV stars themselves, and that 
status reinforced by invitations to White 
House parties and dinners - did nothing to hurt 
the administration 7. 
Kennedy's administration was "an American court where the 
rich, the glamorous and the powerful congratulated each 
other. It was a pantheon of celebrity" ". The President 
set up parameters which made celebrity a viable context 
for remembering his life and death. 
Over the 25 years since Kennedy was shot, 
journalistic retellings of the assassination have upheld 
these parameters 9. Certain journalists developed into 
celebrities for their post-assassination reconstructions 
of Kennedy's reign '0. Others found that retelling the 
assassination was a fertile ground for reporters to be 
perpetuated from positions of well-knownedness. Labelling 
319 
writers Theodore White and Hugh Sidey "Kennedy's elegists" 
was a case in point 1 1 Upholding reporters as 
celebrities, often in front of the names of organizations 
employing them, was thus realized in a systematic and 
regularized fashion. Assassination narratives displayed 
the names of individual reporters as emblems of authority 
for the events in Dallas. 
Retelling the Kennedy assassination thus gave 
journalists a stage on which to gain and maintain status. 
Their record of the assassination allowed them to 
narratively reconstruct its events in ways which addressed 
and reinforced - their own celebrity. Four individual 
reporters have been consistently mentioned in conjunction 
with assassination retellings - Tom Wicker, Dan Rather, 
Walter Cronkite and Theodore White. Each has become a 
celebrity because tales of his rise to fame attended to 
more general concerns at issue :for journalistic 
professionals .. 
Narratives about Tom Wicker perhaps best exemplify 
how members of the journalistic community felt about 
success£ully covering the assassination as a member o£ the 
printed press. Tales told of Wicker being on the scene 
continuously for the first day of events, until he filed 
his report at day's end from an airport terminal. His 
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performance was regarded as an ideal per£ormance o£ 
American journalism, for it showed ho" the goals of speedy 
coverage, eyewitness reporting and terse prose could still 
produce a journalistic success story. 
Years later, colleague Harrison Salisbury praised 
Wicker's on-the-scene reporting by saying that 
The coverage had begun "ith classic reportage -
Tom Wicker's on-the-scenes eyewitness. It could 
not be beat. (I told him to) ... just "rite every 
single thing you have seen and heard. Period. He 
did. No more magnificent piece of journalistic 
wri ting has been published in the :rj._'!l_~§_. Through 
Tom's eye we lived through each minute of that 
fatal Friday, the terror, the p~in, the horror, 
the mindless tragedy, elegant, blood-chilling 
prose ~ .. ;;;:. 
One telling aspect of Salisbury's comments is located in 
his final sentence - "the horror, the mindless tragedy, 
elegant, blood-chilling prose." The transformation by 
which Salisbury quietly moves from telling the horror of 
the event to telling the elegance of the "riting in which 
it was inscribed is a seemingly innocuous one. But in so 
doing, Salisbury rein£orces an intrinsic asssociation 
between Wicker's role in telling Kennedy's death and the 
events of the death themselves. Salisbury makes it appear 
as if Wicker himself is a natural part of the 
assassination story, a pattern frequently repeated in 
tales of journalistic celebrity. 
Narratives of Wicker's celebrity status have been 
predicated upon such an association - Wicker in Dallas as 
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part of the Dallas story. Indeed, Wicker's performance in 
Dallas has been reinforced in subsequent stories o£ his 
own career trajectory. Said one observer p '"IJ.Jicker was a 
product of events, an individual whose career had been 
advanced by the reporting of the assassination" .:. The 
point at ",hich he became known in his own right was not 
long in coming. 
The professional gains associated with covering the 
assassination story were indicated already a year after 
Kennedy's death. At that point ~Y. magazine reported that 
Along with tangible profitsp many people's 
careers have received boosts thanks to Oswald's 
marksmanship. The brilliant performance of Tom 
Wi c ker of I.h."L __ .. l'!.§,.I:'. ____ 'L9£lL_'Lb.!!!..§'..§., w r i t i ng from 
Dallas for the newspaper of record - under what 
was obviously incredible pressure - so impressed 
his bosses that he is now the Washington bureau 
chie£ :1. ... -1> .. 
Wicker's promotion- the "most bruising, office-politics 
wise'" because it propelled him ahead of veteran reporters 
who had been led to expect the same post was 
significant for it came directly after Dallas. As Gay 
Talese mentioned, "after the assassination story that day, 
and the related stories that followed, Wicker's stock rose 
sharply It thus made sense that 
perpetuate Wicker's celebrity status. Upholding Wicker as 
a celebrity for having exemplified what was construed as 
journalistic professionalism did not only accomplish 
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individual aims. It also justiried organizational actions 
taken on his behalr years earlier. 
Tales or Tom Wicker the celebrity have thus been 
linked with highly topical discourses about what it meant 
to be a print-media proressional in the age or television. 
Through the individual, this celebrity tale has allowed 
larger discourses about television journalism 
intersect 
and 
with journalistic proressionalism to 
assassination narratives. It underscores the viability or 
print journalism and shows that celebrities have been 
generated by that medium too. For larger boundaries or 
journalistic community, commonality and authority, this 
tale thereby suggests the relevance or dirrerent media in 
the making or journalistic celebrities. 
Narratives about the perrormance or Dan Rather in 
Dallas were similarly linked in with ongoing discourses 
about journalistic pro£essionalism and television 
journalism, but rrom the side or television. Tales about 
Rather address attempts to legitimate television 
correspondents as bona ride reporters. Rather too was on-
the-spot when Kennedy was killed, but rather than remain 
on the scene, as Wicker had done, he rushed to the nearest 
CBS arriliate where he succeeded in providing rapid up-to-
date relays or what was happening in the city. 
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comparison here is telling. \'Jhile lVicker 
anticipated the deadlines of printing by following the 
story to the airport, where he labored in less-than-
supportive conditions to turn out prose,. Rather 
anticipated the demands of television technology by 
rushing ~~_~_ from the story and t.9~?~££ the technology ot 
its telling. In other words, he ran to the nearest 
affilia"te. The fact that he successfully filed the story 
depended directly on his subordinates, who remained on the 
scene to supply him with information. The difference in 
these tales - which outlined how the story was covered by 
two different media suggests how necessary was the 
celebrity tale for validating television journalists at 
the time. 
Narratives about Rather gave him an individual 
vantage point, becoming frequently referenced in stories 
about his personal career trajectory. In November of 1964, 
2g~ magazine pointed out the fact that 
Dan Rather, CBS's slightly wiggy 
correspondent, seems to have caught the 
his superiors. He may end up with a 
foreign assignment - perhaps Vietnam '7. 
Dallas 
fancy of 
plummy 
While the magazine erred in the exact details of Rather's 
promotion, the upwardly-mobile nature of its account 
proved true over time. Rather's cool-headed performance in 
Dallas was construed as having earned him a White House 
posting,. "over the heads of several more experienced 
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Washington reporters II :I. C::\. Journalistic lore held that "he 
came to national prominence through his coverage of the 
Kennedy assassination" and that the day that Kennedy 
died was 
in career terms, the most important day in Dan 
Rather's life. His swift and accurate reporting 
of the Kennedy assassination and its aftermath 
that weekend transformed him from a regional 
journalist into a national correspondent 20. 
Institutionally-grounded discourse has thereby upheld 
Rather as a celebrity, through his assassination coverage. 
But the celebrity tale does not only have individual 
repercussions. It has also figured in organizational 
overviews of CBS News and more generalized discussions 
about the legitimacy of television journalism. By 
reflecting larger attempts to legitimate television 
correspondents as bona fide reportersp tales of Rather's 
activities are important to the community because they 
have set up parameters of journalistic practice, community 
and authority. They pay deference to larger discourses 
about. journalistic professionalism and television 
journalism, showing that it is possible to gain celebrity 
status through the broadcast media. 
Tales about both Tom Wicker and Dan Rather can be 
seen as playing an important communal role. They have 
foregrounded for all journalists the indicative dimensions 
of journalistic performance. Tales of celebrity have set 
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out the appropriate parameters o£ journalistic practice, 
by grounding what journalism pro£essionals .. do .... At the 
same time, they uphold the two sub-communities which 
com.prise the larger community of' journalism pro£essionals, 
broadcast and print, thereby highlighting the ritual 
aspects o£ creating community that rete11ings o£ the 
assassination achieve for its retellers. More important, 
they suggest that it is possible to assume an 
authoritative presence in such retellings, regardless o£ 
the medium where one is employed. 
While tales o£ Wicker and Rather underscore the 
propriety o£ standard journalistic practice across media, 
other narratives highlight the elevated Iorms in which 
individuals worked in each medium. Narratives about Walter 
Cronkite's per£ormance in Dallas provide such a stage in 
discussions about television journalism. While discussions 
about Rather underscore the standard dimensions o£ 
broadcast journalism, narratives about Cronkite signal the 
more re£ined and sophisticated dimensions o£ journalistic 
performance within that same medium. 
Narratives about Cronkite have created a re£erence 
point in discussions not only about coverage o£ the 
Kennedy assassination but about the evolution o£ American 
television journalism. Cronkite stayed on-air £or much o£ 
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the first day of events, and was responsible for conveying 
to the public the news that Kennedy was dead. His 
emotional relay of that fact, coupled with a number of 
activities which appeared to underscore the anchorperson's 
distressed state notably, removing his eyeglasses in a 
distracted fashion and forgetting to put on his suit 
jacket - made his performance an effective example of 
how it was possible to cast professionalism as improvisory 
and instinctual behavior. Cronkite cried, looked 
distraught, appeared emotionally moved, and then composed 
himself to carry the nation through its evolving crisis. 
He sidestepped his own personal distress to act as father 
figure and master of ceremony throughout the four-day 
ordeal. 
Cronkite's activities were important for the then-
burgeoning authentication of anchorpeople as journalists. 
Discourse centered on both his deeds and words. One 1983 
!'!§'~§x"'."'.!:';. article on the assassination typically held that 
Walter Cronkite broke 
opera, "As the World 
bulletin of the attack 
into a popular CBS soap 
Turns," with the first TV 
on JFK ,,,,c". 
The next sentence noted that Cronkite was U£or 19 years 
anchorman of the CBS Evening News. II Like other 
institutionalized recountings of the assassination, 
link between the 
anchor's role in covering the assassination story and his 
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personal career trajectory. Another 1983 discussion of 
coverage of the Kennedy assassination was entitled "The 
Age of Cronkite" .3. Yet another print retrospective of 
television's fiftieth anniversary hailed Cronkite for 
having taken the American people through assassinations, 
conventions and space shots: 
Seen 
(his) reputation for being the TV news authority 
had evolved in the early 60s and was underscored 
by his coverage of the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
For four straight days, beginning on Friday 
afternoon, Cronkite sat in the anchor chair, 
sometimes in his shirt sleeves and sometimes in 
tears, through the Monday when JFK was buried at 
Arlington National Cemetery --
as producing a personae" for American 
journalists, the image of solid integrity that Cronkite 
projected would thereafter be emulated by journalists 
across the country It was "Cronkite"'s performance 
that was invariably cited" when admiration was expressed 
"for the restraint, the taste and the all-around 
professionalism of TV's coverage that weekend": 
Some of the things he did that day would pass 
into folklore and become part of the legend. 
More than a decade later, journalism pro£essore 
would still be telling their students, who were 
mere children at the time, how Walter Cronkite 
cried on air when he had to report the official 
announcement that President John F. Kennedy was 
dead ,i?Ii:':'. 
That fact depended no less on institutional efforts at 
commemorating his deeds and words than the role he 
originally played in covering the assassination. 
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The legitimation or television anchorpersons~ as 
exemplified by discussions of Cronkite's celebrity, has 
thus become a central dimension of many assassination 
tales. Tales of Cronkite as celebrity have created, and 
reinforced!, not only his individual 
legitimate presence of television 
status, but also the 
journalists and the 
consoling role of anchorpeople in times o£ crisis. 
Cronkite's activities in Dallas have made him a celebrity 
by upholding the improvisory and instinctual behavior that 
journalists 
professional. 
looked upon as the 
Perhaps more than other 
mark of the true 
journalists, tales 
about Cronkite underscore the recasting of professional 
paradigms suggested by the events of Kennedy's death. In 
addition, they are important for evolving discussions 
about the relevance of anchorpeople as a separate yet 
functional breed of 
sUbjunctive mood of 
journalists. These tales uphold the 
journalistic practice by outlining 
"what should be" to members of the community. 
A subjunctive mood of practice was similarly upheld 
in narratives about Theodore White. In much that same way 
that tales of Cronkite reflect the elevated forms of 
broadcast journalistic practice, narratives about White 
signify the more refined dimensions of the print media. 
White·s performance on the assassination story was coopted 
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within discussions o£ the glory o£ the ,,,ritten 
journalistic word. This is significant, for the written 
word, as an effective mode o£ journalistic story-telling, 
underwent questioning following what was perceived to be 
the successful televised coverage o£ Kennedy's death. 
While White was not present during the immediate 
events o£ Kennedy's death, his summons by Jacqueline 
Kennedy one week later drew him into the public eye. 
White's narrative recounting o£ her experiences in Dallas, 
coupled with the labelling - at Jackie's behest - o£ the 
Kennedy administration as "Camelot .. cast I.hi te as one o£ 
the more effective storytellers o£ the time. White's 
success with the written word rapidly turned him into a 
journalistic celebrity. His ability to succe.s.s£ully 
wrestle prose into desired form evolved into an archetypal 
type of narrative structure that olas emulated by 
journalists in all media. His appearance at Jacqueline 
Kennedy's Hyannisport home a week after Kennedy's death 
was portrayed in fictionalized form in the film I..,?£gy_",_l, . .!.I!!2. 
!:l.'?1l.Y.'!.§E .... __ .!s;''''_'1!1.§..9.Y.. where their meeting alone ,,,as used to 
signify Kennedy's death All o£ this drew Ilihi te away 
from periodicized journalism and toward book publishing. 
He remained interested in the larger, more general issues 
that rested behind the making o£ current events, and his 
series o£ books on the Presidential campaigns were 
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considered first-rate by other journalists. Nonetheless, 
he continued to define himself and was defined by others 
as a journalist. His eulogy, printed in Ii.ill.§. in 1986, 
called him "a reporter in search of history" 
Within larger discussions o£ journalistic community 
and authority, narratives about White as celebrity suggest 
again how it was possible to cast the boundaries of 
professional journalism in different ways. His self-
defined 
impulses 
interest in history, his search for general 
in society, his exemplary writing style all 
reconfigure the limits of what good print journalism is 
thought to be. In much the same way that Cronkite 
epitomizes the anchorperson as an effector of unity and 
consolation~ White epitomizes the print reporter as a 
person who not only wrote well but was concerned with 
issues beyond the contemporaneous event o£ news reporting. 
Thus tales about White as celebrity, like those about 
Cronkite, 
practice. 
have upheld the subjunctive mood of journalistic 
They signify what print journalism professionals 
"should be." In both cases, tales of celebrity signal the 
emulatory state of journalistic professionalism to members 
of the community. Circulation of these narratives have 
played an important role to journalists trying to 
authenticate themselves as an interpretive community. It 
is significant that both subjunctive and indicati v"e 
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dimensions of journalistic celebrity are held up through 
the pivotal point of the individual reporter. For it 
Suggests how central is the individual within the 
collective lore circulated among journalism professionals. 
These £our cases - while not the only celebrities 
associated with the assassination story suggest that 
assassination recollections have produced uni£orm 
narratives that feature journalists with tenable celebrity 
status. Recollections which reinforce the celebrity status 
of certain reporters have been perpetuated, while tales 
which documented the presence of lesser-known journalists 
have been left out. The Theodore Whites, Dan Rathers, 
Walter Cronkites and Tom Wickers have been successfully 
incorporated as journalistic celebrities because tales 
about their activities have attended to ongoing discourses 
about journalism: Accomodating a tale about Dan Rather not 
only effectively tells the assassination story but it also 
attends to then-current doubts about the legitimacy of 
television journalists. By weaving the lives and careers 
of certain reporters into recollections of the 
assassination story~ assassination narratives have thereby 
the professional activities of well-known highlighted 
journalists, particularly national television journalists, 
in covering the story. This has allowed journalists to 
facilitate the growth of their celebrity status in a way 
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that separates it from the assassination's retelling, 
giving them independent stature. But it also at the time 
rein£orced hidden institutional agendas about then-nascent 
features of journalistic professionalism and television 
journalism!' setting out both indicative and subjunctive 
dimensions about what constitutes appropriate journalistic 
practice. The celebrity tale thus has both individual and 
collective dimensions. 
The above-mentioned personalities have not been 
perpetuated as celebrities for having covered t.he 
assassination story simply because they reported or 
desired it, however. Their association with the events of 
Kennedy's death has been systematically promoted by 
institutional discourses and practices. In the final 
analysis, creating celebrities from assassination 
retellers has depended on the institutional backdrop from 
which journalists told their tales. 
up certain 
The fact that 
assassination tales set journalists as 
celebrities while dropping others from collective 
consciousness was realized in accordance with the 
institutional support lent them. Gaining status for 
retelling the assassination has thus depended on media 
backing. 
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NevJs organizations played an active part in 
legitimating the celebrity status of reporters who covered 
the assassination. This does not mean that no journalists 
went across media boundaries to perpetuate their authority 
for retelling the assassination story. In 1988, for 
example, reporter Robert MacNeil compiled a pictorial 
history of the assassination entitled I.!:'-'2 ... J;1€\y. •.•... .. l'!.'2 ....... _i.:'i!2X!2 .• 
Discussions of the book were used as part of §Q9_9 ... .Ji9.n,J.'.l9. 
!:\l!l.§. .... :i,.'=§!: s attempt to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Kennedyls assassination, and MacNeil was introduced as 
having been "in Dallas on this day 25 years ago when 
President Kennedy was assassinated" One PBS 
documentary about Kennedy featured print reporter Tom 
Wicker recounting his own narratives almost verbatim 30 
The possibility for cross-breeding across media was 
derived 
status. 
in both cases from the reporter's celebrity 
Celebrity was also reinforced by one's words being 
systematically reprinted and circulated by other media. 
News organizations have effectively perpetuated 
journalistic celebrity through two arenas of discourse and 
practice - commemoration and recycling. Both arenas have 
been used alone and in tandem to systematically signal 
journalists' celebrity status. 
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Commemoration constitutes one way to accord 
journalists special status for having covered the 
assassination story. Commemoration accords assassination 
discourse a self-referential status, giving the events in 
Dallas their own authority. For example, a news-item about 
Dallas on the anniversary of Kennedy's death references 
the assassination story in a way that sidesteps possible 
controversy about whether it is well-placed. Thus writer 
Gary Wills waited for the twentieth anniversary of Dallas 
to publish his 
Manchester in 
Anniversaries, 
institutions 
in 
marked 
as did William 
~:,l :1. 
particular, have given media 
t.ays of commemorating the 
assassination coverage. Anniversaries serve not only as 
loci 
for 
of memories o£ the assassination, but also as loci 
the journalists who bear such memories. As one 
journalist remarked, they produce their own genre of news 
story - "anniversary journalism" ~')i;;:~. 
Anniversaries offer journalists a wide range of media 
formats by which to associate themselves with the 
assassination story. In print,. journalists have used 
recognized and routinized dates to generate special 
commemorative issues about the assassination, special 
sections in journals and commemorative volumes ;,:o:.:r!. 
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Commemoration ranges from actual reconstructions of the 
assassination story to extensive "where were you" articles 
that key into the recollections of prominent people 34. In 
the broadcast media, journalists have coordinated the 
production of media retrospectives around assassination 
anniversaries The tone and content of televised 
recollections not only reflect existing trends in news 
programming but it has been tied into larger moods and 
concerns at the time of each anniversary: Issues o£ 
technology, for instance .. were first discussed in 1967 in 
an early CBS series about charges of conspiracy and the 
assassination~ but were doubly revived in 1988, when CBS's 
E.9..H!:. ___ .Q?y.§.. .. j,-'L._.!I!.9.:'i:.!?J!!l?51!:. s t r e ssed the tec h no 1 og i cal tr i urn phs 
and limitations of television and PBS used scientific 
technology to reexamine the evidence in Kennedy's 
assassination 36. 
These commemorative efforts have helped journalists 
perpetuate their chronicles as the longstanding record of 
one group of assassination retellers. Its record has 
increasingly incorporated journalists as its narrators, a 
point particularly borne out by the broadcast media: Early 
assassination retrospectives were narrated by actors like 
Cliff Robertson, Larry McCann, Hal Holbrook or Richard 
Baseheart; later efforts employed the skills and talents 
of Edwin Newman, Walter Cronkite, Dan Rather, Nancy 
Dickerson~ 
journalis.ts 
highlights 
legitimate 
reinforces 
Tom Brokaw 
over actors 
the emerging 
retellers o£ 
the growing 
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or John 
£or the 
Chancellor. 
part o£ 
Choosing 
narrator 
authority o£ journalists as 
the assassination. It also 
part played by narrators o£ 
televis.ion retrospectives in 
of the assassination~ 
institutional recollections 
Journalists also have commemorated assassination 
coverage by highlighting .. the club" o£ reporters who 
originally participated in the story. Assigning them 
collective status has perpetuated the stories o£ a £ew 
reporters as representative o£ tales o£ the many. 
Perpetuating .. the club"' also underscores the relevance of 
the norm in consolidating professionals into one cohesive 
group, a point with direct relevance £or the emergence o£ 
journalists as an interpretive community. 
In such a light, nearly all television retrospectives 
conclude with long lists o£ names o£ journalists who had 
participated 
documentary 
in the original coverage. 
proposed to identi£y people 
One 1988 PBS 
"'by their 
positions or a££iliations in the £all o£ 1963", creating 
an lias if" mood to the recollections they embodied 
lengthy lists o£ both 
correspondents, management personnel and technical crew 
who had participated on the assassination story in radio 
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and television ':·Hi-:lo 
!:b'lJ?J::.§'.t.:l§'.9. ended '" i t h "a note to more than 500 people IOho 
pooled their e££orts to provide continuous and extensive 
coverage. II Slides sholOed names o£ the "key members o£ the 
Certain "'lead" status has also been assigned to 
journalists viewed as having led "the club" o£ reporters 
working the story. For example, many television and print 
retrospectives stressed the role played by columnist 
Walter Lippmann, IOhose words o£ interpretation were moved 
to £ront-page columns alongside actual assassination 
£requently cited. Reston, whose consolatory columns in the 
days following the assassination were lauded across media, 
was hailed in a 1987 ABC celebrity pro£ile, which called 
him the "most in£luential journalist in the country": 
There is no way in television~ sadly, to 
preserve Restonls prose or capture the real 
essence o£ his in£luence, £or burdened by the 
pain o£ loss £or millions o£ people, Reston has 
made the world less confusing 41 
In the item, anchorperson Peter Jennings quoted verbatim 
from Reston's assassination coverage, seen against still 
pictures o£ John-John saluting his dead £ather. The 
semiotic message of Reston's narrative prose being used to 
anchor the visuals supplied by television £it well into 
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larger discourses about celebrity, technology and 
professionalism. 
Perpetuating lithe club" has also been realized in a 
more literal fashion. In November of 1988, the original 
press corps who covered the assassination convened in 
Washington to commemorate the events 25 years earlier ~I·;!:~: , 
underscoring the assassination's centrality for those 
journalists who had covered it. The fact that nearly all 
television and print retrospectives have assigned 
collective status to the reporters who o'riginally worked 
on the assassination story - and kept their status alive -
suggests how central it is not only to collective and 
individual professional identities but also to the 
formation of collective status around celebrity tales. 
Commemorative discourse and practice has thus given 
journalists routinized ways through which to promote their 
associations 
organiza"tiona 
with 
have 
the 
given 
assassination story. News 
budding celebrities the 
opportunity of consolidating their status at the same time 
as they strengthen and rein£orce the stature of 
journalists independent of the assassination story itself. 
For journalists intent on building up their authoritative 
presence within the assassination story, commemorative 
discourse and practice has thus given them an 
institutional base on which to do so. 
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Recycled discourse and practice is a second arena 
that has given journalists in both the broadcast media and 
printed press a way to perpetuate their own stories, 
presence~ authority and, ultimately, celebrity in 
conjunction with Kennedy's assassination. Each medium's 
technological £eatures have allowed £or the £urtherance o£ 
original tales that £irst appeared in it, with the ability 
to recycle discourse dependent on decisions by media 
organizations that such discourse was worthy o£ being 
recycled. 
Bg.P.E.JNJ:I.!~LG. .. Special issues o£ magazines, journals, 
newspapers and books have systematically borrowed the 
words o£ reporters which had originally graced their 
pages. The dispatches of certain journalists were 
highlighted via their circulation in in-house journals: 
Merriman Smith's dispatch o£ November 23 was reproduced in 
UPI's l!£J ....... .E.§'-P.Q.I.: .. t..§..:r. and later reissued as part o£ a special 
UPI book entitled It was also reproduced in 
the trade publ ication );.';tLtg-L .. ~n.s!. ... £'d.£!.!§h.§'_":" together with 
a letter where UPI editors hailed Smith's coverage as "an 
historic memento, an example o£ narrative style at its 
best·· The words o£ Associated Press correspondent Jack 
Bell were £eatured in its 100-page book Ih.§ ... _ ... .I.QE.S'.Il ...... J.§;. 
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extensive compilation of reporters' original assassination 
accounts under the title "The Reporters' Story" 
Reprintings rein£orced the importance of original 
accounts, as well as their links with original tellers. 
One journalist whose words have been frequently 
reprinted was Tom Wicker. One of Wicker's first pieces 
about the assassination~ entitled "That Day in Dallas," 
was reprinted in December in the in-house t1.§-'~!,._YQ,:<.:.I5_._TJ.,~..§.§, 
organ, It was again reprinted one year 
later 
Must Trust His Instinct" Wicker used the space 
provided 
testimony, 
him to question the validity of eyewitness 
journalistic clarity, even the ability to 
remember what went on during those four days. "Even now, I 
know of no reporter who was there who has a clear and 
orderly picture of that surrealistic afternoon,'" he 
commented ...... ,·if) 
performance 
appropriate 
assassination. 
of 
Wicker's piece raised questions about the 
journalists and the 
journalistic practice 
boundaries 
during 
of 
the 
Its reprinting reflects the problems of 
journalistic practice and definitions of professionalism 
raised by the assassination. 
But other words of Wicker have also been reprinted. 
Seven months after the assassination he penned an article 
for ES£y' .. ,:h,:,::,§, entitled "Kennedy Without Tears" ";0, that was 
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acclaimed as outstanding journalism and called a OI non -
textbook history" of the 19608 ""i While that label 
attested to the already burgeoning tensions between 
journalists and historians over the role of authorized 
retellers of the assassination, it nonetheless reinforced 
Wicker's celebrity for having covered the original 
assassination story. The piece was subsequently reprinted 
as a book wi thin the year and in g,§,-'ly.,,i,!:§,. ten years later 
~e? where it was so identified in a small blurb: 
Tom Wicker's brilliant <and heart-breaking) 
coverage of the assassination for the !'!.§.~ .. _.Y9_J;.!s. 
I~~~§ moved g~~ui~e to ask him to write this 
essay seven months later in June 1964. Mr. 
Wicker went on to become chief of the Washington 
bureau and an associate edt tor of the Ti.I!!.§§. ~:;:;;:;. 
Notes about the author commented that he "covered most of 
the events of the Kennedy administration and was riding in 
the Presidential motorcade when John Kennedy was murdered 
in Dallas" l ~4. Wicker's presence at the assassination thus 
became embedded in tales of the events of that November. 
The career trajectory by which he covered the 
assassination and went on to heights of journalistic glory 
was clearly documented by the institutions which have 
reprinted his words .. Later, they would figure in accounts 
uphelding his celebrity status independent of the 
assassination story which facilitated it. 
In some cases reprinting original assassination 
accounts has allowed journalists to key in to other 
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narratives. For example, a special commemorative volume on 
Kennedy, issued 25 years after his death, <vas linked to 
the events in Dallas by reprinting t<vo articles by 
Theodore White - an essay which he had <vritten t<venty-
five years earlier and his famous post-
assassination interview with Jackie Kennedy that labelled 
the Kennedy administration "Camelot" Not accidentally, 
the label of "Camelot" became part of the title of the 
commemorative volume, <vhich had itself been sponsored by 
Time-Life books, the parent company of bJ_f.§. magazine. 
Other Time-Life publications, including :'Ltm.§. magazine, 
similarly reprinted excerpts of the original White essay 
The fact that ne<vs organizations have chosen to 
reprint original assassination prose accounts in order to 
reconstruct the events in Dallas suggests much about the 
authority of journalistic presence. Recollections of the 
assassination coverage are given an authority accrued from 
recapturing - and reproducing - the events "as they were". 
Yet the decision to reprint the story's original tellings 
also embeds the names. of original tellers within 
institutional recollections. Reprinting practices thus 
reinforce associations between the assassination story and 
the names Or certain reporters in a way which allows 
JOUrnalists to uphold their celebrity status separate from 
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the event. The fact that many reprintings have 
proliferated around the assassination~s anniversary only 
reinforces how central 
have become. 
to the original story journalists 
In the broadcast media, 
recycled discourse and practice has been accomplished 
through media retrospectives and special documentaries 
about the assassination. These presentations function 
similarly to reprinting in the press, in that they give 
journalists a way to narrate - and thus reconstruct 
their original stories of coverage. Journalists 
incorporate contemporary voice-overs to original film-
clips, 
status. 
thereby embedding references to their own celebrity 
Of the broadcast journalists featured by media 
retrospectives, CBS' Dan Rather perhaps best exemplifies 
how retrospectives effectively uphold journalistic 
celebrity. His performance has been systematically 
replayed in various CBS retrospectives, many of which 
employed him as narrator: He narrated a three-part news 
series in 1983 investigating the myths and realities 
behind Kennedy's assassination, an eight-part news series 
in 1988 and a two-hour documentary called fP_l!.!: ..... J?3!.Y .. §L ........ ,i,.I' .. 
which aired on the 25th anniversary of Kennedy's 
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death Ending his narration of the documentary, Rather 
concluded with 
a personal note, based on the many years CBS 
News and I have spent investigating, thinking 
about those four days. It was a day we haven't 
shown that also has alot of meaning for me - the 
fifth day. Tuesday. On Tuesday, American went 
back to work •.• So it is Tuesday I often think of 
That line, labelled "Rather Blather" by one observer ",e" 
nonetheless reinforced Rather's role as an authoritative 
interpreter of the assassination story. Connections 
between the assassination narrative, his interpretation of 
it and his status as a journalist were thus embedded 
within media retrospectives. The fact that stories of his 
assassination coverage have been found equally in 
chronicles of his career shows how that authority has 
helped make him into a journalistic celebrity for his 
coverage. 
Yet another type of 
institutionally-backed discourse which has perpetuated 
assassination tales through journalists' celebrity status 
is self-quoting_ In itself a specific case of recycled 
discourse, self-quoted discourse allows journalists to 
incorporate original tales within larger contemporary 
accounts of the assassination. This perrnits them to look 
back and comment - upon their own words, creating a 
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self-referential discourse by which they can assume the 
position of commentator on their own views. 
Like other kinds o£ recycled discourse, self-quoting 
depends on media backing in order to be effectively 
staged. To a certain extent~ it was anticipated already 
when reporters interviewed other reporters on the night of 
the assassination: For example, that night NBC's Huntley-
Brinkley Report interviewed reporters about what they had 
seen and written But self-quoted discourse has been 
most effective when realized over time. Reportersi' 
appearances on talk-shows and documentary specials, and 
frequent interviews in the press about the words through 
which they originally reported the assassination story 
create and re£erence the authoritative presence o£ certain 
reporters over others. Such presence effectively 
references the added authority that comes from commenting 
on one's own performance from afar. 
For example, radio reporter Ike Pappas took part in 
the following televised exchange about his coverage o£ 
Oswald's murder 25 years earlier: 
Pappas: My job that day was to get an interview 
with this guy, when nobody else was going to get 
an interview ••• So I said the only thing which I 
could say, which was the story. Tell the story: 
"Oswald has been shot. A shot rang out. O.swald 
has been shot". 
Rivera: Is that the single most profound or 
dramatic moment of your life? 
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Pappas: It's an extraordinary story. Probably 
the most extraordinary story I'll ever cover 61. 
The exchange both referenced Pappas' pro£essionalism, 
contextualized it as a critical incident in his 
professional memory and upheld his ensuing independent 
stature as a celebrity. Later reviews o£ Pappas' 
professional career were structured around his coverage o£ 
the Kennedy assassination 
Self-quoting lends an air o£ "r was there" but "now 
I'm here" to narrative. Phrases like "'the crime of the 
century, II "the end o£ innocence'" or "Camelot'" are paraded 
about and commented upon - by journalists years after 
their original coinage. For example, accounts o£ I~:tm.§. 
correspondent Hugh Sidey were partly quoted, partly 
paraphrased by the same magazine 25 years after Dallas 
pointedly commented that "'back then, this is what we knew, 
and this is how I reported it"' 64~ The documentary was 
filled with clips of Rather's coverage from Dallas, 
conveying the sensation that he had almost singlehandedly 
mastered the entire assassination story. Reporter Steve 
Bell introduced an on-air repeat of an original film-clip 
of himself standing in front of the Texas School Book 
Depository 25 years earlier am In a 1977 I;:_"'Sl1!J£§<. piece, 
Tom Wicker wrote that 
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the assassination in 
!,!g~ ......... "y_qEl'; .......... IJ.-_II\.""_'" W h i te 
within weeks (sic) of 
Dallas - which, as the 
House correspondent, I'd 
22, 1963, I had written 
article that the magazine 
and called "Kennedy Without 
covered on 
for §:§.9.".:i, .. £§. 
November 
a long 
ran as a cover piece, 
Tears II ;'::.r.':: •• 
Wicker then quoted two lengthy paragraphs from his 
original assassination coverage. He repeated the practice 
in another essay, where he commented that "I wrote that 
morning (of November 23) what I thought about the way 
things were, and would be" €.,,"'" 
Self-quoting allows reporters to set up their version 
of OI who Kennedy wasil or "what happened during the 
assassination" in order to revise it. In Wicker's case, 
later articles detailed where he had earlier erred, 
allowing him to conduct a dialogue with his own earlier 
discourse. This self-re£erential framework not only 
punctuates the authority of reporters for the events of 
Kennedy's death, but it connects their original words, 
revised with hindsight, to later discourses, thereby 
upholding the independent nature of their celebrity 
status. 
These institutionally-backed discourses and practices 
have thus set up an extended background against tvhieh to 
perpetuate certain journalists as celebrities. Tales have 
generally been recycled in the medium where they were 
originally conveyed. Commemoration has given news 
Organizations convenient, recognizable and routinized ways 
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to highlight - and perpetuate - the status of certain 
reporters. Recycling and self-quoting have maintained a 
focus on the words of certain reporters, while deflecting 
attention from those of others. Institutionally-backed 
discourses and practices have thus depended first on in-
medium deliberations, on decisions taken by news 
organizations that pronounce certain tales worthy of being 
commemorated I recycled or quoted. Once pronounced worthy, 
the words and deeds of journalists about the assassination 
have been turned into fodder for extensive institutional 
efforts at reproducing them. With time, the investments 
surrounding such efforts have justified recognition of the 
tale's original tellers as celebrities in their own right. 
JJ:!&"_P"9_\!!.N.?J!2&"9f __ <;;~b"J;"~BIIY 
The fact that a range of personalities has been 
perpetuated as celebrities for their part in retelling the 
Kennedy 
discourses 
Discourses 
assassination highlights different underlying 
about journalistic practice and authority. 
connecting many journalists with the events of 
the assassination weekend have been played out, and 
ultimately either discarded or legitimated. Those 
journalists who received institutional backing have been 
promoted most effectively as celebrities over time. 
But a number of other journalists who were actively 
associated with Kennedy"'s assassination have not received 
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general acclaim .. Some journalists lost their jobs due to 
their assassination coverage. CBS' Robert Pierpoint was 
rumored to have lost his Washington posting to Dan Rather, 
because Pierpoint's cumulative experience did not match 
Rather's skill in covering Dallas ~e. Other reporters lost 
their positioning in the organizational hierarchy to Tom 
Tom Pettit, whose on-
site, on-air coverage of Oswald's murder for NBC was 
hailed in 1963 by 1?.F2_"l9£§.§j:,j,Il.9. mag az i ne as "a £irst in 
television history" disappeared unexplained from 
collective memory in later years. 
Other journalists have been shunted into collective 
oblivion. Reporter Hugh Aynesworth, for example, whose 
assistance to more renowed reporters working the 
assassination story earned him the title of its "longest 
running reporter,"· was pushed aside to make place for 
journalists with greater celebrity status 70, Penn Jones, 
who uncovered a series of mysterious deaths related to the 
assassination, was labelled "a sign of hope for the 
survival 
acclaim 
of independent journalism" but cries of 
were confined to the leftist press. Tabloid 
journalist Geraldo Rivera claimed the dubious honor of 
having first run a frame-by-frame analysis of Zapruder's 
footage of Kennedy's shooting on nationwide television, in 
a series he hosted in the mid-70s called Gg.Q-'L. __ .B .. ~ . .9h_:t.'-. 
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but his tactics kept him marginalized to the 
serious cadre of reporters working the story French 
journalist Jean Daniel published interviews conducted 
shortly before the assassination with Fidel Castro and 
Kennedy, which pointed to a shared belief in U.S. 
capitalism and Cuban communism, but media discussions of 
Daniel's journalistic performance invariably labelled him 
as being "too involved in politics" 74. Leads by reporter 
Jack Anderson about Mafia involvement occupied columns of 
the ~~_§...hj,)19_j::,2.!LJi'g_§.t.. during the 1970s, but were eventually 
marginalized 
assassination 
as tabloid journalism. Anderson's 1988 
documentary bore a 900-telephone number 
which viewers could call if they wanted to reopen the 
investigation p a far cry from the hard-news formats with 
which Anderson had been earlier associated 7~. 
The actions of each journalist have been rendered 
marginal to consensus about appropriate journalistic 
performanceI' denying celebrity status to the journalists 
behind them. The fact that certain journalists have fallen 
from fame and acclaim despite admirable original 
performances in covering the assassination reveals much 
about the workings of celebrity as a memory system. It 
works by and through larger discourses of relevance to 
the larger community of American journalists. Reporters 
fell from fame because their performances did not attend 
351 
to larger discourses about journalism. This does not 
suggest that they did not attend to any discourses, only 
that they attended to the wrong ones. They lacked 
institutional support because their performances did not 
sufficiently address or complement issues of concern to 
journalism professionals. For example, Dan Rather"s 
performance highlighted a more salient hidden agenda about 
journalism - the legitimacy of television journalism 
than did that of Penn Jones or Hugh Aynesworth, both of 
\vhich addressed rightful parameters of investigative 
journalism. Thus both were marginalized by other 
journalists for being too political, too left-wing, too 
tabloid or too local. Marginalization has denied them the 
kind of institutional backdrop necessary to perpetuate 
their tales and promote their celebrity status. 
The point that certain noteworthy performances have 
failed to generate celebrity status for their tellers, 
while others that are potentially less praiseworthy have 
produced such status is telling. It suggests that the 
workings of journalistic celebrity depend less on actual 
journalistic performances than on institutional agendas 
and surrounding discourses about journalism. Celebrity 
status for journalists is derived not only from the 
quality of their performances but from larger agendas 
related to the institutional apparatuses of American 
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journalism. Both the institutional support that 
journalists £ound available £or retelling their tales, as 
well as the technological, pro£essional and cultural 
discourses that made them timely, thus constitute £actors 
which have figured into the workings of journalistic 
celebrity. 
Il:LE.; .. YIhJ;lJ.!"JI.Y. __ Q£.J?J;;:RPJ;:Il!bT:J:N~LIh!"g2_.I.!:!EQl!~JL.9g6J;J?.B.:J:_TI' 
All of this attests to the viability of celebrity as 
a memory system. Positioning individual reporters as 
pivotal points £or criss-crossing discourses about the 
assassination and about technology and journalistic 
pro:fessionalism constitutes an effective Jfle8nS o£ 
perpetuating collective memories. In that light, Walter 
Cronkite's performance became important in discussions of 
parameters of televised journalistic practice, by 
authenticating the consoling role o£ anchorpeople. Dan 
Rather's coverage re£lected growing attempts to legitimate 
television correspondents as bona £ide reporters. Theodore 
White's coverage highlighted the glory o£ the written 
word, which faced competition following the effective 
televised coverage of much of the assassination story. Tom 
Wicker's per£ormance highlighted the old guard o£ American 
journalism, showing that objectives of speedy coverage, 
eyewitness reporting and terse prose still constituted 
viable goals. Tales o£ celebri"ty attested to the 
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subjunctive and indicative dimensions of individual 
journalistic performance, thereby setting up the narrative 
parameters by which journalists can agree on what 
constitutes appropriate journalistic practice and 
authority. 
Other performances - related to ongoing investigatory 
agendas or uncovering conspiracies- have had less to do 
with the workings of celebrity because they do not 
directly highlight relevant tensions within the 
institutions o£ American journalism. Celebrity, then, 
constitutes an effective memory system for journalists 
precisely because it £ocuses attention on issues crucial 
to journalism through individual reporters. As cited 
earlier, celebrity gives journalists idealized notions of 
how to act or be, institutionally-correct 
versions o£ such actions. Celebrity, as a memory system, 
helps to mould journalists within the contours of 
institutionally-supported agendas. As Leo Braudy has 
commented" 
the urge to fame is not so much a cause as a 
causal nexus through ,ohich more generalized 
forces political, theological, artistic, 
economic, SOCiological flow to mediate the 
shape of individual lives 7~ 
Yet even Braudy's list does not account for all possible 
features of journalistic celebrity. Technological, 
cultural, institutional and professional factors are among 
354 
those which inflect upon its workings as a memory system. 
The emergence and perpetration of contemporary 
journalistic celebrity is thus neither simplistic nor 
static but a complex matrix of larger discourses and 
practices on a variety 
markers of journalists' 
of issues. Tales which become 
celebrity status cluster around 
professional issues central to journalism. In retelling 
the assassination, these issues concerned the legitimacy 
of television as a medium, with tales often used to embed 
the authority of reporters within 
television technology. 
larger discussions of 
Journalists have thus used celebrity to gain the 
advantages offered by systematized recollection. Celebrity 
has cued users into certain personalities and individuals 
as opposed to more global forms of remembering, all the 
while providing the illusion of closure and embedding new 
cues and signals within an already existent associative 
rrame'VJor k .. This makes implicit sense to a community that 
authenticates itself through its narratives, memories and 
rhetoric. It also solidifies the ritual dimensions of the 
very act o£ retelling. 
These pages have addressed the tales and practices 
that have made the storytellers not only more prominent 
than the assassination stories they told but remembered 
and appreciated in a fashion independent from the 
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narratives which originally thrust them into the public 
eye. 
has 
It thus makes sense that celebrity as a memory system 
lingered in the reconstruction work by which 
journalists £ashion their assassination tales. Celebrity 
not only provides a set of shared perceptions and 
recollections about Dallas through which certain reporters 
have been systematically thrust into the public eye over 
others, but it helps mark memories of the assassination in 
a way which independently signals the status of memory-
bearers" 
Perpetuating assassination tales through celebrity 
thus effectively blurs distinctions between "the event o. 
and "the event as told" in journalistic accounts of the 
assassination. It suggests how journalists as tellers-of-
the-event have become the most valued part of the 
assassination's retelling. By embedding their own presence 
in their assassination tales, journalists have created a 
situation which references their own stature as an 
integral part of it. Invoking celebrity as a memory system 
has encouraged journalists to remember the events of 
Kennedy's death by recalling the Walter Cronkites, Dan 
Rathers and Tom \Hckers who gave them voice. Equally 
important, recalling the Cronkites, Rathers or Wickers has 
become a goal in its own right. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTION: 
RECOLLECTING THROUGH PROFESSIONAL LORE 
There were memory systems other than celebrity which 
offered journalists alternate ways of effectively and 
advantageously promoting their part in the assassination 
story Over time. One such system is professional lore, or 
the institutionalized body of knowledge that journalists 
and news organizations systematically circulate amongst 
and about themselves. Professional lore gives journalists 
a cohesive memory system by which to institutionally 
perpetuate certain perspectives on their actions. In 
recollecting assassination coverage, pro£essional lore has 
offered journalists a set of texts, discourses and 
practices that allows them to tailor their assassination 
memories into a celebration of their own professionalism. 
Perpetuating this lore plays a central role in keeping 
journalists, as an interpretive community, together. 
In the following pages, I discuss how assassination 
retellings have been perpetuated through the professional 
lore of the journalistic community. Three major themes 
figure in this lore: Tales of the novice, technological 
aids to professional memory and the authorization of 
television technology. Assassination narratives have been 
systematically re-used in both organizational and 
institutional 
themes. 
contexts 
IJig!tg~ __ QLPBQfg_~~±Ql'!!!1J~li 
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in ways which uphold these 
The relevance of professionalism for establishing 
journalistic authority was already suggested in the days 
immediately following the assassination, when the events 
of covering Kennedy's death were systematically turned 
into a story of professional triumph. The fact that this 
transformation figured so directly within immediate 
recountings o£ assassination coverage made an emphasis on 
its professional aspects central to the eventual formation 
of collective notions about journalism. This set up a 
framework by which the incorporation of assassination 
tales within organizational and institutional overviews 
about journalism as a profession and~ more speci£ically~ 
overviews about the technology of television news would 
make sense. How assassination tales have been accomodated 
within professional lore reveals much about the authority 
they are construed as giving journalists and 
journalistic community. 
Professional lore gives journalists and 
organizations an elaborate set of cues about 
appropriate standards of journalistic practice and, 
the 
news 
the 
by 
implication, authority. While its function has been 
debated by journalism scholars, who hold that it serves 
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less to key journalists into pro£essional behavior than 
members o£ other professions~, its particular relevance 
here derives from its function as a memory system. As a 
memory system, professional lore o££ers journalists an 
alternative to perpetuating tales o£ the individual, 
suggested by tales o£ celebrity. It o££ers them instead a 
way to perpetuate tales o£ the news organization and 
institution" linking them through assassination tales to 
collective notions about professionalism and professional 
lore. Pro£essional lore in this sense serves as a tool of 
socialization, which circulates collective notions about 
practice and authority to members o£ the 
community .. 
Like other memory systems, pro£essional 
journalistic 
lore also 
works by a substitutional rule, "plugging" alternate news 
organizations, news institutions and journalistic 
practices within communal lore: It suggests that what CBS 
did today, NBC could do tomorrow. Just as the individual 
reporter was rendered the pivotal point o£ tales o£ 
celebrity, in tales o£ pro£essional lore the news 
organization and institution are positioned as points 
through which larger discourses about journalism criss-
cross with discourses about covering Kennedy's death. The 
organization and institution constitute the loci by which 
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discourses about television journalism or journalistic 
professionalism are linked with assassination retellings. 
In retelling the assassination story over time, only 
certain dimensions o£ professionalism have been sustained 
as part of the professional lore. Narratives that attest 
to the viability of certain news organizations, the 
journalistic profession or the attributes of television 
ne!,.JS have bolstered larger discourses about the viability 
of journalism in strategic ways, by using an array of 
organizational and institutional issues as their loci~ 
in 
Equally 
a way 
modification: 
important, professional lore blurs time spans 
that bears little respect for ·temporal 
One reporter relates her involvement in the 
assassination story ten years later in much the same way 
that another narrates his tale a quarter-decade after the 
event .. Neither case addresses or problematizes the passage 
of time within their narratives .. This co-opting of 
professional lore .oi thin larger contemporary discourses 
about journalism, conceived and penned at different points 
in time from that of the assassination itself, conceals 
the fact that these narratives reflect the words of the 
contemporary 
- and successful - professional looking back. 
Selecting the assassination story as a locus through which 
to illustrate professional codes and practices thus gives 
pro£essional lore the air of a backward-looking discourse, 
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a self-retrospective that systematically glorifies certain 
points within its own history from the vantage points of 
those who can afford to look back. Lost in the shuffle is 
the perpetuation of any critical perspective on the 
original journalistic coverage of Kennedy's death. What 
remains are clear-cut messages about professionalism that 
have effectively helped journalists perpetuate themselves 
as an authoritative interpretive community. 
In one \rJay or another, all professions have 
tradiionally maintained themselves through their origin 
narratives .. Origin narratives give members of groups 
collective ways of referencing themselves and their shared 
heritage, tradition and values r.-:;: They constitute an 
important part of professional lore, setting in place the 
parameters of successful entry into the profession. At the 
same time, pro£essional lore constitutes one viable locus 
for origin narratives to £lourish. There£ore, origin 
narratives help maintain lore at the same time as lore 
upholds the status of origin narratives: Each new tale 
about the successful adaptation OI novice members into a 
community upholds the status of the lore that records it. 
Tales of professional acclimatization are thus central to 
the lore's ability to function as a memory system. They 
tell the story of untried individuals making their way 
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into the professional community, attesting to the worth of 
the profession and, by implication, the professional lore 
that records its impulses. 
Assassination narratives have been used by 
journalists to generate an extensive set of tales of 
acclimatization. The route by which naive and unknowing 
novices make their \-Jay into the inroads of the 
journalistic profession has been anchored by many 
journalists within coverage of Kennedy's death. Their 
tales legitimate the professional journalist at the same 
time as they uphold the displacement of the amateur. The 
implication that journalists need to view the 
assassination as a locus for the onset of professional 
behavior - has encouraged them to generate tales of the 
novice within professional lore about it. 
One example was provided by reporter Meg Greenfield, 
who wrote a commemorative piece about the assassination 
for I.j, .. m.~. magazine 25 years later. Entitled "The Way Things 
Really Were," the article traced Greenfield's professional 
identity back to the day that Kennedy was killed. It was, 
she said, the day that she began to think and act like a 
journalist: 
I date everything back to November 22, 1963, so 
far as my adult working life is concerned ..• What 
I experienced that day, for the first time, was 
our peculiar immunity as a trade. We became 
immune by a crush of duty ••. allowed, even 
expected to function outside the restraints of 
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ordinary decent behavior. We had a job to do. 
Our license was all but total 3. 
Recalling the detached and disembodied "high-octane state" 
into which she and her colleagues were thrust by Kennedy's 
death, Greenfield detailed the high-paced frenzy which 
pushed them into action and )<ept them there. Her tale 
recounted the displacement of emotion, the intrusive 
nature of journalistic work and the semblance of 
indifference that characterized journalists' activities of 
those four days. 
Similarly, Barbara Walters recalled her own past as a 
wr iter on th e I293!Y. ..... :::l.h2,O!., where she heard the news that 
Kennedy had been shot: 
That next Honday, I had one of my first on-the-
air assignments, reporting on the funeral of 
President John F. Kennedy, and being still a 
novice, I wondered how I could possibly manage 
to keep the tears out of my voice 4 
The fact that she did so, and did so well, is implicit in 
her ability to recount that particular performance from a 
well-regarded contemporary position within the ranks of 
television news personalities. Her ability to ascend 
beyond the anxieties of a first-time broadcast qualifies 
her as a capable television journalist. 
Even former anchorperson Jessica Savitch, then a high 
School student anxious to break into journalism, was 
construed as having reacted I'with a curious mixture of 
personal horror and professional excitement .. : 
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As soon as she heard the news, she raced to a 
pay phone and called in a report to WOND on the 
reactions of Atlantic City high school students. 
Jessica and Jeff Greenhawt thought of trying to 
do a special edition of I.§§m ...... 9gETI.§.E., but in the 
end they were overtaken by the dimensions of the 
event. The show was canceled 5 
Although not yet employed as a reporter, Savitch already 
displayed the proper attributes of being a journalist-
the intensity, drive and motivation, ingenuity. 
Dan Rather offered yet another tale of the novice. In 
his autobiography, n~.§ ..... r::::~.m.§'E!!l .. J':!.§.Y..§l£ .. ..J?'Jj,.t.:!l5.§., Rather related 
how~ on the day that Kennedy was shot, he had been sent to 
Dallas in "what had been intended as a backup role" (c:" 
Attempting to verify the fact of Kennedy's death by 
telephone, at one point he was simultaneously talking to 
both local reporter Eddie Barker in Dallas and his New 
York office on different lines. Rather's recounting of the 
ensuing incident went as follows: 
In one of my ears, Barker was repeating what the 
Parkland Hospital official had told him at the 
Trade Mart. I was trying to watch and listen to 
many things at once. My mind was racing, trying 
to clear, trying to hold steady, trying to think 
ahead. When Barker said again that he had been 
told the President was dead, I said "Yes, yes. 
That's what I hear too. That he's dead." A voice 
came back, "What was that?" I thought it was 
Barker again. It waen It. The "what was that .. had 
come from a radio editor in New York ...• At that 
point I heard what my mind then recognized 
clearly as someone in New York announce, '"Dan 
Rather says the President is dead ...... I began 
shouting into the phone to New York, shouting 
that I had not authorized any bulletin or any 
other kind of report. Confusion burst anew. I 
was told that I had said not once but twice that 
369 
Kennedy was dead. Now it 
Those weren't Barker's 
answering ? 
came through to 
questions I had 
Jfte: 
been 
Rather recalled contemplating the possible repercussions 
of what he had done, saying that '"it da.med on me that it 
was possible I had committed a blunder beyond 
comprehension, beyond forgiving'" ". Because it took a full 
half-hour before official con:firmation of Kennedy's death 
came through, the tensions of that time-span struck him in 
full. He knew '"that if the story was wrong, I would be 
seeking another line of work" 'i •• The fact that Rather was 
right, though shaken, has helped to rank him among the 
qualified professional journalists who covered the 
assassination storya 
Implicit in each narrative is a regard for the 
assassination as a professional trial ground by which the 
journalistic acumen o:f the untried reporter is tested. 
Interestingly, tales of the novice uphold the known 
dimensions of journalistic practice: Unlike {!lalter 
Cronkite, who cried on air, or the various reporters who 
recast notions of professional practice in order to 
provide coverage, tales of the novice play directly into 
accepted and recognized standards of action. Journalists 
emerge as part of the community for having proven 
themselves within already-defined parameters of 
journalistic practice and professionalism. 
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Tales 
professional 
of the novice thus relay the story of 
transformation. In each case, reporters are 
transformed by their coverage of the story, emerging on 
professional the other side as individuals with 
reportorial experience of the first order. This makes the 
assassination story a locus bearing fruitful implications 
for more general discourses about journalism, journalistic 
professionalism and the legitimation of television news~ 
As Rather concluded in his story, "if that weekend, beyond 
the trauma, became a shared experience in journalism, it 
was because without exception those called on responded so 
well to the pressure ~O. In other words, the novice's 
ability to respond effectively to the circumstances of 
Kennedy's death is instrumental in upholding the 
appearance of journalistic professionalism that has come 
to be associated with the event. 
Greenfield made a similar point in her narrative, 
which by its end had set her, too, within the solid ranks 
of veteran reporters. In concluding, she called the 
ongoing efforts to cornmem.orate Kennedy's death 
"anniversary journalism'· . The title is apt, for it 
sugges·t.s the importance of journalists' positioning 
themselves within their assassination tales. Because tales 
o£ the novice recount the trans£ormation o£ largely 
untried cub reporters into hard-nosed journalists, 
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recalling the events of Kennedy's death becomes a way of 
marking this transformation within professional lore. 
Recalling the "way things really were" becomes important 
within ongoing definitions about what it means to be a 
professional journalist. Tales of the novice are thus less 
instrumental for what they suggest about the personal 
career trajectories of individual reporters and more 
important for what they suggest about journalistic 
professionalism. This suggests that professional lore 
constitutes an important dimension by which journalists 
consolidate themselves as an interpretive community. 
TQQ!,·_::?'_.9_E_Ig9!'!JIl_Qb,gGY_A~_{L:u?e __ Qf_R.BQn:2_::?19J~~'=-11gM9JE 
A second theme central to professional lore is 
technology. Professional lore is filled with tales of the 
technologies that journalists employ in their work as 
reporters. While this has traditionally comprised a large 
dimension of discourse about journalistic professionalism 
:I. :t , in retelling the assassination it allows journalists 
to link their tales with viable ongoing discussions about 
the legitimacy of television technology and television 
nevJs. 
This rfteans that assassination tales have been 
refracted in professional lore by the technologies which 
facilitate their perpetuation. For example, the irony of 
the fact that journalists have been called upon to recall 
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activities of decades earlier in order to generate 
contemporary appraisals of the profession has been 
mitigated 
vagaries 
by technology. Journalists readily admit to the 
and inconsistencies of human memory, citing 
faulty recall of that weekend's particulars :1. ;;;~ Many 
mention aids which they found helpful in perpetuating 
memory, admitting that they used certain tools of 
technology to keep their assassination tales fresh. 
Technology is thus invoked as a means of maintaining 
their position as authorized retellers of the 
assassination story. Although they differ according to the 
media where reporters work, the presence of tools of 
assistance within professional lore suggests that to some 
extent journalists enmesh the formation of their own 
professional 
Journalists' 
identities with the technologies they use. 
professional memories have thus been 
construed as depending on the tools of technology they 
employed in perpetuating assassination tales .. They see 
themselves as more professional for having used them. 
The early tales by which journalists recount their 
part in covering the assassination foregrounded the 
importance of technology as part of professional lore. 
Tales of triumph - where reporters hailed themselves for 
having been .. the first," .. the best .. and .. the only" in 
Covering Kennedy's death - set up the kind of context that 
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allowed them over time to celebrate their professionalism 
in conjunction with technology. Immediately after the 
assassination, in an early de£ense o£ television, one 
journalist claimed to use the camera like a newspaper 
This suggests that reporter 
already 
uses his 
then, 
pad and 
reporters 
pencil 
were attending to the 
reconfiguration of practices which technologies of all 
kinds offer their users. 
One tool mentioned frequently by reporters 
recollecting their assassination coverage in pro£essional 
lore is the practice of note-taking. In both print and 
televised media, journalists have recounted at length how 
they took copious notes of events. Note-taking is seen as 
stabilizing memory. The fact that they set down on paper 
what they had seen or heard has made their recollections 
valid. 
One television item bore this out particularly well. 
Reporter Steve Bell, called upon in 1988 to anchor a local 
news station's version of the assassination anniversary, 
did so by incorporating a repeat broadcast of his original 
coverage of Kennedy's death. As Bell recalled that "\r.Je 
were on a round-the-clock vigil for in£ormation, and 
Police Chief Jesse Curry was the primary source of 
in£ormation," the picture of Curry faded to one of Bell 
taking notes years before in Dallas The semic·tic 
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message conveyed by his note-taking was its ability to 
authorize him 25 years later to speak about the 
assassination. 
Another example was provided by 
reporter Harrison Salisburyp who organized his newspaper's 
coverage as editor in New York. In an empassioned 
chronology of his career as a reporter~ Salisbury 
recollected the role of notes in setting down his memories 
of the assassination: 
On November 27, 1963, five days after Kennedy 
was killed, the first moment I had time and 
strength to put down what I felt, I wrote a 
memorandum to myself. I said that in the year 
2000 the Kennedy assassination would still be a 
matter of debate, new theories being evolved how 
and why it happened 'B. 
Referring back to his notes as a viable recording of 
events stabilized memories. Salisbury proceeded to quote 
from the memorandum he had penned two and a half decades 
earlier. But rather than link it with personalized 
discourse about himself as a journalist, he used it to 
reference an already existent lore about journalistic 
professionalism: 
I had concluded before going to work for the 
Ii.~§!.§. in 1949 that the essence of journalism "as 
reporting and writing. I wanted to find things 
out - particularly things which no one else had 
managed to dig aut - and let people have the 
best possible evidence on which to make up their 
minds about policy'· 
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Taking notes thereby linked Salisbury with professional 
lore, allowing him to cast himself as "more pro£essional" 
for having decided to take notes. This implied an interest 
in posterity, perhaps history, and at the very least a 
recognition that note-taking facilitates accuracy and 
stabilizes memory. 
This was also displayed in the recollections of !'L"'_'!1. 
yg;:.!i .. _I.!Ji\_<Ee.:!?_ reporter Tom Wicker, who noted how he 
had chosen that day to be without a notebook. I 
took notes on the back of my mimeographed 
schedule of the two-day tour of Texas we had 
been so near to concluding. Today, I cannot read 
many of the notes; on November 22, they were as 
clear as sixty-point type '7. 
Two years later, he recounted how 
I sat in a stuffy, cramped room in the Baker 
Hotel in Dallas on the morning of November 23, 
when the great plane had borne its burden of 
mortality back to Washington, and the fact of 
death was palpable and tearful in every heart, 
and Lee Harvey Oswald was snarling his tiny 
pathetic defiance a few blocks away in the 
Dallas jail. I wrote that morning what I thought 
about the way things were, and would be ' •. 
Wicker's continued references to his attempts to write 
down what he saw signified his efforts to stabilize 
memory. The technology of note-taking gave him a helpful 
tool to set down his presence as a professional at the 
site of Kennedy's death. Note-taking offered a 
particularly visible accoutrement of journalistic 
profeSSionalism a 
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Failure to take notes worked to the disadvantage of 
other reporters. \~3" .. §.h .. ~.pg.:t:'.Qn ....... .P.Q.§.t. edi tor Benj amin Bradlee, 
for instance,. 
twelve years after the President's death with the premise 
that he had not kept regular notes of his meetings with 
the former President, but could unbelievably "still quote 
verbatim whole chunks of conversations with him" 
Reporter Jean Daniel, the foreign editor of the French 
of interviews with Fidel Castro and John Kennedy shortly 
before Kennedy's death. \~hen Daniel contended that both 
men had said they shared a belief in American capitalism 
and Cuban communism, he was discredited because 
else was present, and Daniel,. by his own account, took no 
notes" ;~;:o His zeal was held to have .. outperformed his 
memory," a statement suggesting that his failure to take 
notes had cast him as unprofessional. 
Another tool mentioned in professional lore is 
photographic technology. References to the filmed and 
photographiC sequencing of the events of Kennedy's death 
have been scattered across media accounts. For example,. 
CBS' d ocu m en ta r y E.Q:\!.l': .......... R.§..Y.§ .... j_.IL.J!I.Q.Y.§'.r~R.§'.!:. inc or par a t ed s till 
photographs, particularly of Oswald being shot, within its 
filmed footage .'. Elsewhere, Edwin Newman recalled how: 
Americans went to sleep with images of 
assassination spinning in their heads. It all 
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seemed some horrible dream from which we would 
awaken. But it wasn't. We would awaken to more 
and more images, images that would become 
forever burned in our memories. We remember 
Jacqueline Kennedy. her dress stained with her 
husband's blood, standing beside LBJ as he took 
the oath of office. We remember her, kneeling 
with her daughter to kiss the flag-draped 
casket. We remember a little boy salute to his 
father. We remember the riderless horse 
Blackjack '''''''. 
Repeated references to assassination images have made the 
image-making technology a relevant tool in circumscribing 
memory. 
Photographic and filmic technology have become 
central to professional lore, largely because photographs 
and films give journalists a way of going back and 
retelling their role in the assassination in certain 
strategic ways. It was suggested earlier that at the time 
of the assassination journalists readily adopted the 
sequencing supplied them by television technology: The 
assassination narrative was transformed into one long 
story that stretched over four days of seemingly 
continuous happenings rather than maintained as piecemeal 
accounts of discrete moments of coverage. This has 
appeared in memory as well, making journalism 
professionals across media dependent on television 
technology for their definitions of professional behavior. 
By barrowing the technology used by journalists in one 
medium,. reporters in other media have thus in effect 
378 
became second-class tellers of the lore surrounding the 
assassination narrative. 
This suggests that implicit in the tales by which 
journalists have sought to promote themselves as 
professionals for having covered Kennedy's deat.h is a 
recognition that professionalism depends to some degree on 
technology and reporters' effective use of it. The fact 
that 
tool 
journalists aspire to a regard for technology as a 
of assistance is interesting, for in consolidating 
themselves as a professional community journalists have 
emphasized the unique access generated by their unique 
tools. Their discussions, in other words, have not 
stressed the collective skills as journalists, per se. Yet 
the reporters' ability to position themselves around 
technologies is held up as a reflection of their 
professionalism across media. It is used to bolster their 
collective memory of the event, much like it was used to 
bolster professionalism at the time of the assassination. 
The incorporation of assassination tales within 
professional lore has not only emerged through individual 
tales about upholding pro£essional behavior through 
technology. 
journalistic 
In much the same 
celebrity succeed 
recycling patterns by which they 
way that tales of 
due to the extensive 
are circulated, so too 
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has the pro£essional lore o£ journalists depended on such 
loreJ's re-usage~ Re-using assassination tales is 
particularly enlightening £or what it 
collective body o£ knowledge by which 
reveals about the 
the journalistic 
community perpetuates itsel£. How a narrative makes 
way from one context to others reveals much about the 
patterns o£ individual and collective legitimation by 
which that community solidi£ies its position 
discourse. 
in public 
Here again, tales become central parts o£ collective 
lore through reprintings and retrospectives. They 
emphasize the organizations or institutions where 
individuals work, focusing attention on the organizations 
that produce the tales being re-used. Pro£essional lore is 
thus in part motivated by an organization's own decision 
to circulate its tales. For example, in the press 
journalists have reprinted original assassination tales 
through special issues o£ magazines, journals and 
newspapers, special sections within those same journals, 
and entire commemorative volumes .. This pattern was 
exempli£ied by !".;i, .. ~§!:_g,. magazine's twenty-:fi£th anniversary 
issue which reprinted its original memorial edition: An 
outer-Iea£ was a££ixed to the original edition, bearing a 
picture o:f the cover published a quarter-century earlier 
and the word "reprint'" slashed diagonally across it. The 
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outer-leaf proclaimed that IIwe recall him 25 years later 
with this historic issue," and a brier insert went as 
follows: 
The first copies of this magazine, published two 
weeks after John F. Kennedy's killing, sold out 
immediately as a grieving America, seeking a 
memoir of its sadness, turned to h.;,.J..§ .••• \~e 
believe this account to be richer than any 
anniversary review could be. So we have 
reprinted our original for the 100 million 
Americans who are too young to remember - and 
for those too old to forget - the assassination 
of a President .a 
Other than these alterations, and a raised price (from 
$.50 to $3.95), the edition was reprinted exactly as it 
had been issued 25 years earlier. Similar patterns were 
found in books and in-house journals. 
Organizational re-usage has also recirculated 
assassination photographs, which perhaps constitute the 
most systematically reprinted part of assassination lore: 
Shots of LBJ being sworn in as President, of Jackie 
Kennedy close to her husband's casket, of Oswald crumpling 
under a murdererls bullet, of Caroline touching her 
rather's co££in were replayed in newspapers, magazines, 
journals and commemorative volumes about the slain 
President. A commemorative volume by Time-Life books, 
entitled concluded with two pictures 
taken from the assassination and pre-assassination 
coverage - one of John-John saluting his father's casket; 
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the other of Kennedy walking on the sand dunes near 
Hyannis Port. The inscription read: 
This is how bJfg ended its special JFK memorial 
following the assassination .. In this retelling 
of Camelot so many years later, it still seems 
fitting to let these two pictures close the 
story r.~~~~ . 
Many of these pictures had appeared 25 years earlier in 
magazine 25, etched into collective memory by earlier 
institutional efforts. Re£erences were again made by 
parent companies, wi th [9.'1::.10.",.,,"-, magazine endorsing 
photographs in the following fashion: 
In the November bJ .. f.". are some of the most 
vividly famous photographs of the instant and 
stunning aftermath (of Kennedy's death) ... the 
First Lady in her blood-soaked pink suit 
standing by as Lyndon Johnson is sworn in as 
President on Air Force One ..• the coffin being 
lowered from the plane for the dead President's 
last White House sojourn •.. John-John saluting 
the coffin. De Gaulle, towering, as they walk 
behind the caisson to Arlington ••• 
the 
The special commemorative volume also featured many 
pictures of photographers who had photographed Kennedy 
Televised tales have been circulated within 
professional lore through the modicum of television 
retrospectives. In this case, retrospectives 't.vere 
forwarded as part of the lore of news organizations. 
Often, they took on different names, allowing journalists 
and organizations to profit a number of times from the 
same footage. ABC, for instance, reused one basic 
compilation of assassination coverage but titled it 
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differently when 
screened on the Arts and Entertainment Cable Network in 
1988, and a t hr e e - par t set ca 11 ed Ih§! .... W..§'§'.!:L .... W.§' ...... 12.§.:I:: .... !:i;.§'D.!1.§'.9Y. 
when sold on the private market one year later ;;:::f::\ 
Although different narrators introduced the clippage, the 
coverage it presented was nearly identical. 
Film clips £rom assassination £ootage have also been 
replayed in news programs, special documentaries and media 
retrospectives: Sequences showed the funeral caisson, the 
riderless horse, the processions o£ mourners, the murder 
of Oswald. Photographs have been recycled: A special 1988 
eight-part CBS series on the assassination was introduced 
with a color montage of the eventls best-known 
photographs, upholding the stature accorded photographs in 
recollecting the story .-. 
Coopting assassination narratives within other texts 
has made re-usage patterns most explicit. \~here an 
assassination narrative has been re-used by journalists 
and news organizations is instrumental in determining its 
importance. For example, the fact that the narrative about 
Dan Rather in Dallas was promoted as part of CBS' 
organizational lore reveals how important the story was to 
CBS. The same narrative~s incorporation within ongoing 
histories about television as a news medium re£lects its 
importance to the emerging legitimacy of television 
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journalism. Similarly~ incorporating the same narrative 
within general overviews about news as a profession 
suggests the tale's centrality to an understanding of news 
at its most generalized level. 
Thus where an assassination tale has been re-used 
says much about the underlying patterns of authority 
perpetuated by the journalistic community's pro£essional 
lore. The effectiveness of professional lore in upholding 
assassination retellings is found in the reusage of 
assassination tales in milieux other than those in which 
they were originally intended. This directly upholds the 
consolidation of journalists into an interpretive 
community~ by displaying how its communal lore depends on 
the continuous recirculation of narratives that celebrate 
l 
journalistic professionalism. 
Journalists have and news-organizations :ce-used 
assassination narratives in two main groups of 
organizationally-bound texts overviews of specific news 
organizations~ such as histories of CBS or I.):1!;:< __ H_§~!_ ... .Y_9£.!s. 
and the biographical and autobiographical 
perspectives of individuals on professional life within 
these news organizations. Both have been used to lend a 
valorized past to organizations. Organizational overviews 
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of both types have used the locus of the news organization 
to recall what happened in 1963. 
The most illustrative example of this kind of 
discourse was found in one history of CBS News, Gary Paul 
Gates' Gates' book began with a chapter 
entitled "Kennedy' oS Been Shot "' that detailed how CBS 
covered the assassination. The chapter's central placement 
reflected the fact that the assassination constituted a 
turning point in the organization's stature, ",i th 
assassination coverage making CBS into a viable news 
organization. In a semiotic sense, framing the book around 
the assassination coverage thus highlights the role it 
played in legitimating CBS News. Such a role was stressed 
throughout the book. Like other accounts found in 
professional lore,. Gates' recounting of the assassination 
story was laced with praise for television technology. He 
traced how CBS would be able to produce coverage like that 
exhibited on Kennedy"'s death- the 1962 opening of three 
new CBS bureaus, one in Dallas; expansion of network news 
coverage from 15 minutes to 30; the addition of Telstar 
and videotape. This contextualized CBS' successful 
coverage of the story as a natural evolution grounded in 
organizational decision-making. Its decision - not only to 
accept technological and organizational advances but to 
facilitate their incorporation within CBS - made it seem 
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as i£ the assassination coverage was the result of 
organizational foresight. This coopted the assassination 
story within a 
organizations. 
larger discourse legitimating the news 
Similar stories were £eatured in professional lore 
about NBC. One biography of former NBC anchorperson 
Jessica Savitch detailed how NBC had set the scene for 
television broadcast coverage of the assassination, when 
executive Robert Kintner decided that NBC would yank all 
programming, including commercials, after Kennedy was 
shot. ··His competitors at CBS and ABC followed suit, but 
NBC garnered the credit for public-spiritedness", went the 
account :?a The same story was featured in other overviews 
of NBC News ;"", suggesting that organizational decisions 
at NBC had helped to make the assassination story into the 
special-event coverage that it became. This supported 
linkages between the assassination story and NBC's 
prestige as a news organization 33. 
In each case the assassination story has been used to 
bolster the prestige of the organizational locus from 
which the tale emerged. As one television retrospective 
maintained,. Ilit was at times like these that a news 
organization finds out how good it is, whether it can do 
the hard jobs, ·the grim Pro£essional lore has 
helped to perpetuate the critical nature of the event for 
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most news organizations. Re-using organizational tales has 
functioned much like the recycling of celebrity tales 
discussed earlier: While recycling the celebrity tale 
serves the individual journalists whose praises it sangp 
by heightening and solidifying their personal stature, re-
usage of organizational tales serves the organization~ by 
stressing the gains it garnered by covering Kennedy's 
death. 
At the same time, assassination narratives have been 
re-u.sed extensively within institutional overviews, 
including discussions about journalism as a pro£ession and 
the evolution of television news. In each case, 
assassination narratives have been coopted within more 
general discourses that have helped create a valorized 
past for the 
question. 
institutions and institutional concerns in 
One representative claim has held that television 
news and the Kennedy assassination were ripe £or each 
other. This claim's centrality in professional lore has 
been borne out quantitatively: One comprehensive tome on 
the evolution o£ television, 
described coverage o£ the assassination in nearly 
10 pages of text a pattern repeated elsewhere too. 
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Mention of the Kennedy assassination is found in nearly 
every institutional overview of the medium of television. 
But the qualitative nuances of claims about the 
loyalties of television and the Kennedy assassination have 
been of more enduring significance. In a special issue 
celebrating television's 50th birthday, Iy. ....... G_Y_!.9§_ held that 
the assassination story constituted a moment of crucial 
importance for the medium. "From this moment on," claimed 
the magazine, .. television becomes the primary source of 
ne~vs £or Americans" b.J.£§:. magazine produced a special 
feature about television, highlighted by pictures of both 
Kennedy's funeral and Oswald'. shooting A CBS 
documentary maintained that 
America needed calming, and it happened because 
television carried it all. Hour after hour, day 
after day, from murder to burial, the flow of 
images and pictures calmed the panic. Someone 
has said that thoBe four days marked the corning 
of the age of television 3e~ 
In account after account, the assassination retellers and 
television were construed as having given each other 
effective stages for collective legitimation. 
This had to do in part with notions about time and space, 
and how television played with them. It was a pivotal year 
for television. Not only did more people say in 1963 that 
they got more news from television than from newspapers, 
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but the advent of the half-hour newscast intensified the 
"bond of familiarity and dependence between anchor and 
viewer" 39. Coverage of the Kennedy assassination was 
construed as capping off what had become an advantageous 
situation: 
Television had already proved its ability to 
cover large-scale events that were pre-planned, 
but never before had it attempted to keep up 
with a fast-breaking, unanticipated story of 
this magnitude ..• Remarked one executive at the 
time, "I think we were frightened when we saw 
our capability." In a medium not noted for its 
dignity or restraint, the commentators and 
reporters also per£ormed admirably, conscious 
perhaps of their role in keeping the nation calm 
and unified. What the networks lost in 
commercial revenues during the four days !Plaa 
more than compensated for by the good will 
generated .• ~Television news had come of age 40. 
This played directly into the hands of the newly-empowered 
television networks. 
In much the same way that organizational tales have 
contextualized the assassination as the result of 
organizational foresight, institutional tales have viewed 
it as the consequence of institutional developments in 
technology, political climate, and the social and cultural 
legitimation of television. Television was seen as an 
active player in the assassination drama. Through the 
assassination it became 
the central nervous 
instrument of 
feeling •.. Commentators 
fill the vacuum in 
system of society? an 
perception and 
and reporters tried to 
our thoughts. Cameras 
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searched for some meaning in the tangle of 
Dallas, Washington and finally Arlington _a. 
Historical overviews thereby have focused on the 
relationship between then-current forms of professionalism 
and technology, repeatedly mentioning the influence of the 
medium of television on memories of Kennedy~s death: 
until (Oswald's death), TV had been exclusively 
a medium of fantasy, so that part of the shock 
of Ruby's action was simply that it was 
real ..• Suddenly we understood television in an 
entirely new way, in a manner that prepared us 
for the many murders to come, for the 'living 
room war' of Vietnam, for the constitutional 
lessons of Watergate, and finally, monotonously, 
for the local murders of the ten o'clock news 
In another's view, 
American television changed 
the day Kennedy died, (when) 
been poor cousins to radio and 
assassination created a new 
On that day, 
forever ••. Unlike 
the networks had 
ne",spaper ... the 
hunger for TV 
television 
information "~':;,'l 
news, and almost overnight, made 
the pre-eminent medium for 
Thus the assassination has been contextualized as one of 
the first circumstances where journalists showed they were 
capable of acting in a way demanded of them by television 
technology. This has made the authorization of television 
a central part of professional lore about the 
assassination. Attempts to incorporate the assassination 
narrative within larger discourses about professionalism 
and ·technology have directly upheld television"'s 
legitimation. 
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The changing configurations of space and time that 
figured within these notions have been £eatured in 
professional lore. For example, a special 1989 issue of 
P.§'92.~~ magazine about television~s £iftieth anniversary 
introduced a section entitled "Unforgettable Images" with 
"collapsing time and distance, TV created instant history 
and hurled it at light-speed into our homes and memories" 
44 The same section used three pictures - of the Kennedy-
Nixon debates in 1960, Kennedy's funeral cortege and 
Oswald being shot - to illustrate TV news' coming of age. 
It happened 
by confronting the unspeakable tragedy of life. 
The eyes of (\lalter Cronkite swelled with tears 
when he heard from a young Dan Rather that 
President Kennedy was dead. Tom Pettit's voice 
filled with horrifed excitement as he broadcast 
TV's first on-air murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, 
on NBC. The world sat in on these extraordinary 
events through the marvels of communication 
satellites that could usually and instantly 
united the globe 4m 
Implicit in these cornmen ts v.18S a recognition that 
television had changed the forms by which the American 
public would remember its events. It solidified its status 
as "a collective re£erence point"· and shaper o£ American 
memories 46. It was not only, as one analyst observed, 
that by bringing the assassination and its ",ftermath 
"vividly into the national consciollsnessD .. £ar more 
graphically than the printed page, the video screen (has) 
depicted some of the most unforgettable scenes in recent 
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history" It was also that it has made certain 
diJftensions of those scenes available for collective 
perpetuation .. Collective perpetuation fit well into 
journalists' attempts to uphold collective notions about 
themselves, upholding the ritual dimensions of 
assassination retellings, and the ongoing patterns of 
community and authority by which journalists are 
consolidated as an interpretive community. 
Yet the 
emphasis on television technology as an institutional 
issue of concern to journalists has not erased 
consideration of the reporter's individual relationship to 
technology. Technologies have remained "peopled" in 
professional lore. In narrating the 1988 CBS documentary 
E.Q.~1': ........ J.!.~.Y§ .... J_!, __ ..... !'!9-Y.§.ffiP..§E, Dan Rather cautioned v iewers that 
they were about to watch a 
hastily-prepared biography CBS 
that weekend. Tapes and films 
our vaults, and my colleague 
improvised from notes 49 
News broadcast 
were rushed from 
Harry Reasoner 
A 1988 Associated Press dispatch relayed the earlier 
performance of NBC correspondent Bill Ryan with the 
following account: 
It was Ryan who read the AP flash that Kennedy 
was dead. 
"It's jarring when 
says, 'You're the 
Kennedy was dead," 
somebody comes up to you and 
one who told me President 
" Ryan said. 
What Ryan, McGee, 
millions of others 
that day, American 
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Huntley, David Brinkley and 
couuldn't know was that on 
television changed forever 
The article recounted the difficulties and circumstances 
of technical naivete which Ryan was expected to overcome 
in covering the story. "We didn't even have a regular news 
studio,," he said, observing that "it wasn't like today, 
where you could punch up the whole world by satellite in a 
minute and a half" ~O. 
Implicit in both accounts were references to the 
improvements of television technology since the days of 
the assassination. Yet also implicit was the admission 
that even without the sophisticated equipment of 
contemporary television, television journalists played 
their trade well in covering Kennedy. Stories about the 
legitimation of journalists as professionals were thus 
for<oarded in conjunction with, but not dependent on, 
stories about television technology. 
It is perhaps in such a light that in the same CBS 
broadcast, Rather chose to introduce the program with a 
detailed overview of the state of television technology at 
the time of the assassination: 
In 1963, television news was broadcast in black 
and white. Lightweight portable tape equipment 
did not exist. Our signals moved mostly by 
hardwire or microwave relay. In some film clips 
which £ollow~ you will see watermarks, looking 
like rain on the screen. The film had no chance 
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to dry out. It was broadcast from wet stock. But 
the message went out across the country ~1 
The embedded message suggests the triumph of reporters 
over what was then an undeveloped technology. \vhen 
separated £rom the visuals which documented the story of 
Kennedy's death, Rather's words told the story not only of 
Kennedy but of the evolution of television, on one hand, 
and the triumph o£ the reporter in such an evolution, on 
the other. These issues have been central to the 
consolidation o£ journalists as an interpretive community 
that authenticates itself through its narratives. 
This does not 
suggest that other technologies have not been similarly 
woven within the story of Kennedy's death. Overviews about 
photojournalism, for example~ have lauded the 
assassination story's photographic £ootage. A special I..~.Jf.!.§:. 
survey of 150 years of photojournalism included the Oswald 
shooting as one of the ten greatest images in the history 
of photojournalism 5_. Another essay in that same issue 
noted that in 1963 "as historical events darkened, 
photojournalism regained some of its tragic power ... A 
Dallas I.:i, .. !!\." .. ?_=l:I".~-':t:J, .. g. photographer caught the instant of Lee 
Harvey Oswald's death" """. 
Yet the professional claims o£ photojournalists to 
the story of Kennedy's death have become secondary to 
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those voiced by television journalists. As the same essay 
went on to say~ the fact that television caught the 
moment of Oswald's death prompted photojournalists to ask 
whether ·'picture taking~ no longer history's first 
witness, (would) ever again be more than stenography?" 
The systematic and repeated of the 
assassination narrative within 
incorporation 
institutional overvie'w's 
about journalism professionalism and the onset 0:£ 
The television news has suggested that it would not. 
fervor with which organizational and institutional memory 
has made television technology a given in recountings o£ 
the assassination story has left little space for contrary 
claims about the professionalization of other groups. 
Radio has seen a similar fate. While most people told 
of receiving their first accounts of Kennedy's death from 
radio ~ •• many had turned to television by the time the 
assassination weekend was over, a point suggesting that 
radio fulfilled an important but transient function. The 
fact that references to its role have more or less 
disappeared from collective memory about the assassination 
is connected with larger discourses about television 
technology that ensued in the interim. Linking memories of 
the assassination with organizational and institutional 
efforts to reference television's glorious past via the 
assassination story suggests that little room has remained 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j 
I 
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for radio practitioners to make similar attempts at 
valorization. This perhaps explains .]hy even in 
professional lore, the role of radio has been thinly woven 
into institutionally-bounded narratives about the 
a.ssassination~ In a sense, it became a local medium next 
to the nationalization of television. Similar arguments 
can be advanced about the disappearance of discourse about 
local media. 
Thus the assassination story has been systematically 
perpetuated within discourse about institutional concerns 
connected IHith television technology and professionalism. 
This has reinforced the collective need to view Kennedy~s 
death as a locus for professional behavior and 
technological legi tima·tion. Organizational and 
institutional memory has thus helped journalists and news 
organizations perpetuate versions of the assassination 
narrative by which they can most effectively profit. Like 
the celebrity tale valorizes individual reporters., 
organizational and institutional tales have helped to 
valorize speci£ic news organizations, institutions and 
institutional values. The repeated and systematic co-
optation of these tales within professional lore has 
helped journalists create the kind of past that appears to 
logically enhance and valorize not only the stature of 
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journalistic professionalism but of television 
well. 
n,ews as 
Thus television technology has shaped not only 
pro£essional lore but the collective perceptions o£ 
journalists about themselves. Walter'Cronkite, asked to 
comment on television's £ifty years of hroadcastingp 
re£lected on using television to look back at television. 
"You'll be amazed at how much you've £orgotten that you 
remembered," he sa i d e.~(,", Claims such as these matter less 
£or their accuracy and more £or the notions that they 
encourage journalists to circulate about and amongst 
themselves. Within and across the journalistic communityp 
journal ists have held that the assassination ",as "real i ty 
framed by a television set· 1 ~7, and they have formed their 
sel£-de£initions as pro£essionals in conjunction with that 
v fev.;' D 
This is important, because it has helped journalists 
turn themselves into an interpretive community by using 
their assassination retellings as an act of communication 
that holds them together. Pivoting assassination 
retellings on pro£essional lore rather than individual 
tales o£ celebrity suggests that such lore is dependent on 
the organizational and institutional loci where individual 
reporters work. Individual reporters are not only cast as 
I 
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players who uphold proven parameters of professionalism 
but certain organizational and institutional loci provide 
frames for their activities both at the time of the 
assassination and their perpetuation of narratives about 
those activities years later. Journalists' pro:fessional 
memories are thus derived not only from individuals but 
from the organizational and institutional loci where they 
fit. Through both dimensions, journalists are able to 
constitute themselves as an independent, authoritative 
community. 
It is worthwhile to quote writer Lance Morrow~ who 
used a recent essay about photojournalism to consider 
certain intersections of memory and professionalism that 
technology has generated. His comments went as follows: 
Taking pictures is a transaction that snatches 
instants away from time and imprisons them in 
rectangles. These rectangles become a collective 
public memory and an image-world that is located 
usually on the verge of tears ... The pictures 
made by photojournalists have the legitimacy of 
being news, fresh information ... (But) it is only 
later that the artifacts of photojournalism sink 
into the textures of the civilization and 
tincture its memory: Jack Ruby shooting Lee 
Harvey Oswald, John-John saluting at the funeral 
Morrow's comments reflect what journalism pro£essionals 
have done with the assassination narrative, in all its 
forms. Through the assassination story, they have 
rearranged instanciations OI time and space in order to 
effectively fashion the kinds of memories that most 
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directly bene£it the organizational and institutional 
concerns of American professional journalism. It is within 
these larger discourses that their narratives have become 
ultimately meaning£ul and power£ul. 
Already in 1964, one o£ the leading trade journals 
maintained that the occurrences o£ November 22 to 25, 
1963, "belonged to journalism, and speci£ically to the 
national organs o£ journalism" The pro£essional lore 
that has unified the American journalistic community has 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PROFESSION: 
RECOLLECTING THROUGH HISTORY AND THE CUSTODIANSHIP OF 
MEl10RY 
"What is accessible to all of us is the memory of 
ourselves during that bleak November weekend" " 
The continued recognition of journalists as the 
preferred retellers of the assassination story ultimately 
depended on the ability of reporters to authorize 
themselves outside of journalism. Because the story of 
Kennedy's death was not only a story about journalism, one 
preferred mode of perpetuating journalistic associations 
with it was through the authentication of reporters in 
parameters not related to their own professionalism. Such 
a mode posited journalists in authoritative positions that 
were culled not from journalism, but from history. It 
authorized journalists as historians. 
This third memory system has encouraged journalists 
to perpetuate notions of themselves as the story's 
preferred spokespeople through the role ascribed them by 
history. Brought into play alongside the memory system 
offered by celebrity - which has elevated the importance 
of the individual reporter and that offered by 
professional lore - which has elevated the importance of 
news organizations and institutions of professional 
journalism, the memory system of history has helped 
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journalists e££ectively perpetuate their assassination 
tales by elevating the importance of considerations basic 
to the general structure of the profession. This chapter 
explores the link between journalism and history, 
considering history's function as a privileged record or 
anachronism in reconsidering the assassination, the 
ability of journalistic record to function as 
historiography, and the emergent focus among journalists 
on the custodianship of memory in their assassination 
retellings. Specifically, I address how journalists, in an 
attempt to validate themselves beyond the profession, have 
established their custodianship of assassination memories 
in order to establish themselves as the story's authorized 
historians. This makes history the most general and final 
stage in journalists'" attempts to consolidate themselves 
as an authoritative interpretive community around their 
assassination retellings. 
!!.I?-I_ORY :-RR :i:..YJb.gG E1LKE.:.Q.QJil2._Q!'Lj\ jIj.!1gH 13 ON I SJ:l3. 
As a memory system, history has long been lauded for 
its ability to lend depth to the events it retells. In one 
View, it is a "discipline which (seeks) to establish true 
statements about events which have occurred and objects 
which have existed in the past.. "". Both in perspective, 
narrative standard and analytical method, historians have 
tried to be record-keepers of a system predicated on 
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distance In their attempt to be analytical, remote and 
seemingly objective about the impulses they inscribe in 
their chronicles, they ascribe to a view of their record 
as value-free .0(1· 
For observers examining events over time and space p 
history offers two advantages: One is the detached, even 
remote, view it offers; another is its larger perspective, 
where looking at events from afar appears to give 
observers a more stable view of what happened. The 
illusion of a greater record or narrative by which events 
can be chronicled gives them a seemingly "natural" 
relevance, making them sensical by -their implantation 
within a larger context. It displays a "certain kind of 
relationship to 'the past' mediated by a distinctive kind 
of written discourse"" History is thus seen as deepening 
the record of an event, traits which have set it apart 
from other modes of chronicling. 
But from a traditional perspective, history does not 
make room £or memory. Among traditional historians, memory 
and history have been seen as offering "mutually opposed 
ways of appreciating the past .. ~:' .. Memory is expected to 
give way to history, its subjective images yielding .. to 
the historian's description of objective facts" "7 Over 
time, memory becomes a tool in the historian~s hands, 
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suggesting that as long as memory remains vital, history 
cannot assume an authoritative role in discourse. 
For retellers o£ the assassination, most of whom 
lived through its events, the terision between history and 
memory bore directly on their activities. Retellers 
attended to history in different ways, with assassination 
buffs playing into their stereotyped role as 
sharpshooters. Their involvement in the story was 
sporadic, often erratic. Historians, on the other hand, 
displayed a consistent interest in the story but tried to 
fasten it within larger discourses about Kennedy's 
administration and Presidency. With few exceptions, their 
interest rested less with the assassination story per se 
and more with how they could use it to illustrate larger 
developments of the time Even historical textbooks 
tended not to mention the assassination in detail 
Situated in and around these groups was the journalistic 
community, with its own professional codes, modes of 
storytelling and technologies for telling tales that were 
all predicated on its presence within the assassination 
story. Such a presence implied the importance of memory. 
To an extent, all assassination retellers expected 
that the events of the assassination would eventually be 
inscribed as part of historical record and that 
professional lived memories would decrease in importance. 
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In large part this was because as the story of the 
assassination moved across time and space, it moved 
directly into the historian~s domain. It was an "event in 
history, II claimed one trade publication already one week 
after events Years later" in 1957, 
contemplated the historical status of the story under the 
ti tIe "Assassination: History or Headlines?"' ~.:1. 
The inevitability of history was a natural 
expectation. As one journalist proclaimed in 1955: 
Millions of words, spoken and written, have 
already been dedicated to the subject (of the 
assassination), and there will be millions, if 
not billions, more before (Kennedy's) 
assassination takes its place as part of history 
:1. 8~ 
History was seen as a resting place to which all 
retellings voluntarily or involuntarily aspired. 
Yet, as these chapters have shown, retelling the 
assassination was not a conflict-free enterprise. Shortly 
following Kennedy's murder, Tom Wicker recalled how 
a few friends - journalists, political figures, 
were lunching informally in academics 
Washington. 
unnaturally, 
history most 
Their attention turned, not 
to Kennedy. What, they asked, would 
likely remember of him? '3. 
Wicker's reference to three groups vying for authority 
oVer Kennedy's memory is significant, for while it pointed 
out what appeared to be a shared perspective on history -
that it held the natural rights to the assassination story 
it also underscored the competition by which alternate 
407 
retellers were attempting to shape collective memory about 
Kennedy's li£e and death. 
It is thus no surprise that the idea o£ history 
taking over the assassination story met with resistance by 
other retellers. In part, this was due to the particular 
kind o£ participant-observer valorized by historical 
record - someone .,ho embodied a sensitivity to the larger 
picture,. objectivity and a detached perspective, a sense 
o£ analytical remoteness about events. Because these 
qualities are in some way determined by the passage o£ 
time, observers needed to wait in abeyance until it was 
possible to pronounce suitable judgment on the events o£ 
Kennedy's death. In order to produce a sequencing o£ the 
event over time, they had to wait to implement their 
retellings 14. In the case of historical retellings, then, 
the "participant" dimension o£ the participant-observer 
was considerably subordinated to the 
remained highly valorized. 
"observer, I. which 
Such a situation was at odds with larger developments 
o£ the time, contradicting the re£lexivity o£ sixties' 
chronicles and the increased proximity o£ history £or 
those seeking to set up new boundaries o£ cultural 
authority. It £ailed to recognize the pseudo-historical 
cast o£ most accounts generated by people who came o£ age 
in the sixties, or the possibility that £orming their own 
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pro£essional identities was in£uaed with history and 
historical relevance. Even larger questions about 
documentary method emphasized pro£essional memories as an 
alternate £orm o£ documentation, which in essence 
valorized qualities in the assassination reteller that are 
lacking in the traditional historian. 
But most important, the idea o£ history taking over 
the assassination story has remained problematic because 
it £ails to account £or the continued vitality o£ memory. 
For example, the eemphasis on a reteller's presence has 
evolved as a valued part o£ assassination retellings, 
circumventing the di££iculties that the evidence o£ memory 
has traditionally presented £or historians. As one 
observer remarked, "Memory has always been di££icult £or 
historians to con£ront ..• (It) is considered an in£ormation 
source to be con£irmed by scholarship" Yet more 
general suggestions that all people with recollections -
not just historians - are able to e££ectively consider the 
assassination story have highlighted the legitimacy o£ 
memory. This is borne out by Tom Wicker's comments about 
the three purveyors o£ memory - the journalist, academic 
and politician who sat together to transcribe the 
parameters o£ collective memory about Kennedy. They 
underlined the actor-based nature o£ the memory systems 
through which many assassination recollections have been 
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e££ectively £orwarded. By underscoring the importance o£ 
recollectors as players, they made memory a salient part 
o£ the historical record o£ Kennedy's death. Over time, 
this has both highlighted the potentially active role 
played by recollectors £rom a range o£ pro£essional 
domains and undermined the privilege accorded traditional 
historians. 
Thus, as a memory system, history has o££ered 
advantages that are valorized but a means o£ record-
keeping that is not. Advantages o£ perspective, 
stability o£ interpretation, or a sensitivity to the 
larger picture - have success£ully separated history £rom 
other chronicles o£ the assassination, but its valued mode 
o£ record-keeping and participant-observation have 
remained problematic. This does not mean that other 
retellers o£ the assassination have deemed history 
irrelevant. Rather, they have attempted to locate ways to 
best correct its surrounding problematics. They have set 
about proving that they can play the historical role 
better than historians, directly boosting their ability to 
consolidate themselves as an independent authoritative 
community. 
Invoking history as a memory system linked into 
journalists' uncertainty over the degree o£ 
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distinctiveness between the two professions. To an extent, 
journalists' interest in history and historical record 
appeared to be somewhat woven into their own retellings. 
"Historic photographs" were referenced across media 
historic films were lauded as media triumphs 1?; "historic 
coverage" became one frequently-aired label o:f 
journalistic per:formances o:f the assassination story 
Even one well-known saying about journalism held that it 
constituted the :first rough dra:ft o:f history. That 
comment, o:f:fered by Was~~ngtoll--E£~~ publisher Philip 
Graham :t'ili/ , 
literature. 
was widely quoted throughout the assassination 
Journalists initially saw themselves helping history 
and historians in retelling the assassination. One trade 
publication held that "never be:fore has there been such 
documentation of history-in-the-making" 80, while another 
reporter admitted that if ":future historians will have a 
full record of events," it was because "they will know 
exactly what Lee Harvey Oswald looked like" This 
implied that television, by disseminating images o:f the 
assassination, had supported the making of history. 
Journalists, particularly television reporters, viewed 
themselves as having offered the American public a "new 
dimension in understanding history" ,:~:iiii: 
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Defining themselves as aides to historians encouraged 
journalists to emphasize differences between journalistic 
and historical retellings of the assassination story, 
which necessarily highlighted journalists' specific 
contribution to the assassination record. As one observer 
remarked: 
Reporters and scholars are inclined to think of 
themselves as antithetical. Call a 
newspaperman's copy recondite and he reaches for 
a pica ruler; tell a professor his paper is just 
journalism and he invites you to join him in the 
gym. The feud is an old one. It is time to stop 
it. The only difference between the two is a 
difference of time; today's journalism is 
tomorrow's history 23. 
Journalists construed the privileged character of history 
as being one of temporal demarcation. As Theodore White 
said, "We reporters are the servants of history, offering 
up our daily or passing tales for them to sort out" ''"''' .• 
Journalists were responsible for the events of today, 
historians for the events of yesterday. Television 
documentaries became occupied with the point at which 
"history reexamined the facts" Journalists defined 
their function as providers of a "first draft," and saw 
their activities preliminary to a final draft of the story 
to be written by historians. One article in lh§'. 
fro9Fe~siv~ noted that 
The commentators, responding in the tragic 
passion of the moment, have had their say about 
Mr. Kennedy, and the historians, writing in the 
coolness of time, will have theirs one day .a 
I 
I 
I 
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This implied that history would take up where journalism 
left off, with history offering a finite point of 
completion where all contradictory or transient claims to 
the story would be discarded, made permanent or 
immobilized. This promoted journalism aa a £orm o£ 
uncooked history, where "the participants' memories 
haven't yet entirely faded and the historians haven't yet 
taken over" a view that in effect detached and 
distanced historians from the assassination story. Because 
journalists were closer to the story, their authority 
derived from their presence therein, they had an advantage 
over historians, whose authority would only come after the 
facts became clear. 
It is thus no surprise that the differences between 
journalistic and historical perspectives were not upheld 
as assassination retellings were perpetuated. The clear-
cut temporal demarcation between them was to a large 
degree undermined by circumstance, with the President's 
early demise itself giving journalists an advantage over 
historians: While historians had had insufficient time to 
gauge the Kennedy regime, journalists, who had been 
granted easy access to the 1,000 days of Kennedy's 
administration, were placed in the position of becoming 
its preferred evaluators. This was certainly the case with 
Theodore White ••• As Norman Mailer said: 
413 
Much o£ what we had to say, intended to have the 
li£e o£ contemporary criticism (became) abruptly 
a document which speaks £rom ... a time which is 
past, £rom history··. 
Journalists, whether or not they so desired, were cast by 
the circumstances o£ Kennedy's death into the role o£ 
instant historians. 
Moreover, the traditional distinction between 
journalists and historians, which separated 
contemporaneous accounts £rom accounts a£ter-the-£act, 
became less relevant as retellings o£ the assassination 
story persisted over time. In part this was because news 
reports themselves lacked a temporal £initeness: 
The (New Yo:rk.2. Tim,.!'!..§!. would not be thrown away by 
readers a day later, it was a collectors' 
item ... lt would pass on, as a £amily heirloom or 
a relic or a vague testimony to existence on the 
day a President was shot 30 
The £unction and role o£ media accounts took on a 
historical cast, by which journalists' documentation was 
used to anchor the events o£ that weekend in memory 
The £act that retellings o£ the events o£ Kennedy's death 
persisted worked to historians~ disadvantage, its 
persistence raising serious questions about the length o£ 
time journalists were expected to retain their positions 
as spokespersons £or events, and at which point historians 
were expected to take over. 
Demarcations between journalists and historians were 
also blurred by the period o£ suspension expected o£ 
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historians. That state of limbo, by which historians were 
expected to wait before they began their analysis of 
Kennedy's death, never ended. Instead, the story's 
persistence prevented them from '"being able to complete a 
coherent account of this extraordinarily complex even·t·· 
This put them in the peculiar position of having a 
IInon-role" in the assassination's retelling. It also meant 
that notions about history as the end of a process, where 
the interim nature o£ news was made permanent~ were 
displaced by the involvement of other retellers. 
The ability of historians to uphold history was also 
undermined by questions of professional perspective. It 
was suggested earlier that the larger focus on the 
participant and reflexive quality of sixties' narratives 
set up standards of analysis and storytelling that 
traditional historians could not fulfill. Rather, the 
emphasis on presence, participation and memories made the 
detached mode of historical storytelling ineffective in 
retelling the assassination tale. Even notions about the 
constructed nature of the historical record undermined the 
position of historians, whose attempts to forward the 
.. truth"' were deemed problematic. The constructed nature of 
the assassination record suggested that there was no one 
"truth'" to be had. The fact that their own professional 
practices depended on the eventual weaving of 
415 
contradictory threads in"to one coherent narrative put 
historians into a professional quandary. 
Yet all of these points have worked to the advantage 
of journalists: Proximity and presence uphold their 
perspective on events; their mode of storytelling is 
valorized within larger attempts to reconsider the 
assassination record; and the memories they provide are a 
legitimate mode of record-keeping. This means that 
professional justifications for journalistic and 
historical involvement in the assassination story has put 
journalists in an advantageous position, and supported 
their attempts to assume the role of historians in their 
retellings. 
historians, 
Rather than define themselves as aides to 
journalists have thereby begun to see 
themselves as independent makers of the historical record. 
!"lIST.9RljlNS:_ ATTEl'IPT1LTO ACCQ.!tQDATE E.~l,.EXIY.1TY 
This does not mean that historians and other persons 
qualified to engage in historical research have not 
attempted to resolve tensions between the valued mode of 
detailed historiography and a more general demand for 
participant, re£lexive narratives. Transitions within the 
history pro£ession, particularly during the early 
seventies, generated professional hybrids who appealed to 
an alternate view of historical record ~"" One such 
hybrid, mentioned earlier, was the assassination buff. 
I , 
I· :.' I 
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While the buffs were situated outside of the ranks of 
historians per se, they wreaked havoc on the recognized 
boundaries of cultural authority in a variety of 
professional domains, including history. Their ability to 
contest acceptable limitations of a citizen~s right to 
reconsider official documentary record constituted a 
testament to the viability of Uotherness" within 
documentary process. Not only did their activities uphold 
the reflexivity of the time but they supported a larger 
context where individuals appealed to a sense of history 
in making their lives meaningful. As time passed, and the 
volume of material produced by assassination buffs 
increased, their presence within the assassination story 
constituted a direct challenge to the role generally 
played by historical record. 
Another such pro£essional hybrid generated by 
disjunctions between the historical mode of detachment and 
an emphasis on reflexivity and participation was the so-
called ··participant .. historian, or historian of popular 
memory_ Individuals like David Halberstam, Garry Wills, or 
possibly Todd Gitlin have sought to effect an alternate 
mode of documenting history that attended to their own 
participation in it. Unlike traditional historians, who 
were wont to shift through documents from a distance, 
popular historians - many of them historians - have used 
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their experience within events to look at them from 
nearby. 
In retelling the assassination, popular historians 
have built up a distinct advantage over their more 
traditional colleagues. Their views and actions are seen 
as a legitimate part of the stories they wrote, a point 
that links them with ongoing discourses about 
participation, reflexivity, and the relevance of memory. 
for example, 
documented the trappings of American politics in a way 
that left little doubt as to his own perspective on them, 
and he did so while events relevant to his chronicle 
continued to take place ~,., .. But even the fact that popular 
historians have som.etimes displaced more traditional 
record-keepers of the assassination tale did not earn them 
status as an integral part of the professional community 
of historians 3~ 
other attempts to accomodate reflexivity have been 
found in discussions about what constitutes preferred 
historical documentation. This was borne out by the 
various changes in perspectives on memory, with historians 
and historical theorists beginning to break down 
traditional opposition to memory and deconstruct the 
rigidity of such an opposition. For certain observers, 
such as Aries or Braudel, memory is seen as complementary 
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to history, in that it allows access to domains that 
history cannot reach 3G Yet another, equally innovative 
perspective is one which equates memory with history, as 
featured in the work o:f Pierre Nora '::'::7 This has had 
direct relevance :for journalists, for their method o:f 
record-keeping and perspective on events are closely 
aligned with what historians are trying to achieve in 
their attempts to accomodate reflexivity. Discourse about 
historical reflexivity has thus upheld journalists' 
attempts to consolidate themselves as an independent and 
authoritative community. 
Yet other alternatives to the detached mode of 
historical record-keeping are found in alternate forms o:f 
historiography, such as memoirs or biographies. 
Chroniclers have used them to promote versions of the 
story that are less detached, writing "personal memoirs 
based on remembered experiences" ~~H~\. For example, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr.'s A_-Ih~~n~-P-~s. used its chronicler's 
insider's status at Kennedy's White House to generate an 
historical view of what had transpired therein, as did 
Theodore Sorensen's ~~~~~gy Alternate modes of 
historiography have played a particularly important role 
in highlighting the reflexive dimension of historians' 
retellings of the story of Kennedy's life and death. But 
again, as with popular historians, they have remained 
;:: 
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separate from the general set of texts considered first-
rate historical documents 40. Like the popular historians, 
their hybridization, as a mode of record-keeping, has kept 
their chroniclers in marginal positions vis a vis the 
larger community of historians. 
The existence, however tentative, of professional 
hybrids and practices of hybridization suggests that there 
is room for definitional flexibility over what constitutes 
historical record and the role to be played by historians. 
For as historically-anchored chronicles have begun to lend 
their signature to the record of Kennedy's death, 
journalists have been forced to rethink their own 
distinctiveness from historians. Shortly after the 
assassination, the work of memoirists, biographers and 
particularly popular historians began to punctuate the 
record. In particular, the popular historians' attempts to 
accomodate their own reflexivity were met with skepticism 
by many reporters. 
Interestingly, journalists generally criticized these 
historians for the very qualities that made them different 
from their traditional colleagues. Journalists lambasted 
them for being subjective, too close to events, too hasty, 
and not sufficiently detached-' Attempts by historians 
to adopt either a more participatory stance on events or a 
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less analytically remote pespective in their analysis were 
treated harshly. This was perhaps because reporters felt 
that historians were encroaching on their domain. Popular, 
or participant, historiography was particularly seen as 
being too similar to journalism. 
In that light, William Manchester's publication of 
touted as the official history 
o£ the assassination, was panned in reviews which brushed 
it off as "compelling narrative but hardly as impartial 
history" 4_. Columnist Mary McGrory asked whether it was 
possible to "once see Kennedy plain," as she plied a 
critical look at biographers who produced, in her view, 
"early, perhaps hasty, memoirs II .<'.j.'::-s.. Biographers ~ accounts 
were caustically labelled "memorists" by one reporter, who 
asked "what are the proprieties and improprieties of all 
this secret-baring?'" In the discussion that followed, 
Kennedy's biographers were assumed to have overstepped 
their participation in historical record: 
The a fortiori argument does not apply to the 
memoirists' other stated intention, that of 
rendering a service to history. But history 
even somewhat precipitately written - has its 
claims .•• The circumstances under which these 
books were written would dictate that they meet 
the same set of criteria: that the history at a 
minimum be accurate, the the assessments be 
reasonably fair, and that the disclosures be 
made for some recognizably serious purpose 45 
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The article documented how memoirists had undermined their 
commitment to accuracy, and then concluded that drama had 
been served "at the expense of history" <,.<;. 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was perhaps the most direct 
victim of the journalistic community's scorn. "Brief, not 
a history," went !i§!;L§JNe~_~~ critique of Schlesinger's !i 
His attempts to tamper with the 
historian's detachment and objectivity ruffled the backs 
of many journalistic observers. Said Andy Logan: 
It's all right to be taken aback when 
Schlesinger in the Lif~ serialization of !i 
Iho~~and D§L~ has the President crying in his 
wife's arms after the Cuban setback and then 
removes the scene from his published 
book ... Apparently where John Kennedy is 
concerned, the previous winner of the Bancroft, 
Parkman and Pulitzer prizes in history thinks of 
historic material as something that may be tried 
this way, turned around and tried that way, and 
balled up and discarded if it doesn't seem 
entirely becoming to the subject 48. 
An accompanying drawing portrayed Kennedy and his "instant 
historians" - including Schlesinger, Theodore Sorensen, 
William Manchester and Pierre Salinger - in the role of 
Jesus and his disciples 
Thus attempts by historians to infuse their own 
chronicles with a re£lexive, participatory mode of 
analysis have been denigrated by the journalistic 
community. Journalists tended to upbraid popular 
historians for abandoning the detached mode of record-
keeping favored by their traditional counterparts, and 
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have paid little attention to the corrective this brought 
to the anachronistic dimensions o£ traditional 
historiography. This has had to do in no small part with 
the £act that popular historiography has brought 
historians substantially closer to journalists' own mode 
o£ chronicling. By adopting alternative modes o£ 
historical record-keeping, historians interested in 
accomodating re£lexivity are seen as stepping into the 
journalists' domain. 
Historians' growing involvement in the assassination 
story in ways that resembled the reportorial mode o£ 
story-telling has thus encouraged journalists to clearly 
de£ine their own involvement in the story. Rather than 
contextualize their activities as assisting in the making 
o£ historical record, journalists have begun to see 
themselves as makers o£ the historical record. They have 
moved £rom acting as £acilitators o£ historians, to 
historical £acil!tators. This has lent a new dimension to 
their attempts to use the assassination retelling as a 
ritual act o£ communication. It suggests that retellings 
have not only authorized journalists amongst themselves 
but among other interpretive communities as well, 
underscoring basic assumptions about the structure o£ the 
journalistic pro£ession. 
::c, 
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In such a way, journalists' narratives about the 
Kennedy administration and assassination have addressed 
notions about history and historical record overlooked by 
historians. Journalists have begun to consciously promote 
themselves within the larger corpus of historiography and 
the making of historical record. Memoirs, biographies and 
popular histories were provided by reporters and writers 
like Theodore White or Pierre Salinger All of them 
have continued to define themselves as reporters despite 
their forays into historical interpretation. 
Already one week after the assassination, trade 
publications hailed "a dark day in history (that> was 
covered superbly by the mass media which in turn made 
history" "". Journalists saw themselves addressing points 
in the record that historians had missed, and stressed 
that they were doing the work of historians: Media critic 
Gay Talese said that for reporters, .. the test in Dallas 
was like no other test ..• (New ___ ~ork -I~~ correspondent 
Tom) Wicker was writing for history that day" """'. A New 
Y9.~k Times book called Ih~Kegn~~~ was billed by one 
paper as a "history prepared by M~ York Times staff under 
H. Faber's direction"' ~.3 Referring to his hunger .. to 
contribute to the recording of contemporary history" 
reporter Benjamin Bradlee recounted how he was motivated 
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by his "unique, historical access" to the Kennedy 
administration: 
I knew enough of history to know that the fruits 
of this kind of access seldom make the history 
books, and the great men of our time are less 
understood as a result am. 
At heart of the considerations through which Bradlee 
negotiated his right to act as historian was an almost 
unvoiced assumption that his history would be preferred to 
that offered by professional historians. Such a view was 
also implicit in an appraisal that Tom Wicker's articles 
and books about Kennedy were '"non-textbook histories" "-'<.>. 
In that view, Wicker was praised for having worked against 
the distortions effected by historical record on memories 
of Kennedy. 
Attempts to recast journalistic retellings as history 
have existed across media. For example, reporter Jack 
Anderson justified his televised report on the Kennedy 
assassination by lamenting the suspended involvement of 
historians. He said that 
The government has sealed the most sensitive 
files on the Kennedy assassination - the key CIA 
file, the critical FBI file - all in the name of 
national security. By the time these files are 
jarred loose from the agencies that could be 
embarrassed by them, the information will be 
ancient history, and only the historians will 
care, but we care now t~';7' 
Anderson saw journalists providing a degree 
participation that historians had missed. 
of 
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Another particularly illustrative example was £ound 
in a set o£ video-casettes about Kennedy's administration 
and assassination that NBC produced in 1988. The blurb on 
the back o£ the tape, entitled Th.e Week i&§L..I".Qst ,Jotm . ..E ...... 
K§!!f1edy, went as £ollows: 
To commemorate the 25th anniversary o£ JFK's 
death, NBC News has opened its archives to make 
available The Week We L09t ___ ... John __ E.... 
~enn~9J[ ••. perhaps the most important video 
document o£ our time. From more than 70 hours o£ 
live, on-the-air coverage, the most dramatic, 
crucial segments have been skil£ully woven in a 
special production by NBC News to give you a 
moment-by-moment account o£ the Kennedy 
assassination and its a£termath. This is history 
exactly as it happened ••• and happened to you. As 
you saw it then ~a. 
Implicit here was the notion o£ providing the "real" 
version of events. In the next paragraph, the possibility 
of "owning history" was raised, when the tape was called 
"an extraordinary piece o£ history that you could not own 
until now". By recasting their retellings as history, NBC 
News made explicit one o£ the underlying tensions in 
journalists' attempts to authorize themselves as 
spokespeople £or Kennedy's death. Such a recasting o£ 
journalistic retellings attempted to legitimate 
journalists as historians. Forwarding themselves as the 
event's right£ul historians thus became part o£ 
perpetuating their authority £or the events in Dallas. 
This suggests that rather than regard history as an 
untouchable terrain, journalists have reworked the notion 
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o£ history as a semi-sacred space inside o£ which 
journalistic chronicles have their own legitimate resting 
place. Larger discourses both about the increased 
accessibility o£ history and the legitimacy o£ accessing 
records o£ the record have worked in their £avor. They 
have cast journalistic attempts to access historical 
record in a positive light. In such a way, journalistic 
involvement in the assassination story has made irrelevant 
the idea o£ history providing a haven, where the events o£ 
Kennedy's death can eventually be granted proper 
articulation. Journalists have implied that there is 
something in-between contemporary retellings and 
historical record, where the meaning o£ the event can be 
negotiated not only as an interim arrangement but as a 
long-term one. 
All o£ this suggests that journalists have 
systematically tried to perpetuate themselves as alternate 
keepers o£ the historical record. They £ancy themselves as 
a di££erent kind o£ participant-observer - one that is 
validated by presence, participation and proximity, rather 
than the remote and detached objectivity touted by 
traditional historians. Alongside popular historians and 
historians who use less traditional methods o£ record-
keeping, 
promoters 
journalists have established themselves as 
o£ the historical record. Within larger 
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discourses about accesa to history, the salience o£ 
pro£essional memories and the viability o£ accessing 
records, this makes sense. It has set up a legitimating 
£ramework by which journalists can promote the 
perpetuation o£ their assassination tales within the role 
ascribed them by history. This constitutes the £inal £rame 
through which journalists have established themselves as 
authorized spokespeople £or the assassination story. It is 
within such a £rame that the act o£ perpetuating their 
retellings helps to consolidate them as an interpretive 
community, in that it makes clear that the legitimation o£ 
the pro£ession rests not only inside journalism but 
outside as well. 
Because the assassination story remains such a vital 
and contested story among so many groups o£ retellers, 
their strong presence within it has undermined a number o£ 
givens about the practices o£ historians and their 
inability to uphold the privileged status o£ history. 
Journalists' activities have rendered them particularly 
well-suited to take on the historian's role, i£ not 
totally, then at least in tandem with historians 
interested in their own re£lexivity. 
Perpetuating journalists as retellers o£ events, 
whose authority exceeds the recognized bounds o£ 
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journalism, is there£ore in a sense implicit in all 
journalists' attempts to perpetuate assassination tales. 
For by the very activity o£ perpetuation, journalists have 
sought to extend their authority £or the assassination 
beyond the immediate temporal £rame in which it occurred. 
Such an activity has o££set what were earlier recognized 
as legitimate temporal boundaries separating journalistic 
£rom historical record. It has blurred the notion that 
journalists are responsible £or the contemporaneous event, 
historians £or the event o£ the past. For as time has 
passed, and journalists have continued to show reluctance 
about turning the events o£ Kennedy's death over to 
historians, such a distinction has become irrelevant. 
Journalists' declared interest in perpetuating certain 
versions o£ the assassination story, as well as their role 
in it, has upset demarcations between the two pro£essional 
communities. 
All o£ this blurs distinctions about where 
journalistic record ends and historical record begins. In 
his book j...ibra, Don Delillo relayed how the investigator 
o£ Kennedy's murder took re£uge in his record-keeping 
strategies: 
The notes are becoming an end in themselves. 
Branch has decided it is premature to make a 
serious e££ort to turn these notes into coherent 
history. Maybe it will always be premature. 
Because the data keeps coming. Because new lives 
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enter the record all the time. 
changing as he writes m_. 
The past is 
Journalists~ unwillingness to surrender the facts to 
historians has emerged from concerns that the record they 
provide facilitates closure, perhaps prematurely. 
Journalistic reluctance over whether historians should 
lend closure has thus become an embedded message of 
journalist's perpetuation of their assassination tales. 
Journalists have thereby refused to turn the 
assassination story over to historians in part because 
they want to remain its authoritative spokespeople. For as 
long as the story remains part of their domain, the 
perpetuation of their authority remains a viable 
objective. By invoking history, and passing off 
journalistic pactice as being historically-motivated, 
journalists have transported themselves into the role 
ascribed them by history. 
And what kind of history do they perpetuate? Unlike 
historians, who tend to make sense of what other people 
remember, journalists have made use of their own memories, 
their recording of historical events accomplished through 
lived recollections. It is significant that journalists' 
distinctiveness from historians pivots on the centrality 
of memory, because through memory journalists have assumed 
the role ascribed by history. Their assumption of that 
role has been facilitated by television technology. Its 
I 
f-
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repeated images and recastings of the events of Kennedy's 
death have allowed journali"sts to access the record about 
the record in a way that has made the idea of turning it 
over to historians less appealing. Television coverage has 
made it easier to access the archives of memory provided 
by television networks or news magazines than to go back 
to the original documents themselves. As John Connally 
said in 1988: 
I don't think the time has come when history 
will really look at the Kennedy administration 
with a realistic eye. And how could we? When you 
see a beautiful little girl kneeling with her 
hand on her father's coffin, and when you see a 
handsome little boy standing with a military 
salute by his slain father, how can you feel 
anything but the utmost sympathy? It's a scene 
of pathos, of remorse, of tragedy, and that's 
the way we now view President Kennedy <ii",. 
Television has interfered with historical progression by 
not allowing memories to move beyond the images it 
repeatedly showed. The idea of a history frozen by images 
has thus worked to the advantage of journalists: 
Television had no memory, it was not interested 
in the past, it erased the past, there was never 
time to show film clips of past events, and so, 
inevitably, it speeded up the advent of the 
future ,,.. 
In this way television has helped journalists offer 
and perpetuate their own version of historical narrative. 
One observer recalled how ABC used a recreation of the 
shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald as a promotional trailer for 
f:-! a Kennedy-related mini-series. He noted: "As the fictional 
tI, 
t 
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clip was rebroadcast over and over again, the memories o£ 
the real event faded away. A clone had taken its place" 
Gi.:;:; Television has relied, in Pierre Nora's words, on lithe 
materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, 
the visibility of the image" .~. It has produced a mode of 
historical recording that is based on archives of memory. 
Becoming a "veritable history machine, spewing out a 
constant stream of historical, semi historical and pseudo-
historical recreations"· television has helped 
journalists create an archive of their memories that is 
now referenced as history itself. 
This suggests an implicit regard for the memories of 
journalists, who are better equipped than other retellers 
to access them in a repeated and systematic fashion. For 
as long as journalists' memories remain, and can be 
accessed, reporters will be reluctant to yield the 
authority they suggest. Their emergence as custodians of 
memory about the assassination has made them into 
archivists of its story, becoming gatekeepers of their own 
presence. Journalists have done their best to build a 
history of the story through memory. Memory has become the 
basis of the preferred retelling of the assassination 
story. 
In such a way, journalists have come to promote 
themselves as authorized historians of the events of 
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Kennedy's death. By perpetuating their assassination tales 
through the memory system offered by history, journalists 
have emerged as the story's legitimate preferred retellers 
beyond the bounds of professional journalism. They have 
perpetuated their tales by reconstructing their activities 
as something other than journalism. Drawn by the 
privileged status of history, they have created a record 
of the assassination which not only has the depth, 
perspective and stability of interpretation of historical 
record, but the proximity, personal memories and 
experience of journalistic accounts. Journalists have thus 
personalized the history of the assassination, through 
their own professional codes of journalistic practice, 
collective memory and journalistic authority. They have 
given texture to the historical record of Kennedy's death. 
In concluding, it makes sense to quote from a remark 
once made about historians: 
Most historians would give a great deal to have 
had the chance of being actually present at some 
of the events they have described .''''. 
The proximity journalists have upheld as their birthright 
to the assassination story can be assumed by no other 
reteller of the tale. The fact that journalists possess 
what other retellers want has allowed them to immortalize 
their experience o£ covering Kennedy's death as a 
preferred mode of retelling the assassination. As one 
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reporter said, "those of us who shared it will never 
forget" In perpetuating assassination tales, 
journalists have made certain that they will not be 
forgotten. Journalists' tales have upheld their presence, 
their participation and ultimately their memories as a 
preferred mode of retelling the events of Kennedy's death. 
Across time and space, the memory system of history has 
made it possible for them to do so. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOURNALISTIC AUTHORITY 
"You are, among other things, what you remember, 
or believe you remember'" :1. 
This study began with somewhat amorphous and 
tentative thoughts on the workings of journalistic 
authority. Suggested as a notion by which journalists 
assume the right to present authorized versions of events 
taking place in the "real" world, journalistic authority 
has been approached as a dimension implicit - if hidden -
within the practices of contemporary American journalists. 
Originally defined as "the ability of journalists to 
authorize themselves as spokespeople for the stories they 
told," journalistic authority has been given no more 
precise definition in these pages. But this study has 
shown that it is neither implicit, amorphous nor 
tentative. Journalistic authority is found first of all in 
narrative, where journalists work to uphold it in a 
variety of ways. In a systematic and strategic fashion, 
journalists construct themselves as authorities for events 
through the stories they tell about them. This includes 
both who tells such stories, how they tell them, what they 
tell and do not tell. In short, journalistic authority is 
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enacted as a narrative craft, 
narrative £orms. 
and is crafted through 
But it does not end there. Journalists' narratives 
are transported into collective memory, where they are 
used as models for understanding the authoritative role o£ 
the journalist and journalistic community in different 
ways. Capturing specific narratives within larger 
discourses that signal different boundaries o£ appropriate 
journalistic practice puts them in the position o£ 
clarifying the boundaries o£ cultural authority across 
time and space. This is what Habermas, Weber and others 
have called rhetorical legitimation, the ability of 
speakers to legitimate, or authorize, themselves through 
the stories they tell in public discourse. 
Rhetorical legitimation has been shown here to work 
in a Giddens-like fashion: Narratives beget authority, 
that beget memories, that beget more narratives, that 
beget more authority, that beget more memories. At heart 
o£ this circular process are journalists. They epitomize 
what Hayden White has long contended about the makers o£ 
historical discourse of all kinds: They produce a second-
order fiction that attends through its craft to the needs 
o£ its chroniclers -. 
While rhetorical legitimation gives journalists a way 
to determine the appropriate parameters o£ their craft, 
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this study has explored the £ull span o£ its workings 
through one critical incident, the assassination o£ John 
F. Kennedy. By examining how journalists have narratively 
reconstructed their role in covering Kennedy's 
assassination over time and space, these pages have 
considered a rainbow o£ narrative practices by which 
journalists uphold their own stature, credentials and 
positioning as authorized spokespeople £or its story. By 
turning tales o£ the assassination into stories about 
themselves in di££erent ways, journalists generate 
re£erences to their own presence in the story. Co-opting 
their narratives within larger systems o£ remembering and 
£orgetting across time and space additionally re£erences 
the same authorized presence. Positioning and 
repositioning their narratives has thus allowed 
journalists to perpetuate speci£ic versions o£ their power 
as cultural authorities. In such a £ashion - by situating, 
authenticating, accessing and perpetuating their 
assassination tales - journalists have created themselves 
as an authoritative, interpretive community. They have 
created journalistic authority. 
This does not suggest that journalistic authority 
exists in one whole form in any given narrative or memory 
system. 
starts. 
Authority exists in bits and pieces, £its and 
It is a synergistic construct in continual tension 
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with its creators, never becoming embodied by one 
practice. Like slices o£ a pie, parts o£ journalistic 
authority exist everywhere. But without the other slices, 
it exists nowhere. 
I.!:tE ARGUMENT ,J:~.E;I_:IJ;I.!i;'12. 
This study has traced the establishment and 
perpetuation o£ journalistic authority through practices 
o£ narrative adjustment that are employed by journalists. 
Journalists strategically £ashion their narratives in £our 
main ways, by situating them in viable contexts, basing 
their tellings on real-li£e acts o£ coverage, using 
technology to access them over the tales o£ other groups 
o£ speakers and perpetuating them through recognizable 
memory systems. Each stage in the process o£ establishing 
authority is connected in synergistic £ashion with the 
others. I have argued that journalistic authority is 
constructed on the basis o£ three threads: 
Journal istic authority emanates £rom S'E_'l.t_§.xt. This 
included contextual £actors both at the time o£ Kennedy's 
death and in the years that £ollowed. At the time o£ the 
assassination, context included ongoing discourses about 
the boundaries o£ cultural authority and historical 
relevance, journalistic pro£essionalism and the nascent 
medium o£ television news, and ties between journalists 
and the Kennedy administration; it also included the 
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context created by the circumstances o£ covering Kennedy's 
death itsel£. Journalists used their coverage as a 
springboard £or narrative reconstruction in ways that 
upheld their authority. In the years that £ollowed, larger 
questions about documentary process and changes in the 
£orms o£ cultural authority it generated also had an 
imprint on assassination retellings. They produced shi£ts 
in the accessibility o£ collective memory, by which 
o££icial memory was de-authorized and the lore o£ 
pro£essional memories, particularly o£ journalists, made 
relevant. In all contexts, collective assessments about 
journalism have proved crucial to the legitimation o£ 
journalists as an authorized presence in the assassination 
story over time and space. 
Journalistic authority depends on collective 
memory. Journalistic authority was shown to derive £rom 
memory systems, or shared ways o£ recollecting events 
across time and space. 
journalists a way to 
Memory 
link 
systems have given 
in with ready-made 
interpretations o£ their tales. Whether through ceiebrity, 
pro£essional lore or history, journalists have embedded 
their assassination tales within di££erent systems o£ 
recollection. This has ensured e££ective ways o£ 
remembering the details o£ those tales. Assassination 
tales not only £it the memory systems where they were 
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embedded, but they accrued di££erent parameters o£ 
cultural authority to the journalists who told them. 
Journalistic authority depends on n~~~~ve. The 
cra£t o£ narrative brought the other two threads - memory 
and context - together. Through narrative, journalists 
have linked contexts about the sixties, television, 
documentary questioning - with memory systems about 
celebrity, professional lore, history. Narrative has 
allowed journalists to connect larger discourses that were 
situated outside o£ journalism with smaller developments 
taking place inside it. More important, narrative has 
implicitly £ocused on the people who generated it, the 
journalists. 
Journalists have worked these three threads together 
to produce patterns o£ what I call journalistic authority. 
Throughout the process they have embedded notions o£ 
technology and pro£essionalism that in£lect not only the 
contexts and memories associated with journalistic 
authority but the narratives - in £orm and content - too. 
In particular, invoking di££erent con£igurations o£ space 
and time has helped journalists determine the appropriate 
boundaries o£ their cultural authority. 
These pages have told the tale o£ how American 
journalists have established themselves as authorized 
spokespeople o£ the assassination story. They have shown 
;Ii~ . 
..• 
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how journalists have turned their retellings of the 
assassination tale into stories about themselves, making 
the narrative as much a story about American journalism as 
about America's 34th President. The workings of 
journalists" rhetorical legitimation, and their ability to 
promote themselves as an independent, interpretive 
community, is shown to have been forwarded by their 
narratives and their systematized ways of remembering 
them. Journalists have used a complex and intricate set of 
practices of narrative adjustment to turn the 
assassination story on angles crucial to their own self-
legitimation. 
This is not to suggest that all events covered by 
journalists are central to their establishment as cultural 
authorities. Rather, certain events function like critical 
incidents, which journalists use to display and negotiate 
the appropriate boundaries of their profession. Narratives 
about such events thereby embody ongoing concerns about 
journalists as a professional and authoritative 
interpretive community. For instance, many critical events 
took place during the sixties and embodied distinctive 
"sixties" perceptions·· about everyday life - its fusion 
with history and historical relevance, shifting boundaries 
of cultural authority, growing demands on professionalism, 
a spirit of reflexivity. Ongoing definitional activity 
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about the appropriate boundaries of ones professionalism 
was thus resolved in part by invoking such issues, in that 
journalists used their narratives about many events - the 
assassination, space exploration, Watergate or Vietnam-
to air their concerns about history, cultural authority, 
professionalism or reflexivity. Through narrative, they 
have upheld and maintained their authoritative presence 
within those parameters in many tales of the time. 
Nor does it suggest that the Kennedy assassination 
played a larger part in generating journalistic authority 
than did other contemporaneous events of similar stature. 
Watergate - the scandal which journalists uncovered 
displayed the appropriate boundaries of investigative 
journalism. Vietnam - the war which television brought 
into the American home - generated questions about the 
responsibilities and roles of journalists in conducting 
wartime coverage. Space exploration the voyage of 
discovery on which television brought American along 
highlighted the boundaries of tele-visually connecting 
American audiences with unknown frontiers. News-events 
have given journalists different opportunities to claim 
special roles through the stories they tell about them. 
From alternate time periods have emerged different 
critical incidents, such as the Teapot Dome Scandal or 
coverage of the Falklands War. At each point in time and 
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space, alternate critical incidents have highlighted 
different issues that are central to journalism at the 
time of the event's un£olding, issues that become 
refracted as the event is retold. Critical incidents of 
different kinds illuminate certain rules and conventions 
about journalistic practice and authority over others. 
They thus give journalists alternative ways in which to 
discuss, challenge and negotiate boundaries of appropriate 
journalistic practice. Their discussion through narrative 
has allowed journalists to set up collective notions about 
journalistic practice, and thereby uphold themselves as an 
interpretive community. 
In such a light, narratives about the Kennedy 
assassination constitute one stage among many on which 
journalists evaluate, challenge and renegotiate consensual 
notions about what it means to be a reporter. This study 
has thereby told a story of journalistic authority as it 
was crafted around one event. Journalists have used it as 
a way to address changing parameters of their own 
professionalism, their approaches to new technologies of 
newsgathering, their role in determining historical 
record, and, finally, the importance of their own memories 
in establishing and perpetuating their role as cultural 
authorities. In highlighting assassination tales over time 
and space, they have thus attended to a number of agendas, 
i 
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many o£ which have little to do with the events o£ 
Kennedy's death. 
Implicit in the cra£t o£ journalistic authority were 
thus distinct di££erent notions about the appropriate 
shape o£ journalistic community, suggesting the degree to 
which journalistic authority, as a dimension o£ mediated 
discourse in everyday li£e, was relatively 
unproblematized. Journalists' stories ensured entry to 
certain types o£ journalists at the same time as it barred 
admittance to others. The speci£ic shape o£ community 
implied by their stories raises questions about the ef£ect 
of authority not on audiences but one members of the 
journalistic community, and the way that jockeying £or 
power among themselves has engendered certain pre£erred 
versions o£ real-li£e events. In retelling the 
assassination, the establishment o£ authority casts doubt 
on the valid canonization o£ a central moment in American 
history, largely at the behest o£ the organs o£ national 
broadcast journalism. 
The process o£ adjusting the £it (between what 
actually happened and received narratives about 
the past) is an ongoing one, subject to 
continual debate and exchanges in which memory 
and history may play shifting, alternately more 
or less contentious roles in setting the record 
straight" '" 
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The establishment and perpetuation of journalists as 
authorized spokespeople for the story of John F. Kennedy's 
assassination was no small feat. The original laundering 
of the assassination tale - by which it was recast as a 
story of professional triumph rather than mishap was 
only the first order of reconstructive work that 
journalists employed in relaying their story. Journalists' 
reliance on reconstructions of their presence, 
participation and memories as part of the preferred mode 
of retelling was a task that required careful attention 
over the 27 years since Kennedy died. The transformations 
by which journalists' narratives and memories were 
adjusted 
cultural 
in accordance 
authority were 
with larger discourses about 
systematic, constant and 
inventive. Problematic dimensions of original coverage of 
Kennedy's death were erased as larger collective questions 
about professionalism, technology, memory and authority 
came into play. Narrative retellings of the assassination 
thus took place in face of other developments that 
assisted journalists in their establishment as cultural 
authorities. 
Realizing the craft of journalistic authority 
depended first on the reasoned and simultaneous workings 
of narrative in a number of different domains. In 
retellings, the narrative craft of establishing and 
, 
I 
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perpetuating authority was accomplished both through the 
form and content o£ journalists' narratives. Form 
referenced the storytelling practices that journalists 
use, content the types of stories those practices embody. 
Form and content in turn displayed features that were 
internal - within the narrative itself - and features that 
were external - existing beyond the narrative. Portrayed 
graphically, the craft of journalistic authority might 
look as follows: 
INTERNAL 
TO EACH 
NARRATIVE 
EXTERNAL 
TO EACH 
NARRATIVE 
THE CRAFT OF JOURNALISTIC AUTHORITY 
FORM 
(PRACTICES OF) 
synecdoche 
rearrangement 
personalization 
commemoration 
recycling 
reprinting 
re-using 
retrospectives 
CONTENT 
(STORIES ABOUT) 
being the first 
being the best 
being the only 
journalistic 
professionalism 
TV technology 
documentary failure 
pro£essional memory 
Journalists systematically and strategically incorporated 
references to their authoritative presence within their 
tales across all domains. Narrative strategies of 
synecdoche, personalization and rearrangement helped them 
adjust the internal workings of their tales in ways that 
efficiently referenced their presence within them. 
l 
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Strategies o£ recycling, re-using, commemoration~ 
reprinting and retrospectives cued journalists and news 
organizations into the most e££ective ways o£ gaining 
mileage £or their tales beyond the tale's internal rhythm. 
Similarly, internal issues o£ content guided journalists 
in developing stories about being the £irst, best and 
only, at the same time as external discourses keyed them 
into issues about journalistic pro£essionalism as a mode 
o£ cultural authority, the impact o£ television 
technology, documentary £ailure or the importance o£ 
memory. In other words, journalists were able to uphold 
their authoritative presence within their tales on each 
dimension o£ narrative they employed, leaving little doubt 
about their positioning as authoritative spokespeople. 
At the same time, journalists needed to uphold their 
authoritative presence as their tales were disseminated 
across time and space. They did so by credentialling 
themselves across varying time and space con£igurations. 
These roles - o£ eyewitness, representative, investigator 
and interpreter - ensured that regardless o£ their own 
positioning vis a vis the assassination tale, journalists 
were able to speak authoritatively about it. Fastening 
journalists in authoritative roles across time and space 
was £urther upheld by repairing to memory systems. Indeed, 
the appeal to memory systems within retellings o£ the 
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assassination tale signalled journalists' awareness o£ the 
importance o£ perpetuating themselves across time and 
space. Memory systems o££ered journalists alternate ways 
o£ perpetuating their tales within meaning£ul systems o£ 
recollection. T.he £act that di££erent memory systems have 
allowed journalists to perpetuate di££erent dimensions o£ 
their retellings in itsel£ displays the di££erent 
dimensions o£ journalistic community: Celebrity tales have 
upheld the stature o£ individual journalists, pro£essional 
tales the stature o£ news organizations and institutions, 
historical tales the structure o£ the pro£ession and the 
role o£ journalism and journalistic record in chronicling 
the nation's impulses. Each has bred its own practices £or 
upholding certain codes o£ knowledge over others, yet each 
dimension has emerged as important £or establishing 
journalists as an interporetive community. This displays 
the circular workings o£ journalistic authority: Memory is 
codi£ied, zed back to its codi£iers, who codi£y it yet 
again. Journalists have thereby perpetuated a tightly-knit 
cycle o£ sel£-legitimation through narrative, suggesting 
the central role o£ discourse in determining the 
boundaries o£ community. 
These pages have suggested that the e££ective 
circulation o£ discourse about the Kennedy assassination 
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depended on refracting the event through lenses of 
journalistic professionalism and technology. Boundaries of 
journalistic practice were considered within larger 
concerns about amateurism, professionalism and technology. 
The role of technology, in particular, offered journalists 
alternate ways of repairing to professionalism, by helping 
them to classify activities realized by loosely-defined 
improvisory standards as professional, at the same time as 
it gave reporters a way to establish custodianship over 
memories .. Mastering the technology became almost as 
important as mastering the coverage, linking cultural 
authority with successful technological mastery. 
This in part reflected a reordering of the functions 
through which journalists have admitted the importance of 
technology. Technology allowed journalists to perpetuate 
old, or familiar, journalistic practices in their usage of 
old media. It also allowed them to use old practices on 
new media, and to develop new practices ~~. In other words, 
the introduction of new technoiogies allowed them to 
experiment with new modes of social and professional 
interchange when using new media as well as old. 
In retelling the assassination, technologies were 
referenced for their function of transmission, such as 
conveying in£ormation; documentation, as in providing new 
means for testing evidence; and storage, as in holding 
, -~ 
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onto assassination tales so that they could eventually be 
retold. In order to establish their own mastery over the 
tales they told, journalists often reordered these 
technological functions, enmeshing them with each other. 
For ex:ample~ journalists upheld their mastery over 
technology by highlighting their creative usage of it, as 
in Walter Cronkite's usage of new technology for re-
testing evidence on Nov~. This prevented assassination 
tales from falling within the domain of tales about "great 
machines" that were faceless and unmanned. Jburnalists 
turned tales of unpeopled technologies into stories about 
how they strategically used technology to accomplish 
professional and social aims in new and improvisory ways 
The fact that journalists worked the story of the 
ascent of television to their favor was testament to their 
persistent efforts to remain active players within the 
assassination tale. 
This point has been adopted in the retellings of 
other events too, such as the Challenger incident, where 
journalists reordered television~s functions of 
documentation, storage and transmission via its recording 
of events. Similarly, journalistic retellings of Vietnam 
have consistently focused on the technological 
sophistication by which journalists were able to record 
more intrusive (and potentially more damaging) dimensions 
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of the war. Journalists' tales of covering that story were 
thus determined in large part by their relationship with 
the technology of newsgathering G 
All of this suggests that tales of technological 
mastery are crucial for what they continue to suggest 
about journalists: Reporters are portrayed as masters of 
presence within their tales of the "real world," willing 
and able to manipulate the technology-at-hand in the name 
of professionalism. Embedded within each story of 
technology is the tale of a journalist who makes it work, 
a point upholding technology's role in creating and 
maintaining journalists as cultural authorities. While 
certain technologies have produced more effective and 
plausible stories, and have given journalists an enhanced 
capacity for story-telling, tales of technological mastery 
by journalists subordinate the tale to the technology by 
which it is told, dislodging news from its proportional 
critical import as information of the "real world," 
Technology is also important for what it has given 
journalists over time. In retelling the assassination, 
technology has helped journalists create archives of 
memory, giving them a base and a set of indices through 
which to reference their presence within their original 
tales. This suggests that it has become necessary to 
reference the technology in order to reference the memory. 
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As Natalie Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn have suggested, 
UWhenever memory is invoked, we should be asking 
ourselves: by whom, where, in what context and about what" 
This has led to tales which document the way in which 
events are originally captured, producing not only a 
discourse about Kennedy's death but a discourse about the 
technologies which shaped its collective memories. Such a 
discourse - about the record of the record - has generated 
changes in commonplace understandings of history and 
memory. Replaying markers in collective memory about the 
assassination directly references the technologies by 
which they were recorded. Through narrative, journalists 
have defrosted the frozen moments of memory and made their 
transmission meaningful. Their strategic and creative use 
of technology has established them as active masters in 
their relationship to it, allowing them to use technology 
to create archives of memory in a way that consolidates 
them as the assassination story's authoritative 
interpreters. This pattern is also repeated in other 
events, with journalists, for example, becoming a primary 
repository of memories of the Vietnam war S. Journalists 
thereby use transmission as a way of fleshing out the 
signif'icance of storage, or memory. Technology thus 
becomes important because it successfully stores 
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in£ormation, making the memory, or storage, function of 
technology equally important to its transmission function. 
This in itself is a function of ultimate importance for 
interpretive communities, in that it has embedded direct 
re£erences to journalists within collective memory, 
upholding their stature as general archivists. 
The fact that it has become easier for subsequent 
'" retellers to reference archives than original documents 
has turned the archives of memory, as created by 
journalists and news organizations, into a mode of 
documentation preferred to original documents. lis 
Halbwachs maintained, "the reality of the past (was) no 
longer in the past" "'. Rather, it it in a present occupied 
by American journalists, most of whom are eager to tell 
their versions of the events of Kennedy's death. 
Within all of these developments, journalists emerge 
as the authorized spokespeople of the events whose stories 
they tell. Because their ultimate organization of 
narratives takes place on the archival level, making 
information about the past itself archival .0 and turning 
public memory into what Mary Douglas called "the storage 
system for the social order" :1. :I. , their placement as 
cultural authorities for a wide range of events is 
ensured. Through their discussions of critical incident, 
journalists are turned into archivists, or custodians,of 
] 
t 
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social memory. Technology has not only upheld them as 
professionals in their retellings of tales, but it has 
fostered a tightly-constructed view of their activities 
that turns away other competitive presences. In other 
words, through intricately linking pro£essionalism~ 
technology ~nd social memory, journalists have established 
themselves not only as cultural authorities for retelling 
the story of John F. Kennedy's death, but for a host of 
other public events, such as retellings of Watergate or 
Vietnam. 
THE SHAPE OF JOURNALISTIC CQMMUNITY 
The question thus remains what kind of journalistic 
community is implied by assassination retellings. It is 
firstly made evident by those segments of the community 
that have been filtered out of retellings. Gone are most 
radio journalists, who played a part in the original 
coverage of Kennedy's death. Gone too are many local 
reporters who assisted their national counterparts in 
covering the story. Gone are those less-renowned reporters 
no longer around to tell their tales. The journalists who 
remain are national reporters, with an emphasis on those 
employed by television. More important, those who remain 
are journalists who have retained their access to the 
media and who continue to possess the kind of 
organizational and institutional support necessary for 
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perpetuating their tales. ~e shape of journalistic 
community is thus to a large degree shaped by access, 
technology and medium, individual stature, and one's 
position within a news organization. Journalistic 
community accedes to the powerful and vocal members among 
its constituents, and it shapes stories which uphold such 
boundaries. The well-known nationally-employed journalist 
has been forwarded as the vanguard and prototype of the 
journalistic community, led by those employed by national 
television. 
Equally important, journalists have used alternate 
memory systems to allow for the similar shaping of 
journalistic community, generating parallel categories of 
who is "allowed" in and who is shunted aside. The fact 
that a similar sense of community is genrated across 
different memory systems - celebrity, professional lore, 
and history - attests to the centrality of the three 
levels of motivation with regard to retelling. These 
the dimensions of the individual journalist, 
organization and institution, and the structure of the 
profession - figure prominently within retellings. While 
they are not always compatible, those retellings which 
have been given the most play over time by journalists are 
constructed as upholding issues about journalistic 
community that attend to all three dimensions. For 
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example, 
personal 
tales about Dan Rather not only attend to his 
career (the level o:f the individual journalist) 
but also to his news organization (the 
organizational/institutional level) and to the legitimacy 
o:f television news in general (the level o:f the structure 
o:f the pro:fession). It is thus no surprise that they are 
found across all three memory systems. On the other hand, 
tales which only attend to the level of the individual 
exemplary journalist such as stories about the 
investigative reporting of Penn Jones may not have 
persisted because they attend to neither the dimension of 
the organization nor basic issues central to the 
profession. 
negotiation 
Each dimension is thereby configured in 
with the others. This suggests that 
journalists have used their discourse to address what they 
see as relevant to their constitution as an authoritative 
interpretive community issues ranging £rom personal 
careers, to the prestige of specific news organizations, 
to the structure of the profession as a whole. 
For journalists invested in such an aim, levels of 
the individual, organization/institution, and pro£ession 
have proven a more fruitful way of retelling than stories 
which emphasize the differences between press and 
televi~ion reporters, or between different reportorial 
roles. This is because in their stories, journalists have 
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stressed how they have regularly and consistently crossed 
lines across media, news organization and journalistic 
£unction. Journalists have not only assumed roles across 
media - writing books and appearing on talk shows - but 
they have £unctioned as anchorpeople instead o£ reporters, 
as columnists instead o£ on-the-spot chroniclers, taking 
on roles that have little to do with their original 
£unction in the story. They have told their tales across 
media and news organization, promoting the recirculation 
o£ narratives in media that are di££erent £rom the medium 
where they originally worked. And £inally, their own 
narratives have been £illed with re£erences to the 
accounts o£ reporters in other media and other news 
organizations. 
Thus central to all patterns o£ cross-breeding have 
been motivations o£ the individual, the 
organization/institution and the pro£ession. Their 
salience in retold tales has largely subordinated 
distinctions generally made about di££erent kinds o£ 
journalistic practice to larger issues pertaining to 
journalistic community. Distinctions between di££erent 
kinds o£ reporters such as generalists versus 
specialists, or anchorpersons versus print columnists 
have emerged as secondary to the making o£ journalists as 
an interpretive community that £avors the power£ul and 
J . I 
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vocal among them. This suggests that journalists' desire 
to be associated with the assassination story has 
generated concerns directly relevant to the making o£ 
communi t.y. In so doing, journalists have eschewed 
commonly-held boundaries about reportorial tasks, and have 
displayed their ability to involve themselves regardless 
o£ predetermined tasks, de£initional roles or 
demarcations. While this has blurred distinctions between 
di££erent kinds o£ reporters in retellings, it has 
succeeded in outlining the communal parameters o£ the 
American journalistic community. Separate motivations - o£ 
the individual, the organization/institution, and the 
pro£ession - have provided £ruit£ul illustrations o£ the 
workings o£ journalism as an authoritative interpretive 
community. This does not suggest that the columnist 
£unctions with the same authority as the anchorperson or 
beat reporter. But that distinction has emerged in 
journalists' tales as secondary to the unpacking o£ 
similarities which as a group they see themselves sharing 
with each other. 
All o£ this heralds back to the role o£ discourse in 
serving a ritual £unction £or journalists. It provides a 
locus by which journalists can come together as a 
community but in ways not necessarily heralded by 
£ormalized pro£essional codes. While not the only event to 
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do so, the assassination tale has given journalists 
reason, cause and means through which to realize and 
articulate the shi£ting boundaries o£ their community. 
Discourse serves as an antidote to problems and issues o£ 
concern to members o£ the pro£ession. 
There is reason to assume that a similar pattern 
exists with other groups o£ speakers involved in public 
discourse. The shape o£ journalistic community was shown 
here to have emerged through discourse that extended 
beyond the journalistic community, displaying its 
similarities to other groups that validate themselves 
through their rhetoric. This suggests that the shape o£ 
journalistic community is in part determined through its 
resemblances to other groups o£ public speakers, many o£ 
them non-pro£essional. For larger questions o£ cultural 
authority, it is thus in the inter£aces across social and 
cultural groups that the signi£icance o£ authority 
ultimately rests. 
Such a point bring this discussion back to the 
£unction o£ narrative. These pages have £orwarded the view 
that journalists use narrative to uphold their position 
and stature as an authoritative, interpretive community. 
Two alternate points comprise this notion: One is that 
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journalists £unction as an interpretive community, 
The second authenticating itsel£ through its narratives. 
is that authority has ritual dimensions, designed to 
consolidate journalists into a cohesive group. Both points 
hint at how public speakers might use narrative to 
establish collective understandings o£ themselves as 
cultural authorities. Authority not only helps speakers 
consolidate themselves into an independent interpretive 
community, but it helps them remember events in a way that 
enhances their collective dignity as pro£essionals 
Was the tale o£ covering the body o£ John F. Kennedy 
a unique event £or American journalists? On one level, it 
appears to have been both extreme and unpredictable: Its 
circumstances o£ coverage 
unpredictability, novelty 
were 
and 
characterized 
unexpectedness. 
by 
It 
constituted an archetypal example o£ what Tuchman called 
""what a story."' Journalists were £orced to employ 
practices!' such as improvisation or relying on instinct, 
in ways which allowed them to re-assert their control over 
the event's unpredictability. 
Yet beyond actual coverage, the patterns o£ retelling 
the event over time and space suggest that the 
assassination tale was not as unique an event as 
journalists have ascribed it to be. Through narrative, 
"covering the body" o£ John F. Kennedy has been turned 
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into a manageable occurrence. While the mere presence or 
patterns or narrative retelling and memory suggest that 
journalists were not strangers to events or its type, 
journalists~ narratives have in errect reinstated their 
control over the assassination story. This suggests that 
even ir journalists were ·set back by 
circumstances of the assassination coverage, 
the unique 
they used 
ramiliar and agreed-upon practices to construct the story 
as a routine news tale. Such a construction was necessary 
ror them to establish their own presence as cultural 
authorities in its retelling. More important, narratives 
about the assassination have helped journalists make sense 
or themselves as a proressional interpretive community. 
This suggestion that journalistic authority is 
maintained by instating control through narrative that 
journalists lose through coverage - is disturbing, largely 
because journalists' narrative strategies have been 
studiously avoided in models or journalistic proressional 
practice. The ract that journalists use narrative to make 
sense or the one type or incident least explained by media 
researchers 
suggests 
rolkloric 
- the event Tuchman called "what a story" -
that journalists have generated their own 
ways or interpreting their boundaries as 
proressionals. They have chosen to make sense or 
insurriciently-addressed codes or practice, knowledge and 
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memory through discourse. This suggests the existence of a 
viable community involved in constant interpretive 
activity about its own boundaries of action. It also 
underscores the failure of formalized standards of 
professional practice to sufficiently address all kinds of 
journalistic practice, a failure which has generated 
certain events as critical incidents for journalism 
professionals. 
This highlights the communal, collective dimensions 
of journalistic retellings. Journalists use their 
narratives to address dimensions of performance that have 
been overlooked by more formal socializing agents, 
underscoring their need to address such issues through 
discourse. In so doing, they function as interpretive 
communities, relying as much on their tales for group 
authentication as on the more formal features that define 
boundaries of appropriate practice. Discourse about 
critical incidents thus address a lack in the formal 
conventions by which journalists are coached into the 
pro£ession, allowing them to air professional concerns by 
strategically revitalizing certain events through tailored 
stories. The formal features of their constitution as an 
interpretive group is thereby bolstered through informal 
discursive practice. Narratives give journalists stages 
where they can rethink the hows and whys of the profession 
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at a number o£ points in time and space, according to 
their own agendas about what is important. 
Thus in answer to the original question that 
motivated this study what makes journalists better 
equipped than others to o:f:fer a "pre:ferred" version o:f 
events? the response rests within journalists' own 
activit.ies. Journalists themselves perpetuate the sense 
that their version o:f reality is a pre:ferred one. By 
codi:fying their versions o:f li:fe in repetitive and 
systematized mediated narratives, they place themselves 
ahead o:f other potential retellers. They turn contests :for 
the construction o:f reality into a one-horse race, by 
narratively attending to critical events that uphold their 
authority. This retains journalists as ultimate masters o:f 
their destiny as pro:fessionals and public speakers, 
allowing them to attend through narrative to those 
incidents which they :feel mast e:f:fectively reveal the 
parameters o:f appropriate practice. 
This does not suggest that transmission is irrelevant 
to the larger picture o:f establishing cultural authority. 
Authority, ultimately, is realized through transmission. 
But :for speakers seeking to establish themselves as the 
authoritative spokespeople o:f the events they report, the 
implication o:f transmitting in:formation o:ften becomes 
secondary to the way that in:formation is turned back on 
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the group which generates it. In retelling the 
assassination, journalists have used transmission of the 
assassination story as much for what it means to audiences 
as for how it has been shared by journalists. This 
suggests the extent to which the function of community is 
critically embedded within the routinized relay of news 
<l 
narrative. It also highlights how individuals and groups 
can master and manipulate the technology they use when 
communicating, to address aims that bear little relevance 
to the efficacy of their transmissions. 
The embedding of "narrati ves of ritual"' wi thin "acts 
of transmission" thereby highlights the real workings of 
cultural authority in discourse. Through narrative, 
speakers set up an extensive self-referential discourse 
through which they address, air, challenge, negotiate and 
alter the parameters of their practice as speakers. 
Authority is used as a marker of collective practice, 
delineating for other members of the group the parameters 
of what is appropriate and preferred. Within such 
boundaries, speakers find their place for retelling a 
variety of events. 
This suggests a view of authority as a construct 
anchored within community, generating "a self portrait 
that unfolds through time ... and allows the group to 
recognize itself through the total succession of images" 
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which it generates Authority thus not only plays a 
central part in authorizing acts o£ transmission but in 
legitimating narratives o£ ritual. It constitutes a tool 
by which collectives o£ speakers uphold themselves as 
viable and authoritative interpretive groups. 
FH~LQRICAL LEGITIMATION_~~D CU~TURAL AUTHORITY 
The establishment and perpetuation o£ authority 
through narrative as an implicit dimension o£ maintaining 
community recalls the theoretical importance attributed to 
rhetorical legitimation earlier in this study. The 
reconstructive work by which speakers shape their 
retellings o£ the events o£ the "real world" in certain 
ways and not others constitutes an important dimension o£ 
how it works. The ability to shape collective visions o£ 
onesel£ as an independent interpretive community through 
narrative recalls claims by Habermas, Weber and others, 
that underscore the legitimating £unction with which 
speakers embellish their communicative messages. In this 
study, journalists have been shown to emerge as one group 
among many, which use narrative as an act o£ rhetorical 
legitimation. 
But legitimation is not a one-an-one exercise between 
a speaker, and his or her tale. Rather, it involves the 
invocation o£ an intricate network o£ patterns o£ 
collective memory. Narratives about one incident rein£orce 
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each other; narratives about different incidents uphold 
narratives about other incidents, with speakers applying 
the authority accrued from retelling one event to stories 
of another. This application of Giddens' notion of 
structuration, and the circular recycling of information 
it implies, suggests that the creation of a collective 
lore through codified knowledge depends on the positioning 
of agreed-upon discursive stages through which to air 
concerns about practice. Rhetorical legitimation, as a 
strategy, is thus shown to be circular in nature, leaning 
back on the community which originally sets it in motion. 
Rhetorical legitimation is used by speakers to make larger 
questions about authority in discourse explicit, clear-cut 
and manageable. This is made possible not only by the 
internal adjustments within each and every tale of 
critical incidents, but by the positing of adjustment as a 
legitimate mode of constructing reality. In other words, 
rhetorical legitimation underscores basic assumptions 
about the latitude allowed speakers in all kinds of public 
discourse. 
ON CULTURAL A~THORITY~ __ MEMORY ANP COMMVNITY 
This study has suggested that cultural authority 
emerges through a circular system of practices which 
codify knowledge across time and space. Such a 
perspective, welding the perspectives of Durkheim, Giddens 
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and Halbwachs, has been examined through one practice-
that of narrative. While "the function of narrativity in 
the production of the historical text" '.',. bears its own 
impulses,. this analysis suggests that it constitutes a 
viable and effective way for speakers to position and 
uphold themselves as authorities in culture. 
The workings of authority in discourse across time 
and space results from an unequal concentration of power 
in the hands of those with routinized media access. This 
study has shown that particularly in the workings of 
public discourse, authority is tied in with media 
practices. Both the establishment of individuals and 
groups as authorities and the perpetuation of that status 
are directly dependent on media access, particularly as it 
plays across time and space. Media provide speakers with 
effective mechanisms on which to display their authority -
both to themselves and others. This has most directly 
benefitted journalists, by helping them recycle among 
themselves collective codes of knowledge about what makes 
them an authoritative interpretive community. 
Clifford Geertz long ago forwarded a notion of 
knowledge that held it to be firmly situated within 
practice. He said,. "If you want to understand what a 
science is, you should look at what the practitioners of 
it do" "~. Geertz's comments are enlightening here because 
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they underscore the importance o£ practice in determining 
the boundaries o£ cultural authority. This study's 
emphasis on the real £lesh-and-blood people behind what 
Christopher Lasch has termed the "assassination mythology" 
;L(.':;' suggests that an extensive network o£ strategic 
practices has put the mythology into place. Yet in so 
doing;> those £lesh-and-blood people have not only given 
li£e to the assassination tale. They have given li£e to 
their own authority to act as spokespeople £01' Kennedy's 
death. More important, they have given li£e to their 
authority £or new generations o£ onlookers, who will adopt 
their versions o£ both the tales they tell and the 
appropriate parameters o£ journalistic practice and 
authority which such tales embody. 
The implications o£ this analysis - o£ culture and 
cultural authority as an "acted document" :1.7 raise 
questions about the legitimate workings o£ cultural 
authority in all kinds o£ public mediated discourse. They 
generate questions about the mechanisms by which other 
public speakers legitimate themselves through their 
stories. Why certain individuals and groups are 
legitimated as spokespeople £01' events over others depends 
on an intricate network o£ strategic practices by which 
they codi£y knowledge and use it to realize collective 
gains. This suggests that speakers o£ all sorts 
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systematically and routinely borrow from the codes of 
other groups in legitimating themselves. In a sense, then, 
authority is realized by mechanisms for recycling 
knowledge not only across members of a group but across 
members of many groups. 
This does not suggest an elimination of the construct 
of professionalism for examing the American journalistic 
community. But it does underscore a number of similarities 
shared by journalists and other communities of public 
speakers, not necessarily professional ones. It also 
emphasizes yet an additional force among speakers who 
legitimate themselves through their rhetoric - community. 
Speakers consolidate themselves as independent 
authoritative communities because their discourse keeps 
them together. Acting as an interpretive community, 
speakers authenticate themselves through the interplay of 
narrative, memory and authority which make their stories 
credible, repeatable and memorable. A drive to keep their 
community intact motivates them to look within themselves 
for the legitimacy by which they can authenticate their 
actions, practices and values. 
This study has thereby shown that the rhetorical 
legitimation of journalists has generated its own origin 
narratives about American journalism. Retelling the 
incidents that are critical to the American journalistic 
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community constitutes an exemplary case of the circular 
codi£ication o£ knowledge, by which speakers have 
strategically authenticated themselves as cultural 
authoritities. This suggests that group consolidation 
through discourse does not only £unction as a ritual o£ 
community and commonality. Rather, discourse also 
£unctions as a ritual o£ continuity, guiding and directing 
speakers into their own £uture as members o£ groups 
constantly engaged in authoritative interpretation o£ 
events o£ the "real world." 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
This study has posited journalistic authority as an 
"ideal-type", a perspective common to certain kinds of 
sociological studies". By examining different stages or 
arenas which together give a fuller sense of the patterns 
through which notions of journalistic authority were 
expected to emerge, it suggested a theoretically unified 
perspective that was empirically eclectic. Other work has 
been done in a similar fashion: Eviatar Zerubavel's work 
on time adopted a similar approach, as did Erving 
Goffman's on forms of talk ~ Both have utilized what 
Glaser and Strauss call "strategically-chosen examples" to 
illuminate theoretical concepts Although this 
methodology does not aim to provide an all-inclusive or 
conclusive picture of the theoretical construct being 
examined, it has provided a clearer picture of the major 
patterns by which it can be expected to emerge. Therefore, 
by examining the establishment of journalistic authority 
via different kinds of public published discourse - both 
professional and mediated across time, the study 
provides a clearer picture of some of the central patterns 
by which journalistic authority emerges and is 
perpetuated. 
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This study has employed diachronic textual analysis 
in order to elicit both tacit and explicit notions o£ 
journalistic authority. Narratives were examined in two 
main arenas: 
1) Mediated discourse about journalism (or, how 
journalists talk with the general public about their 
coverage o£ the assassination). This includes mass 
mediated accounts through which both the original coverage 
o£ the assassination as well as discussions about the role 
o£ journalists in covering it were £ound. It also includes 
accounts o£ the assassination and media criticism o£ how 
those accounts were handled. This discourse was £ound in 
press and television accounts, sequel led memoirs in 
magazines, and biographies. The analytical £ocus rests 
with how journalists discussed their own role o£ media 
coverage. 
2) Pro£essional discourse about journalism (or, how 
journalists talk to other journalists about journalistic 
coverage o£ the Kennedy assassination). This discourse, in 
which journalists talk to themselves about themselves, was 
£ound in the trade press, published speeches, pro£essional 
journalism reviews and the proceedings o£ various 
pro£essional meetings or conventions in which the Kennedy 
assassination was discussed. The concern here was with the 
ways in which journalists talked to their peers about 
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their role or the role of others in covering the 
assassination story. 
Yet a third area which comprises a less central focus 
than originally intended is instructional discourse. This 
area whose discourse is found in textbooks, how-to 
manuals and other published guidelines for new journalists 
was generally discarded from the study due to the 
voluminous quantity of material in the other two areas. 
However it was used when references to the assassination 
story were particularly salient. 
These arenas o£ discourse were spanned over a period 
of 27 years, from 1963 to 1990. Such a time-span extended 
from the Kennedy assassination itself (November 22, 1963) 
to two years after the 25th anniversary of Kennedy's 
death. Public discourse about the role of journalists in 
covering the assassination story was explored via 
contemporaneous citations about journalistic practice and 
ethics, which were found in a number of public affairs 
indices. 
The public affairs indices and which were scanned 
between 1963 and 1990 for this study included: 
- New York Times Index 
- Washington Post Index 
- Current Guide to Periodical Literature 
- Vanderbilt Archives 
- CBS Archives 
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- NBC Archives 
The trade press was scanned through the following 
periodicals: 
- Columbia Journalism Review 
- Washington Journalism Review 
- Editor and Publisher 
- Broadcasting 
- The Quill 
The proceedings of various professional associations were 
also surveyed, including: 
- Sigma Delta Chi 
- NANE (National Association of Newspaper Editors) 
- NAB (National Association of Broadcasters) 
Other institutions which lent support in the collecting of 
documentary materials included: 
- John F. Kennedy Memorial Library 
- Sherman Grinburg Library 
- Journal Graphics, Inc. 
- ABC News Transcripts 
- Investigative News Group 
• See Max Weber, ~~~.~; Select!2n§ in~~~~~~ti£n 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) or George 
Simmel, I.!:l_'i!L SocioJd';>.9Y-2.f. . ...§eorge J2.immel (New York: The Free 
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